Moving beyond pretense: nuclear power and nonproliferation
The U.S. President and nearly all his critics agree that the spread of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their seizure and potential use is the greatest danger facing the United States and the world. Looking at the way government and industry officials downplay the risks of civilian nuclear tec...
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Buch |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Carlisle Barracks, PA
United States Army War College Press
2014
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | The U.S. President and nearly all his critics agree that the spread of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their seizure and potential use is the greatest danger facing the United States and the world. Looking at the way government and industry officials downplay the risks of civilian nuclear technology and materials being diverted to make bombs, one would get almost the opposite impression. In fact, most governments have made the promotion of nuclear power's growth and global development a top priority. Throughout, they have insisted that the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation are manageable either by making future nuclear plants more "proliferation-resistant" or by strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and acquiring more timely intelligence on proliferators. How sound is this view? How useful might civilian nuclear programs be for states that want to get nuclear weapons quickly? Are current International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safeguards sufficient to block military nuclear diversions from civilian programs? Are there easy fixes to upgrade these controls? How much can we count on more timely intelligence on proliferators to stem the further spread of nuclear weapons? This volume taps the insights and analyses of 13 top security and nuclear experts to get the answers. What emerges is a comprehensive counternarrative to the prevailing wisdom and a series of innovative reforms to tighten existing nuclear nonproliferation controls. For any official, analyst, or party concerned about the spread of nuclear technology, this book is essential reading |
| Beschreibung: | "June 2014.". - Cover title. - Includes bibliographical references |
| Beschreibung: | XII, 507 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 1584876204 9781584876205 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| adam_text | MOVING BEYOND PRETENSE
/
: 2014
TABLE OF CONTENTS / INHALTSVERZEICHNIS
INTRODUCTION : NUCLEAR ENERGY S SECURITY STORY / HENRY SOKOLSKI
PART I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION MATTERS. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION : LOOKING
BACK, THINKING AHEAD : HOW BAD WOULD THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS BE? / FRANCIOIS HEISBOURG
THE HISTORY OF PROLIFERATION OPTIMISM : DOES IT HAVE A FUTURE? / MATTHEW
KROENIG
PREVENTIVE WAR AND THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR PROGRAMS / MATTHE FUHRMANN
PART II. NUCLEAR POWER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS : CLARIFYING THE LINKS. NUCLEAR
POWER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS : CLARIFYING THE LINKS / VICTOR GILINSKY
SCOPING INTANGIBLE PROLIFERATION RELATED TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS :
TRACKING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WITHIN A COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM
/ SUSAN VOSS
PERSUADING COUNTRIES TO FORGO NUCLEAR FUEL-MAKING : WHAT HISTORY
SUGGESTS / RICHARD S. CLEARY
CENTRIFUGES : A NEW ERA FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION / R. SCOTT KEMP
PART III. HOW WELL CAN WE SAFEGUARD THE PEACEFUL ATOM? HOW WELL WILL THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY BE ABLE TO SAFEGUARD MORE NUCLEAR
MATERIALS IN MORE STATES? / PATRICK S. ROBERTS
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY INSPECTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE / OLLI
HEINONEN
LOOKING BEYOND IRAN AND NORTH KOREA FOR SAFEGUARDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION / PIERRE GOLDSCHMIDT
PART IV. IGNORING NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION INTELLIGENCE. CASTING A
BLIND EYE : KISSINGER AND NIXON FINESSE ISRAEL S BOMB / VICTOR GILINSKY
THE 1979 SOUTH ATLANTIC FLASH : THE CASE FOR AN ISRAELI NUCLEAR TEST /
LEONARD WEISS
THE NONUSE AND ABUSE OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INTELLIGENCE IN THE CASES
OF NORTH KOREA AND IRAN / ROBERT ZARATE
FACING THE REALITY OF IRAN AS A DE FACTO NUCLEAR STATE / GREGORY S.
JONES
PART V. SERIOUS RULES FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION. SERIOUS RULES FOR
NUCLEAR POWER WITHOUT PROLIFERATION / HENRY SOKOLSKI AND VICTOR GILINSKY
DIESES SCHRIFTSTUECK WURDE MASCHINELL ERZEUGT.
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| spelling | Moving beyond pretense nuclear power and nonproliferation Henry Sokolski, ed. Carlisle Barracks, PA United States Army War College Press 2014 XII, 507 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "June 2014.". - Cover title. - Includes bibliographical references The U.S. President and nearly all his critics agree that the spread of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their seizure and potential use is the greatest danger facing the United States and the world. Looking at the way government and industry officials downplay the risks of civilian nuclear technology and materials being diverted to make bombs, one would get almost the opposite impression. In fact, most governments have made the promotion of nuclear power's growth and global development a top priority. Throughout, they have insisted that the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation are manageable either by making future nuclear plants more "proliferation-resistant" or by strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and acquiring more timely intelligence on proliferators. How sound is this view? How useful might civilian nuclear programs be for states that want to get nuclear weapons quickly? Are current International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safeguards sufficient to block military nuclear diversions from civilian programs? Are there easy fixes to upgrade these controls? How much can we count on more timely intelligence on proliferators to stem the further spread of nuclear weapons? This volume taps the insights and analyses of 13 top security and nuclear experts to get the answers. What emerges is a comprehensive counternarrative to the prevailing wisdom and a series of innovative reforms to tighten existing nuclear nonproliferation controls. For any official, analyst, or party concerned about the spread of nuclear technology, this book is essential reading Politik Nuclear disarmament United States Nuclear weapons Government policy United States National security United States Nuclear nonproliferation Government policy United States Deterrence (Strategy) Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd rswk-swf Proliferation Militär (DE-588)4309759-5 gnd rswk-swf USA United States Military policy USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 s Proliferation Militär (DE-588)4309759-5 s DE-604 Sokolski, Henry Sonstige oth Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.) Sonstige (DE-588)1046371-9 oth LoC Fremddatenuebernahme application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027535782&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
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| title | Moving beyond pretense nuclear power and nonproliferation |
| title_auth | Moving beyond pretense nuclear power and nonproliferation |
| title_exact_search | Moving beyond pretense nuclear power and nonproliferation |
| title_full | Moving beyond pretense nuclear power and nonproliferation Henry Sokolski, ed. |
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| title_short | Moving beyond pretense |
| title_sort | moving beyond pretense nuclear power and nonproliferation |
| title_sub | nuclear power and nonproliferation |
| topic | Politik Nuclear disarmament United States Nuclear weapons Government policy United States National security United States Nuclear nonproliferation Government policy United States Deterrence (Strategy) Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd Proliferation Militär (DE-588)4309759-5 gnd |
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