The myth of the intuitive: experimental philosophy and philosophical method
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Ma. [u.a.]
MIT Press
2015
|
| Schriftenreihe: | A Bradford book
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | In The Myth of the Intuitive, Max Deutsch defends the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental philosophy ( xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition -- in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people's intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. Deutsch argues forcefully that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of "metaphilosophical folklore," and he supports his argument with close examinations of results from xphi and of a number of influential arguments in analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but, Deutsch writes, philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. Deutsch discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier's refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke's Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the "Multiple Concepts" and "Expertise" replies, to be severely lacking. |
| Beschreibung: | XX, 194 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0262028956 9780262028950 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV042200663 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20150901 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 141120s2015 d||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 0262028956 |c Hardcover |9 0-262-02895-6 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780262028950 |c Hardcover |9 978-0-262-02895-0 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)911957445 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV042200663 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-19 |a DE-11 |a DE-20 |a DE-12 |a DE-355 |a DE-634 | ||
| 084 | |a CC 5100 |0 (DE-625)17635: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Deutsch, Max |d 1971- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1073184722 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The myth of the intuitive |b experimental philosophy and philosophical method |c Max Deutsch |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Ma. [u.a.] |b MIT Press |c 2015 | |
| 300 | |a XX, 194 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a A Bradford book | |
| 500 | |a In The Myth of the Intuitive, Max Deutsch defends the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental philosophy ( xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition -- in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people's intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. Deutsch argues forcefully that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of "metaphilosophical folklore," and he supports his argument with close examinations of results from xphi and of a number of influential arguments in analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but, Deutsch writes, philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. Deutsch discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier's refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke's Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the "Multiple Concepts" and "Expertise" replies, to be severely lacking. | ||
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Experimentalphilosophie |0 (DE-588)4719507-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Intuition |0 (DE-588)4027532-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Erkenntnis |0 (DE-588)4015286-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Analytische Philosophie |0 (DE-588)4001869-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Intuition |0 (DE-588)4027532-2 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Erkenntnis |0 (DE-588)4015286-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Analytische Philosophie |0 (DE-588)4001869-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Experimentalphilosophie |0 (DE-588)4719507-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027639552&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027639552 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804152717471383552 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction ix
1 Varieties of Xphi, Pragmatic Distortion, and the No-Theory Theory
of Intuitions 7
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Positive versus Negative Xphi: Some Sample Studies 2
1.3 The Negative Xphi Critique 1 7
1.4 Pragmatic Distortion 21
1.5 The No-Theory Theory of Intuitions 24
2 Intuitions and Counterexamples 33
2.1 Introduction 33
2.2 The State/Content Ambiguity of Intuition 35
2.3 Two Case Studies: Gettier and Kripke 39
2.4 More General Methodological Misrepresentations 52
2.5 Evidence for the Evidence 55
3 The Relocation Problem and Williamson on Judgment
Skepticism 59
3.1 Introduction 59
3.2 The Relocation Problem and a Sketch of a Solution 61
3.3 Williamson on Judgment Skepticism 63
4 The Evidence for the Evidence; Arguing for Gettier judgments 73
4.1 introduction 73
4.2 Arguing for Intuitions 74
4.3 Arguing for Gettier Judgments 78
4.4 Inventing Thought Experiments and the Order of Explanation
Objection 95
vi Table of Contents
5 More Evidence for the Evidence and the Relocation Problem
Redux 101
5.1 Introduction 101
5.2 More Evidence for the Evidence 103
5.3 The Relocation Problem Redux 122
6 Other Replies to Xphi: The Expertise and Multiple Concepts
Replies 129
6.1 Introduction 129
6.2 The Expertise Reply 1 34
6.3 The Multiple Concepts Reply 145
6.4 The Right Reply 153
Conclusion: Armchairs versus Lab Coats? 157
Notes 163
References 183
Index 189
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Deutsch, Max 1971- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1073184722 |
| author_facet | Deutsch, Max 1971- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Deutsch, Max 1971- |
| author_variant | m d md |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV042200663 |
| classification_rvk | CC 5100 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)911957445 (DE-599)BVBBV042200663 |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03373nam a2200421 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV042200663</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20150901 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">141120s2015 d||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0262028956</subfield><subfield code="c">Hardcover</subfield><subfield code="9">0-262-02895-6</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780262028950</subfield><subfield code="c">Hardcover</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-262-02895-0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)911957445</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV042200663</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-11</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-634</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CC 5100</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)17635:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Deutsch, Max</subfield><subfield code="d">1971-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1073184722</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The myth of the intuitive</subfield><subfield code="b">experimental philosophy and philosophical method</subfield><subfield code="c">Max Deutsch</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Ma. [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="b">MIT Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XX, 194 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">A Bradford book</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In The Myth of the Intuitive, Max Deutsch defends the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental philosophy ( xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition -- in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people's intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. Deutsch argues forcefully that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of "metaphilosophical folklore," and he supports his argument with close examinations of results from xphi and of a number of influential arguments in analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but, Deutsch writes, philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. Deutsch discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier's refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke's Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the "Multiple Concepts" and "Expertise" replies, to be severely lacking.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Experimentalphilosophie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4719507-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Intuition</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4027532-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Erkenntnis</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4015286-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Analytische Philosophie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4001869-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Intuition</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4027532-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Erkenntnis</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4015286-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Analytische Philosophie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4001869-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Experimentalphilosophie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4719507-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027639552&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027639552</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV042200663 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:15:09Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0262028956 9780262028950 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027639552 |
| oclc_num | 911957445 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-11 DE-20 DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-634 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-11 DE-20 DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-634 |
| physical | XX, 194 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publishDateSearch | 2015 |
| publishDateSort | 2015 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | A Bradford book |
| spelling | Deutsch, Max 1971- Verfasser (DE-588)1073184722 aut The myth of the intuitive experimental philosophy and philosophical method Max Deutsch Cambridge, Ma. [u.a.] MIT Press 2015 XX, 194 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier A Bradford book In The Myth of the Intuitive, Max Deutsch defends the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental philosophy ( xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition -- in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people's intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. Deutsch argues forcefully that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of "metaphilosophical folklore," and he supports his argument with close examinations of results from xphi and of a number of influential arguments in analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but, Deutsch writes, philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. Deutsch discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier's refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke's Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the "Multiple Concepts" and "Expertise" replies, to be severely lacking. Experimentalphilosophie (DE-588)4719507-1 gnd rswk-swf Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnis (DE-588)4015286-8 gnd rswk-swf Analytische Philosophie (DE-588)4001869-6 gnd rswk-swf Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 s Erkenntnis (DE-588)4015286-8 s Analytische Philosophie (DE-588)4001869-6 s Experimentalphilosophie (DE-588)4719507-1 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027639552&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Deutsch, Max 1971- The myth of the intuitive experimental philosophy and philosophical method Experimentalphilosophie (DE-588)4719507-1 gnd Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 gnd Erkenntnis (DE-588)4015286-8 gnd Analytische Philosophie (DE-588)4001869-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4719507-1 (DE-588)4027532-2 (DE-588)4015286-8 (DE-588)4001869-6 |
| title | The myth of the intuitive experimental philosophy and philosophical method |
| title_auth | The myth of the intuitive experimental philosophy and philosophical method |
| title_exact_search | The myth of the intuitive experimental philosophy and philosophical method |
| title_full | The myth of the intuitive experimental philosophy and philosophical method Max Deutsch |
| title_fullStr | The myth of the intuitive experimental philosophy and philosophical method Max Deutsch |
| title_full_unstemmed | The myth of the intuitive experimental philosophy and philosophical method Max Deutsch |
| title_short | The myth of the intuitive |
| title_sort | the myth of the intuitive experimental philosophy and philosophical method |
| title_sub | experimental philosophy and philosophical method |
| topic | Experimentalphilosophie (DE-588)4719507-1 gnd Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 gnd Erkenntnis (DE-588)4015286-8 gnd Analytische Philosophie (DE-588)4001869-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Experimentalphilosophie Intuition Erkenntnis Analytische Philosophie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027639552&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT deutschmax themythoftheintuitiveexperimentalphilosophyandphilosophicalmethod |