Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva: Srbija na prelazu u XXI vek
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Beograd
Službeni Glasnik
2013
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| Schriftenreihe: | Biblioteka Nauka i društvo / Edicija Sinteze
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | 331 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9788651917458 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | SADRŽAJ
UVODNI
DEO I
11
О
IZUČAVANJU RAZARANJA IREKONSTITUCIJE DRUŠTVA
SRBIJENAPRELAZUUXXIVEK
|
13
P. S.
-
Biografska napomena |
17
RAZORENO DRUŠTVO
-
SOCIOLOŠKI KONCEPT I DRUŠTVENA REALNOST
SRBIJE DEVEDESETIH GODINA |
20
О
konceptu „razorenog društva |
20
Bitna svojstva društvene razorenosti
[ 24
Radikalna dezintegrisanost društvene strukture |
25
Društveno-sistemske
promene
i razaranje društvenih institucija |
29
Neki empirijski uvidi u razorenost društva Srbije tokom devedesetih |
32
Zašto dolazi do razaranja društva |
40
Da li je Oktobra
2000.
započela rekonstitucija društva Srbije |
49
Ideo
О
DETERMINANTAMA RAZARANJA DRUŠTVA SRBIJE
[ 57
DRUŠTVENA KRIZA KRAJEM OSAMDESETIH, SUPROTSTAVLJENI
INTERESI I UNUTRAŠNJI RAT U JUGOSLAVIJI |
59
Društvene prilike u Jugoslaviji početkom osamdesetih |
60
Razlaganje koalicije radnih ljudi |
64
Pouke
о
socijalnoj strani reformi u Jugoslaviji krajem osamdesetih |
70
Suprotstavljenost interesa i rasplitanje društvene krize osamdesetih |
74
Od latentnog nacionalizma do međuetničkog i građanskog rata |
79
Kritičko razmatranje politika rasplitanja krize |
82
Da li je bilo predvidljivo ratno rasplitanje krize osamdesetih |
87
Zašto se nije predviđao unutrašnji rat u Jugoslaviji
J
89
TEGOBNA SVOJINSKA TRANSFORMACIJA I BLOKIRANJE TRANZICIJE |
96
Nevolje sa svojinskom transformacijom |
98
О
alternativnom preuređivanju svojinskih odnosa
j
107
Silvano
Bolcić
Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva
„NACIONALIZACIJA POSTJUGOSLOVENSKIH DRUŠTAVA
I NJENE
POSLEDICE | 112
Suštinska svojstva „nacionalizacije društva |
114
Nacionalizam i nacionalizovano društvo |
120
Šta može biti sutra |
123
RAZARANJE CIVILNOG DRUŠTVA |
125
Civilno delanje i svakodnevni život |
126
Osujećeni egzistencijalni interesi i civilno delanje |
131
Ildeo
GLOBALNO DRUŠTVO SRBIJE U TRANZICIJI I RAZARANJU |
137
DRUŠTVENO RESTRUKTURIRANJE I POLITIČKA PONAŠANJA
U SRBIJI DEVEDESETIH |
139
Neke osobenosti političkih ponašanja u Srbiji devedesetih |
142
Politička elita i usporena postsocijalistička transformacija u Srbiji |
148
DRUŠTVENE NEJEDNAKOSTI U SRBIJI DEVEDESETIH
U KOMPARATIVNOJ PERSPEKTIVI |
153
ODNOSI MOĆI U OTVORENOM I RAZORENOM DRUŠTVU |
165
Poperove napomene
о
odnosima moći u otvorenom društvu |
166
Moderni sistemi moći i otvoreno društvo |
168
Zašto društvo Srbije devedesetih ostaje zatvoreno društvo |
169
RAZORENOST DRUŠTVA I KORUPCIJA U SRBIJI DEVEDESETIH |
174
О
suštini korupcije i njenim razmerama u Srbiji devedesetih |
174
Razaranje društva, uzroci i perspektive korupcije |
179
III deo
TRANSFORMACIJE I RAZARANJE SFERE RADA |
185
SVETSKÍ
MEGATRENDOVI U SFERI RADA I STANJE U SRBIJI I
187
TRANSFORMACIJE I RAZARANJA DRUŠTVENOG SEKTORA
RADA U SRBIJI DEVEDESETIH |
195
Nastajanje i nestajanje društvenih preduzeća |
197
Urušavanje ljudskog kapitala i promenjeni odnosi moći u sferi rada |
201
USPON I BLOKADE PRIVATNOG SEKTORA |
204
О
ubrzanom rastu privatnog sektora |
204
О
svojstvima novih preduzetnika |
210
Kakva je ekonomska elita u Srbiji devedesetih |
215
Sadržaj
!
BLOKIRANO PREDUZETNIŠTVO I POSTSOCIJALISTIČKA
TRANSFORMACIJA SRBIJE |
219
Društveno-sistemski uslovi za razvoj preduzetništva u Srbiji |
220
О
uzrocima blokiranog preduzetništva u Srbiji |
227
RAZORENO DRUŠTVO I ODLIV MOZGOVA |
231
OPOREZIVANJE IMOVINE I PREPREKE U AFIRMACIJI RADA |
239
IVdeo
О
AKTERIMA I REKONSTITUCIJI DRUŠTVA U SRBIJI |
245
AKTERI I STRATEŠKI PRAVCI BUDUĆIH
PROMENA
U DRUŠTVU SRBIJE |
247
Bitne socijalno-strukturalne
promene
u Srbiji tokom devedesetih |
248
Sadašnji i budući akteri društvenih
promena
u Srbiji |
251
ANGAŽOVANOST
SOCIOLOGIJE I RAZARANJE DRUŠTVA SRBIJE |
255
„Angažovaná
sociologija
-
о
čemu to govorimo |
257
Angažovanost
sociologije i rasprave
о
nastavi marksizma polovinom osamdesetih |
261
Angažovaná
sociologija u Krajgerovoj komisiji |
267
Ima li pouka |
272
BITNE PRETPOSTAVKE I ŠANSE ZA REKONSTITUCIJU DRUŠTVA SRBIJE |
275
Neophodnost prevazilaženja procesa „nacionalizacije društva |
276
Pretpostavke rekonstitucije ekonomije |
278
О
novom uređivanju svojinskih odnosa |
282
Pretpostavke rekonstitucije politike kao delatnosti usmeravanja društva |
283
О
moralnoj obnovi i novim uslovima za društvenu promociju |
284
О
meritokratskoj rekonstituciji društva Srbije
j
286
Zaključna napomena |
289
SUMMARY
|
291
DESTRUCTION AND
RECONSTITUTION
OF SOCIETY:
SERBIA IN TRANZITION INTO THE
2
1st CENTURY |
293
Essential features of a destroyed society |
296
Destruction of social structure of Serbia |
297
On destruction of social intitutions |
300
On the causes of the destruction of society |
305
On the
reconstitution
of the society of Serbia |
311
DODACI
|
315
CITIRANA LITERATURA |
317
INDEKS POJMOVA I
327
DESTRUCTION AND RECONSTITUTION
OF
SOCIETY:
SERBIA IN TRANSITION INTO
THE
2
1st CENTURY
In theoretical works of sociology, one can find general definitions of the society
as such, review of historically known formations of society, descriptions of the main
forms of social change, of the stable functioning of society, of evolutionary and revolu¬
tionary aspects of social change, characterization
oí
social stagnation, involution, and
social regression, of social disorganization, social disintegration, of social
anomie
(when
developments in society become unpredictable, uncontrollable, due to the destruction of
social values and rules).1 All these conceptual tools could be of use for understanding
social developments in Serbia in the
1990s,
for comparing them with developments
in other countries, as well as for comparing recent and past events in Serbia as a glo¬
bal society.
Specifically, concepts of social disorganization, disintegration, involution, social
anomie,
certainly offer relevant explanations of many developments in Serbia in the
1990s.
Still, by relying only on such concepts, one will not get a comprehensive under¬
standing of the multiplied, quasi-independent, extremely negative and destructive deve¬
lopments in practically all spheres of society such as the economy, politics, culture,
moral, spiritual sphere, including interpersonal relations of individual members of
the Serbian society in the
1990s.
Furthermore, by relying only on these concepts (in
their usual meaning), it seems impossible to understand the key causes of an endu¬
ring, long-lasting and disturbing inefficiency
oí
social actions taken in Serbia since the
regime change in the fall of the year
2000
with the intention to rebuild institutions ,
to reorganize society , to strengthen the role of the state, to reestablish the confidence
of the people in the
integrative
agents of society such as church, school and cultural
institutions, to restore the faith of the socio-systemic institutions in their subjects ,
as well as to rebuild the trust of the citizens in those who hold the leading positions
in the society, who are now chosen by new, democratic electoral procedures and who
are under public control. The problem is that all these concepts are related to some
1
When values and rules exist, people behave in a considerate and ordered manner in their interactions.
This is one of the preconditions for the formation
oí
а
society or a social community from a mass of
human individuals.
294
Silvano
Boicie
Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva
partial aspect of social reality, such as the problems of inappropriate regulation of the
political sphere, of shortcomings of social organization, of a lack of morality and
value confusion in the society, with a presumed standpoint that society as such still
exists, and that society has just lost its ability to intervene in a systemic way to stop
or prevent the undesired social developments.
Considering all aspects of negative social developments in Serbia in the
1990s,
the
long-lasting destructive consequences of those developments, and the persistence of
the negative effects of those developments in spite of a multitude of actions of internal
and external social forces, aimed at restoring the social normalcy in Serbia, it seems
advisable to analyze those developments by using another, more complex sociological
concept, the concept of the destroyed society1, which was not used either in the analysis
of societal developments in Serbia in the
1990s,
or in the analysis of other highly
disrupted contemporary societies. It is important to stress that with this concept one
describes things that are happening to the society as such, whose basic features of soci¬
ety, as an ordered social community, are being destroyed. From the text which follows,
one should grasp the heuristic value of this concept for the general study of destroyed
society , but primarily in studying and understanding social developments in Serbia
during the
1990s
and afterwards. The author of this book believes that the concept of
destroyed society proposed here could also serve well while studying other post-
Yugoslav societies, and some other contemporary societies which were facing severe
social destructions due to their internal and other kinds of wars. It is expected that
this concept of the destroyed society could be included in the set of theoretical tools of
sociology as a general social science, especially in that part of sociology dealing with
processes
oí
social dynamics, pinpointing the case of the disappearance of some really
existing global society.
Both in the lay persons and in the sociologically educated mind, there is a pre¬
vailing perception of a society as something that exists eternally regardless of spe¬
cific social developments. Considering some events in the distant past, people could
possibly assume that some global society could disappear , but due to some natural
catastrophe, or that some civilizations (like the Roman,
Inca
and Maya civilizations)
could disappear or could be conquered by some other civilization, while substantive
causes of such disappearances of civilizations remain mainly unclear. One should men¬
tion that there are relevant descriptions3 of many global societies which have vanished
from the map of human societies in the past centuries. It has been established in
such studies that fundamental or, at least, crucial causes of the decay of most of those
vanished societies lay in their social constitution, particularly, in the
socio
-systemic
This author introduced, for the first time, this concept of the destroyed society in a discussion within
the Serbian Sociological Association in the fall of
1990.
The concept was elaborated in a paper on
everyday life in the destroyed society , published in: M.
Prošić-Dvornić,
1994;
see, also, S.
Bolčić,
1994..
From the existing literature on this topic, just two of them will be mentioned here: J. Tainter,
2007,
and J. Diamond,
2005.
Summary
295
failures which were not observed and eliminated in time. As long as the decay of tho¬
se societies resulted from the wrong doings of their key social actors, one can claim
that these were cases of the destruction of society , and not of the disappearance of
a society due to some natural catastrophe. Evidently, the destruction of society is
not an unknown social phenomenon. The novelty proposed in this study is in the
analytical conceptualization of this phenomenon and in the specific application of this
concept in explaining social developments during the
1990s
and the early 2000s in
Serbia, where the instances of the destruction of society have been clearly manifested
and sociologically highlighted in numerous published works of this author.4
The very formation of society is a complex social process, but equally complex are
the processes of the destruction, as well as of the
reconstitution
of a society. As in other
aspects of human living where it is easier and faster to ruin or destroy something
than to fix , improve or rebuild it, it seems that it was easier to enter the process of
the destruction of society in Serbia in the
1990s,
than to come out of this stage of
the destroyed society afterwards. By considering this finding, people in Serbia sho¬
uld have shown impatience while requesting that the processes of the destruction of
society be stopped, but they should be reasonably patient in their expectations of a
relatively quick
reconstitution
of society, and of the rebuilding of Serbia as a modern
and successful society.
It should be stressed that the concept of destroyed society is being used as a con¬
cept of the ideal-type analysis, which has been elaborated in sociology by Max Weber.
Such a concept, while requiring analytical insights in phenomenological ( historic )
reality of society, does not assume a full correspondence between the phenomenolo¬
gical reality and that reality which is being described, by the use of the concept, as
a generalized (abstract) description of a given social reality. The ideal-type concept
is a peculiar mental construct , by which real features of reality are being idealized
and generalized with the aim to make given characteristics of reality more visible
and apprehended in their substance. Therefore, the statement, that a given standing
of society is denoted as the standing of a destroyed society , does not imply that all
dimensions of society have been fully destroyed, or that some manifestations of the
destruction of society were non-existent in the time before given society fell in the
destruction , or that some manifestations of destructions of society could not be fea¬
tures of those societies which, by ideal-type analysis, were not denoted as destroyed
societies . Considering some conditionality and research limits of such an analysis, qua¬
lifying a given society as the destroyed society could not be viewed as some subjective
(in value terms pessimist ) perception of social reality. The scientific validity of such
a concept, and of findings based on this concept, should be judged by the heuristic
fertility of such an analysis, by empirical findings and their reliability, as well as by
practical implications of the findings based on the concept of the destroyed society.
See the list of references in this book.
296
Silvano
Bolčić Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva
Essential features of a destroyed society
From the starting proposition that the destruction of society denotes dominant
features of the constitutive aspects of society in its totality, there follow these essential
features of social destruction :
Radical disintegration of the social structure, social system and societal culture,
disintegration of longer duration, without a visible new integration by which a given
society would regain its identity, its peculiar social personality and vitality;
Emptying of the key social institutions (state institutions, economic, regulative,
cultural institutions and institutions of socialization), emptying of institutions of
their institutionally specific activities, transformation of institutions into the empty
social forms , where there are no happenings substantively important for the everyday
life of people in a given society;
Annulment of and making senseless basic social roles such as occupational roles,
professions, social functions, even the roles in inter-personal relations, like roles of
parents, relatives, friends, etc.;
Defacto
putting the system of social rules but of order , and in particular, disre¬
spect of legal regulation of social developments, generalized disregard of legal rules, but
also, forgetting morality in inter-personal relations, leading altogether to the situation
where normative social order becomes, in practice, irrelevant for the everyday life of
people in a given society;
The life behind the scene becomes the real life of people (all members of society,
both the most powerful and those ordinary citizens are hiding, covering up things
they are really doing); public life becomes, in fact, a facade , even a masquerade ,
preventing others from seeing what should not be known and seen, so that lies tend
to dominate social communications;
Accumulation of the unfinished happenings , of the activities (in the societal
domain, as well as in the domain of individual doings) which started but not ended,
the consequence being the cancellation
oí
the perspective, the destruction of a sensible
relation to the future (people have no sensible answer to the question: What should I
do today, tomorrow?);
Prevalence of quasi and para-phenomena instead of normal forms of activity
established by institutions (quasi, or para-institutions, para-organizations, etc.), which
are out of regular social control;
Normalization of generalized mal-practices resorts considered as inappropriate
and illegitimate before the destruction of society , such as using public transportation
without a valid ticket, using things which are someone else s property, doing things
that are considered good from the point of self-interest, disregarding the rights and
benefits of others, destroying life of others, including taking someone
s
life if that is
in ones self-interest.
Mass forgetting about ethics and morality (not primarily the confusion of valu¬
es ), which generates tacit, collective tolerance
ofinhumane
doings, including killing
Summary
297
innocent individuals, destroying houses, homes, foundations of human existence of
those who are not ours , forced massive emigration, cleansing of territories, and
similar wrong doings;
Massive impoverishment, even of those members of society who would usually
not be considered as poor , but whose real quality of life has been so degraded in com¬
parison to their previous living conditions that they consider their personal situation
as de-civilization, as a regression to lower life practices which they have left behind,
even forgotten.
This analytical description of the destroyed society might be considered as
incomplete and unacceptable in all of the above-mentioned dimensions. Evidently, it
is very difficult to make such a complex concept operational for the needs of specific
empirical investigations of manifestations of destruction of society Respecting these
limitations of the presented concept of the destroyed society, the following pages will
deal with some relevant findings of the specific study of the destruction of society in
Serbia in the
1990s
and afterwards. This author believes that, even if they are not suffi¬
cient in all respects, these findings support the sociological assessment of the society of
Serbia in the past two decades
(1990-2012),
as a destroyed society that will have to go
through the process of
reconstitution
as society, which is a more complex and a more
difficult process than the process of transition and post-socialist transformation
that other post-communist countries in East-Central Europe had to face.
Destruction of social structure of Serbia
All available findings lead to the conclusion that from the beginning of the
1990s
the society of Serbia, did not have
а
formed social structure. On the social scene there
were at the same time greatly deconstructed parts of former social groupings (fragmen¬
ted and socially degraded working strata , de-stratified peasants, greatly de-structured
middle strata, still relatively powerful fractions of the former functionary class ), and
a poorly constituted new owners stratum (relatively numerous small entrepreneurs,
a segment of peasantry who had been successful in commercialization of their pro¬
duction, owners of larger privatized former state enterprises, owners and managers of
foreign firms located in Serbia). Considering this
defacto
de-structured structure , it
seems improper to denote the Serbian society during the
1990s
as a society with the
system of the restored capitalism5, whose developmental logic would be generated
by this newly re-established capitalist identity of Serbian society since the beginning
of the
1990s.
An indicator of the situation of a destroyed Serbian society, reflecting the social
structure faced with the process of de-structuring , is the inability to create great
5
M.
Łazić
(2011),
describes the Serbian society since the
1990s
as a society of the blocked transition
from socialism to capitalism, and not as a case of clear restoration of capitalism .
298
Silvano
Boleie
Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva
social coalitions capable
of
global social actions, as
well as the incapacity to achieve
the level
oí
social consensus6, which is a necessary prerequisite for the articulation of a
strategy of the long-term and successful systemic social actions. Even since the end
of the year
2000,
in the Serbian political arena, there have been the so-called impos¬
sible coalitions (coalitions of former socialist and political forces that were mem¬
bers of the so-called Democratic opposition of Serbia
-
DOS, coalitions of the new
social-democrats and advocates of
neoliberal
capitalism, coalitions of those in favor
of the restoration of monarchy and those advocating the constitution of Serbia as a
republic , etc.). Of course, there are variations in the political programs of the par¬
ties joining these impossible coalitions, but these variations do not generate major
conflicts during the selection of specific policies of societal governance. It seems that
those conflicts are greatly about the control of the sources of state power, or are even
caused by some personal ambitions of members of the government. From the point of
view of ordinary citizens, those in power are all the same, the selfish guys who
use power mainly for their own benefits.
The
de-
structuring of the actual Serbian social structure is also reflected in the real
fragmentation and practical lack of legitimate formation ofthe social elite. There was an
awkward public perception and the characterization of the elite in Serbia during the
1990s
and even after the regime change in fall of the year
2000.
In its basic notion, and
as it has been understood throughout most of the modern history, elite has had a
positive connotation, denoting those who are elected as the best or excellent . Of
course, to be a member of the elite has meant having some features that ordinary
members of society cannot have, like an outstanding respect, recognition, great social
power, more favorable life chances, including some legitimate privileges. It is relevant
to stress that this positively connoted elite status assumes that someone s reaching of
the apex of the social pyramid cannot be achieved over night , cannot be without
proven high personal qualities, and that someone must be without moral or any other
behavioral stains while climbing to the top, to the elite status in the given society.
In the Serbian society during the
1990s
and afterwards, the elites were perceived
as social groupings of variable composition and domains of activities. In the con¬
sciousness of most people, elitism lost its positive meaning. Even if not in all cases,
many of those called the elite were treated as individuals who proclaimed themsel¬
ves, or were proclaimed by some narrow clique, as members of the elite . Regrettably,
they were and still are quite frequently individuals with moral and other stains in
their biography, lacking many positive characteristics. This accentuated illegitimacy
of great segments of the new elites affects negatively all successful individuals , whose
success is also being questioned. Consequently, this makes people turn their back
on all structures of power , and leads to the withdrawal of public support to all, even
One can also stress the inability to establish the social hegemony , as described by
A. Granasi
,
where
the leading class is successful in controlling the basic societal processes, not only by the monopoly
of force and property, but also by cultural domination.
Summary
299
positive, leading forces of the contemporary Serbian society. The long-lasting illegi¬
timate structuring of the newly constituted Serbian society is one of its major troubles,
as most people are poorly motivated to follow the specific governmental policies, i.e.
those deliberately aimed at the termination of the crises inherited from the past. Even
though there are a lot of new persons assuming political roles, and despite many new
governmental measures, social crises remain the enduring feature of the still destroyed
Serbian society in the 21st century.
From the beginning of the
1990s,
there were many changes of the Serbian social
system. In Serbia, as well as in other former socialist countries, even during
1988
in
former Yugoslavia, of which Serbia was one of republics , there were reforms aimed
at replacing the former socialist system with a new post-socialist social system (for
some actors of those changes, the change had to be the restoration of capitalist social
system). Such fundamental social changes normally bring many problems and diffi¬
culties to the changing society. Some degree of
a non-
systemic functioning of a given
society, seems to be unavoidable. Such aspects of insufficient and inconsistent systemic
regulation of a given society could be considered as a normal price of transition, and not
necessarily a sign of a global social destruction! However, in Serbia in the
1990s
and
afterwards, besides those normal social difficulties caused by the replacement of the
former socialist social system with a new post-socialist order, there were many less
normal social developments. As first, there were numerous non-institutional activities,
which were not of short duration. These non-institutional doings have been visible
in all societal domains. Specifically,
socio-
systemic changes of ownership relations, of
the governance regime, and of the constitution of the central state government have
remained institutionally unfinished. In social reality, therefore, greatly incompatible
social arrangements existed. From the
1990s,
many of the former self-managed work
organizations remained, nominally, in social ownership for years because they were
neither privatized nor transformed into state enterprises However, these organizations
could not perform self-management of their employees, nor could they appoint their
managing bodies . The management role was given to acting directors , appointed by
local authorities, but their management decisions were not controlled by the employees
in the firm or by any other institutionally provisioned body.
Contrary to the expected de-etatization (weakening of the role of the state), and
a generally reduced influence of politics on the economy (expected as a consequence
of the post-socialist transformation), in Serbia, during the past two decades, there was
de
facto a predominance of the state governance and a crucial influence of political
factors on all spheres of social life. This aspect of system inconsistence must have
had negative effects on all social developments. This is both an indication and a cause
of the social destruction of Serbia in this period.
Systemic formation of a society as a normally arranged human community
comprises, besides other features, basically congruent social rules that are applied in
various subsystems such as economy, polity, culture and a spiritual sphere. It is assu¬
med that desired behaviors in one of the domains is supported by practices in other
300
Silvano
Boicie
Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva
spheres of social life. In Serbia, during the
1990s
and afterwards, by the intentions of
new social actors , some changes in the global value system were enacted , specifically
in the new valuation of individualism (in contrast to the former socialist collectivism ).
This new value paradigm should have been supportive in restoring capitalist social
relations, leading to the more efficient economic and overall social development of
Serbia. However, due to the peculiar ethno-nationalization of society , in an attempt
to constitute Serbia as the Serbian state and society in ethnic sense, in social reality,
particularly in the sphere of politics and culture, traditional collectivism as value
orientation was of great importance, with an emphasis on collective interests of the
leading and constitutive (Serbian) nation, with the expectation to return to traditional
patterns of collective life in the family, in local communities, and even in the global
society. These
incongruent
value orientations had a negative impact on the overall
social integration of Serbian society in that period.
Incongruent
value orientations were present also in the domain of culture. On the
one hand, people were expected to embrace patterns of behavior characteristic of the
developed Western societies, specifically, to follow fashion trends from the West ,
at least in their appearance in the public sphere. And, at the same time, they had to
manifest their belongingness to their Serbian nation , to demonstrate their respect
for revived national mores, to show symbols of their belongingness to the Serbian
Orthodox church, etc. This attempt to behave, at the same time, in accordance with
the modern-time rules and in accordance with the revived traditional Serbian valu¬
es often had some grotesque results, e.g. when certain men with the hair-cut typical
for the Rambo warriors were wearing wooden cross necklaces typical for orthodox
monks. Or, when some females in short skirts and shirts with greatly visible boobs
(typical for young call-girls ), wore a big golden cross, normally worn by ladies wea¬
ring shirts up to their necks, when going to church. These are just illustrations of the
greatly prevailing non-cultural culture , which became one of the manifestations of
the overall destruction of society of Serbia in the last two decades.
On the destruction of social institutions
Every specific social institution has its peculiar functional domain and specific
institutional functions
.
By their form, institutions can continue to exist even after
they have lost their original functions. In such a case, people can treat these institu¬
tions as habitual frames which require some ritual behavior, or consider them as
senseless, emptied social forms . Institutions are changed by introducing some new
social rules under the influence of some new social actors, controlling these institu¬
tions. Some of these changes could be so radical, signifying, therefore,
а
formation
7
These general introductory remarks on social institutions come from a general sociological know¬
ledge on social institutions; see, also, M. C. Brinton, V. Nee,
1998.
Summary
301
of a new institution. In processes of institutional changes, one could expect some
inconsistencies of institutional rules and some mal-functioning of such institutions.
Even such situations of mal-functioning of institutions can be perceived by people
as situations of social disorder . Still, if such an episode of institutional confusion
is short-lived, and while the basic social regulation is being provided within and by
appropriate institution, global society will be considered as an ordered social entity
where social developments are greatly predictable.
A fundamental social change begins when institutions cease to fulfill their basic
social function, when they become permanent empty forms and when the regula¬
tion of society is being provided by various non-institutional forms, by some quasi
or para institutions. The otherness of these para-institutions, in comparison with
usual, normal institutions, is in their functioning by unknown rules , by rules of
questionable legitimacy, by rules which protect some particular, illegitimate interests.
The social power of actors controlling these para-institutions is mostly uncontrolled.
Therefore, the destruction of social institutions exists when the social power of some
actors becomes uncontrollable and when social regulation is in favor of some par¬
ticular private interests .
The destruction of the institutions of state is of crucial importance for the overall
destruction of society. In Serbia, a specific irregularity in functioning of the instituti¬
ons of the state began before the dissolution of the Yugoslav federal state. By the Con¬
stitution of Serbia, enacted in September
1990,
the Republic of Serbia defined itself as
an independent state, not explicitly as a federal unit of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia8. From the legal point, this meant a deviation from the normal way of
functioning of the institutions of the state of Serbia. From that moment on, there were
many other social developments leading to the gradual destruction of institutions of
state in Serbia when many crucial state decisions were made by actors who acted outside
the regular institutions of the state. The
de
facto involvement of Serbia in the internal
wars (those in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo), assumed decisions of the
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, though, in fact, there were no such decisions, and
those making
de
facto such decisions acted outside regular state institutions.
Since Serbia was involved in the internal wars within the borders of the former
state of Yugoslavia, it should have been expected that the still existing institutions of
the state in Serbia would enter the process of an abnormal functioning, with the mar-
ginalization of the legislative side of the state and an increased power of the executive
branch of the state. Since Serbia, as a state, was in a peculiar state of war , the increa¬
sed stress on the repressive functions of the state should have been expected.9 However,
typical state decisions about mobilization of military reserve forces, of the deployment
of police and army units, which were sent informally, unofficially to the war zones
8
See: M.
Pajvančić,
2005, 20.
9
According to some findings, the police force of the Serbian state increased from
25.000
at the begin¬
ning of the
1990s
to almost
100.000
at the end of the
1990s.
302
Silvano
Boicie
Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and many other decisions relevant for war
activities, were made and enacted extra-institutionally , disregarding institutionally
defined procedures. Nominally The President of Yugoslavia
(Slobodan Milosevic)
and an institutionally non-existent Coordination body (whose members were key
politicians of Serbia, selected most probably by S. Milosevic) were making and enac¬
ting strategic and operative decisions of the Serbian state, claiming that such decisions,
under the existing conditions, were needed to safeguard the vital national interests of
the Serbian nation dispersed throughout all the former republics of Yugoslavia. Some
non-state actors, like citizens associations made up of individuals willing to volun¬
teer in protecting the life and national interests of the Serbs living in any part of the
former Yugoslavia were also involved in defense activities . Such associations had even
their para-military units, which were sent into defense actions in coordination
with the authorized state organs, but often by independent decisions of the leading
organs of such associations. Evidently, such extra-institutional activities contributed
to the degradation of regular state institutions and, consequently, to the destruction of
the institutions of the Serbian state. One can claim that in such a social context, some
nominal state functionaries became private possessors of the state10 who were making
state decisions in the name of Serbian citizens. The consequences of such decisions
were generally tragic for the citizens of Serbia, for the people in other parts of former
Yugoslavia, and, in the long-run, for the future of the Serbian state and society.
During the times of destruction of the state institutions, a widespread disrespect
of laws and all other legal rules becomes normal , first the disrespect by those pos¬
sessing state power, but also the disrespect by anyone among ordinary citizens of
such a state. As confirmed by some survey findings11 carried out during the years of
the destruction of society in Serbia, the majority of people in Serbia agreed that the
laws in the
1990s
were less respected than before the
1990s.
Two thirds of respondents
considered this disrespect of laws as a precondition of a mere survival, and as legiti¬
mate
ifit
proved crucial for safeguarding someone s interests. Such findings warn that
under peculiar irregular
socio-structural
conditions, like widespread pauperization
and lack of provisions of basic life goods, most individuals of such a destroyed soci¬
ety tend to become offenders of laws . By such most probably undesired doings ,
even ordinary citizens contribute to the destructions of society , which is not in
their fundamental life interests.
Normalcy of any society greatly depends on the normality in functioning of
economic institutions whose social function is to mobilize and activate disposable eco¬
nomic resources, to provide production and exchange of goods and services needed
for a civilized life of people in a given society. Economic institutions tend to exist and
function even when in other spheres of society, particularly in politics, there are some
10 N.
Dimitrijevic
(2004,58-59)
assesses that in Serbia during the
1990s,
a system of privatized gover¬
nance existed.
11
See: S.
Bolčić,
2002,63.
Summary
303
major social disturbances . It is known, for example, that during the wars between
states, most enterprises continue to function.
In Serbia, during the
1990s
there were some expected disorders in the functio¬
ning of economic institutions, partly caused by changes of the economic system, by the
transformation of property relations. Some general mal-functioning of the Serbian
economy also resulted from the economic sanctions imposed by the UN and other
international bodies, provoked by the involvement of Serbia in the Yugoslav wars .
Considering these circumstances, one should say that the economic institutions in
Serbia were facing accentuated disturbances in their functioning due to the overall
destruction of Serbian society. It should be mentioned that in Serbia during the
1990s,
there were numerous work organizations, enterprises, shops, etc, which could be only
nominally denoted as places of business , where people work and do some jobs. Peo¬
ple were employed in factories which had no production; they went to retail shops
which had no goods to sell. Banks ceased to be financial institutions as they could
not provide financial services for their business partners nor could they make it
possible for the depositors to save and withdraw their money when they needed it.
At the time regular economic institutions ceased to fulfill their normal institutional
functions, social reality witnessed a mushrooming of para -firms doing extra-insti¬
tutional business in the grey market (goods were offered for sale on the streets, on
car hoods; street dealers provided financial services , exchanging foreign currenci¬
es, lending money, offering to informal depositors some interest on their deposited
money, and basic financial transactions were not in the official currency
-
dinar
-
but
in German mark). Due to such a severe destruction of economic institutions12, the state
lost its capacity to use its normal state measures in order to regulate economic life in
Serbia. This resulted in widespread scarcity of various, even basic life goods. Such goods
most often could be found in the grey market where prices could not be controlled
by the state, therefore they sometimes increased several times during the day. This was
one of the causes of a galloping inflation and of the devaluation of purchasing power
of the official currency. Even state institutions became participants in the non-legal
provision of various goods (gasoline, strategic goods needed by the state institutions,
etc.) Due to the international economic sanctions, such goods, needed for the state
purposes had to be supplied by unofficial suppliers i.e. privately owned firms. Those
services provided by private firms to the state were often generously paid, in kind ,
and in non-disclosed favors , creating a structural base for all kinds ofcorruptive rela¬
tions between these private suppliers and state officials. The first millions (in those
years, expressed in German marks), the provenance of which was not explained by
the big businessmen, for they were not asked to explain later how they had made them,
actually seem to have been made during those years of the overall social destruction of
Serbia. It seems self-evident that a society where corruption affects all key social acti¬
vities in an essential way, cannot be but a destroyed society in the substantive meaning.
12
See more on the destruction of the economy in Serbia, M.
Dinkić,
1995.
304
Silvano Bolcic
Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva
The galloping inflation appears to have been the most disturbing sign of the overall
destruction of society in Serbia during the
1990s.
While in
1989
prices had an annual
growth rate of
195%,
in the year
1992
prices grew at an annual rate of
9000%.
By the
end of
1993
and at the beginning of
1994
the rate of inflation had to be counted on a
daily basis: in January
1994
the inflation was
60%
daily, even
2%
per hour13.
Considering all these facts, it was inevitable for such a destroyed Serbian society
to become also a pronouncedly pauperized society. According to the official statistical
findings, there were
14%
of poor people in
1990, 39%
in
1994,
and
33%
in 1999.14 In
a survey study conducted in the year 2000,15 only
1%
of respondents assessed their
living standard as good , while
78%
answered that their life situation was hardly
bearable , or unbearable .
Processes of the destruction of institutions were visible even in the functioning
of the religious institutions. The
1990s
were certainly the years of the revival of religio¬
sity and the wide spreading of the overt religious behavior, especially when baptizing
children, while getting married, during burial ceremonies, when celebrating religio¬
us holidays, as well as in showing one s religious orientation by wearing crosses, and
displaying religious objects such as icons, etc., in ones home,16 The
1990s
were also
the years of accentuated presence of churches as institutions and church dignitaries
in a wider public life, including in the political life in Serbia. Considering such facts,
it would seem inappropriate to claim that there was a trend of destruction of religi¬
ous institutions. However, if one has in mind the original and specific functions of
religious institutions, i. e. procuring spiritual orientations to people and strengthening
their religious beliefs17, then, the actual doings of religious institutions could not be
assessed as being in accordance with their specific institutional functions. The word
of the church was often heard about non-church and non-religious matters, about
the state and political activities, and it was not properly heard in condemning vario¬
us inhumane, non-Christian doings (like torturing or killing people, taking other
peoples property, amoral behavior in various situations, including amoral behavior of
the people of the church ). While expressing the discontent with the general spiritual
situation in the Serbian society, those asking for a greater social influence of religious
institutions often overlooked their contribution and their mal-practices in establishing
a desired and proper spiritual situation in Serbian society.
In this elaboration of the aspects of destruction of the Serbian society during the
past two decades, one needs to underline some developments related to the interpersonal
13
M.
Dinkić,
1995, 43.
14
A. Pošarac,
1995.
15
S.
Bolčić,
2002.
16
See more on developments in the religious domain in Serbia during the
1990s,
D.
Radisavljević-
-Ćiparizović,
2002.
17
According to the findings presented by D.
Radisavljević-Ćiparizović
(2002, 123-131),
only
2%
of
the surveyed population regularly attended liturgy in their churches.
Summary
305
relations in this society and to the peculiarities of the modal type of personality prevai¬
ling in Serbia in that period. By sensing the destruction of society, people often felt the
vanishing of society behind their back. They also lost their friends and others close
to them. They were aware that it was hard to find those who would help and support
them in their everyday lives. A survey study carried out in
1999
showed that
46%
of
respondents assessed that they had fewer friends than before
1990.
In some cases this
loss of friends was affected by quite a massive emigration of people during this period18.
In explaining these undesired changes in interpersonal relations and in shaping
of modal personality19 it is important to underline the socio-structural circumstances
generated by the process of destruction of society , entailing such changes. It becomes
normal that an individual thinks most of himself in most of everyday situations,
looks for his personal gains even when this means overlooking needs and rights of
others. In the above-mentioned survey study,
65%
of all respondents admitted that they
thought mostly of themselves in those years, while
57%
of the respondents agreed
with the claim that in those years people were less honest than in the
pre-
1990
period.
This oblivion of morality, being one of the manifestations of the destroyed society, may
highlight the reasons of the people all over the former Yugoslavia who were inactive
in condemning the unquestionably inhumane doings of many individuals taking part
in war activities in that area, and who did not express their disapproval of all forms
of criminal activities that made the life of the majority of citizens of Serbia miserable.
In a society, where, by necessity, there is widespread oblivion of moral rules, where
there is considerable tolerance of amoral doings, one should expect a weak motivation
for civil actions, a lack of all those activities in which autonomous persons, moved by
their consciousness, attempt to improve the overall quality of life of most members of a
given society. According to some findings20, a peculiar mode ofdestruction of civil soci¬
ety has also been a manifestation of the general destruction of society during the
1990s.
The hitherto presented findings concerning the social situation in Serbia during
the
1990s
should be treated just as the first illustration of a manifested destruction of
Serbian society. A more elaborated description of the manifestations of the society
destruction requires further, comprehensive investigations.
On the causes of the destruction of society
The starting point of this study is that processes of the destruction of society
generate very profound, long-lasting disorders in the functioning of a given society.
The destruction of Serbian society in its fundamentals continued after the systemic
changes in Serbia in October
2000,
in spite of hefty attempts to stop those sinister social
18
See: S.
Bolčić,
2002.
19
See more on this, Z.
Golubović,
1995, 8-9.
20
More on this, see, S.
Bolčić,
1999.
306
Silvano
Bolcić
Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva
developments . Even if one has to make a more systematic analysis of social develop¬
ments in Serbia after the end of
1990,
there are numerous observations which suggest
that since the year
2000
manifestations of the destruction of society have continued
to be an essential aspect of the Serbian social reality. Those who took leading roles
in Serbian society after the dethronement of Milosevic in the fall of
2000,
were quick
to admit that they were not aware of how profoundly destroyed all social institution
in Serbia had been. They had to learn painfully that neither their enthusiasm nor
their expertness were sufficient for prompt and substantive social changes of Serbian
society, which continued to be heavily influenced by bad consequences of the social
developments in the
1990s.
Among the circumstances contributing to the destruction of society one should pri¬
marily pinpoint war developments , especially when there is a case of the internal war .
One can learn from various historical precedents that societies facing civil or internal
wars , experience most fierce confrontations, greatest destructions and atrocities, and
even de-civilization of longer duration. Therefore, in the search of circumstances that
might have caused the process of the destruction of Serbian society, one should con¬
sider war developments on the area of the former Yugoslavia, with Serbia being part of
that country. Even if neither the state nor the society of Serbia had declared war to any
other part of Yugoslavia, it is undeniable that both the state and the society of Serbia
were seriously involved in the war developments in the area of Yugoslavia. Those war
confrontations have most often been defined as civil , inter-ethnic or even inter-
religious war(s). If one considers various sides involved in war activities, they cannot
simply be defined as ethnicities, for in some cases the battle grounds witnessed even
some regular military formations of the newly independent states constituted within
the borders of former republics of Yugoslavia. Thus it seems more appropriate to qualify
those wars within the borders of the former Yugoslavia as internal wars.
Involvements in such an internal war provoked deep disorders in the functioning
of all social institutions in Serbia, primarily in the functioning of institutions of state.
These institutions, influenced by changing situations in war zones, and even more by
the way they were used by leading functionaries of the state, ceased to be institutions
under proper institutionally defined social control. Afterwards, these institutions were
either marginalized (that being the case of legislative and judicial institutions), or put
under the peculiar private control of the highest-ranking state official and his
unofficially appointed collaborators who presumed that they had unlimited man¬
date of the Serbian nation to use the state means to secure and promote interests of
the Serbian nation. So, the destruction of society is an outcome of the involvement of a
given society in an internal war , and also of a peculiar privatization of state institutions.
Institutionally irregular dissolution of the
SFR
Yugoslavia contributed greatly to
various disorders in the functioning of the newly constituted republic^tares and
also of the newly constituted republic-sorieries . These newly established, indepen¬
dent states promptly underwent the new constituting and redefining of the state s
social identity. Since the ethnic problem was perceived by most of the new forces as
Summary
307
the crucial unresolved problem of the former Yugoslavia, the post-Yugoslav states and
societies were re-constituted as ethnic states, as the states of the dominant ethnicity
within the borders of the former Yugoslav republics. It seems just to assess that such
an ethno-national constitution of the new post-Yugoslav societies led to numerous
inter-state conflicts, to hostile relations, including the war conflicts. One should know
that the former republics of Yugoslavia were not ethno-nationally homogeneous21.
According to the Constitution of Yugoslavia, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians,
Montenegrins, and Bosnians had the status of the constitutive nations in Yugoslavia
and in all former Yugoslav republics. Because of the ethno-national constitution of
the new post-Yugoslav states, considerable segments of those constitutive nations5
lost that status, becoming ethnic minorities , which most of them could not accept,
either as individual citizens, or as a collectivity of a given former constitutive nation .
The consequence of such sentiments made the new post-Yugoslav states the states with
limited legitimacy whose considerable number of citizens rejected, at least in their con¬
sciousness, their citizens loyalty to such a state. These citizens felt deprived of some of
their former citizens rights, they felt as second-rate citizens disbelieving in the good
will of such an ethnically biased state to treat them equally in securing their civil and
human rights, particularly fearing unfair treatment of their ethnic needs .
It should be expected that society, lacking a consensus on the basic constitution of
its state, becomes a society of deep cleavages and tensions. This generates inefficiency
and speedy ruining of all social institutions.Therefore, the inter-ethnic conflicts were
just one side of this ethno-national constitution of the new post-Yugoslav states and
societies. There were also severe and destructive social developments affecting everyday
life of the people in those territories. They were more severe in those ethnic states
which were multiethnic to a greater extent. The ethno-national constitution of the new
post-Yugoslav states generated ethno-national formation of new global societies in this
region, expressed in the tendency to treat society as property of the dominant ethno-
nation22. This meant establishing a basic identity of a given society, its social order and
its socio-systemic goals in direct service to the dominant ethno-nation. Ethno-nationa-
listic society is socially structured along ethnic lines, making all other divisions in the
society of secondary importance. Not only state governance, but also power relations
in social terms have to be in accordance with the socio-systemic realization of interests
of the dominant ethno-nation. All other sides of social, economic, political, cultural
and spiritual spheres of a given society should be formed along these ethnic lines .
21
Only the Republic of Slovenia had
91 %
of citizens declaring themselves as Slovene, while other repu¬
blics had up to
30-40%
of citizens of ethnicity other than the dominant one in that republic. With
the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Serbs, as an ethnicity, were the most numerous (some
2
million)
group whose members were left out of their state (Serbia). It is important to stress that, at least
in constitutional intention, the former Yugoslav republics were not ethno-nationally constituted
social entities.
22
One could term this process as a peculiar, second nationalization ; see more in S.
Bolčić,
The
Features of a Nationalized Society ,
Sociologija,
No.
4, 1995, 473-483.
308
Silvano
Boleie
Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva
Radical deviation from the respect of basic human values, due to the pronoun¬
ced socio-systemic biased treatment of any doing considered as being good for the
leading ethno-nation, resulted in a peculiar oblivion of morality, followed by an en
masse breaking of legal rules, by widespread criminalization of society, by frequent
inhumane doings directed not only to individuals who belonged to ethnic group (s)
with which the given society was in hostile relations, but also to those individuals of
the same ethnicity who were considered to be disloyal toward their ethnicity. If one
takes into consideration the real multi-ethnicity of the new post-Yugoslav societies
and destructive consequences of the ethno-national constitutions of such societies,
it is inevitable to conclude that just this process of ethno-nationalization of all post-
Yugoslav societies, and Serbian society in particular, contributed in a fundamental sense
to the destruction of society
m
the area of former Yugoslavia.
When analyzing social circumstances that could have contributed to the process
of destruction of society, one should not forget the long-lasting economic crises both
in the former Yugoslavia and in Serbia as well, generating widespread pauperization of
people in this country. Individuals who were, sometimes for years, out of job and wit¬
hout an income, thus lacking basic existential means, must have resorted to selfishness
and forgotten their society as they had to look for ways to solve their life problems
disrespecting the regular institutions, disrespecting legal rules. A massively pauperized
society cannot be a well ordered society in which institutions and individuals act in accor¬
dance with their social roles. Therefore, under the given
socio-structural
conditions,
even ordinary citizens can contribute, by their doings, to the destruction of society.
Of course, their impact on this process is not autonomous. More relevant are doings
oí
powerful social actors who decisively contribute to the formation, functioning and
destruction of social institutions and to the functioning of social system in its totality.
In the preceding analysis of social circumstances which could generate processes
of social destruction, several circumstances were mentioned, but none of them was
characterized as a decisive circumstance . In the case of Serbia during the
1990s,
the
destruction of society was most probably a result of simultaneous impacts of a mul¬
titude of factors . Of course, some of those circumstances preceded other circumstan¬
ces, i. e. the long-lasting social and economic crises in Yugoslavia being severe and
destructive since the beginning of the
1980s.
Economic instability seemed to have
been the crucial reason for a widespread dissatisfaction of the people in Yugoslavia
during the
1980s,
qualified as such by the leading political and state organs of Yugo¬
slavia23. Discussions about measures for economic stabilization opened confrontations
23
At the beginning of
1982,
the Presidency of Yugoslavia appointed the Commission for the long-
term program of economic stabilization, presided by the President of Presidency
(Sergej
Krajger).
A group of leading sociologists, coordinated by this author, was asked to prepare a document on
social aspects of the program of economic stabilization . In that document, the sociologists charac¬
terized the social situation in Yugoslavia as a situation of the social crisis, and not just as a situation
of economic instability, proposing radical socio-systemic changes as a way to overcome even the
problems of economic instability. At the time this assessment of the sociologists was not accepted
Summary
309
between the leading figures of various republics, expressed mainly as the confron¬
tations about the relations in the Federation. Leaders of some republics, specifically
those from Slovenia and Croatia, blamed federal institutions for enacting wrong mea¬
sures of economic policy, for inappropriate investment policy and mal-regulation of
economic contributions of republics to the Federal sources distributed mostly to the
less developed parts of Yugoslavia. Some leaders (of Serbia and some less developed
republics) advocated stronger Federation , others were in favor of greater indepen¬
dence in activities of the state organs in the republics, i. e. of a weaker Federation or
asymmetric Federation. Although the republics of the former Yugoslavia were not
constituted as ethno-national states but as socio-political communities of all the
citizens living at the territory populated mostly by the citizens of a given ethnicity, those
cleavages about the relations in the Federation were felt like conflicts between nati¬
ons (ethnicities) united in Yugoslavia because of their conflicting national interests .
One could expect that this ethnic articulation of conflicts of the representatives of
the nations would provoke the rise of national sentiments of ordinary citizens,
massive frustrations of the members of the given ethnicities, the revival of national
ideologies and even some preparatory activities to safeguard the vital interests of the
nations if endangered by other nations .
It must be stressed that in their discussions about the relations in the Federation ,
the politicians of the republics avoided qualifying their own positions as well as the
positions of others taking part in discussions, as ethnically biased or as favorable to
the interests of a certain constitutive nation . All overt positions were expressed in
terms of advocating further development of self-management mode of governan¬
ce in all segments of the Yugoslav society and efforts in favor of modernization and
democratization of Yugoslavia. It looked as if the media and the creators of the public
opinion played a big independent role in the revival of national sentiments, evoking
bad memories of previous ethnic clashes. Among ordinary citizens there was still a
prevailing perception that, all in all, the inter-ethnic relations in each of the republics,
and in Yugoslavia in general, were good24. Even the expressed problems and cleavages
were perceived as solvable within the existing constitutive framework of Yugoslavia as
a multi-ethnic state and a multiethnic society. Well, in spite of those prevailing feelings
among ordinary citizens who did not envision any threatening conflicts, the real
social developments took a different, tragic direction in resolving those conflicting
demands for redesigning the Federation by war activities within the borders of the
former republics and within the borders of the former Yugoslavia.
Searching for an explanation of such a tragic course in resolving the Yugoslav
crisis of the
1980s,
one has to consider the role of some powerful social actors, playing
by the leading politicians in Yugoslavia, including the politicians in Serbia, although there was no
direct opposition to it. See more on the statements of the sociologist in: Scientia Yugoslavia, No.
4-5,
Zagreb,
1985.
24
See: M.
Łazić,
1991.
310
Silvano
Bolcić
Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva
an important role in the final characterization of the essence of the state and the social
problems in Yugoslavia at the end of the
1980s,
and in making strategic decisions
while trying to resolve those problems. There is one moment that should also be con¬
sidered. Namely, the long-lasting social crises, clearly manifested at the beginning of
the vl 980s, causing a massive discontent of the people with the worsening of their life
situations and even more, a discontent with the crying inefficiency and incapacity of
the politicians to work out proper measures to resolve the existing social and state
problems, contributed to the formation of a social atmosphere in which a request for
quick, decisive solutions was accentuated. Such an atmosphere was a fertile ground for
the demand and also for the supply of political actors who had (or pretended to
have) the necessary qualities and the ability to make prompt and decisive actions to
overcome the disturbing social problems. Even if, from some superficial insights, one
might come to the conclusion that some of the key contributors to the tragic deve¬
lopments in the given destroyed society somehow self-elected themselves to those
leading positions, one should not forget the
socio-structural
context that enabled such
individuals to assume the leading roles, and one must also be aware of a multitude of
actors, visible and invisible, supporting the activities of those key historical figures.
Emphasizing this side of the story does not mean undermining the real role and
responsibility of some of the key political figures in starting and maintaining the pro¬
cesses of the overall destruction of the given society.
The role of personality must be considered in this attempt to understand the pro¬
cess of social destruction of Serbia during the
1990s.
Even if a lot of serious investiga¬
tions are needed in order to understand essential social circumstances which lead to
the destruction of the society of Serbia, there seems to be a reliably established fact that
Slobodan Milosevic, in the role of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
played an essential part, regrettably a sinister one, in the initiation and stabilization of
the processes of destruction of society , i. e. both of the multi-ethnic Yugoslav society
and of the newly constituted Serbian society.
Without attempting to make a comprehensive analysis of S. Milosevics actions in
regard to social developments in Serbia in the last two or three decades, in the context
of this analysis of the destruction of the Serbian society, particular attention will be
given to his contribution to the processes of destruction of the social institutions in
Serbia. It is relevant to know that some of his actions contributing to the later destruc¬
tion of the social institutions in general began at the beginning of the
1980s,
that is,
before the final dismantling of Yugoslavia as a multi-ethnic federal state, and also
before the beginning of war activities on the Yugoslav area . One might say that, in
a symbolic sense, the Milosevic era was announced on the poster for the
10*
Con¬
gress of the League of Communists of Serbia
(1986),
the poster with a characteristic
fist, when Milosevic was elected President of the Central Committee of the Serbian
Communist League. Soon after he was enthroned as the most powerful politician
in Serbia, S. Milosevic undertook actions aimed at unraveling the social crises in
Yugoslavia as well as in and Serbia. Unfortunately, his contributions to the unraveling
Summary
311
of the Yugoslav crisis led to the dismantling of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, to the final destruction of the state of Yugoslavia and to a series of sinister
developments in all parts of Yugoslavia. The destruction of the society of Serbia is one of
those sinister results ofS. Milosevic s unraveling of social crises of the
1980s
in Yugoslavia.
The new style of S. Milosevic s political acting was characterized as determina¬
tion, prompt action,
afirm
unity (not only within the Party, but also in the society),
which must be achieved even by disregarding usual institutional procedures, when
necessary. This new style was visibly demonstrated in the way S. Milosevic perfor¬
med his role of the President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCS25.
What is relevant here is the conflict within the Presidency of the Central Committee
between S. Milosevic and D.
Pavlovié,
President of the Committee of Belgrade Party
organization, which ended with the ousting of D.
Pavlovic
from all the Party bodi¬
es and from the Party itself.26 The mode of resolving this intra-Party conflict also
visible, in Milosevic s subsequent activities in resolving other social situations in
Yugoslavia and Serbia, indicated clearly his disrespect of institutional arrangements.
Also, this superficially characterized intra-Party conflict demonstrated a new Ser¬
bian ethno-national policy, which inevitably led to the destruction of Yugoslavia as a
multi-
ethnic state and society.
S. Milosevic was explicit in his advocacy of non-institutional methods of resol¬
ving social issues: But, the solution will not come by the procedure, its small and big
traps, small and big trickeries, intrigues and wiles. The solution will provide the policy
chosen by the majority of people of this country, institutionally or non-institutionally,
according to the statute or against the statute, on the street, or inside, in a populist
or elitist way, with arguments, or without arguments, in any case it should be clear
that this will be in accordance with the politics for Yugoslavia in which we will live
more united, treated equally, wealthier and more cultural. 27The real effects of such
a policy became more and more damaging in all domains of life in Yugoslavia and
Serbia. Among those deserving recognition one could hardly question the leading
position of Slobodan Milosevic.
On the reconstitution of the society of Serbia
It has been mentioned that the processes of social destruction are complex pro¬
cesses of longer duration, generated by many actors and factors. Therefore, it was
unrealistic to expect the immediate reconstitution of society in Serbia after the dethro¬
nement of the old government and the electoral victory of
anti-Milošević s
forces
25
See more: D.
Pavlovic,
1988, 42, 45, 63.
26
Comprehensive description of this case in given in the quoted book of D.
Pavlovic.
27
This quotation comes from the speech of S. Milosevic at the Central Comittee of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia, see: Milosevic,
1989, 333.
312
Silvano Bolcic
Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva
in the autumn of
2000.
Of course, there were some positive developments: positions
in the state institutions were mostly taken by new persons selected through free and
fair democratic elections. The living standard of the majority of citizens was slightly
improved. The share of the grey economy decreased, and most of the economic life
returned to the usual legal forms and institutions. Still, many of the above-mentioned
features of a destroyed society have continued to exist in Serbian society after the year
2000.
The activation of disposable domestic economic resources (both material and
human resources) has been insufficient. The revival of retail trade activities and finan¬
cial transactions has come mostly owing to the liberalization of foreign investments,
financial and trade activities. However, because of such a model of revitalization of
the economy there has been a great increase of the external debt, the
de
facto under¬
valued domestic currency, and the number of unemployed has continued to rise.
In the political domain, in the socio-systemic building of the state and society,
there are still many unfinished developments. Most of the issues concerning the
state borders after the dissolution of the Yugoslav state are still open. From the
socio-
structural
aspect, the society of Serbia has continued to be very fragmented with an
elite whose legitimacy is still under question. Under such conditions, state institutions
continue to be inefficient in carrying out their functions, especially in making proper,
socially accepted strategic decisions. People continue to see that key political decisions
are being taken outside of the provisioned institutions. In spite of some improvements
in the living conditions, most citizens subjectively perceive their situation as similar
to the one they had during the
1990s.
In public reactions one continues to speak of
a moral crisis, of widespread selfishness, of corruption, of low trust in institutions
and of a need to evade the legal rules in securing ones essential personal interests.
In such a social atmosphere the social and individual perspectives seem to be unclear.
A great number of young people still see their future somewhere abroad and the brain
drain trend from the
1990s
continues.
The transformative changes since October
2000
have provided a fast personal
replacement in the apex of the social pyramid, not a radical change of the strategic
orientation in state and social building of the Serbian society. There has been a discon¬
tinuity with the Milosevic regime by replacing of a greatly autocratic governance with
a more democratic governance; by forming a more responsible executive branch of
government; by abandoning the policy of confrontation with the rest of the world,
with the international community , and by building less hostile relations with the
neighboring states; by substituting the dominant state/social ownership of the means
of production mostly with privately owned economic units, etc. On can speak of the
discontinuities that have just been initiated, for it will take the new state and social
policy years to achieve fundamental changes in Serbia. However, even
ifall
of the abo¬
ve-mentioned transformations had been successfully carried out, one would have to
assess such transformations as small transformations and not great transformations ,
Summary
313
according to K. Polanyi s interpretation.28 In the case of Serbia, one should recall that
the basic tone of all political and social developments originated from the battles
for national interests . Unless such battles are reconsidered, unless failures and those
responsible for them are revealed, it is practically impossible to rebuild new societal
strategies for the future of Serbia and to leave behind the sinister years of resolving
social crises, that is, the years of the destruction of Serbian society during the
1990s.
The new political forces in Serbia tended to postpone the questioning of the nati¬
onal agenda of the
1990s,
thus pushing themselves into an awkward and contradictory
situation: on the one hand, these new political forces established cooperative relations
with the institutions of the international community , including the cooperation with
the Hague tribunal, regaining, in return, the respect and credibility of those foreign
factors ; on the other hand, partly because of such a cooperative approach toward the
international community , these new governing powers were losing credibility and
support of their citizens. Since a considerable number of Serbian citizens questioned its
legitimacy and credibility, the new government was incapable of greater mobilization
of all the disposable resources and of improving economic conditions in the country.
It becomes clear that ethno-national issues should not be provisionally swept under
the carpet for tactical reasons . This kind of social engineering
de
facto brings back
the bad years of the
1990s;
the discrepancy between the existing
Constitution
and the new
social reality is maintained, contributing to the inconsistent legal rules, which must be
disrespected, thus leading to a situation of a destroyed society that is characterized by
the negation of the legal regulation as the key mode of regulation in modern societies.
Before the Serbian society achieves maturity in addressing the difficult issues of
the Serbian national program , a national program which will be sufficiently different
from the program attempted to be implemented during the
1990s,
but again, a pro¬
gram that
wiîl
rebuild a sufficient consensus between the masses and their elites, the
time for a new leap forward and for the
reconstitution
of society will not come. Serbia
could be faced with a continuing blockade of its post-socialist transformation , with
a limited scope of its democratization and modernization, losing its attractiveness to
its own citizens, and even more, losing attractiveness to the rest of the modern world.
28
See: K. Polanyi,
1944;
G.
Lengyel
(2001)
prepared a reader of the papers on transformation in Hun¬
gary, qualifying those changes as a small transformation .
|
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| author_role | aut |
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| id | DE-604.BV042151091 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:13:58Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788651917458 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027590934 |
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| publisher | Službeni Glasnik |
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| spelling | Bolčić, Silvano Verfasser (DE-588)170042928 aut Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva Srbija na prelazu u XXI vek Silvano Bolčić Beograd Službeni Glasnik 2013 331 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Biblioteka Nauka i društvo / Edicija Sinteze Geschichte 1990-2010 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftssystem (DE-588)4117663-7 gnd rswk-swf Soziales System (DE-588)4055764-9 gnd rswk-swf Sozioökonomischer Wandel (DE-588)4318539-3 gnd rswk-swf Systemtransformation (DE-588)4060633-8 gnd rswk-swf Serbien (DE-588)4054598-2 gnd rswk-swf Serbien (DE-588)4054598-2 g Sozioökonomischer Wandel (DE-588)4318539-3 s Geschichte 1990-2010 z DE-604 Wirtschaftssystem (DE-588)4117663-7 s Soziales System (DE-588)4055764-9 s Systemtransformation (DE-588)4060633-8 s Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027590934&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027590934&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Bolčić, Silvano Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva Srbija na prelazu u XXI vek Wirtschaftssystem (DE-588)4117663-7 gnd Soziales System (DE-588)4055764-9 gnd Sozioökonomischer Wandel (DE-588)4318539-3 gnd Systemtransformation (DE-588)4060633-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4117663-7 (DE-588)4055764-9 (DE-588)4318539-3 (DE-588)4060633-8 (DE-588)4054598-2 |
| title | Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva Srbija na prelazu u XXI vek |
| title_auth | Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva Srbija na prelazu u XXI vek |
| title_exact_search | Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva Srbija na prelazu u XXI vek |
| title_full | Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva Srbija na prelazu u XXI vek Silvano Bolčić |
| title_fullStr | Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva Srbija na prelazu u XXI vek Silvano Bolčić |
| title_full_unstemmed | Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva Srbija na prelazu u XXI vek Silvano Bolčić |
| title_short | Razaranje i rekonstitucija društva |
| title_sort | razaranje i rekonstitucija drustva srbija na prelazu u xxi vek |
| title_sub | Srbija na prelazu u XXI vek |
| topic | Wirtschaftssystem (DE-588)4117663-7 gnd Soziales System (DE-588)4055764-9 gnd Sozioökonomischer Wandel (DE-588)4318539-3 gnd Systemtransformation (DE-588)4060633-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Wirtschaftssystem Soziales System Sozioökonomischer Wandel Systemtransformation Serbien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027590934&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027590934&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bolcicsilvano razaranjeirekonstitucijadrustvasrbijanaprelazuuxxivek |