Država i korupcija:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Beograd
Čigoja Štampa [u.a.]
2013
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract Klappentext |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Political corruption and weak state |
| Beschreibung: | 394 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9788675589686 8675589689 |
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| 246 | 1 | 3 | |a Political corruption and weak state |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1812641565695279104 |
|---|---|
| adam_text |
Sadržaj
Uvodne napomene
.5
SAVREMENA DRŽAVA
KONTROVERZE OKO DRŽAVE
.11
Uvod: Kratka istorija države i teorija
о
državi
.12
Genealogija koncepta države
.13
Klasična teorijska trijada: marksizam
-
elitizam
-
pluralizam
.15
Marksizam: Država kao klasna hegemonija
.15
Elitizam: Država podeljena na elitu i mase
.17
Pluralizam: Država kao arbitar između konkurirajućih interesa
.19
Posttradicionalni pristupi
.21
Savremeni razvoj teorija države
.22
Feminizam: Država kao instrument održavanja patrijarhata
.22
Ekologizam: Socijalno i ekološki održiva država i društvo
.23
Struktura i oblici države
.24
Proces građenja države: slabe i jake države
.26
Proces građenja države
.26
Granice države
.27
Kapacitet države
.28
Slabe i jake države
.30
Srbija kao slaba država
.32
Postoktobarska Srbija
.34
Obim i granice države: Socijalna država
.
r.
37
„Građa i alati" socijalne države
.37
Teorijski okvir i moralna i socijalna argumentacija
.39
Kontroverze oko obima i funkcija
-
granica države
.41
Klasifikacija i tipologija socijalnih država
.46
Primer:
Evropski socijalni model(i)
.48
Država u „teškom" tranzicionom okviru i ključu
.50
Država po
meri
i ukusu građana
.52
Perspektive: Agonija i krah ili transformacija nacionalne socijalne države
.55
TRANZICIJA KA DEMOKRATIJI
.61
Tranzicija i demokrati]a
.61
Procesi, akteri i arene demokratizacije
.62
„Mapiranje" demokratije
.66
Konsolidované
-
„ukotvljene" i „manjkave" demokratije
.67
Postliberalne demokratije
.69
Pretpostavke „ukotvljavanja" demokratije
.69
Srbija na testu demokratije
.75
Konsolidován)
e
demokratije
.,.78
POLITIČKI AKTERI I DRŽAVA
PROCES I AKTERI POLITIČKOG ODLUČIVANJA
.81
1.
Faze i akteri političkog procesa
.82
2.
Civilne i političke strategije
promena
.85
Organizacije civilnog društva (OCD) i politički proces
.87
Sredstva i aktivnosti aktera politike
.89
Civilno društvo i političke stranke
.91
3.
Lobiranje i demokratija
.94
Lobiranje i lobisti
.95
Modeli i taktike lobiranja
.96
Lobiranje i rizici korupcije
.97
(Ne)isplativost lobiranja
.97
IZBORNA OBEĆANJA IPOSTIZBORNA REALNOST:
JAVNE POLITIKE U IZBORNOJ PONUDI U SRBIJI
.99
1.
Metodski pristup(i) analizi
.100
Analitičko-hipotetički okvir
.103
2.
Izbori
2012.
godine
-
Kontekst, platforme i ishodi
.105
Izborna šarenica
.105
2012.
godina
-
Koalicioni potencijali i izvodljive
i održive vladavinske politike
.109
Tok i efekti pregovora
.112
3.
Pogled u budućnost:
Funkcionisanje koalicione vlasti i faktori (ne)stabilnosti Vlade
.113
Srbija 2012-te: Sporazum
о
zajedničkim političkim ciljevima
.114
1.
Ekonomska i socijalna politika
.118
2.
Borba protiv korupcije
.119
3.
Spoljnopolitički prioriteti i rizici
.120
Pitanja bez (za sada) pravog odgovora
.121
Reforma javnih preduzeća
.121
Socijalni dijalog i održiva ekonomska i socijalna politika
.123
MOĆ I NEMOĆ PARLAMENTA
.127
1.
Modeli objašnjenja (ne)moći parlamenta
.129
2.
Parlament Srbije: normativni okvir i praksa
.135
STUDIJA SLUČAJA: PARTIJE I PARLAMENT U PROCESU
DONOŠENJA ANTIKORUPTIVNOG ZAKONODAVSTVA
.145
Uvodne napomene
.145
1.
Problem korupcije u programima političkih stranaka
.146
2.
Analiza procesa usvajanja zakona
.149
Parlamentarni saziv i antikoruptivno zakonodavstvo
(2008-2011).149
Predmetni okvir analize
. 149
Zakon
о
izmenama i dopunama Zakona
о
slobodnom pristupu
informacijama od javnog značaja
.150
Javne nabavke i ekonomsko poslovanje
.153
Zakon
о
zaštiti konkurencije
.155
Rasprava i usvajanje zakona
.157
Zakon
о
oduzimanju imovine proistekle iz krivičnog
dela
.157
3.
Zakon(i)
о
Agenciji za borbu protiv korupcije
.158
Zakon
о
Agenciji za borbu protiv korupcije:
Rasprava i usvajanje zakona
.158
Zakon
о
izmenama i dopunama
Zakona
о
Agenciji za borbu protiv korupcije
.160
4.
Zakoni
о
finansiranju političkih aktivnosti:
Karakter i ograničenja rešenja u Srbiji
.162
Zakon
о
finansiranju političkih aktivnosti
(2011).163
Pozicija i ovlašćenja Agencije za borbu protiv korupcije
.165
Zaključne napomene
.,.170
SRBIJA U RALJAMA TRANZICIJE
I GLOBALIZACIJE
PUTEVII STRANPUTICE SRPSKE TRANZICIJE
.175
1.
Gde smo sada
.176
1.
Srbija i planetarna kriza
.176
2.
Ruinirana ekonomija
.178
3.
Aktuelni socijalni kontekst
.181
4.
Političko-kulturne posledice
.183
2.
Šta da se radi: U potrazi za novim odgovorima
.185
3.
Ekonomske politike
.188
4.
Političke
promene: Konsolidovanje
demokratije
.195
5.
Redistributivne, socijalne politike:
Država, socijalna kohezija i solidarnost
.197
6.
Pogled u budućnost
.207
KORUPCIJA I ANTIKORUPTIVNE
STRATEGIJE
KARAKTER I LOGIKA KORUPCIJE
.215
1.
Određenje korupcije
.215
„Cena
korupcije"
.216
Pojam korupcije
.218
2.
Pojavni oblici, vrste i tipologije korupcije
.219
2.1.
Tipologija korupcije u postkomunističkim društvima
.221
3.
Uzroci korupcije
.222
4.
Strategija borbe protiv korupcije
.225
Antikoruptivne metode
-
alatke i mehanizmi
.226
1.
Sukob interesa
.226
Zakonska regulativa
.227
2.
Kontrola imovine i registar funkcionera i njihove imovine
.230
Krivična
dela
.231
Prekršaji
.231
Dalji pravci reformi
.231
3.
Zaštita uzbunjivača
.232
4.
Kontrola finansiranja političkih aktivnosti
. 234
Sistem društvenog integriteta i uloga međunarodne regulative
.235
Institucije za borbu protiv korupcije
-
regionalna iskustva
.238
PRIVATIZACIJA KAO (VIŠEDECENIJSKA) IGRA
INTERESA I MOĆI
.241
1.
Privatizacija
-
pristupi i modeli
.241
2.
Akteri i tok privatizacije u Srbiji
.246
2.1.
Prva faza
(1990-2000):
Privatizacija ili podržavljenje?
.246
2.2.
Privatizacija po četvrti put među građanima Srbije
(efekti aukcijske i tenderske privatizacije nakon
2000.
godine)
.248
Polazni modeli i hipoteze
.248
3.
Privatizacija i korupcija
.258
4.
Privatizacija: šta dalje?
.264
POLITIKA I NOVAC:
FINANSIRANJE POLITIČKIH AKTIVNOSTI
.267
1.
Politički akteri i korupcija
.267
2.
Antikoruptivni regulatorni okvir
.269
2.1.
Izvori finansiranja
.271
2.2.
Namena, vrste i način raspodele sredstava javnog finansiranja
.275
2.3.
Kontrola i javni nadzor nad stranačkim finansijama
.277
3.
Karakter i ograničenja rešenja u Srbiji
.279
4.
Finansiranje izborne kampanje
2012.
godine
-
preliminarni nalazi
.285
„MERENJE" KORUPCIJE
.299
1.
Metodski pristupi
.299
2.
Javnomnjenjska istraživanja korupcije
.301
3. 2012.
godina
-
promena
vlasti i preokretanje trenda rasta nepoverenja
.306
4.
Akteri i šanse antikoruptivne strategije
.307
Percepcija rada Agencije za borbu protiv korupcije
.309
IZAZOVI I EFEKTI BORBE PROTIV KORUPCIJE: SLUČAJ SRBIJA
.315
1.
Kratka istorija „borbe protiv korupcije"
(2001-2012).315
Četvrta grana vlasti
.315
Nacionalna strategija za borbu protiv korupcije
(2005-2010).325
2.
Ka novoj antikoruptivnoj strategiji
(2013-2017).341
Prioritetne oblasti i ciljevi
.341
Politička korupcija
.343
Upravljanje javnim resursima
.344
394
Zoran Stojiljković
Sektor
javnih preduzeća
.345
Zdravstvo
.345
Devet velikih rizika od korupcije u zdravstvu
.346
Obrazovanje
.347
Preporuke upućene privatnom i civilnom sektoru
.349
Primena Strategije: lični i institucionalni integritet
.350
Poželjan epilog: Dobra uprava i
konsolidovaná
demokratija
kao okvir redukovanja korupcije
.351
Principi dobrog upravljanja
.352
Dobra uprava kao brana korupciji
.353
LITERATURA
.355
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND WEAK STATE
.373
Beleška o
autoru
.387
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND WEAK STATE
Beyond any doubt, corruption is an immensely complex, multidimensional
and highly persistent negative social phenomenon. The author starts from the
hypothesis that it is essential for the countries of the region to critically assess
the synergy established between systemic, political corruption and a selectively
weak, "devious" nature of the state. Moreover, the key dilemma is whether the
expanded practice of rent seeking beyond the logic of the market and competi¬
tion supports the (neo)liberal conclusion that the root of all corruption is in the
very existence of the state
-
particularly in excessive, selective and deforming state
interventions and benefits that create a fertile ground for corruption? According
to the author, there is no evidence to demonstrate that private monopolies are less
inefficient or less corrupt than public ones, or that privatization, especially a long
lasting and obscure one, rejects the positive growth and social effects, including
the reduction of corruption. The author argues that the destructive combination
of weak government and rampant political corruption is based on scattered state
intervention, the absence of strong institutional framework and the precise rules
of the game, control of public finances and effective political and anti-monopoly
legislation and practice included.
State-building process
Following the launching of transition, war and breakup of the former coun¬
try, in other words in extremely adverse post-conflict framework, followed by the
world-wide crisis and recession since
2008,
states in the ex-Yugoslav territory
faced enormous challenges of state-building. The state-building process itself,
according to Francis Fukuyama, includes of two relatively autonomous aspects.
(Fukujama
2007).
The first one is agreement over definition of the scope and depth of state
intervention in the social soil, i.e. over different extent of regulatory, security,
ownership, economic or social and cultural functions and internal and external
political arrangements of the state.
374
Zoran Stojiijković
The second aspect refers to its (insufficient, efficient and economically sus¬
tainable and "profitable" capacities to carry out the selected scope of its functions.
It primarily refers to the extent of existence and rational organization of a credible,
responsible, competent and uncorrupted state apparatus.
However, the end of the 20th century was marked by two phenomena relating
to the character and functions of the state: expansion of democracy and almost
universal acceptance of the liberal-democratic system as a model, accompanied
by the simultaneous process of "state emptyng" (Jessop
1990).
An "empty state" is the result of synergetic action of three complementary
processes that erode the sovereignty of a nation state. Globalization and at the
same time transfer of government to sub-state levels (regions and local communi¬
ties) are a reflection of the fact that the nation state at the same time became too
small and too big to solve a certain range of problems in an optimum way. The
third process of state restructuring is manifested through partial marketization,
deregulation and even privatization of public services, that is attempt to make
the public sector (including through the practice of public-private partnerships)
sustainable and competitive. The essence of that process is shift from rule to gov¬
ernance (Hejvud
2004: 193-196).
Capacity of the state
On the other hand, institutional design and capacity of state bodies depend
on four interrelated aspects of stateness. The first aspect refers to the quality of
management in the field of organization and management of public institutions
and enterprises. Knowledge in this area is relatively easily transferable and can
be acquired through training and education. Modern, necessarily organized as
rationally as possible in competitive globalized framework, competitive
-
entre¬
preneurial states seek transfer of knowledge from the private sector in the area of
management of public policies and public finances, by outsourcing relevant affairs
under contract.
The second aspect is the chosen form of rule and political system. Its cer¬
tain formative characteristics such as decentralization and principle of subsidi¬
arity may be suitable to certain subsystems (economy, regional development, civil
initiatives), while creating problems of adaptation in other subsystems (security,
defense, anti-corruption strategies). Optimum designed institutional structure is
therefore extremely important.
Optimality and professional competence of government administration are
necessary but not sufficient conditions. It is necessary that the relevant order also
enjoys credibility and democratic legitimacy by citizens. Trust in political actors
Država i
korupcija
375
and institutions is the third resource, highly lacking in Serbia and most of transi¬
tion countries.
Offe
defines horizontal and vertical networks and established re¬
lations of trust as widespread confidence that others will refrain from inflicting
damage and that whenever possible they would contribute to our well-being
(Offe
1999: 142-144).
The fourth, subpolitical aspect of institutional capacities and "sound health"
of the state relates to discouraging/encouraging character of social norms and
values contained in citizens' political culture and "memory", i.e. in their social
capital. Social capital is actually made up of a dense network of values, norms
and established relations of trust which enable individuals to increase, through
joint action, the likelihood for accomplishing their common goals. Specific
character of social capital of a political community largely influences the supply
and demand of appropriate political actors and institutions and their rating. For
example, informal habits and norms and forms of grouping may both foster but
also undermine and corruptively block the operation of formal institutions and
prevent transfer of real flows of economic and political action into legal frame¬
work (Fukujama
2004).
Therefore, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between the scope of the state
which includes basic functions and goals, and the strength of state power which
has to do with the ability of the state to plan and execute policies and to enforce
laws. That strength of state authority is referred to as institutional capacity (Fuku¬
jama
2007: 17).
Institutional abilities represent "the ability to formulate and carry out policies
and enact laws; to administrate efficiently and with a minimum of bureaucracy;
to control graft, corruption and bribery; to maintain a high level of transparency
and accountability in governmental institutions; and, most important, to enforce
laws" (Fukujama
2007: 20).
Weak and strong states
The essence of the state is therefore defined by its ability to protect its terri¬
tory, citizens, political order against various external threats, but also to establish
internal order. It must make the citizens obey its laws and rules of behavior (Fuku¬
jama
2007:16).
Institutional or administrative capacities lie in the foundations of division
between strong and weak states. According to Joel S.
Migdal,
a strong state is
capable of accomplishing its objectives. It has the capacities "to penetrate society,
regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources
in determined ways"
(Migdal
1988).
376
Zoran Stojiljković
Strong states should deliver its citizens nine fundamental "public" goods:
(1)
full control of own territory;
(2)
protection against political violence and crime;
(3)
guaranteeing of political freedom and civil liberties;
(4)
creation of the overall
environment conducive for economic prosperity;
(5)
rule of law;
(6)
independ¬
ent judiciary;
(7)
highly developed communication and physical infrastructure;
(8)
deliver a full range and a high quality of public services and highest standards
in education and health care and
(9)
effective civil society.
Jürgen Habermas
justly points out that "to remain a source of solidarity, the
status of citizenship has to maintain a use value: it has to pay to be a citizen, in the
currency of social, ecological and cultural rights"
(Habermas 2002:81).
A state lacking three key elements: capacity to achieve internal cohesion of
society, to ensure development and security, as well as international sovereignty
can be considered to be a weak state
(Nakarada
2007: 73).
In addition to the mentioned modalities and reasons for weakness of states,
there is another phenomenon that can be observed
-
a selectively weak "cunning
state". It is weak only in certain segments. Balancing between pressure from the in¬
ternational community and pressure from the public, political elite tends to make
functions of the state weak in areas that are unimportant for the regime's survival
while being sufficiently strong enough when it comes to the governing elites in¬
terests (Blue Bird
2004:38).
Such a state does not have a sufficient degree of autonomy, while its organi¬
zational capacities are weak, government apparatus inefficient. Such a phenom¬
enon is known as a "captured state". Therefore, it can generate substantial revenues
through taxes, but manages such revenues in highly corruptive way which enables
a small number of powerful individuals who control administration to increase
their gains, while doing damage to its citizens.
Countries of the region as selectively weak states
This thesis is substantiated by the fact that most states in the territory of ex-
Yugoslavia have not yet managed to reach the developmental level they had at the
end of the communist period. "In the meantime, states in the region, after contro¬
versial privatizations and great influence of individuals who became rich in an un¬
lawful way, became also 'captured' or 'abducted' by private interests"
(Teokarević
2010:11).
At the same time, the fact that these are weak states is best corroborated
by
12
selected indicators of the Fund for Peace, which cover a wide range of risk
factors that may lead to failed state, such as demographic imbalance, social dis¬
content, uneven development, economic crisis, delegitimation of authorities,
Država i
korupcija
377
widespread corruptive and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes and solicit
citizens1 support, as well as environmental deterioration and brain drain. Failing
state attributes, particularly in the case of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in¬
clude also the loss of monopoly on the legitimate use of force, erosion of authority
for making collective decisions and inability to provide effective public services.
Consequently, the risk of losing equal position in interaction with other states is
increasing.
Summarizing the above findings, it seems that we are stuck with flawed or
"defective" democracy. Defective or semi-consolidated democracies are actually
unstable democracies, prone to political crises, characterized by:
(1)
partocracy
and resulting
(2)
weak structures of (parliamentary) representation;
(3)
incom¬
plete decentralization of authority;
(4)
limited civil society potentials, depend¬
ent on foreign sources;
(5)
influence of "powermongers"
-
special economic and
political interest groups
-
on the media;
(6)
slow, inconsistent court proceedings,
unable to resist pressures, and
(7)
weak capacities for combating widespread cor¬
ruption
(Merkel 2009).
Detecting social causes of such a situation, I would propose a thesis about
partial reforms undertaken, in other words about the "social marriage of conven¬
ience" established between temporary transitional winners and transitional los¬
ers, as the reason for absence of radical reforms
(
Stoj iljko vić
2011:217-222).
The biggest resistance to reforms came from winners of the initial open¬
ing of economy. They include politicians and businessmen, members of the old
elite, who managed to gain the biggest wealth from initial opening of economy.
Naturally, those who gained advantage, assets and benefits through initial, partial
opening of economy will not support further reforms and opening of economy,
because that can destroy the advantage already acquired.
From a rather objectivized viewpoint of transition countries' citizens, "social
pyramid of corruption" is made up of its mass wide basis from petty, everyday
corruption whose actors are lower public servants and citizens, and its peak, in¬
volving predator new bourgeoisie, which derives its power from
extralegal
strip¬
ping of public assets for their private benefit. Predators include two large groups:
(a) "big, successful businessmen" which came to their position by using politi¬
cal support and monopolistic privileges, and (b) party commissioners managing
non-privatized enterprises and public funds, whose privileged position depends
on the promotion of party interests.
378
Zoran Stojiljković
Political corruption and (selectively) weak state:
two sides of the same coin
Particularly for transitional societies, an important story relates to corrup¬
tion, particularly systemic one
-
political and weak and captured, partocratic
states.
The notion of corruption and political corruption
In structural terms, the three constitutive elements for the definition of cor¬
ruption include:
(1)
public powers;
(2)
their abuse, and
(3)
acquired benefit.
From almost immense sum of definitions of corruption which, in addition
to criminal-law approach, proceed from the approach the core of which includes
public opinion and public interest or economic consequences of corruption, I will
single out only two definitions of corruption.
Robert Klitgaard claims that corruption exists when an individual unlaw¬
fully puts his personal interest above the interests of people and ideals he took
an oath to serve. The accent here is without any doubt not only on violation of
laws, but also on failing the public interest and ethos of public service. Klitgaard
is also credited for the definition through the formula: corruption
=
monopoly
+
discretion
-
accountability, with an important methodological remark that un¬
derlying every effective
anti-
corruption strategy is an inverse order
-
reduction of
monopoly and discretionary authorities with simultaneous increase of all forms
of accountability (Klitgaard
1988).
Expanding the list of factors, the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP,
2004:
XX) also takes into account in its publications integrity and trans¬
parency, which are counterbalance to monopoly and secrecy. Amended Klitgaard
s
formula is now: Corruption
=
monopoly of authority
+
discretionary powers
-
(accountability
+
integrity
+
transparency).
Finally, I find the famous definition by
Vito Tanzi
superior and indeed com¬
plete. Tanzi asserts that corruption exists when deliberate, intentional noncompli-
ance with the principle of impartiality in decision-making occurs in the aim of
deriving certain benefit. Tanzi introduces two clear rows of selective limitations at
the beginning and at the end of potential corruptive interaction. First, there is no
corruption in the case of deliberate, planned violation of the principle of imparti¬
ality. Being uninformed or acting on the basis of the feeling of affinity or antipathy
are indications of insufficient competence or professionalism, but not necessarily
of corruption. Secondly, if there is at least a deferred payment involved, or at least
Država i
korupcija
379
a proposal for exchange of services, this is not necessarily corruption, despite ac¬
companying bias and obstinacy of administration (Tanzi
1998).
Unlike "petty", everyday corruption, systemic, political corruption is un¬
derstood to imply the practice of abuse of public power
-
conferred authorities,
for private benefit, or benefit of a narrower group, which the policy stakeholders
perform in the aim of increasing their power and wealth. In this way, political
life is focused on rent seeking instead of on developmental and regulatory activi¬
ties, thereby undermining the democratic idea on public interest and service of
politicians and public servants and their responsibility to the constituency. Politi¬
cal corruption has many manifestational forms from conscious preparation and
enactment of defective laws and laws and bylaws full of "legal gaps", through de¬
signing of hardly enforceable legislative solutions with numerous "surprises" in
transitional provisions, to tax avoidance, provision of resources from "rainy day"
funds and non-transparent management of revenues and expenditures of political
parties.
A favorite method of exercising selective benefits and exchange of corrup-
tive services in politics is widespread "decreemania"
-
the rule by regulations and
bylaws issued by the executive authorities.
Susan Rose-Ackerman maps three central dimensions identifying three
central dimensions that define the space and opportunities for political corrup¬
tion:
(1)
existence of privileges that politicians may distribute to narrow groups;
(2)
possibility of the rich to exercise benefits in legitimate ways, and
(3)
long-term
character of these established economic-political alliances. The mentioned three
dimensions increase the readiness of politicians to accept illegitimate resources
for their campaigns and the willingness of tycoons to corrupt politicians (Rouz-
Ejkerman
2007:143-144).
Corruption at the highest levels of politics results in the "institutional cap¬
ture"
-
"state capture" which, according to Rasma Karklins, reflects in the takeover
of the entire state by cartels formed by political elites and business oligarchs. The
legislature, the executive, the judiciary or regulatory agencies and law enforce¬
ment authorities which, depending on political interest, misuse the principle of
opportuneness of criminal prosecution, may be captured and made politically
purposeful, but not socially effective (Karklins
2004:32).
The sector most exposed to corruption in my opinion is the legislature,
which enacts regulations at the order of leaders of political parties and/or their
financiers. Exposure to corruption and political dictate of prosecuting and ju¬
diciary authorities, which deliberately violate the principles underlying the legal
order, should be added to this.
380
Zoran Stojiljković
Causes of corruption
In addition to a group of contextual characteristics of corruption whose roots
can be found in blocked and largely deformed nature of transitional changes at the
end of the 20th century, such as poverty, war, isolation, legal uncertainty and insta¬
bility, a number of its correlates demonstrates relatively persistent character and
effect. In this regard, many will agree that corruption is as old as human society.
There are, above all, two groups of factors that contribute to the maintenance
of a high level of corruption and represent a characteristic destructive mix of open
possibilities for corruption (systemic-institutional preconditions) and at the same
time present propensity to corruption (political-cultural reasons).
Systemic-institutional correlates of corruption include:
(1)
poor situation in
public services, characterized by political overpopulation and domination of the
logic of loyalty over professional standards and resulting measure of job insecurity
and modest pay;
(2)
widespread practice of avoidance of payment of obligations
to the state, with parallel and
(3)
limited supply of resources that leads to intro¬
duction of quotas and existence of monopolies.
However, the most devastating consequence is the existence of money laun¬
dering mechanism, i.e. creation of association between organized criminal groups
and parts of government apparatus. The primary goal of regionally connected or¬
ganized criminal groups is not just mere acquisition of material gain through ille¬
gal activities, but money laundering, implying its transfer and investment in legal
channels of financial transactions. This "laundered money" is often used for pur¬
chase of real estate, in privatization process or for financing of election campaigns.
A part of that money serves to "buy protection"
-
for corruption of government
officials, prosecutors and members of the police to get access to privileged infor¬
mation and exert influence on the course and outcome of criminal activity.
The second, justifying and anesthetizing side of the mechanism that main¬
tains a high level of corruption is the inherited, traditionally established po¬
litical-cultural matrix and behavioral pattern where people reconciled and got
accustomed to corruption, believing that it always existed and that it will always
exist.
In this political-cultural matrix of interpretation of roots of corruption, cor¬
ruption is directly associated with corrupt character of power and human nature
prone to corruption. This thesis can be best illustrated by Lord Actons famous
sentence: "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely".
Actually, even ancient philosophers thought that corruption marks social
situation in which anomy or lawlessness predominate. Aristotle stated in his Poli¬
tics that exercising power brings benefits and that is why people want to rule. Con¬
sequently, by exercising power its actors, and whole societies as well, deteriorate,
Država i
korupcija
381
and when a society becomes pervert, it moves to a lower, bad or pervert social
form.
For
Niccolo Machiavelli,
the originator of modern political sociology, a cor¬
rupt citizen is the one who places his personal ambitions or advantages of his party
above general wellbeing. The main causes that lead to corruption, in his opinion,
are moral degradation, bad upbringing and bad faith
(Pavlovic
2011:116).
Montesquieu also thought that every power is prone to abuse and therefore
must be restricted by another power. Personal interest is a permanent element of
human nature.
Actually, David Hume warned that we will be mistaken if we proceed from
optimistic view of human nature and if we assume that people are guided in their
actions by some abstract benevolence and philanthropy, instead of personal inter¬
est in which he finds the origin of justice, society and power. According to him,
where the government rests on good institutions, it will "make even a bad man
to act for the public good". On the other hand, though not universally true, it
is certainly true in politics that "every man ought to be supposed a knave" and
continues: "For so great is the natural ambition of men that they are never satis¬
fied with power; and if one order of men, by pursuing its own interest, can usurp
upon every other order, it will certainly do so and render itself, as far as possible,
absolute and uncontrollable".
At the end of the 19th century, Moisei Yakovlevich Ostrogorski, one of the
founders of political sociology, researching the method of financing and opera¬
tion of modern political parties, established that massive corruption is prevalent
in them. He found the causes in destructive connection between politics and
money. On the market, thought Ostrogorski, one can buy politicians, but also
laws. His conclusion is that corruptness of political parties weakens representative
democracy and leads it to bankruptcy (Ostrogorski
1921:94-98).
Corruption is actually a dual sale-and-purchase relationship: using it, the
government may buy consent and loyalty of its subjects, but the private owners
and groups may also "buy" the government. These processes unfold when the
government allows its associates in the environment to get rich at governments
expense, tying their fate to the leadership or leader, while holding them in check.
Corruption is therefore almost inevitable companion of power. Power is the way
to get money. This process is particularly characteristic of transition countries,
with weak constitutional barriers and moral control and in which free public is
not yet sufficiently developed.
Members of political elite are regarded as the most powerful and the most re¬
sponsible group, as described in satirical message that "politicians used to have a
vision, but now they only have commission". Tenacious, long tradition of corrup¬
tion and coupling between the rich and powerful in Serbia is perfectly described,
for example, in short stories by
Milovan Glišić,
particularly in his anthological
382
Zoran Stojiljković
story about the recurring purchases of one and the same sugarloaf which is then
used as a gift to butter up (local) powermongers. More than dramatic and far-
reaching are warnings by Archibald Reiss about Serbs' inclination to succumb to
the power of purveyors and usurers, given in the work under indicative title "Lis¬
ten to me, Serbs". Strong anti-corruptive sentiment in the Montenegrin tradition
is to be found in the narrative about humanity by
Marko
Miljanov.
Similar message and effect is to be found in "amoral familism"
-
a model of
behavior which focuses in all relations only on the interest of an individual and his
closest environment, regardless of the laws and professional standards. Corrup¬
tion in the public sector is largely facilitated by widespread logic and understand¬
ing of public property and interests as something that, unlike private property,
does not have its owner, which is both nobody's and everybody's, hence mine as
well.
Strategy of fight against corruption
When suppression of corruption is concerned, the only effective strategy is
the one which combines repressive and preventive approach and measures. The
strategy that primarily relies on repressive approach
-
on detection and prosecu¬
tion of corrupt individuals
-
proved to be insufficient and inadequate. Such a
strategy is based on "rotten apples" theory, which proceeds from the fact that it is
sufficient to solve the problem of corruption by simple detection, prosecution and
elimination of corrupt individuals and groups.
Preventive measures which, in addition to traditional state bodies and inde¬
pendent control bodies
-
"the fourth branch of power" also include transparency,
media, civil society organizations and citizens, are:
(1)
increased transparency
and control,
(2)
encouragement of competition and abolishment of monopolies,
(3)
simplification and greater visibility of different administrative procedures,
(4)
control of financial transactions,
(5)
keeping public informed,
(6)
creating ap¬
propriate and verifiable economic and social policy,
(7)
encouraging transparency
and competitiveness in political processes and
(8)
introduction of the freedom of
press and independent media.
Mechanisms and tools for prevention of corruption
The main purpose and essence of
anti
-corruption strategy is elimination of
conflict of interest and promotion and establishment of the system of social in-
Država i
korupcija
383
tegrity and accompanying mechanisms of accountability with a view to making
corruption a high-risk venture with uncertain and small gain.
Conflict of interest is any situation in which the officeholder has private in¬
terest which affects or may affect his actions in the discharge of public office or of¬
ficial duty, in a way that may endanger the service to public interest. As a rule, laws
that regulate conflict of interest initially define criteria and conditions to identify
persons who are considered public officials. Most often, a demarcation line be¬
tween who is and who is not to be considered a public official is how an official is
elected, appointed or nominated to a particular public office.
The circle of public offices and officials, in addition to traditional political
offices within certain branches and levels of government, includes positions in the
bodies of public enterprises, institutions and other organizations whose founder
is the state, region or local self-government unit. Whether someone will be con¬
sidered a public official also depends on the assessment whether the specific of¬
fice involves the administrative and decision-making powers and powers to issue
general and specific acts.
A circle of public officials defined in such a way is in obligation to submit
regular reports on their property and on any substantial change in its value and
structure, but also to record sources of income and offices he discharges.
When conflict of interest is concerned, the first step is to reduce the number
of offices that one person may discharge by defining their (in)compatibility, such
as the provision that one cannot simultaneously occupy positions in different
branches of power
-
legislative and executive, for example. The next step is "freez¬
ing" of employment status or transfer of governing or ownership rights that may
be in conflict with the discharge of public office to other persons. The official is
required to seek approval from the competent
anti-
corruption body for the dis¬
charge of any other office he intends to assume, and to withdraw, within the term
set by the law, from any office he discharged prior to coming into force of relevant
legislative provisions that deem their further discharge incompatible.
Relying on Transparency Serbia analyses, the system of social integrity is
seen as a Greek temple with the roof (integrity) supported by a row of eight pillars
which make up constitutive elements of a single system
(Transparentnost
Srbija;
Evropski pokret u Srbiji
2001) :
ombudsman,
commissioner for information of
public importance or independent
anti-
corruption agencies, professional public
services, transparent and effective local self-government, independent and free
media and critical and developed civil society and citizens aware of their rights
and obligations.
384
Zoran Stojiljković
Desirable epilogue: Good governance and consolidated democracy
as a framework for reducing corruption
Good governance (of the public and private sector) understood as a process,
with strong institutions, is the best barrier to systemic, political corruption, but
is also the main prerequisite for economic development, political stability and
security of any society. The concept of sustainable development requires adequate
environment in the sense of principles of good governance which, overall, is a
complex ideal.
There is no universal definition of good governance. However, in principle,
a broad understanding of good governance implies such rules, procedures and
decision-making processes which in an optimum way define certain behaviors
and interests, management of resources and generally how the state exercises au¬
thority in a society.
According to the definition used by UNDP, "good governance is participa¬
tory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable. And it pro¬
motes the rule of law. Good governance ensures that political, social and eco¬
nomic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the
poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation
of development resources".
The very notion of good governance is characterized by its formative prin¬
ciples, of which the three fundamental are particularly important: transparency,
accountability and participation
-
active involvement of all relevant actors and
stakeholders in the public, private and civil sectors.
Transparency of processes, activities and decisions includes: regular disclo¬
sure of all relevant information to the public (regular reporting on key activities
and decisions), providing unimpeded access to information, and effective and real
communication with the public.
Accountability, in anti-corruption context, as its core assumption, implies
undertaking two basic types of activities: (a) measurement of performance
-
ob¬
ligation to achieve measurable results, particularly in the field of public finance
management. Effective management of public finances, professional staff, as well
as precise procedures for optimization of budget spending and public procure¬
ment are the main components of good governance. Parallel and complementary
is (b) the system of established anti-corruption measures
-
preventive (enforce¬
ment of laws, institutional strengthening, establishment of preventive mecha¬
nisms and clearly defined responsibilities) and repressive measures (prosecution
and punishing of corruption cases committed by public officials and employees in
government administration).
Država i korupcija
385
Participation, i.e. involvement of citizens and open and active participation
of the civil and private sectors in decision-making processes, starting from initia¬
tion and formulation of proposal, planning, to implementation and monitoring of
adopted arrangements is the third key principle of good governance. Practically,
this refers to participation of citizens through various forms of social partnership
in the creation of public policies and at the same time promotes good govern¬
ance.
Good governance as a barrier to corruption
Analyses and reports of the Anti-Corruption Agency indicate the existence
of six distinguishable, major risks of corruption. These are:
(1)
existence of un¬
necessary decision-making procedures;
(2)
apparently contradictory, absence of
clearly defined criteria and prescribed procedures for decision-making that would
limit discretionary powers of public authorities;
(3)
absence or non-implementa¬
tion of effective mechanisms of oversight over the operation of public authorities;
(4)
absence or non-implementation of effective mechanisms of accountability of
public authorities for their work;
(5)
insufficiently functional system of punish¬
ment for corrupt behavior, and
(6)
insufficiently developed mechanisms to pre¬
vent corruption.
On the other hand, their elimination, i.e. practicing of the principle of good
governance
-
transparency, accountability, participation and, particularly, the
principle of impartiality, enables the establishment of good governance, which
then serves as a barrier to further expansion of corruption. One could even pro¬
pose a hypothesis on inverse correlation between corruption and good govern¬
ance
-
about them being a face and its mirror image or the two sides of a coin.
It is quite obvious that corruption occurs where there is a combination of
opportunity and propensity.
Anti
-corruption strategies should target both factors.
Opportunities can be minimized through systemic reforms, and propensity re¬
duced through higher transaction costs, in other words reversing the "high profit
-
low risk" scenario into "low profit
-
high risk", through effective combination
of preventive and repressive, deterring mechanisms of accountability. Having pri¬
marily
ρ
ost-
communist countries in view, Rasma Karklins sees effective anti-cor¬
ruption strategy as a coherent unity of four phases and groups of activities, each
resulting from the previous one:
(1)
recognizing and establishing facts on corrup¬
tion;
(2)
developing optimum legal and institutional framework and mechanisms;
386
Zoran Stojiljković
(3)
functional network of acting anti-corruption bodies and institutions and
(4)
monitoring and fine-tuning and adjusting of
anti-
corruption mechanisms and
procedures (Karklins
2007).
If we return to initial Klitgaards formula for definition of corruption, then
the reverse sequence
-
reducing discretionary powers, breaking up monopo¬
lies and at the same time increasing moral, political and criminal responsibility
-
would represent a kind of a win-win combination for successful fight against
corruption.
In this context, successful fight against corruption is possible only if there is
wide awareness about its destructive effects, clear and effective political will, appro¬
priate regulatory and institutional framework and unique and coherent anti-cor¬
ruption strategy, including monitoring and evaluation by independent bodies.
The final conclusion is best represented by the belief that in the long run
the "natural environment" and the widest framework for fighting corruption is a
resultant of engagement and synergetic effect of three groups of elements: (a) the
rule of law instead of partocratic rule, within which the power of social groups
is brought in equilibrium and distributed as evenly as possible; (b) cultivation
of a "delicate, vulnerable plant" of political and widest social dialogue within a
developed network of forms and institutions of participative democracy, and
(c) development of self-generating and self-supporting, robust and courageous
civil society with transparent methods of operation and financing. Of course,
underlying all this is always evolution from (perfidious) subject and/or arrogant
primitive to self-aware citizen who walks tall.
Kao sociolog politike, kao opservator i kritičar političkog života,
autor prati decenijama dugu plovidbu Srbije u uslovima
istorijskog nevremena. Pošavši iz luke folklorno-balkanske varijante
meke diktature u obličju socijalističkog samoupravljanja,
putujući preko paklenih mitskih ostrva nacionalizma,
stiže do grabežljivog kapitalizma. Rasplićući zamršeno klupko
tranzicije, privatizacije i korupcije, autorova saznanja pokazuju
da se upravo politička „visokonaponska" korupcija našla
u središtu „slabe" ili „meke" države. To je i razlog stoje političku
korupciju i slabu državu video kao dva lica iste medalje.
Spajajući teorijsko-analitičku sondu s empirijskim instrumentarijem,
dr Zoran Stojiljković analizira ključne procese i njihove
dosadašnje efekte na poziciju, sadržaje svesti, socijalni i politički
kapital „običnih" građana. Logikom lucidnog, rafiniranog i kritički
usmerenog istraživača, autor nastoji da identifikuje aktere
i skicira pravce poželjnih, strukturalnih promena.
On polazi od uverenja da nema konsolidovanja demokratije
bez istovremenog raskida sa podaničkim mentalitetom
i populističkom političkom kulturom. |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Stojiljković, Zoran 1953- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1059298651 |
| author_facet | Stojiljković, Zoran 1953- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Stojiljković, Zoran 1953- |
| author_variant | z s zs |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV041784467 |
| classification_rvk | MG 91020 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)869846133 (DE-599)BVBBV041784467 |
| discipline | Politologie |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Serbien gnd Jugoslawien gnd Serbien (DE-588)4054598-2 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Serbien Jugoslawien |
| id | DE-604.BV041784467 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-10-11T18:01:45Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788675589686 8675589689 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027230233 |
| oclc_num | 869846133 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-739 DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-739 DE-12 |
| physical | 394 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publishDateSearch | 2013 |
| publishDateSort | 2013 |
| publisher | Čigoja Štampa [u.a.] |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Stojiljković, Zoran 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)1059298651 aut Država i korupcija Zoran Stojiljković Political corruption and weak state Beograd Čigoja Štampa [u.a.] 2013 394 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Political corruption and weak state Korruption gnd Staat gnd Privatwirtschaft gnd Nachfolgestaaten gnd Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd rswk-swf Politische Krise (DE-588)4046539-1 gnd rswk-swf Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd rswk-swf Privatisierung (DE-588)4047297-8 gnd rswk-swf Serbien gnd Jugoslawien gnd Serbien (DE-588)4054598-2 gnd rswk-swf Politische Krise (DE-588)4046539-1 s Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 s DE-604 Serbien (DE-588)4054598-2 g Privatisierung (DE-588)4047297-8 s Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 s Digitalisierung UB Passau - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027230233&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027230233&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract Digitalisierung UB Passau - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027230233&sequence=000006&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
| spellingShingle | Stojiljković, Zoran 1953- Država i korupcija Korruption gnd Staat gnd Privatwirtschaft gnd Nachfolgestaaten gnd Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd Politische Krise (DE-588)4046539-1 gnd Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Privatisierung (DE-588)4047297-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4112701-8 (DE-588)4046539-1 (DE-588)4032524-6 (DE-588)4047297-8 (DE-588)4054598-2 |
| title | Država i korupcija |
| title_alt | Political corruption and weak state |
| title_auth | Država i korupcija |
| title_exact_search | Država i korupcija |
| title_full | Država i korupcija Zoran Stojiljković |
| title_fullStr | Država i korupcija Zoran Stojiljković |
| title_full_unstemmed | Država i korupcija Zoran Stojiljković |
| title_short | Država i korupcija |
| title_sort | drzava i korupcija |
| topic | Korruption gnd Staat gnd Privatwirtschaft gnd Nachfolgestaaten gnd Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd Politische Krise (DE-588)4046539-1 gnd Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Privatisierung (DE-588)4047297-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Korruption Staat Privatwirtschaft Nachfolgestaaten Bekämpfung Politische Krise Privatisierung Serbien Jugoslawien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027230233&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027230233&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027230233&sequence=000006&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT stojiljkoviczoran drzavaikorupcija AT stojiljkoviczoran politicalcorruptionandweakstate |