Varieties of logic:
Logical pluralism is the view that different logics are equally appropriate, or equally correct. Logical relativism is a pluralism according to which validity and logical consequence are relative to something. In Varieties of logic, Stewart Shapiro develops several ways in which one can be a plurali...
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1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Univ. Press
2014
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Ausgabe: | 1. ed. |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Zusammenfassung: | Logical pluralism is the view that different logics are equally appropriate, or equally correct. Logical relativism is a pluralism according to which validity and logical consequence are relative to something. In Varieties of logic, Stewart Shapiro develops several ways in which one can be a pluralist or relativist about logic. One of these is an extended argument that words and phrases like 'valid' and 'logical consequence' are polysemous or, perhaps better, are cluster concepts. The notions can be sharpened in various ways. This explains away the 'debates' in the literature between inferentialists and advocates of a truth-conditional, model-theoretic approach, and between those who advocate higher-order logic and those who insist that logic is first-order. A significant kind of pluralism flows from an orientation toward mathematics that emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century, and continues to dominate the field today. The theme is that consistency is the only legitimate criterion for a theory. Logical pluralism arises when one considers a number of interesting and important mathematical theories that invoke a non-classical logic, and are rendered inconsistent, and trivial, if classical logic is imposed. So validity is relative to a theory or structure. The perspective raises a host of important questions about meaning. The most significant of these concern the semantic content of logical terminology, words like 'or', 'not', and 'for all', as they occur in rigorous mathematical deduction. Does the intuitionistic 'not', for example, have the same meaning as its classical counterpart? Shapiro examines the major arguments on the issue, on both sides, and finds them all wanting |
Beschreibung: | 226 S. |
ISBN: | 9780199696529 0199696527 |
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520 | |a Logical pluralism is the view that different logics are equally appropriate, or equally correct. Logical relativism is a pluralism according to which validity and logical consequence are relative to something. In Varieties of logic, Stewart Shapiro develops several ways in which one can be a pluralist or relativist about logic. One of these is an extended argument that words and phrases like 'valid' and 'logical consequence' are polysemous or, perhaps better, are cluster concepts. The notions can be sharpened in various ways. This explains away the 'debates' in the literature between inferentialists and advocates of a truth-conditional, model-theoretic approach, and between those who advocate higher-order logic and those who insist that logic is first-order. A significant kind of pluralism flows from an orientation toward mathematics that emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century, and continues to dominate the field today. The theme is that consistency is the only legitimate criterion for a theory. Logical pluralism arises when one considers a number of interesting and important mathematical theories that invoke a non-classical logic, and are rendered inconsistent, and trivial, if classical logic is imposed. So validity is relative to a theory or structure. The perspective raises a host of important questions about meaning. The most significant of these concern the semantic content of logical terminology, words like 'or', 'not', and 'for all', as they occur in rigorous mathematical deduction. Does the intuitionistic 'not', for example, have the same meaning as its classical counterpart? Shapiro examines the major arguments on the issue, on both sides, and finds them all wanting | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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---|---|
adam_text | Contents
1.
Relativism, Pluralism,
Tolerance
1
2.
Varieties of Pluralism and Relativism for Logic
17
3.
Structure: An Eclectic Perspective
63
4.
We Mean What We Say: But What Do We Mean?
88
5.
Meaning and Context
126
6.
Theory and Meta-theory; Logic and Meta-logic I:
Philosophical and Foundational Studies
163
7.
Theory and Meta-theory; Logic and Meta-logic II:
Meta-theoretic Perspective
182
Recapitulation and Conclusion
205
References
210
Index
221
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Shapiro, Stewart 1951- |
author_GND | (DE-588)131540564 |
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dewey-full | 160 |
dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-ones | 160 - Philosophical logic |
dewey-raw | 160 |
dewey-search | 160 |
dewey-sort | 3160 |
dewey-tens | 160 - Philosophical logic |
discipline | Philosophie |
edition | 1. ed. |
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language | English |
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spelling | Shapiro, Stewart 1951- Verfasser (DE-588)131540564 aut Varieties of logic Stewart Shapiro 1. ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2014 226 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Logical pluralism is the view that different logics are equally appropriate, or equally correct. Logical relativism is a pluralism according to which validity and logical consequence are relative to something. In Varieties of logic, Stewart Shapiro develops several ways in which one can be a pluralist or relativist about logic. One of these is an extended argument that words and phrases like 'valid' and 'logical consequence' are polysemous or, perhaps better, are cluster concepts. The notions can be sharpened in various ways. This explains away the 'debates' in the literature between inferentialists and advocates of a truth-conditional, model-theoretic approach, and between those who advocate higher-order logic and those who insist that logic is first-order. A significant kind of pluralism flows from an orientation toward mathematics that emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century, and continues to dominate the field today. The theme is that consistency is the only legitimate criterion for a theory. Logical pluralism arises when one considers a number of interesting and important mathematical theories that invoke a non-classical logic, and are rendered inconsistent, and trivial, if classical logic is imposed. So validity is relative to a theory or structure. The perspective raises a host of important questions about meaning. The most significant of these concern the semantic content of logical terminology, words like 'or', 'not', and 'for all', as they occur in rigorous mathematical deduction. Does the intuitionistic 'not', for example, have the same meaning as its classical counterpart? Shapiro examines the major arguments on the issue, on both sides, and finds them all wanting Metamathematik (DE-588)4074759-1 gnd rswk-swf Relativismus (DE-588)4177682-3 gnd rswk-swf Philosophie der Logik (DE-588)4382045-1 gnd rswk-swf Epistemologischer Kontextualismus (DE-588)4998367-2 gnd rswk-swf Relativismus (DE-588)4177682-3 s Epistemologischer Kontextualismus (DE-588)4998367-2 s Philosophie der Logik (DE-588)4382045-1 s DE-604 Metamathematik (DE-588)4074759-1 s Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027504040&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Shapiro, Stewart 1951- Varieties of logic Metamathematik (DE-588)4074759-1 gnd Relativismus (DE-588)4177682-3 gnd Philosophie der Logik (DE-588)4382045-1 gnd Epistemologischer Kontextualismus (DE-588)4998367-2 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4074759-1 (DE-588)4177682-3 (DE-588)4382045-1 (DE-588)4998367-2 |
title | Varieties of logic |
title_auth | Varieties of logic |
title_exact_search | Varieties of logic |
title_full | Varieties of logic Stewart Shapiro |
title_fullStr | Varieties of logic Stewart Shapiro |
title_full_unstemmed | Varieties of logic Stewart Shapiro |
title_short | Varieties of logic |
title_sort | varieties of logic |
topic | Metamathematik (DE-588)4074759-1 gnd Relativismus (DE-588)4177682-3 gnd Philosophie der Logik (DE-588)4382045-1 gnd Epistemologischer Kontextualismus (DE-588)4998367-2 gnd |
topic_facet | Metamathematik Relativismus Philosophie der Logik Epistemologischer Kontextualismus |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027504040&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT shapirostewart varietiesoflogic |