Institutions, property rights, and economic growth: the legacy of Douglass North
"After ten rounds of playing the prisoners' dilemma game, subjects were given the possibility of eliminating one of the two actions by plurality. Each subject voted on whether to keep all actions, eliminate D, or eliminate C. After voting, the subject participated in ten more rounds depend...
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| Weitere Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge Univ. Press
2014
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| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "After ten rounds of playing the prisoners' dilemma game, subjects were given the possibility of eliminating one of the two actions by plurality. Each subject voted on whether to keep all actions, eliminate D, or eliminate C. After voting, the subject participated in ten more rounds depending on the decision made by plurality. To study the effect of subjects' understanding of the game on voting decisions I modify how game is presented to the subjects. In half the sessions, the computer screen shows the payoff matrix with the subject action as rows and their partners as columns. Feedback about the outcome is also provided by highlighting the chosen row and column. The other half of the sessions did not see the payoffs displayed as a matrix and feedback did not stress the behavior of the partner by highlighting his/her behavior in the matrix (but this behavior was reported). Figure 1 shows a screen shot of each treatment (payoffs are set in cents). I hypothesize that not showing the game as a matrix may diminish subjects' understanding of the structure of the game and the likely effect of modifying the game by eliminating a strategy. I called these two treatments as "See Matrix" and "Do Not See Matrix" treatments, respectively. The participants were 80 Brown University or RISD undergraduates. Half the subjects participated in each of the treatments. As Figure 2 shows, in the first ten rounds the evolution of cooperation is consistent to what has been found in the literature: a significant cooperation rate that decreases with experience (see Andreoni and Miller 1993, and Dal B |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Beschreibung: | X, 327 S. Ill., graph. Darst., Kt. |
| ISBN: | 9781107041554 |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Economic history | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Econometrics | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804152070490554368 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Contributors
page vii
Preface
ix
Introduction
1
Sebastian Galiani and
hai Sened
1
The Contribution of Douglass North to New Institutional
Economics
11
Claude
Ménard
and Mary M. Shirley
2
Persistence and Change in Institutions: The Evolution of
Douglass C. North
30
John Joseph
Wallis
3
The New Institutionalism
50
Robert Bates
4
The Rules of the Game: What Rules? Which Game?
66
Kenneth A, Shepsle
5
Institutions and Sustainability of Ecological Systems
84
Elinor
Ostrom
6
Land Property Rights
107
Sebastian Galiani and Ernesto Schargrodsky
7
Constitutions as Coordinating Devices
121
Gillian K. Hadfield and Barry R.
Weingast
8
Culture, Institutions, and Modern Growth
151
Joel Mokyr
vi
Contents
9
What Really Happened During the Glorious Revolution?
192
Steven C. A. Pincus and fames A. Robinson
10
The Grand Experiment That Wasn t? New Institutional
Economics and the Postcommunist Experience
223
Scott Gehlbach and Edmund
}.
Malesky
11
Using Economic Experiments to Measure Informal Institutions
248
Pamela fakiela
12
Experimental Evidence on the Workings of Democratic
Institutions
266
Pedro Dal Bo
References
289
Index
323
|
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| spelling | Institutions, property rights, and economic growth the legacy of Douglass North ed. by Sebastian Galiani ... 1. publ. Cambridge Cambridge Univ. Press 2014 X, 327 S. Ill., graph. Darst., Kt. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index "After ten rounds of playing the prisoners' dilemma game, subjects were given the possibility of eliminating one of the two actions by plurality. Each subject voted on whether to keep all actions, eliminate D, or eliminate C. After voting, the subject participated in ten more rounds depending on the decision made by plurality. To study the effect of subjects' understanding of the game on voting decisions I modify how game is presented to the subjects. In half the sessions, the computer screen shows the payoff matrix with the subject action as rows and their partners as columns. Feedback about the outcome is also provided by highlighting the chosen row and column. The other half of the sessions did not see the payoffs displayed as a matrix and feedback did not stress the behavior of the partner by highlighting his/her behavior in the matrix (but this behavior was reported). Figure 1 shows a screen shot of each treatment (payoffs are set in cents). I hypothesize that not showing the game as a matrix may diminish subjects' understanding of the structure of the game and the likely effect of modifying the game by eliminating a strategy. I called these two treatments as "See Matrix" and "Do Not See Matrix" treatments, respectively. The participants were 80 Brown University or RISD undergraduates. Half the subjects participated in each of the treatments. As Figure 2 shows, in the first ten rounds the evolution of cooperation is consistent to what has been found in the literature: a significant cooperation rate that decreases with experience (see Andreoni and Miller 1993, and Dal B North, Douglass C. (Douglass Cecil) North, Douglass Cecil 1920-2015 (DE-588)119307944 gnd rswk-swf BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Microeconomics bisacsh Wirtschaft Wirtschaft. Geschichte BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Microeconomics Economic history Econometrics Institutional economics Law and economics Property-Rights-Ansatz (DE-588)4047479-3 gnd rswk-swf Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content North, Douglass Cecil 1920-2015 (DE-588)119307944 p Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 s Property-Rights-Ansatz (DE-588)4047479-3 s DE-604 Galiani, Sebastián (DE-588)133433889 edt Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027210605&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Institutions, property rights, and economic growth the legacy of Douglass North North, Douglass C. (Douglass Cecil) North, Douglass Cecil 1920-2015 (DE-588)119307944 gnd BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Microeconomics bisacsh Wirtschaft Wirtschaft. Geschichte BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Microeconomics Economic history Econometrics Institutional economics Law and economics Property-Rights-Ansatz (DE-588)4047479-3 gnd Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd |
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| title | Institutions, property rights, and economic growth the legacy of Douglass North |
| title_auth | Institutions, property rights, and economic growth the legacy of Douglass North |
| title_exact_search | Institutions, property rights, and economic growth the legacy of Douglass North |
| title_full | Institutions, property rights, and economic growth the legacy of Douglass North ed. by Sebastian Galiani ... |
| title_fullStr | Institutions, property rights, and economic growth the legacy of Douglass North ed. by Sebastian Galiani ... |
| title_full_unstemmed | Institutions, property rights, and economic growth the legacy of Douglass North ed. by Sebastian Galiani ... |
| title_short | Institutions, property rights, and economic growth |
| title_sort | institutions property rights and economic growth the legacy of douglass north |
| title_sub | the legacy of Douglass North |
| topic | North, Douglass C. (Douglass Cecil) North, Douglass Cecil 1920-2015 (DE-588)119307944 gnd BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Microeconomics bisacsh Wirtschaft Wirtschaft. Geschichte BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Microeconomics Economic history Econometrics Institutional economics Law and economics Property-Rights-Ansatz (DE-588)4047479-3 gnd Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | North, Douglass C. (Douglass Cecil) North, Douglass Cecil 1920-2015 BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Microeconomics Wirtschaft Wirtschaft. Geschichte Economic history Econometrics Institutional economics Law and economics Property-Rights-Ansatz Institutionenökonomie Aufsatzsammlung |
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