EU competition law: 5 Abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU
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Leuven
Claeys & Casteels
2013
Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, USA Edward Elgar Publishing 2013 |
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| Beschreibung: | XCVIII,848 S. |
| ISBN: | 9789077644133 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a EU competition law |n 5 |p Abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU |c Gian Luigi Tosato ; Leonardo Bellodi (eds.) |
| 264 | 1 | |a Leuven |b Claeys & Casteels |c 2013 | |
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| 700 | 1 | |a González-Díaz, Francisco Enrique |e Sonstige |0 (DE-588)171809440 |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Tosato, Gian Luigi |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Bellodi, Leonardo |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CONTENTS - SUMMARY V
TABLE OF CONTENTS VII
TABLE OF CASES
TABLE 1. CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF COURT RULINGS XXXIII
TABLE 2. CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF EUROPEAN COMMISSION
MERGER DECISIONS XLVII
TABLE 3. CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF EUROPEAN COMMISSION
ANTITRUST DECISIONS LIII
TABLE 4. CASES AND DECISIONS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS LXIII
TABLE 5. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LEGISLATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION LXXI
TABLE 6. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LEGISLATION OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS LXXIX
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES LXXXI
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS LXXXIII
FOREWORD XCV
CHAPTER 1 MARKET DEFINITION
I. INTRODUCTION L
II. DEFINING THE RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET 5
1. DEMAND-SIDE SUBSTITUTABILITY 6
1.1. INTRODUCTION 6
1.2. QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE 7
1.2.1. THE SSNIPTEST 7
1.2.1.1. INTRODUCTION 7
1.2.1.2. SSNIP METHODOLOGY 8
1.2.1.3. TYPES OF DATA NEEDED 8
1.2.1.4. SUBSTITUTABILITY AND MARGINAL CUSTOMERS 9
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.2.1.5. LIMITS OF THE SSNIP TEST 12
1.2.1.6. PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF THE SSNIP TEST 14
1.2.2. OTHER QUANTITATIVE TESTS 15
1.2.2.1. OWN- AND CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITY 15
1.2.2.2. ANALYSIS OF PRICE CORRELATIONS, STATIONARITY
AND CO-INTEGRATION 16
1.3. QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE 18
1.3.1. DEFINITION 18
1.3.2. PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE 18
1.3.3. PRICE DIFFERENCES 19
1.3.4. COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS AND STRUCTURE OF
SUPPLY AND DEMAND 19
1.4. ADDITIONAL TYPES OF EVIDENCE 20
1.4.1. REVEALED PREFERENCES 20
1.4.2. CONSUMER PREFERENCES AND PERCEPTIONS 21
1.4.3. BARRIERS AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH SWITCHING 21
1.4.4. PRICE DISCRIMINATION 22
1.4.5. PATTERNS OF DEMAND 22
1.4.6. SURVEYS AND INTERNAL DOCUMENTS 23
2. SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSTITUTABILITY 23
2.1. DEFINITION 23
2.2. CONDITIONS FOR TESTING SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSTITUTABILITY 24
2.2.1. ABSENCE OF SUNK COSTS AND MAJOR BARRIERS
TO SWITCHING 24
2.2.2. IMMEDIATE SUBSTITUTABILITY 25
2.2.3. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO SWITCH PRODUCTION 25
2.2.4. DEMAND-SIDE SUBSTITUTABILITY 25
2.3. PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSTITUTABILITY 26
2.4. DISTINCTION FROM POTENTIAL COMPETITION 27
2.5. ASSESSING SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSTITUTABILITY' 28
TABLE OF CONTENTS
III. DEFINING THE RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKET 29
1. THE CONCEPT OF A GEOGRAPHIC MARKET 29
2. THE DELINEATION OF THE GEOGRAPHIC MARKET 30
2.1. APPROACH UNDER THE MARKET DEFINITION NOTICE 30
2.2. DELINEATING THE GEOGRAPHIC MARKET IN PRACTICE 31
2.2.1. CUSTOMERS PURCHASING PATTERNS AND
TRADE FLOWS 32
2.2.2. VARIATIONS IN PRICES 33
2.2.3. MARKET SHARES 35
2.2.4. BARRIERS TO TRADE 35
2.2.4.1. TRANSPORT COSTS 36
2.2.4.2. CONSUMER PREFERENCES 36
2.2.4.3. IMPORT TARIFFS OR DUTIES 37
2.2.4.4. LOCAL PRESENCE 37
2.2.4.5. REGULATORY FACTORS 38
IV. TEMPORAL MARKETS 39
V. SPECIFIC ISSUES IN DEFINING MARKETS 40
1. AFTERMARKETS 40
1.1. INTRODUCTION 40
1.2. COMMISSION AND COURTS PRECEDENTS 41
1.3. POSSIBLE MARKET DEFINITIONS 44
1.4. ASSESSING COMPETITIVE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN MARKETS 46
2. CAPTIVE PRODUCTION AND MERCHANT MARKETS 47
3. CHAINS OF SUBSTITUTION 49
4. DYNAMIC MARKETS 51
4.1. INTRODUCTION 51
4.2. DEMAND-SIDE SUBSTITUTABILITY 52
4.3. SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSTITUTABILITY 53
4.4. POTENTIAL COMPETITION 54
5. TWO-SIDED MARKETS 55
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VI. CONCLUSIONS
57
1. MARKET DEFINITION AS A FOUNDATION FOR THE
COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT **** 57
2. QUANTITATIVE V QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 58
3. MARKET DEFINITION UNDER ARTICLE 102 TFEU AND
UNDER MERGER CONTROL **** 59
CHAPTER 2 DOMINANCE
I. INTRODUCTION 61
II. THE CONCEPT OF DOMINANCE UNDER
ARTICLE 102 TFEU 62
1. THE CLASSICAL DEFINITION OF DOMINANCE UNDER
ARTICLE 102 TFEU 63
2. THE DEFINITION OF DOMINANCE IN THE 2009
GUIDANCE PAPER 66
III. THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS IN THE ARTICLE 102 DOMINANCE
ASSESSMENT 68
1. MARKET STRUCTURE AND MARKET SHARES 69
1.1. MARKET SHARE-BASED PRESUMPTIONS OF DOMINANCE 69
1.2. LOW MARKET SHARES 73
1.3. DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT MARKETS 76
1.4. BIDDING MARKETS 77
1.5. "NEW" MARKETS 78
2. BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND EXPANSION BY COMPETITORS 79
2.1. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND EXPANSION 81
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2.1.1. LEGAL BARRIERS 82
2.1.1.1. TARIFFS AND QUOTAS 82
2.1.1.2. STATUTORY MONOPOLIES 83
2.1.1.3. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 84
2.1.2. ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE 85
2.1.3. PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL INPUTS OR
NATURAL RESOURCES 86
2.1.4. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE 87
2.1.5. ESTABLISHED DISTRIBUTION AND SALES NETWORK 88
2.1.6. NETWORK EFFECTS 89
2.1.7. UNDERTAKING'S OWN CONDUCT 90
2.1.7.1. SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENT 90
2.1.7.2. LONG-TERM CONTRACTS WITH APPRECIABLE
FORECLOSURE EFFECTS 91
2.1.8. PERSISTENTLY HIGH MARKET SHARES 91
2.1.9. SWITCHING COSTS FOR CONSUMERS 92
3. COUNTERVAILING BUYER POWER 92
3.1. THEORY AND BASIC APPROACH 92
3.2. UNAVOIDABLE TRADING PARTNERS 94
3.3. OBSERVATIONS ON SIGNIFICANCE OF BUYER POWER ANALYSIS 96
4. OTHER INDICATORS OF DOMINANCE 97
4.1. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 97
4.2. ABUSE 100
4.3. RELATED MARKETS 100
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHIFT TO EFFECTS-BASED ANALYSIS
UNDER ARTICLE 102 102
1. "SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER": A HIGHER STANDARD
FOR DOMINANCE? 102
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2. THE DEATH OF "SUPER-DOMINANCE" 105
3. ROLE OF THE DOMINANCE FINDING IN ARTICLE 102
INFRINGEMENT DECISIONS.
109
CHAPTER 3 THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE
I. INTRODUCTION H5
II. THE NOTION OF ABUSE IN ARTICLE 102 TFEU 115
III. CLASSIFICATION OF ABUSES 116
1. EXPLOITATIVE ABUSES 117
2. EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES 119
2.1. UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING ITS DEFINITION AND
ALTERNATIVE TESTS 119
2.2. ECONOMIC TESTS OF FORECLOSURE 123
2.2.1. IMPAIRMENT OF OPPORTUNITIES OF RIVALS, WITH
CONSUMER HARM 123
2.2.2. EQUALLY EFFICIENT COMPETITOR 125
2.2.3. PROFIT SACRIFICE AND NO ECONOMIC SENSE 127
2.2.4. RAISING RIVALS' COSTS 130
2.2.5. THE CONSUMER WELFARE TEST 131
2.2.6. ARTICLE 102(B) - THE TREATY TEST 133
3. THE POSITION OF THE COMMISSION AND THE EU COURTS 134
3.1. THE NOTION OF "SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY" 134
3.1.1. "SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY" IN THE CASE LAW 134
3.1.2. THE NOTION OF "SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY'"
AND THE ECONOMIC TESTS OF FORECLOSURE 136
3.2. ECONOMIC TESTS OF FORECLOSURE AND EFFECTS-BASED
APPROACH IN THE COMMISSION PRACTICE AND EU CASE LAW 138
3.2.1. CONSUMER WELFARE AND EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH 138
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3.3. THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 140
3.3.1. THE COMMISSION DISCUSSION PAPER 140
3.3.2. THE COMMISSION GUIDANCE PAPER 144
3.4. THE POSITION OF THE EU COURTS 149
3.4.1. EVOLUTION OF THE ARTICLE 102 TFEU CASE
LAW AND THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH 149
3.4.2. THE RECENT SHIFT TOWARDS A MORE
EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH 154
IV. OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION AND EFFICIENCIES 156
CHAPTER 4 PREDATORY CONDUCT
I. INTRODUCTION 159
1. THE NOTION OF PREDATION 159
2. COST RULES AND OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS 161
3. PREDATORY PRICING AND OTHER ABUSES 162
3.1. MARGIN SQUEEZE 162
3.2. EXCLUSIVE DEALING 162
3.3. MIXED BUNDLING 162
3.4. PRICE DISCRIMINATION 163
II. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PREDATION 163
1. FINANCIAL MARKET MODELS 165
2. SIGNALLING MODELS 166
3. REPUTATION MODELS 167
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 168
III. COST BENCHMARKS 169
1. MARGINAL COST ("MC") 170
2. AVERAGE VARIABLE COSTS ("AVC") 170
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3. AVERAGE AVOIDABLE COSTS ("AAC") *
72
4. LONG-RUN AVERAGE INCREMENTAL COSTS ("LRAIC") 373
5. AVERAGE TOTAL COST ("ATC") 174
6. EVALUATION OF COST BENCHMARKS 176
6.1. MARGINAL COST ("MC") - 176
6.2. AVERAGE VARIABLE COSTS ("AVC") 177
6.3. AVERAGE AVOIDABLE COSTS ("AAC") 178
6.4. LONG-RUN AVERAGE INCREMENTAL COSTS ("LRAIC") 179
6.5. AVERAGE TOTAL COST ("ATC") 180
7. MEASURING COSTS IN PRACTICE 181
IV. THE BASIC RULES ON PREDATORY PRICING UNDER
ARTICLE 102 TFEU 183
1. THE AREEDA-TURNER TEST 183
2. THE AKZO RULES 184
3. PRICING ABOVE AVC/AAC BUT BELOW ATC 186
3.1. DIRECT EVIDENCE OF INTENT 187
3.2. INDIRECT EVIDENCE OF INTENT 188
3.3. INTERPLAY BETWEEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT EVIDENCE 190
4. RECOUPMENT 191
4.1. NO RECOUPMENT CONDITION UNDER ARTICLE 102 TFEU 193
4.2. THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH 195
5. MARKET-SPECIFIC ISSUES 197
5.1. PREDATORY PRICING TO EXTEND A DOMINANT POSITION 197
5.2. MULTI-PRODUCTS/CROSS SUBSIDIES (DEUTSCHE POST) 198
5.3. START-UP LOSSES 201
5.4. FREE SERVICES 202
6. ABOVE-COST "PREDATORY PRICING" 203
6.1. CRITIQUE OF A BAN ON ABOVE-COST PRICE CUTS 205
6.2. ABOVE-COST PRICE CUTS AS AN ABUSE UNDER ARTICLE 102 TFEU 206
6.3. EVALUATION OF THE ARTICLE 102 TFEU CASE LAW 208
TABLE OF CONTENTS
V. OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS 210
1. THE "MEETING COMPETITION" DEFENCE 211
1.1. STATUS OF THE DEFENCE UNDER EUROPEAN UNION LAW 212
1.2. PRICES BELOW AVC/AAC 213
1.3. PRICES BELOW ATC BUT ABOVE AVC 214
1.4. EIEMENTS OF THE DEFENCE 215
1.4.1. PRICE CUTS MUST BE DEFENSIVE 215
1.4.2. THE DOMINANT COMPANY MUST ACT IN GOOD FAITH 216
1.4.3. MEETING BUT NOT BEATING COMPETITION 218
2. SHORT TERM PROMOTIONS 219
3. EFFICIENCIES IN GROWTH MARKETS 220
VI. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 222
1. THE GUIDANCE PAPER. SACRIFICE 223
2. THE GUIDANCE PAPER: ANTICOMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE 225
3. THE PATH FORWARD 226
CHAPTER 5 MARGIN SQUEEZE
I. INTRODUCTION 229
II. MARGIN SQUEEZE DEFINED 231
1. A SIMPLE MODEL OF MARGIN SQUEEZE 231
1.1. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND PRESENCE IN TWO MARKETS 233
1.2. UPSTREAM DOMINANCE 234
1.3. OBJECTIVE NECESSITY OF THE UPSTREAM INPUT 234
2. MARGIN SQUEEZE IN PRACTICE 235
3. MARGIN SQUEEZE AS A DISTINCT AND AUTONOMOUS PRICING
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 102 238
TABLE OF CONTENTS
III. SUMMARY OF EUROPEAN UNION AND
NATIONAL PRECEDENTS
240
1. EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND EUROPEAN COURTS DECISIONS 241
1.1. NATIONAL CARBONISING (1975) 241
1.2. BRITISH SUGAR/NAPIER BROWN (1988) 242
1.3. INDUSTRIE DES POUDRES SPHERIQUES (2000) 243
1.4. DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG (2003 COMMISSION DECISION,
2008 GENERAL COURT, 2010 COURT OF JUSTICE) 245
1.5. KONKURRENSVERKET V TELIASONERA SVERIGE AB 249
1.6. TELEFONICA (2007 COMMISSION DECISION, 2012
GENERAL COURT) 250
2. NATIONAL CASES ON MARGIN SQUEEZE 253
3. UNITED STATES PRECEDENTS 258
4. OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT PRECEDENTS 259
IV. OSCAR BRONNER, CONSTRUCTIVE REFUSALS TO SUPPLY,
THE RELEVANCE OF REGULATION AND TELIASONERA 262
V. RECURRING ISSUES IN MARGIN
SQUEEZE CASES 270
1. ESSENTIALITY OF INPUTS 271
2. DOWNSTREAM DOMINANCE 274
3. THE REASONABLY EFFICIENT VERSUS EQUAUY EFFICIENT
COMPETITOR TEST 277
3.1. PRECEDENTS 277
3.2. THE REASONABLY EFFICIENT COMPETITOR TEST 281
4. RELEVANT PRODUCTS: THE NEED FOR COMPARABLE SERVICES 283
5. ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS 287
6. ROLE OF OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION, EFFICIENCIES,
AND MEETING COMPETITION 291
7
. THE RELEVANCE OF REGULATION IN MARGIN SQUEEZE ANALYSIS 295
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VI. ECONOMICS OF MARGIN SQUEEZE 299
1. NEED FOR EXCESSIVE PRICES UPSTREAM OR PREDATORY
DOWNSTREAM PRICES 300
1.1. MARGIN SQUEEZE PRICING 300
1.2. EUROPEAN UNION AND NATIONAL PRECEDENTS 301
2. THE CHICAGO CRITIQUE 304
3. ELIMINATION OF INEFFICIENT RIVALS: VERTICAL INTEGRATION
AND DOUBLE MARGINALISATION 306
4. COSTS ANALYSIS IN MARGIN SQUEEZE CASES 308
4.1. MEASURES OF COSTS 308
4.2. RECOVERY OF COST 311
VII. CONCLUSION AND THE PATH FORWARD 316
CHAPTER 6 EXCLUSIVE DEALING: EXCLUSIVE
OBLIGATIONS, QUASI-EXCLUSIVE
OBLIGATIONS AND REBATES
I. INTRODUCTION 319
II. EXCLUSIVITY OBLIGATIONS 320
1. EXCLUSIVE PURCHASING 321
1.1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 321
1.2. EXISTING RULES 323
2. EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION 326
3. QUASI-EXCLUSIVE OBLIGATIONS 329
3.1. REQUIREMENT CONTRACTS FOR LESS THAN
100 PER CENT OF THE PURCHASERS NEEDS 329
3.2. REQUIREMENT CONTRACTS EXPRESSED IN TERMS
OF VOLUME 331
3.3. DE FACTO REQUIREMENT CONTRACTS 332
3.3.1. ENGLISH CLAUSES 332
3.3.2. EQUIPMENT PLACING 332
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3.3.3. SLOTTING ALLOWANCES 333
3.3.4. CATEGORY MANAGEMENT 333
4. ECONOMICS 334
4.1. INTRODUCTION 334
4.2. THE CHICAGO CRITIQUE 335
4.2.1. EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION 336
4.2.2. EXCLUSIVE PURCHASING 337
4.2.3. EFFICIENCIES 337
4.2.3.1. FREE-RIDING BETWEEN DOWNSTREAM FIRMS 338
4.2.3.2. FREE-RIDING BETWEEN UPSTREAM FIRMS 339
4.2.3.3. HOLD-UP PROBLEMS AND SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS. 339
4.2.3.4. QUALITY CERTIFICATION 340
4.2.3.5. DOUBLE MARGINALISATION 340
4.2.4. CONCLUSION ON THE CHICAGO CRITIQUE 341
4.3. POST-CHICAGO MODELS 341
4.3.1. INTRODUCTION 341
4.3.2. RESTORING UPSTREAM MARKET POWER 342
4.3.3. DEFENSIVE LEVERAGING 343
4.4. QUASI-EXCLUSIVE OBLIGATIONS 345
4.5. CONCLUSIONS 346
5. COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES 347
6. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 349
III. REBATES 349
1. DEFINITION AND TYPES OF REBATES 349
1.1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 352
1-1.1. HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE, COURT OF JUSTICE, 1979
(EXCLUSIVE DEALING) 352
1.1.2. MICHELIN I, COURT OF JUSTICE, 1985 (INDIVIDUALISED
VOLUME TARGETS) 353
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.1.3. BPB INDUSTRIES, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, 1993
(PROMOTIONAL PAYMENTS) 353
1.1.4. IRISH SUGAR, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, 1999
(INDIVIDUALISED VOLUME TARGETS) 354
1.1.5. MICHELIN 11, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, 2004
(INDIVIDUALISED AND STANDARDISED TARGET REBATES) 354
1.1.6. PROKENT/TOMRA, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2006
(QUANTITY COMMITMENTS AND RETROACTIVE REBATES) 355
1.1.7. BRITISH AIRWAYS, COURT OF JUSTICE, 2007
(INDIVIDUALISED VOLUME TARGETS) 358
1.1.8. INTEL, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2009
(CONDITIONAL REBATES AND PAYMENTS) 359
1.2. EXISTING RULES 362
2. ECONOMICS 363
2.1. INTRODUCTION 363
2.2. FORECLOSURE EFFECTS 364
2.2.1. INCREMENTAL REBATES 365
2.2.2. RETROACTIVE REBATES 366
2.3. EFFICIENCIES 372
2.4. CONCLUSIONS 373
3. COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES 374
4. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 377
IV. CONCLUSIONS 378
CHAPTER 7 REFUSAL TO DEAL
I. INTRODUCTION 385
II. FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 386
1. WHAT IS A REFUSAL TO SUPPLY? 386
2. WHY MIGHT A REFUSAL TO SUPPLY BE BENEFICIAL TO CONSUMERS? 388
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2.1. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY IN ORDER TO MINIMISE
DOUBLE MARGINALISATION 388
2.2. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN QUALITY 390
2.3. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY IN ORDER TO PREVENT DOWNSTREAM
FREE-RIDING ~ "
2.4. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY TO PREVENT UPSTREAM FREE-RIDING 393
2.5. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY IN ORDER TO REDUCE HOLD-UP PROBLEMS 394
2.6. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PRICE DISCRIMINATION 395
3. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY AND THE INCENTIVES TO INVEST AND INNOVATE 396
3.1. WHY ARE INNOVATION AND INVESTMENT IMPORTANT? 397
3.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION AND INNOVATION 401
3.3. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY AND THE INCUMBENT'S INCENTIVES TO INVEST 403
3.4. SHOULD ALL PROPERTY RIGHTS BE TREATED EQUAL? 407
4. WHY MIGHT REFUSALS TO SUPPLY BE HARMFUL TO CONSUMERS? 410
4.1. THE LEVERAGING STORY AND THE CHICAGO CRITIQUE 411
4.2. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY IN ORDER TO RESTORE MONOPOLY PROFIT 412
4.3. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY IN ORDER TO PROTECT AN UPSTREAM
MONOPOLY POSITION 415
4.4. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY IN ORDER TO RAISE DOWNSTREAM RIVAL'S COSTS .
418
5. CONCLUSIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 420
III. FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS 421
1. THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 423
1.1. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 423
1.1.1. CONDITIONS PROVIDED BY LAW 425
1.1.2. PUBLIC INTEREST OBJECTIVE 426
1.1.3. RESPECT FOR THE ESSENCE OF THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 427
1.1.4. PROPORTIONALITY 429
1.1.5. FAIR COMPENSATION PAID IN GOOD TIME 429
1.2. RIGHT TO CHOOSE ONE'S TRADING PARTNER 430
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2. TFEU LEGAL FRAMEWORK BALANCING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AGAINST
FREEDOM TO COMPETE 432
2.1. ART 345 TFEU (EX ARTICLE 295 EU AND EX ARTICLE 222 EC)
AND THE "EXISTENCE-EXERCISE" DICHOTOMY 432
2.2. THE CONCEPTS OF "SPECIFIC SUBJECT MATTER" AND
"ESSENTIAL FUNCTION" 433
2.3. THE REQUIREMENT OF "EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES" 439
2.3.1. CASE LAW 440
2.3.2. ANALYSIS OF THE "EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES"
REQUIREMENT 448
2.3.2.1. NO NEED TO PROVE ADDITIONAL FACTUAL
CIRCUMSTANCES? 449
2.3.2.2. "EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES" MAY
INVOLVE VARIOUS TYPES OF ABUSE? 450
2.3.2.3. "EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST
APPLIES IN ALL COMPULSORY DUTY TO
DEAL CASES 452
3. CONCLUSION 454
IV. CONDITIONS FOR IMPOSITION OF A DUTY TO DEAL 457
1. MONOPOLY IN INDISPENSABLE INPUT 458
1.1. "TWO MARKETS" REQUIREMENT 458
1.2. INDISPENSABLE TO COMPETE 464
1.2.1. INTRODUCTION 464
1.2.2. CASE LAW LEADING TO THE INDISPENSABILITY CRITERION 465
1.2.3. DISCUSSION 475
1.2.3.1. DENNING INDISPENSABILITY 475
1.2.3.2. BARRIERS TO ENTRY 478
1.2.3.3. INDISPENSABILITY IN CASE OF A DE NOVO
REFUSAL TO SUPPLY AND OF DISRUPTION 480
2. REFUSAL TO DEAL 481
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3. CONSUMER HARM AND EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT BEYOND THE
MERE REFUSAL TO DEAL
483
3.1. CONSUMER HARM - THE "NEW PRODUCT" AND "REDUCTION OF
INNOVATION" TESTS 485
3.1.1. "NEW PRODUCT" NEED NOT BE AN EXISTING PRODUCT 485
3.1.2. CONSUMER HARM MUST ARISE IN A NEIGHBOURING OR
DOWNSTREAM MARKET 487
3.1.3. THE "NEW PRODUCTS" TEST APPLIES IN ALL COMPULSORY
LICENSE CASES 489
3.1.4. CONSUMER HARM IN CASES NOT INVOLVING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 490
3.1.4.1. CATEGORISATION OF THE CASE LAW 491
3.1.4.2. LIMITING PRINCIPLES FOR IMPOSING A DUTY
TO SUPPLY 493
3.2. CONCLUSION 495
4. EXCLUSION OF ALL EFFECTIVE DOWNSTREAM COMPETITION 496
5. ABSENCE OF OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION, AND THE
EFFICIENCY DEFENCE 502
5.1. RULE OF REASON 502
5.1.1. LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVES 503
5.1.2. EFFECTIVENESS AND CAUSAL LINK 507
5.1.3. NECESSITY 508
5.1.4. PROPORTIONALITY 509
5.2. BURDEN OF PROOF 511
V. EXPLOITATIVE REFUSAL TO DEAL 512
VI. REMEDIES
514
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 8 TYING AND BUNDLING
I. INTRODUCTION 515
II. ECONOMIC THEORY OF TYING AND BUNDLING 516
1. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL THEORY 517
2. CRITIQUE OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL THEORY 518
3. REASONS FOR TYING AND BUNDLING EXPLORED IN THE
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 519
3.1. COST SAVINGS 519
3.2. SYSTEM ASSEMBLY AND SYSTEM QUALITY ISSUES 519
3.3. PRICING STRATEGIES 520
3.4. TYING AND BUNDLING AS AN EXCLUSIONARY STRATEGY 523
3.4.1. TYING TO EXTEND A MONOPOLY INTO THE TIED
PRODUCT MARKET 523
3.4.2. TYING TO PROTECT A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE
TYING MARKET 524
3.4.3. TYING TO EXTEND A MONOPOLY INTO A
THIRD MARKET 527
3.5. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON ECONOMIC THEORY 527
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TYING AND BUNDLING CONDUCT
UNDER ARTICLE 102 528
1. DOMINANCE OF THE SELLER IN THE MARKET FOR THE TYING PRODUCT 531
2. EXISTENCE OF A SEPARATE TIED PRODUCT 531
2.1. APPROACH OF THE COMMISSION AND THE COURTS TO SEPARATE
PRODUCT ANALYSIS 532
2.1.1. PRESENCE OF INDEPENDENT SUPPLIERS 532
2.1.2. FUNCTIONALITY OF PRODUCTS 533
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2.1.3. CUSTOMER CONDUCT 533
2.1.4. THE DOMINANT COMPANY'S CONDUCT 533
2.1.5. RATIONALE FOR THE TIE 533
2.1.6. COMMERCIAL USAGE 534
2.1.7. COMPLEMENTARITY OF PRODUCTS 534
2.2. SEPARATE PRODUCTS TEST AND MARKET DEFINITION 535
2.2.1. DIFFERENT MANUFACTURING OR DISTRIBUTION LEVELS 535
2.2.2. GENERALISTS V SPECIALISTS 536
2.2.3. AFTERMARKETS 536
2.3. RELEVANT MOMENT IN TIME 538
2.4. OVERLAP BETWEEN THE "SEPARATE PRODUCTS" TEST AND THE
REVIEW OF "OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS" 538
3. COERCION 539
3.1. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY THE TYING PRODUCT WITHOUT THE TIED PRODUCT 540
3.2. CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 540
3.3. FINANCIAL COERCION 540
3.4. NO REQUIREMENT THAT CUSTOMERS USE THE TIED GOOD 541
3.5. NO REQUIREMENT THAT CUSTOMERS PAY A SEPARATE PRICE
FOR THE TIED GOOD 541
4. A RESTRICTIVE EFFECT ON COMPETITION FOR THE TIED PRODUCT 542
5. COERCION AND FORECLOSURE IN MIXED BUNDLING 544
6. OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION 547
6.1. EXTERNAL BENEFITS 548
6.2. INTERNAL EFFICIENCIES 550
6.3. INDISPENSABILITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 553
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 554
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 9 ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION
I. INTRODUCTION 555
II. UNJUSTIFIED DISCRIMINATION 557
1. EQUIVALENT TRANSACTIONS 558
1.1. SAME OR SIMILAR PRODUCTS 559
1.2. SIMILAR COSTS 562
1.3. COMMERCIAL CONTEXT 564
1.4. TIMING OF TRANSACTIONS 565
1.5. CUSTOMER-RELATED FACTORS 566
2. DISSIMILAR CONDITIONS 569
3. OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION 570
III. EXCLUSIONARY VERSUS NON-EXCLUSIONARY
DISCRIMINATION 570
1. EXCLUSIONARY DISCRIMINATION 572
1.1. PRIMARY LINE DISCRIMINATION 573
1.2. EXCLUSIONARY SECONDARY LINE DISCRIMINATION 576
2. NON-EXCLUSIONARY DISCRIMINATION 579
2.1. OTHER TRADING PARTIES 580
2.2. COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE 581
3. SPECIFIC ISSUES 587
3.1. KNOWLEDGE OF DISCRIMINATION 587
3.2. DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY 588
3.3. DISCRIMINATION AIMED AT PARTITIONING
THE COMMON MARKET 590
3.4. DISCRIMINATION BY PATENT POOL MEMBERS 591
3.5. CONSUMER HARM IN SECONDARY LINE
NON-EXCLUSIONARY DISCRIMINATION 593
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3.6. OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION
594
3.7. MEETING COMPETITION 595
3.8. MFN CLAUSES
5%
IV. ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 598
1. THE FORMS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 598
2. HOW PRICE DISCRIMINATION IS ACCOMPLISHED 601
3. THE WELFARE EFFECTS 602
V. THE FUTURE OF ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION
UNDER EU LAW 608
CHAPTER 10 EXCESSIVE PRICING
I. INTRODUCTION 615
II. EXCESSIVE PRICING TREATMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 102TFEU 619
1. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 102(A) TFEU IN EUROPEAN
UNION CASE LAW 619
1.1. EARLY CASES 619
1.2. THE UNITED BRANDS CASE 620
1.3. POST UNITED BRANDS DEVELOPMENTS 622
1.3.1. BRITISH LEYLAND 622
1.3.2. SACEM II AND III 623
1.3.3. DEUTSCHE POST 624
1.3.4. SCANDLINES 626
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2. COMPARATORS TO ASSESS EXCESSIVE PRICES 630
2.1. PRICE/COST COMPARISON 630
2.2. COMPARISON WITH COMPETITORS OR COMPETITIVE MARKETS 633
2.3. COMPARISON WITH OTHER GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS 634
2.4. COMPARISON OVER TIME 636
2.5. COMPARISON WITH "EX ANTE" BENCHMARKS 636
2.6. COMBINATION OF COMPARATORS 636
III. EXCESSIVE PRICING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS * COLLABOARATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
AND THE EX ANTE APPROACH 639
1. INTRODUCTION 639
2. COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING IPRS * EFFICIENCIES
AND MARKET POWER 641
2.1. WELFARE AND EFFICIENCY ENHANCING PROPERTIES 642
2.2. MARKET POWER AND DOMINANCE 644
3. ANTITRUST REGULATION 647
4. BENCHMARKING EXCESSIVE ROYALTY CLAIMS 652
4.1. TRADITIONAL BENCHMARKS, FRAND AND IP LICENSING 652
4.2. THE ECONOMIC MEANING OF FAIR AND REASONABLE 653
4.3. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE EX ANTE APPROACH 654
4.3.1. PREVENTIVE USE 654
4.3.2. EX POST APPLICATION OF EX ANTE BENCHMARKS 657
4.3.3. EXTENSIONS TO OTHER SITUATIONS 660
IV. CONCLUSIONS 661
1. INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE AND INVEST 661
2. REGULATORY ROLE 663
3. STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS 665
4. SYNTHESIS 665
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 11 OTHER ABUSES
I. INTRODUCTION
667
II. PROCEDURAL ABUSES
669
1. DEFINITION
669
1.1. EXCLUSIONARY STRATEGY 671
1.2. NO OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION 672
1.3. NO OR LITTLE DISCRETION OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 672
2. PRECEDENTS 673
2.1. VEXATIOUS LITIGATION 673
2.2. MISUSE OF PATENT REGISTRATION PROCEDURES 674
2.3. MISUSE OF TRADEMARK REGISTRATION PROCEDURES 680
2.4. MISUSE OF ANTIDUMPING PROCEDURES 680
2.5. ABUSE OF STANDARDISATION PROCEDURES 682
3. DISCUSSIONS AND OUTLOOK 685
3.1. ARTICLE 102 TFEU VERSUS SPECIFIC REGULATIONS:
WHERE ARE THE LIMITS? 685
3.2. ARE PROCEDURAL ABUSES COMPATIBLE WITH THE
EFFECTS-BASED DOCTRINE? 686
3.3. A CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE US? 687
3.4. ISOLATED CASES OR A NEW CATEGORY OF ABUSES? 689
III. CONTRACTUAL ABUSES 691
1. ABUSIVE CONTRACTING 691
2. ABUSIVE CONTRACT TERMS 692
2.1. THE APPLICABLE TEST 692
2.2. PRECEDENTS 694
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3. ABUSE OF THE EXERCISE OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 698
4. DISCUSSIONS AND OUTLOOK 700
4.1. LIMITED CASE LAW 700
4.2. CONSUMER AND COMMERCE LAWS 700
4.3. ANTITRUST LAWS 701
4.4. COMPETITION POLICY 702
4.5. AN OBSOLETE CATEGORY OF ABUSES? 702
IV. STRUCTURAL ABUSES 702
1. ARTICLE 102 TFEU AND MERGER CONTROL 703
1.1. BEFORE THE MERGER REGULATION 703
1.2. AFTER THE MERGER REGULATION 704
2. ARTICLE 102 TFEU AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDINGS 706
3. OTHER RELEVANT CASES 709
V. ABUSES RELATING TO LIMITATION OF PRODUCTION,
MARKET OR TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS 709
1. LIMITATION OF THE NORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION 709
2. FAILURE TO SATISFY DEMAND 711
3. INEFFICIENCY 712
CHAPTER 12 REMEDIES
I. INTRODUCTION 715
1. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR REMEDIES FOR ABUSE
OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU 716
2. MANDATORY AND VOLUNTARY REMEDIES 717
TABLE OF CONTENTS
II. KEY OBJECTIVES
720
1. THE REMEDY MUST BRING THE INFRINGEMENT TO AN END 721
2. THE REMEDY MUST ADDRESS ALL COMPETITIVE DISTORTIONS
RESULTING FROM THE INFRINGEMENT 721
2.1. ARE THERE PARTICULAR MARKETS SUSCEPTIBLE TO
ADDITIONAL COMPETITIVE DISTORTIONS? 722
2.2. HOW CAN THESE ADDITIONAL COMPETITIVE DISTORTIONS
BE ADDRESSED? 723
2.3. STRUCTURAL MEASURES 724
2.4. INFORMATION REMEDIES AND RENEGOTIATION OPTIONS 726
2.5. PRE-EMPTING FUTURE ABUSES 727
3. THE COMMISSION'S DISCRETION IN DESIGNING REMEDIES IS
LIMITED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 727
3.1. RE-ESTABLISHING COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES INFRINGED 727
4. THE REMEDY MUST HAVE USEFUL EFFECT (ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION) 729
5. STRUCTURAL REMEDIES ARE MEASURES OF LAST RESORT 731
6. COMMISSION DECISIONS MAY ALSO PROVIDE FOR FINES 735
III. TYPOLOGY OF ARTICLE 102 REMEDIES 736
1. INTERIM MEASURES 736
1.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERIM MEASURES 739
1.2. PROCEDURE FOR INTERIM MEASURES 740
1.3. ENFORCEMENT AND REVIEW 741
2. REMEDIES VOLUNTEERED BY THE UNDERTAKING 741
2.1. COMMITMENT DECISIONS 741
2.1.1. PROCEDURAL STEPS IN COMMITMENTS PROCEEDINGS 742
2.1.2. CONTENT OF COMMITMENT DECISIONS 745
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2.1.3. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
IN COMMITMENTS CASES 746
2.1.4. ENFORCEMENT OF COMMITMENT DECISIONS 749
2.1.5. EFFICIENCIES RESULTING FROM COMMITMENT DECISIONS 751
2.2. INFORMAL UNDERTAKINGS 752
3. INFRINGEMENT DECISIONS 753
4. FINES 754
4.1. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 754
4.2. THE 2006 FINING GUIDELINES 758
4.2.1. THE BASIC AMOUNT 758
4.2.2. THE 2006 FINING GUIDELINES 759
4.2.3. DURATION OF THE INFRINGEMENT 759
4.2.4. RECIDIVISM 759
4.2.5. DETERRENCE MULTIPLIERS 760
4.2.6. INABILITY TO PAY 760
5. ENFORCEMENT OF REMEDIAL MEASURES 760
5.1. PERIODIC PENALTY PAYMENTS 761
5.2. MONITORING MECHANISMS 761
IV. SUBSTANCE: ARTICLE 102 TFEU ABUSES AND
EFFECTIVE REMEDIES 762
1. PRICING ABUSE REMEDIES 762
2. TYING ABUSE REMEDIES 765
3. REFUSAL TO DEAL 769
3.1. STRUCTURAL REMEDIES 773
3.2. TREATMENT OF PHYSICAL INPUTS AS COMPARED WITH IPR 774
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. REMEDIES IN DISCRIMINATION CASES 782
4.1. THE CONTENT OF THE NON-DISCRIMINATION OBLIGATION 782
4.2. MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
NON-DISCRIMINATION OBLIGATION 784
BIBLIOGRAPHY 787
INDEX 831
XXX11 |
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| spelling | EU competition law 5 Abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU Gian Luigi Tosato ; Leonardo Bellodi (eds.) Leuven Claeys & Casteels 2013 Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, USA Edward Elgar Publishing 2013 XCVIII,848 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier González-Díaz, Francisco Enrique Sonstige (DE-588)171809440 oth Tosato, Gian Luigi Sonstige oth Bellodi, Leonardo Sonstige oth (DE-604)BV021656716 5 SWB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027298901&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | EU competition law |
| title | EU competition law |
| title_auth | EU competition law |
| title_exact_search | EU competition law |
| title_full | EU competition law 5 Abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU Gian Luigi Tosato ; Leonardo Bellodi (eds.) |
| title_fullStr | EU competition law 5 Abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU Gian Luigi Tosato ; Leonardo Bellodi (eds.) |
| title_full_unstemmed | EU competition law 5 Abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU Gian Luigi Tosato ; Leonardo Bellodi (eds.) |
| title_short | EU competition law |
| title_sort | eu competition law abuse of dominance under article 102 tfeu |
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