The roommate problem: is more stable than you think
Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferable and when it is not. We show that when utility is transferable, the existence of a stable matching is restored when there is an even number of individuals of indistinguishable characteristics and ta...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
München
CESifo
2014
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper
4676 : Category 12, Empirical and theoretical methods |
| Online-Zugang: | http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19107330 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferable and when it is not. We show that when utility is transferable, the existence of a stable matching is restored when there is an even number of individuals of indistinguishable characteristics and tastes (types). As a consequence, when the number of individuals of any given type is large enough there always exist "quasi-stable" matchings: a stable matching can be restored with minimal policy intervention. Our results build on an analogy with an associated bipartite problem; it follows that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to the roommate problem. |
| Beschreibung: | 30 S. |
Internformat
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| author | Chiappori, Pierre-André 1955- Galichon, Alfred Salanié, Bernard |
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| id | DE-604.BV041946744 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:08:55Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 30 S. |
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| publishDate | 2014 |
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| publisher | CESifo |
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| series | CESifo working paper |
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| spelling | Chiappori, Pierre-André 1955- Verfasser (DE-588)124033504 aut The roommate problem is more stable than you think Pierre-André Chiappori ; Alfred Galichon ; Bernard Salanié München CESifo 2014 30 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier CESifo working paper 4676 : Category 12, Empirical and theoretical methods Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferable and when it is not. We show that when utility is transferable, the existence of a stable matching is restored when there is an even number of individuals of indistinguishable characteristics and tastes (types). As a consequence, when the number of individuals of any given type is large enough there always exist "quasi-stable" matchings: a stable matching can be restored with minimal policy intervention. Our results build on an analogy with an associated bipartite problem; it follows that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to the roommate problem. Galichon, Alfred Verfasser (DE-588)1045766704 aut Salanié, Bernard Verfasser (DE-588)124033520 aut CESifo working paper 4676 : Category 12, Empirical and theoretical methods (DE-604)BV013978326 4676 http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19107330 http://www.cesifo-group.de/de/ifoHome/search/result.html?main.query=4676 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Chiappori, Pierre-André 1955- Galichon, Alfred Salanié, Bernard The roommate problem is more stable than you think CESifo working paper |
| title | The roommate problem is more stable than you think |
| title_auth | The roommate problem is more stable than you think |
| title_exact_search | The roommate problem is more stable than you think |
| title_full | The roommate problem is more stable than you think Pierre-André Chiappori ; Alfred Galichon ; Bernard Salanié |
| title_fullStr | The roommate problem is more stable than you think Pierre-André Chiappori ; Alfred Galichon ; Bernard Salanié |
| title_full_unstemmed | The roommate problem is more stable than you think Pierre-André Chiappori ; Alfred Galichon ; Bernard Salanié |
| title_short | The roommate problem |
| title_sort | the roommate problem is more stable than you think |
| title_sub | is more stable than you think |
| url | http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19107330 http://www.cesifo-group.de/de/ifoHome/search/result.html?main.query=4676 |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV013978326 |
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