Having it both ways: hybrid theories and modern metaethics
"The two main competing traditions in mainstream metaethics are cognitivism and non-cognitivism. The traditional view of this divide is that the cognitivist understands moral (and other normative) judgments as representational states (e.g. beliefs) whereas the non-cognitivist understands them i...
Gespeichert in:
| Weitere Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Oxford Univ. Press
2014
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Oxford moral theory
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The two main competing traditions in mainstream metaethics are cognitivism and non-cognitivism. The traditional view of this divide is that the cognitivist understands moral (and other normative) judgments as representational states (e.g. beliefs) whereas the non-cognitivist understands them instead as non-representational states - typically as desire-like states of some kind (e.g. emotions, plans, preferences). Because moral and other normative judgments genuinely do seem to have both belief-like and desire-like elements, this debate has seen each side going through seemingly endless epicycles to either accommodate or debunk what the other side explains easily. Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in theories which transcend these categories by holding that moral and other normative judgments are themselves constituted by both belief-like and desire-like elements and/or that moral and other normative judgments 'express' both belief-like and desire-like states. These are called hybrid theories. The papers in this volume, all new, both provide a guide to the state of the art in this debate and push it forward along numerous fronts".. |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Beschreibung: | XVI, 302 S. |
| ISBN: | 9780199347582 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text |
HAVING IT BOTH WAYS
/
: 2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS / INHALTSVERZEICHNIS
CONTRIBUTORS
INTRODUCTION
PART I
1. HOW TO INSULT A PHILOSOPHER
MICHAEL RIDGE
2. EXPRESSIVISM, NON-DECLARATIVES, AND SUCCESS-CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS
DANIEL BOISVERT
3. CAN A HYBRID THEORY HAVE IT BOTH WAYS? MORAL THOUGHT, OPEN QUESTIONS
AND MORAL MOTIVATION
DAVID COPP
4. ATTITUDINAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MORAL THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE: NONCOGNITIVE
TYPE-GENERALITY
RYAN HAY
5. DIACHRONIC HYBRID MORAL REALISM
JON TRESAN
6. THE PRAGMATICS OF NORMATIVE DISAGREEMENT
STEPHEN FINLAY
7. HYBRID EXPRESSIVISM: HOW TO THINK ABOUT MEANING
.JOHN ERIKSSON
PART II
8. MORAL UTTERANCES, ATTITUDE EXPRESSION AND IMPLICATURE
GUY FLETCHER
9. PURE VERSUS HYBRID EXPRESSIVISM AND THE ENIGMA OF CONVENTIONAL
IMPLICATURE
STEPHEN BARKER
10. (HOW) IS ETHICAL NEO- EXPRESSIVISM A HYBRID VIEW?
DORIT BAR-ON, MATTHEW CHRISMAN AND JIM SIAS
11. WHY GO HYBRID? A COGNITIVIST ALTERNATIVE TO HYBRID THEORIES OF
NORMATIVE JUDGMENT
LAURA SCHROETER AND FRANCOIS SCHROETER
12. TRUTH IN HYBRID SEMANTICS
MARK SCHROEDER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
DIESES SCHRIFTSTUECK WURDE MASCHINELL ERZEUGT. |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
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| dewey-full | 170/.42 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 170 - Ethics (Moral philosophy) |
| dewey-raw | 170/.42 |
| dewey-search | 170/.42 |
| dewey-sort | 3170 242 |
| dewey-tens | 170 - Ethics (Moral philosophy) |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| format | Book |
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| indexdate | 2024-09-23T16:14:30Z |
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| isbn | 9780199347582 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 014004731 |
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| spelling | Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics ed. by Guy Fletcher ... Oxford [u.a.] Oxford Univ. Press 2014 XVI, 302 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Oxford moral theory Includes bibliographical references and index "The two main competing traditions in mainstream metaethics are cognitivism and non-cognitivism. The traditional view of this divide is that the cognitivist understands moral (and other normative) judgments as representational states (e.g. beliefs) whereas the non-cognitivist understands them instead as non-representational states - typically as desire-like states of some kind (e.g. emotions, plans, preferences). Because moral and other normative judgments genuinely do seem to have both belief-like and desire-like elements, this debate has seen each side going through seemingly endless epicycles to either accommodate or debunk what the other side explains easily. Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in theories which transcend these categories by holding that moral and other normative judgments are themselves constituted by both belief-like and desire-like elements and/or that moral and other normative judgments 'express' both belief-like and desire-like states. These are called hybrid theories. The papers in this volume, all new, both provide a guide to the state of the art in this debate and push it forward along numerous fronts".. PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy bisacsh Metaethics PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy Normativismus (DE-588)4268278-2 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd rswk-swf Metaethik (DE-588)4169556-2 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s Normativismus (DE-588)4268278-2 s Metaethik (DE-588)4169556-2 s DE-604 Fletcher, Guy 1983- (DE-588)1065851251 edt LoC Fremddatenuebernahme application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027697026&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy bisacsh Metaethics PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy Normativismus (DE-588)4268278-2 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd Metaethik (DE-588)4169556-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4268278-2 (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4031630-0 (DE-588)4169556-2 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
| title | Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics |
| title_auth | Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics |
| title_exact_search | Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics |
| title_full | Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics ed. by Guy Fletcher ... |
| title_fullStr | Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics ed. by Guy Fletcher ... |
| title_full_unstemmed | Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics ed. by Guy Fletcher ... |
| title_short | Having it both ways |
| title_sort | having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics |
| title_sub | hybrid theories and modern metaethics |
| topic | PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy bisacsh Metaethics PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy Normativismus (DE-588)4268278-2 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd Metaethik (DE-588)4169556-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy Metaethics Normativismus Erkenntnistheorie Kognition Metaethik Aufsatzsammlung |
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