Beogradska Konferencija Nesvrstanih Zemalja 1 - 6. septembra 1961.: prilog istoriji trećeg sveta
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Tagungsbericht Buch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Beograd
Zavod Za Udžbenike
2013
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. izd. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Engl. Zsfassung u.d.T.: Towards the Belgarde Conference : Yugoslavia and the beginnings of the Non-Alignment-Movement |
| Beschreibung: | 583 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 9788617180605 |
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| 500 | |a Engl. Zsfassung u.d.T.: Towards the Belgarde Conference : Yugoslavia and the beginnings of the Non-Alignment-Movement | ||
| 546 | |a In kyrill. Schr., serb. | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Садржај
БЕОГРАДСКА КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА НЕСВРСТАНИХ ЗЕМАЉА
1-6.
СЕПТЕМБРА
1961.
ПРИЛОГ ИСТОРИЈИ
ТРЕЋЕГ
СВЕТА
.............................. 7
Увод
...............................................................
Π
Прерастање доктринарних
начела
у политику
несврстаности
................................................. 14
Успостављање
тесне билатералне
сарадње Југославије
са
несврстаним
земљама
............... 23
Инициативе за
формирање
покрета ванблоковскихдржава
....... 52
Београдска
конференција
и проблем
институционализације
сарадње
ванблоковских држава
............................... 109
ОД БАНДУНГА ДО БЕОГРАДА
(Југославија
и почеци организованна ванблоковског света)
........ 123
ОД БАНДУНГА ДО БЕОГРАДА
(документи)
.......................................................... 221
[
глава
Бандунг
-
Бриони
-
Њујорк
1955-1960.
Завршни коминике Бандуншке
конференціє
.................. 223
II
глава
Инициативе и дилеме
.......................................... 243
,
III
глава
Намере,
реакције, притисци
.................................... 326
IV
глава
Београдска
конференција несврстаних земаља
................ 403
V
глава
Београд и после Београда
...................................... 490
Towards the Belgrade Conference
.................................... 568
Биографије
аутора
.................................................. 578
Регистар личних имена
............................................. 580
TOWARDS THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE
Yugoslavia and the Beginnings of the
Non-Aligned Movement
In September
1961,
Yugoslav State and Party leadership viewed the future with opti¬
mism. Both the East and the West respected Yugoslavia s borders and its territorial integrity
and tolerated its foreign policy, albeit somewhat
bègrudgingly.
What was the essence of this foreign policy with regard to Asia and Africa?
Judging by
Josip Broz
Tito s political speeches and statements, Yugoslavia s foreign
policy posture, which possessed clear ideological bias, was founded on several important
premises:
-
That the belief in the ability of the Great Powers to find a peaceful solution to the key
problems of the post-war world was a delusion;
-
That it was erroneous to dismiss „small and especially non-engaged countries as
incapable of participating in World politics and contributing to the resolution of interna¬
tional problems.
-
That the fate of the world is universal (everyone would bear the consequences of a
clash between the Great Powers) and that as a consequence, „large and „small countries
share deep common interest, obligations and responsibilities.
-
That conservative regimes have no future, that their time has run out and that the true
aims of the armament race and the Cold war were to stop the defeat of capitalism and the
spreading of socialism („...the triumphant march of progress and world transformation...
in Tito s words) by the use of military force.
-
That international relations should be viewed realistically in an age of nuclear weap¬
ons, space exploration, accelerated technological development, scientific achievements
and unprecedented life
opportunities.
-
That concentrated efforts should be directed towards the triumph of the „permanent
peace over the catastrophe caused by a war between the Great Powers. These principles
represented the foundation of the policy of „coexistence (peaceful and active) which
implied more than bare acknowledgment of other countries existence. It represented
a template for international relations based on lasting norms and principles including
non-interference into internal affairs of other countries, empowering nations to decide
their domestic and foreign policy, opposition to aggressive wars and spheres of interest,
promotion of peaceful political, economic and cultural cooperation irrespective of the
political system.
The policy of Non-Alignment, whose main proponents gathered in Belgrade in Sep¬
tember
1961,
was not an abstract concept. It was directly influenced by the direction of
international relations. The sources of the philosophy of Non-Alignment were in the process
of decolonisation and struggle for development. At the same time, Non-Alignment repre¬
sented a response to the prevalent characteristic of the international relations marked by
the presence of military blocs and consequent divisions as well as the resultant politics
of force. The opposition to the division of the world into power blocs was the signature
characteristic of the policy of Non-Alignment. This was based on the estimate that world
peace would be endangered for as long as the politics offeree and existence of blocs were
568
Towards the Belgrade Conference Yugoslavia and the Beginnings of the Non-Aligned Movement
present and as long as the powerful countries were allowed to impose their will on the
weaker ones. Siding with one of the blocs would represent abrogation of the newly-won
sovereign rights, independent political course, active participation in international politics,
cooperation with other peaceful countries and tailoring policies to suit their own interests.
Anti-colonial revolutions made the Non-Aligned movement possible. The striving for inde¬
pendence vis a vis foreign policy that emerged from these revolutions was superseded by
the need for regional coming together for the purpose of a common foreign policy posture.
This regionalism was eventually challenged by the universal significance of the problems
that needed to be tackled. The policy gradually changed from individualism to regionalism
to
universalism.
This process was assisted by the political principles which developed over
a number of years within certain Asian countries. These principles were articulated by the
Bandung Conference held in April
1955
and affirmed by all subsequent meetings of lead¬
ers of Non-Aligned countries. Unanimous demands for a radical change in international
relations
-
characterised by the Cold War polarisation, economic inequality and nuclear
holocaust threat
-
were made from the very beginning. Awareness that active participa¬
tion on the international scene strengthened the independence of individual countries and
made them an important factor in international political and economic relations did not
immediately result in coordinated joint action. The main obstacle lay in the differences
between individual countries interests which, as would transpire later, were difficult to
overcome. The universal validity of the principles of Non-Alignment was not always suf¬
ficient to heal divisions and resolve conflicts. The right of these countries to be treated as
equals in tackling international problems was not granted but wrested through struggle.
This was demonstrated by the Initiative of Five [Nehru, Nkrumah, Nasser, Sukarno and
Tito] submitted to the UN General Assembly in September
1960,
which demanded that
the leaders of the US and USSR restore their contacts and find solutions for the pressing
problems through negotiations. The Belgrade Conference represented a concrete applica¬
tion of the right to equitable participation in solving international problems.
Several factors critically influenced the formulation of the Yugoslav policy of „peaceful
and active coexistence . Experience gained through an indigenous revolution had a direct
impact on the idiosyncrasies of the domestic political developments and international
activities. Conflict with the Soviet Union and members of the Cominform forced the lead¬
ership to abandon old priorities and define new foreign policy aims. According to the
judgment of the Communist Party leadership, the cooperation with the West, although
grudging, represented the only way of protecting the country from the pressures coming
from the Soviet Union and „Popular democracies . Additional incentives for cooperation
were provided by the dire economic situation caused by the blockade, a large military
budget, poor harvests (especially in
1951)
and general poverty. The real prospect of attack
forced Yugoslavia to „tone down its foreign policy, abandon the revolutionary rhetoric and
draw closer to the West. Although „not conditional on political concessions , this unequal
collaboration with the West bothered Tito. Steps such as the liberalisation of economy,
change in the principles of social development, switch from the heavy to light industry,
démocratisation
of governance, diminished role for the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
as well as the gradual rapprochement with, and the inclusion into the Western military
alliance
-
all of this fundamentally meant abandoning socialist principles. In the opinion
of Tito and the Yugoslav leadership, finding a political alternative and a new international
direction would provide a way out of the deadly embrace of the East and the West, which
was bringing into question the survival of the country and the Communist Party rule. The
knowledge gained about developments in Asia, Africa and Europe contributed greatly to
the charting of this new course.
Yugoslav public paid a great deal of attention to the activities of the colonial Powers.
Of special interest was the liberation struggle fought by various anti-colonial movements.
The news concerning the situation in Iran appeared in the Yugoslav press as early as the
569
БЕОГРАДСКА
КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА
НЕСВРСТАНИХ
ЗЕМАЉА
1-6.
СЕПТЕМБРА
1961.
late autumn
1944.
Gradually, political vistas broadened to include Egypt, Syria and Leba¬
non all the way to China and Japan. The focus was on India and Levant but Indonesia, but
Vietnam (Indochina), Ethiopia, Iraq and Palestine were also of interest. From early on, the
public learned about the likes of Nehru, Sukarno and Mao Zedong. Information given in
the newspapers and on the radio was steeped in ideology which guided the interpreta¬
tion and evaluation of international events. The bulk of the information originated from
the „Soviet sources
-
telegraph agencies, radio stations and the press. From mid-
1948
onward, the sources changed but the interpretations remained the same. Political infor¬
mation dominated the discourse. News concerning the exploitation of natural resources
and cheap labour, strikes, state terror, passive resistance, armed struggle, conservative
regimes „tottering under the onslaught of freedom, social justice, racial and class equal¬
ity, moral bankruptcy of wars fought by the colonial powers, a „wildfire of anti-colonial
movements and revolutions
-
contributing to the emergence of a convincing and precisely
defined (and disseminated) ideological view of colonialism. Divisions and conflicts reported
in the media reflected a critique of the policy of spheres of interest, division into blocs,
armament race, technological boom, misuse of the nuclear energy, all forms of exclusion
and politics of force.
Similar to the information fed to the public was the (ideologically coloured] informa¬
tion entering the country through diplomatic channels and Party contacts from China
(from
1945),
Korea
(1946),
Iraq
(1946),
Lebanon
(1946),
Syria
(1946),
the Republic of
South Africa
(1946).
The conflict with the Soviet Union compelled Yugoslavia to redefine its foreign policy.
The Principles of the UN Charter were placed at the forefront of Yugoslavia s posture.
Already viewed by the Yugoslav politicians as an upholder of peace, guarantor of the ap¬
plication of International Law and the platform for dialogue between the Cold War rivals,
the OUN served as the sole forum for expressing their views. Although Yugoslavia had
already held well-defined positions on numerous international questions, it was notice¬
able that it followed the Soviet lead and adapted its views to suit the policy of the „First
Land of Socialism .
This undoubtedly resulted from a „genuine commonality of interests prompted by
the ideological and political closeness to the Soviet Union as well as the acceptance of the
Soviet experience and „solutions in all spheres of life. In addition, international opinion
was automatically polarised in line with the views of the Great Powers. Friendship Treaty
with the Soviet Union ratified in Moscow on 11th April
1945
ensured a common stance in
the spirit of „sincerest cooperation in all international activities aimed at securing peace
and security . Between
1945
and
1948,
Yugoslav diplomacy occasionally acted indepen¬
dently on what it considered to be the crucial issues, notwithstanding moderate levels of
engagement and superficial understanding of the functioning of the UN. Such acts were
informed by the indigenous nature of the Yugoslav revolution, „own understanding and
„independent estimates of the current situation. The specificity of the Yugoslav internal
development and „independent spirit was also coloured by the repeated insistence on
„strengthening peace , independence, autonomy, sovereignty, equality and cooperation
with all countries prepared to accept these principles.
Reduced diplomatic activity and pronounced agreement with the views of the Soviet
delegation during
1948
reflected attempts to eliminate foreign policy differences. The
approach Yugoslavia was forced to adopt following the clash with the Soviet Union and
„Popular democracies contained several important characteristics. It became realistic and
pragmatic (making use of international divisions), elastic (rather than dogmatic), active
(based on the understanding that small countries have their place in the international
political arena) and cautious (predicting future outcomes, evaluating different scenarios
and eliminating the element of surprise). The principles of the UN Charter were at the
forefront of the Yugoslav foreign policy. Differences with the Soviet Union not only brought
570
Towards the Belgrade Conference Yugoslavia and the Beginnings of the Non-Aligned Movement
into question the nature of the relations between socialist countries but also offered a
way forward for Yugoslav foreign policy. Following the decision by the Politburo of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (September,
1949],
the Yugoslav
diplomats at the UN were to act independently, in the interest of state and world peace.
This new foreign policy stance became visible at the Fourth Session of the UN General
Assembly in
1949
in which the Yugoslav side made public its dispute with the Soviet Union
-
receiving support from the majority of the members in the process. On that occasion,
Yugoslav delegates posed the question that would later serve as the basis for the policy
of „peaceful coexistence , namely, was it possible for states with different systems to co¬
exist and peacefully cooperate thereby securing world peace? As a direct consequence,
the Soviet Union abrogated the Friendship, Mutual Cooperation and Post-War Assistance
Treaty and a Second Resolution of the Cominform was published two months later (29th
November,
1948].
The Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia held at
the end of December
1949,
these pressures were characterised as „Cold War tactics used
by the USSR against Yugoslavia, and the „battle for independence fought by Yugoslavia
as the „most important battle for socialism in the world . From that point on, Yugoslavia
voted in accordance with its international interests and convictions. This new policy was
based on stressing the importance of small countries in world politics, opposing outside
interference in domestic affairs and pointing out the dangers of military blocs.
One year later, Yugoslavia became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Addressing the General Assembly, Head of the Yugoslav delegation
Edvard Kardelj
rejected
the imperative according to which „...the only choice for Mankind is between the hege¬
monies of two Powers . As an alternative, he offered a „second way to all free and equal
nations
-
the way that leads to permanent peace through the establishment of democratic
relations between nations, non-interference, striving for equality and comprehensive in¬
ternational cooperation. This new position signalled a toning-down of dogma-laden views
of irreconcilable fronts and a life-and-death struggle between conservatism and forces of
progress which had hitherto hampered Yugoslavia s international standing. Rejection of
the politics offeree and the risks of bloc alignment represented another premise of the
new course. Yugoslavia saw this policy as a way of defending its endangered existence (at
the UN, Yugoslavia was fighting a diplomatic battle for independence, territorial integrity
and the right to self-determination), shape its own position vis a vis the crucial questions
of world order and build a new international role. Such an approach meant abandoning the
role of a „second-rate player that necessarily befell small and economically and militar¬
ily weak countries. It indicated that Yugoslavia was now pursuing a mature policy based
on an understanding of the broader political context. Speeches by Yugoslav delegates to
the UN soon brought to light the outlines of a „new diplomatic course which consisted
in principled cooperation with all countries (irrespective of their system), struggle for
world peace and a world of free and equal nations, as well as the opposition to any form
of outside interference into domestic affairs.
The Korean War brought about another change in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.
At the time the Korean War broke out, it became possible for Yugoslavia, as a member of
the Security Council, to add a number of universally valid principles to a foreign policy
hitherto marked by a high degree of tension provoked by the clash with the Cominform.
These principles brought Yugoslavia closer to the countries such as India, Burma, Egypt
and Indonesia and made possible common action with regard to important international
issues. The commonality of views was reflected in the conviction that the polarisation of
the world was pushing small and newly liberated countries towards neutrality. According
to Tito, alignment with one of the sides meant „clearly endangering one s own country .
The calls for the defence of peace, peaceful conflict resolution, abolition of artificial trade
barriers and spheres of interest, rejection of all forms of aggression, as well as opposition
to hegemony and outside interference and support for the natural and historic striving of
571
БеОГРАДСКА КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА
НЕСВРСТАНИХ
ЗЕМАЉА
1-6.
СЕПТЕМБРА
1961.
the peoples of Asian and African countries to be free and independent
-
these were not
just elements of an attractive foreign policy platform, but also a means of defending one s
own independence. The Superpower conflict and the developments within the UN made
Yugoslavia, Burma, India, Egypt and Indonesia parts of the same historical process. The
journey from the vote against allowing the UN troops to cross the 38th Parallel in
1950,
via
first economic policy consultations, to permanent contacts maintained during UN General
Assembly Sessions, was a substantive one. It articulated resistance to the bloc-inspired
polarisation of the world.
The first contacts Yugoslavia made at the UN led to the „broadening of the political
perspectives through which a Eurocentric policy was replaced by the forging of global
links among Non-Aligned countries. In the beginning
[1950-1951],
such cooperation did
arise from a commonality of views regarding the international situation. It emerged from
the unique positions of individual countries vis a vis various political questions. According
to Tito (February
1952),
the policy of „active neutrality implied a struggle for peace and
protest against aggressive wars and spheres of interest, opposition to all forms of outside
interference into domestic affairs, maintenance of neighbourly relations and comprehen¬
sive development of peaceful economic, political and cultural cooperation on the basis of
equality and mutual understanding. In this period, Yugoslav diplomacy acted continu¬
ally at the Sessions of the UN General Assembly in accord with countries holding similar
positions. At the Seventh Session held in
1952,
the non-engaged countries raised the
issue of underdevelopment and the urgent need to overcome it. The following year saw a
demand for the establishment of an International Development Fund. In
1954,
the focus
was on colonialism. The Tenth Session
(1955)
highlighted the problems of disarmament.
Joint interventions demonstrated the degree to which non-alignment was already built
into the international doctrine of the countries of South-East Asia. Resisting pressures to
join the blocs, seeking peaceful resolution to conflicts with neighbours, fiercely protecting
national sovereignty, common position on decolonisation, opposition to racial discrimina¬
tion, actively neutral posture, poverty and underdevelopment and non-alignment
-
all of
these elements characterised the international stance of countries such as India, Burma,
Indonesia and Ceylon. Similar developments took place in the Middle Eastern and Afri¬
can countries such as Egypt, Syria (later the UAR) and Ethiopia as well as the states that
gained independence in the second half of the
1950s
(Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, the Congo
and others).
Beginning with
1952,
the Yugoslav Press started to analyse the problems of Asian and
African countries. At the end of
1952,
Yugoslav diplomats were given strict directives to
„strengthen contacts with representatives from Asian and African countries. This coincided
with the moment in which Yugoslavia, burdened by the relationship with the West, sought
a new foreign policy direction. The brief foray into regional cooperation with Greece and
Turkey (The Balkan Pact was formed in
1953
and became a military alliance in
1954)
as
well as the formulation of the policy of active neutrality opened the road for a new ap¬
proach marked by Tito s journeys (of which there were seven:
1.
Turkey, 12th-18th April,
1954; 2.
Greece, 2nd-6th June,
1954;
India and Burma, 16th December
1954-501
February
1955,
including the meeting with Nasser on board the yacht
Galeb
on the 5th February,
1955); 4.
Ethiopia and Egypt 11th December
1955-6*
January
1956; 5.
The UAR, Indonesia,
Burma, India, Ethiopia and Sudan, 5th December, 1958-Sth March
1959; 6.
15th Session
of the UN General Assembly in New York;
7.
Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco,
Tunisia, Algeria and the UAR, 28th February^nd April,
1961).
These trips represented
the first opportunity for Yugoslavia to connect with countries that followed a similar for¬
eign policy course. The crucial point was Titos s visit to India and Burma. Addressing the
members of the Indian Parliament on 21st December
1954,
Tito pointed out the importance
of coordinated international activity on the part of Yugoslavia and the countries of South
East Asia. Tito listed inequality, outside interference, spheres of interest and colonialism
572
Towards the Belgrade Conference Yugoslavia and the Beginnings of the Non-Aligned Movement
as greatest „evils faced by Mankind. He pronounced „active peaceful coexistence to be
the only path towards world peace. In his Rangoon speech, Tito contrasted attempts to
bring the principle of coexistence to the regional level with the strategy of connecting and
organising on a global scale. These two principles
- regionalist
and
universalist
-
would
clash often in years to come. At the end of his first journey, Tito realised that the quality of
information gained through personal contacts represented political capital which placed
him ahead of other Communist leaders traditionally unwilling to travel. Visits, meetings,
talks and exchanges of views became permanent features of Tito s and Yugoslavia s inter¬
national strategy. Conflict mediation not only shaped the policy of peaceful coexistence
but also ensured a role for Yugoslavia in global politics. Maintaining existing contacts was
complemented by the deepening of newly forged ties. Yugoslavia s foreign policy posture
was well thought through and carefully organised, leaving no room for improvisation. A
hitherto remote and poorly understood part of the world became a subject of deep analy¬
sis and systematic study. This was based on a sound understanding of world politics and
its principal protagonists. Yugoslavia constantly exchanged union, party, parliamentary,
economic, youth, scientific, military, cultural and expert delegations with a large number
of countries. The most capable and creative Yugoslav politicians travelled constantly to
Africa and Asia bringing back with a wealth of impressions, information and ideas. Yugo¬
slavia started sending its best diplomats to Africa and Asia [J. Djerdja, J. Vilfan, D. Kveder,
V.
Popović,
M.
Nikezić, D. Vidić
and others] and developing a highly professional press
service which monitored the media, reviewed literature and provided a daily analysis of
political and economic events.
A special unit was formed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tasked with analysing
the incoming information. Economic and Foreign policy institutes also contributed to a
better understanding of the prevailing trends in world politics. Such analytical approach
yielded a truthful image of the „other . This required a sound understanding of both histori¬
cal (studying historical development and especially
anticolonial
movements) and general
facts (area, population density, social structure, institutions, geopolitical and geostrategic
importance, political system, political, economic and cultural personalities). These two sub¬
jects made up
10-12%
ofinformation
gathered and analysed through diplomatic channels.
The conclusions arrived at were necessarily mutable and were continually updated by new
information. Economic analysis, exchange of expertise, knowledge and technology transfer
and the strengthening of economic ties meant that
20-25%
ofinformation
gathered by
diplomats and correspondents concerned economy. Political information, which involved
analysis of internal and external circumstances with a focus on key underlying processes,
comprised
50-60%
of all collected information. All of this information was used in formu¬
lating optimal state interests. The result was a complex yet reliable picture of the „other as
well as of Yugoslavia s own interests. This represented a cognitive shift from a superficial
(relying on perception and hearsay) to a deeper, scientific, level of understanding of for¬
eign policy issues. Although Yugoslavia did not participate in the Asia-Africa Conference in
Bandung (April,
1955),
the conclusions stated in the Final
Communiqué
were close if not
identical to its position. The very fact that
24
countries with diverse systems and views
gathered in one place was considered a success. In the opinion of Yugoslav diplomats, the
most important result of the Conference was the principle according to which
„...
the right
of all nations to individual and collective defence in accordance with the UN Charter should
be respected . Another principle stated that „...countries should refrain from entering into
collective defence arrangements which further interests of either Superpower . The stress
was placed on the solidarity between Asian and African countries in pursuing world peace
as well as their common determination to „...decide their own fate and tackle their own
problems . The Bandung Conference was considered a crossroads in terms of awakening
and bringing together of Asian and African nations as well as expressing the will for inde¬
pendence, belief in self-reliance and the increasing role in World politics. Importance was
573
БЕОГРАДСКА
КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА
НЕСВРСТАНИХ
ЗЕМАЉА
1-6.
СЕПТЕМБРА
1961.
given to the agreement on furthering economical development based on mutual interest
and respect for national sovereignty as well as the conviction that cultural cooperation
represented one of the most powerful ways of furthering international understanding.
These principles were followed by concrete demands for the improvement of cultural and
educational cooperation through knowledge and information exchange, revival of national
cultures and rejection of all forms of cultural and racial discrimination. The unanimous
condemnation of colonialism and discrimination and the proclamation of the principle
of self-determination and freedom to choose a political and economic system were con¬
sidered important victories. Branding colonialism as an evil that breaches fundamental
human rights and that should be urgently eliminated fitted in with the Yugoslav policy of
anti-colonialism. Condemnation of aggression, demands for universal disarmament and
ban on the production of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons were considered a great
success. It was stressed that the Bandung Principles contributed to a detente and created
a platform for solving current issues through international cooperation based on equality.
In Belgrade, the Bandung Conference was judged to represent a „historic crossroads her¬
alding a „new political landscape , triumph of non-alignment and „improvement in global
situation . For Tito himself, the determination by the peoples of Asia and Africa to „decide
their own fate as far as possible was of primary importance. The same was true of the
fact that „the conception dominating the Conference is in complete accord with our own .
The Principles of Bandung were confirmed in the meeting between Tito, Nehru and
Nasser, held in July of
1956.
The Joint Declaration insisted on the principle of „peaceful and
active coexistence . Notable were demands for disarmament and acceptance of China into
the UN. It was pointed out that the „...conflicting interests of Superpowers hindered the
resolution of the Middle Eastern conflict. It was concluded that the efforts of the Algerian
people to gain independence should be supported. Colonialism was condemned in prin¬
ciple and the Bandung position vis a vis Palestine was endorsed. The meeting abounded in
misunderstandings, difficulties in reconciling widely differing views, reserve and attempts
to diminish its importance. Nevertheless, the Brioni Meeting contributed significantly to
the convergence of Nehru s, Nasser s and Tito s views. The nationalisation of the Suez
Canal and the ensuing Suez Crisis prompted Tito and Nehru to open regular channels of
communication in order to coordinate views and act jointly in resolving the crisis. These
were the outlines of the core of the movement personified by Nehru, Tito and Nasser.
The contacts between Tito, Nasser, Nkrumah and Nehru at the 15th Annual Session of the
UN General Assembly (September,
1960)
were motivated by the conclusion that the Super¬
powers were not capable of reaching a compromise with respect to the key issues of world
peace. Presented in a separate resolution „The Initiative of Five represented an attempt by
Non-Aligned countries to mediate between the opposing Superpowers and their leaders.
Even though it failed to gain sufficient support, the Resolution signaled future realignments in
the UN, charted a course for the joint action by Non-AHgned countries and contributed to the
formation of close ties between countries with similar agendas. The „detente line achieved
a moral victory over the „politics of force .
41
countries voted for the Resolution and
37
US
allies voted against.
17
members close to the USSR abstained. Non-Aligned countries started
to view themselves as a positive, peaceful factor in the world politics. The speeches by the
above statements focussed on the issues of disarmament and colonisation to be followed
by more trips, meetings and talks. One of the topics was the organisation of a conference of
Non-Aligned countries as well as placing their cooperation on a formal footing. The idea of
a Non-Aligned summit to be held in Belgrade was taking shape.
The obstruction of the work of the UN which resulted from the Superpower conflict
added urgency to the need for a conference of Non-Aligned countries. The conclusion that
the Superpowers and aligned countries were not capable of maintaining world peace and
ensuring the running of the UN led to the idea that these tasks should become the responsi¬
bility of the numerically dominant Third World countries. In Tito s opinion, the first step to-
574
Towards the Belgrade Conference Yugoslavia and the Beginnings of the Non-Aligned Movement
wards strengthening their international clout would be a conference of Non-Aligned states.
The aim was to reach agreement on important issues such as the preservation of peace,
abolition of colonialism, disarmament, ban on nuclear testing and the unobstructed work
of the UN, before the 16th Annual Session of the UN General Assembly. An additional aim
of the gathering was to formulate a common stance at the UN through which Non-Aligned
countries could contribute to the resolution of the crises directly imperilling world peace.
Tito presented his views to some of Non-Aligned leaders (the King Hassan II, the Prince
AI-Hassan
and President
Bourguiba).
At a meeting held at the same time, Nasser gave his
support to the need to organise a Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-
Aligned Countries and reach a common position on all key issues. The diplomatic push
was immediately joined by the President of Indonesia Sukarno, governments of Afghani¬
stan and Ghana and after some equivocation, by the Prime Minister of India Nehru. This
opened the way for a gathering of representatives of Non-Aligned countries on a global
scale. The universal doctrine triumphed over the regional one. The Preparatory Meeting
held in Cairo in June
1961
represented an important step in that direction. There, a com¬
mon policy core was formulated vis a vis international issues. The agreed criteria used in
selecting Conference participants defined the essence of Non-Alignment. Belgrade was
chosen to be the host city by the majority of participants.
Bandung, Brioni, New York and Cairo represented important signposts to Belgrade
conference. During that time, views on international issues matured, aims and principles
were formulated and Yugoslavia s international position was defined. This position in¬
formed the proposals put forward by the Yugoslav delegation at the Belgrade conference.
The process of decolonisation which gained momentum at the beginning of the
1960s
had a strong impact on Yugoslavia s foreign policy through a number of universal premises.
The demand for immediate and comprehensive decolonisation brought Yugoslavia closer
to the newly liberated countries of Africa and Asia and enabled a coordinated international
activity on their part. Submission to foreign domination and exploitation was deemed to
represent „abnegation of basic human rights and the primary obstacle to international
peace and cooperation. The right to self-determination was demanded enabling them to
decide freely on the form of political system they would adopt as well as the direction of
their development. Cessation of military interventions and repression by colonial powers
was considered a necessity. It was demanded that the power be immediately handed over
to subjugated nations so that they could enjoy the fruits of freedom and independence.
Any possibility of endangering the territorial unity and integrity of these new nations
was rejected a priori. Yugoslav politicians were of the opinion, these goals necessitated
strengthening „independent and non-engaged forces and arrive at a blueprint for the
permanent dismantling of power blocs. Until such time, it was important to detach the
process of decolonisation from the Cold War and prevent the countries in Asia and Africa
from becoming entangled in the Superpower contest. Consequently, attention was directed
towards tackling the current crisis hotspots. The UN General Assembly was deemed re¬
sponsible for overseeing the process of decolonisation in order to „ensure the transfer of
power to the hands of genuine representatives of the people .
Decolonisation revealed the tragic chasm between the developed and underdeveloped
parts of the world and highlighted the question of the future direction. Yugoslav politi¬
cians thought that the economic policies of the developed countries were tainted by the
exigencies of the Cold War resulting in the transformation of military blocs into closed
economic groupings. The danger of the Cold War spilling over into the economic arena
was reflected in the conditions attached to aid which required access to domestic markets,
profit export, and demands for changes to the political systems. The conclusion was that
the economic backwardness represented a permanent source of international instability
and a generator of new conflicts. In addition, inequalities in economic development pre¬
cluded an active and equitable cooperation and consequently world peace and stability.
575
БЕОГРАДСКА
КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА НЕСВРСТАНИХЗЕМАЉА
1-6.
СЕПТЕМБРА
1961.
For these problems to be resolved, economic aid had to become an international obliga¬
tion especially for the industrially developed countries. The levelling of inequalities neces¬
sitated an increase in long-term aid which in turn would enable accelerated development,
decoupling economic aid from political and military demands through a clear definition
of conditions for receiving international development grants and an awareness that new
political relationships required new economic relationships. Those same problems raised
the awareness of common interests and the need for joint action in overcoming poverty.
With regard to the problem of disarmament, Yugoslavia s view was that a new approach
to negotiations was necessary. As opposed to the zero-sum game approach adopted by the
Great Powers, it demanded that disarmament talks be joined by the entire international
community and especially by the Non-Aligned countries. General, comprehensive and
monitored disarmament was considered the ultimate aim. Until this was achieved, freezing
of arms budgets, stopping the arms race and nuclear test ban treaties were considered the
more realistic steps. The alternative was the continuation of the propaganda war, spread
of hopelessness and fear and the ability of the Great Powers to hijack the international
discourse for their own selfish ends.
At the time of the Belgrade Conference, the Cold War was in full swing. The Super¬
power confrontation over Berlin resulted in the construction of the Berlin Wall. The Cu¬
ban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. Peace was threatened
by colonial and Superpower interventions in the Congo, Angola, Vietnam and Laos. The
nuclear moratorium was disregarded. All of these issues tested the statesmanship of the
politicians gathered in Belgrade.
„We have gathered here today in order to coordinate our efforts to help the world,
which is constantly being pushed towards the brink, to see at this late hour the danger
it faces, to invest its moral strength and energy in strengthening peace and furthering
a comprehensive and equitable international cooperation. With these words from his
opening speech of
1st
September,
1961,
Josip Broz
Tito greeted the delegates from
25
participating countries, three observer countries and
40
liberation and progressive
movements. His political convictions were shared by the likes of Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno,
Nkrumah, Sihanouk,
Makarios,
Selassie,
U
Nu, Bourguiba,
Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Keita
and other statesmen attending the conference from Asia, Africa, South America and
Europe. The Conference agenda proposed an exchange of views regarding the world
situation, strengthening of world peace and security and the problems of economic
inequality and underdevelopment.
Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries were in complete agreement
that world peace could only be achieved with a complete eradication of colonialism, impe¬
rialism and neo-colonialism „in all their forms . They brooded over the realisation that Su¬
perpower rivalry could lead to a „global conflagration . Peaceful coexistence which involved
an active effort in removing historical injustices and subjugation and encouraging individual
development, was seen as the only alternative to the Cold War and a sound platform for
international relations. They condemned the politics of force and the armament race. War
was considered not only an anachronism but a crime against humanity. They rejected the
view that the Cold War was unavoidable as well as the policy of permanent ratcheting up
of the tension which had brought the world to the brink of global war. Differences in social
organisation were not viewed as an insurmountable obstacle to international coopera¬
tion. Imposition of political systems by force was considered unacceptable. They rejected
outside domination and interference and supported self-determination, independence
and free choice of modes of economic, cultural and social development. They believed
that the conduct of the foreign policy should shun ideology as a weapon for waging a Cold
War, exerting pressure and imposing one s will. They insisted on responsibility, realism
and constructive approach to world politics. They indignantly rejected accusations that
one of aims of the Belgrade Conference was the creation of a new bloc. They believed that
576
Towards the Belgrade Conference Yugoslavia and the Beginnings of the Non-Aligned Movement
Non-Aligned countries should play a major role in world politics. Population growth was
seen as a significant contributor to the process of „narrowing the gap between the blocs .
The Belgrade Conference adopted two documents: A Declaration by Heads of State or
Government of Non-Aligned Countries and a Statement Concerning the Danger of War and
an Appeal for Peace. At the same time, copies of an identical letter were sent to President
Kennedy and Premier Khruschev. In contrast to the Declaration which had a strategic
character, the other two documents referred to the current political situation.
Pointing out acute problems the world was facing, the Declaration insisted on an un¬
conditional, complete and final abolition of all forms of colonialism, neo-colonialism and
imperialism. Cessation of military actions and repression against „dependent nations as
well as their right to independence and respect for their state territory were considered
important. Wholehearted support was given to the national liberation struggle of the
peoples of Algeria and Angola against French and Belgian colonial forces. Solidarity with
the people of the Congo and the condemnation of the Belgian intervention were expressed
equally strongly. The French massacre in Bizerte (Tunisia] directly influenced the demand
for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all „dependent countries. The policy of Apartheid
in South Africa and other forms of racial discrimination were condemned unanimously.
Support was given to the right of ethnic and religious minorities to protection especially
against genocide. Wholehearted support was also given to the people of Palestine. The
building of foreign military bases especially against the will of the people was considered
a gross violation of sovereignty. Disarmament was considered an „imperative and the most
urgent task facing Humanity . The economic inequality inherited from the age of colonial¬
ism and imperialism was to be eliminated and the economic, industrial and horticultural
development accelerated. Developing countries were advised to increase their economic
and trade cooperation. A separate World Economic Conference dedicated to the issue of
underdevelopment was deemed necessary. The Declaration reaffirmed the deep convic¬
tion of the delegates that all nations had the right to independence and self-determination
The Belgrade Conference agenda covered all the important international questions. The
participants exhibited a high degree of agreement. At the same time, debates on various
issues clearly indicated the presence of divisions and differences. Beside the advocates
of pro-Soviet policies and those who were not ready to criticise the West, there existed
countries that lacked well-formed views on international issues.
Subsequent analyses by Yugoslav politicians revealed the existence of an „Arab faction
which focussed on „Arab demands . The West labelled the Belgrade Conference an anti-
Western and anti-American gathering. The reactions were heated and inimical. Moscow
reacted by restarting nuclear tests. The Conference was ignored by the Soviet and Eastern
European public. Nevertheless, the reverberations of the summit as well as the worldwide
publicity it received, exceeded expectations. The Yugoslav leadership assessed the Confer¬
ence to be a „major event which signalled the „victory of the Yugoslav conception which
put paid to the
regionalist
strategy calling for a „second Bandung .
The Non-Aligned movement was not born in Belgrade. The gathering of Heads of State
or Government of Non-Aligned Countries did not necessarily imply a movement. Neverthe¬
less, decisions reached in Belgrade clearly demonstrated that the idea which had brought
these statesmen together represented an alternative to power blocs and world polarisa¬
tion. The then frequently spoken words „peace , „independence , „equality , „development ,
„law and „justice resonated in the minds of the peoples which had for centuries existed
on the margins of history and which were trying, through anti-colonial struggle, to ascend
the ladder of global power.
In
1961,
Non-Alignment seemed like a „policy with a future .
577
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Bogetić, Dragan 1953- Dimić, Ljubodrag 1956- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1054319049 (DE-588)1043994343 |
| author_facet | Bogetić, Dragan 1953- Dimić, Ljubodrag 1956- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Bogetić, Dragan 1953- |
| author_variant | d b db l d ld |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV041996611 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)885219927 (DE-599)GBV769987796 |
| edition | 1. izd. |
| era | Geschichte 1961 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1961 |
| format | Conference Proceeding Book |
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| publisher | Zavod Za Udžbenike |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Bogetić, Dragan 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)1054319049 aut Beogradska Konferencija Nesvrstanih Zemalja 1 - 6. septembra 1961. prilog istoriji trećeg sveta Dragan Bogetić ; Ljubodrag Dimić Towards the Belgarde Conference : Yugoslavia and the beginnings of the Non-Alignment-Movement 1. izd. Beograd Zavod Za Udžbenike 2013 583 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Engl. Zsfassung u.d.T.: Towards the Belgarde Conference : Yugoslavia and the beginnings of the Non-Alignment-Movement In kyrill. Schr., serb. Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries 1. 1961 Belgrad (DE-588)3022831-1 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1961 gnd rswk-swf Gipfelkonferenz (DE-588)4136586-0 gnd rswk-swf Neutralität (DE-588)4041958-7 gnd rswk-swf Blockfreie Staaten (DE-588)4007183-2 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)1071861417 Konferenzschrift gnd-content Blockfreie Staaten (DE-588)4007183-2 g Gipfelkonferenz (DE-588)4136586-0 s Neutralität (DE-588)4041958-7 s Geschichte 1961 z DE-604 Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries 1. 1961 Belgrad (DE-588)3022831-1 f Dimić, Ljubodrag 1956- Verfasser (DE-588)1043994343 aut Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries 1. 1961 Belgrad Sonstige (DE-588)3022831-1 oth Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027438740&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027438740&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Bogetić, Dragan 1953- Dimić, Ljubodrag 1956- Beogradska Konferencija Nesvrstanih Zemalja 1 - 6. septembra 1961. prilog istoriji trećeg sveta Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries 1. 1961 Belgrad (DE-588)3022831-1 gnd Gipfelkonferenz (DE-588)4136586-0 gnd Neutralität (DE-588)4041958-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)3022831-1 (DE-588)4136586-0 (DE-588)4041958-7 (DE-588)4007183-2 (DE-588)1071861417 |
| title | Beogradska Konferencija Nesvrstanih Zemalja 1 - 6. septembra 1961. prilog istoriji trećeg sveta |
| title_alt | Towards the Belgarde Conference : Yugoslavia and the beginnings of the Non-Alignment-Movement |
| title_auth | Beogradska Konferencija Nesvrstanih Zemalja 1 - 6. septembra 1961. prilog istoriji trećeg sveta |
| title_exact_search | Beogradska Konferencija Nesvrstanih Zemalja 1 - 6. septembra 1961. prilog istoriji trećeg sveta |
| title_full | Beogradska Konferencija Nesvrstanih Zemalja 1 - 6. septembra 1961. prilog istoriji trećeg sveta Dragan Bogetić ; Ljubodrag Dimić |
| title_fullStr | Beogradska Konferencija Nesvrstanih Zemalja 1 - 6. septembra 1961. prilog istoriji trećeg sveta Dragan Bogetić ; Ljubodrag Dimić |
| title_full_unstemmed | Beogradska Konferencija Nesvrstanih Zemalja 1 - 6. septembra 1961. prilog istoriji trećeg sveta Dragan Bogetić ; Ljubodrag Dimić |
| title_short | Beogradska Konferencija Nesvrstanih Zemalja 1 - 6. septembra 1961. |
| title_sort | beogradska konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja 1 6 septembra 1961 prilog istoriji treceg sveta |
| title_sub | prilog istoriji trećeg sveta |
| topic | Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries 1. 1961 Belgrad (DE-588)3022831-1 gnd Gipfelkonferenz (DE-588)4136586-0 gnd Neutralität (DE-588)4041958-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries 1. 1961 Belgrad Gipfelkonferenz Neutralität Blockfreie Staaten Konferenzschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027438740&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027438740&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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