Political institutions and party-directed corruption in South America: stealing for the team
"An important question for the health and longevity of democratic governance is how institutions may be fashioned to prevent electoral victors from drawing on the resources of the state to perpetuate themselves in power. This book addresses the issue by examining how the structure of electoral...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York
Cambridge Univ. Press
2013
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Political economy of institutions and decisions
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | "An important question for the health and longevity of democratic governance is how institutions may be fashioned to prevent electoral victors from drawing on the resources of the state to perpetuate themselves in power. This book addresses the issue by examining how the structure of electoral institutions - the rules of democratic contestation that determine the manner in which citizens choose their representatives - affects political corruption, defined as the abuse of state power or resources for campaign finance or party-building purposes. To this end, the book develops a novel theoretical framework that examines electoral institutions as a potential vehicle for political parties to exploit the state as a source of political finance. Hypotheses derived from this framework are assessed using an unprecedented public employees' survey conducted by the author in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile"-- |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index Machine generated contents note: 1. Institutions and political corruption: a framework; 2. Institutional design and the case for mechanism-based analysis; 3. Ballot structure, political corruption, and the performance of proportional representation; 4. An approach to overcoming the fundamental problem of inference in corruption studies; 5. Political career paths in the bureaucracy and the use of institutional resources in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile; 6. Conclusion |
| Beschreibung: | XVIII, 282 S. graph. Darst. 24 cm |
Internformat
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| 490 | 0 | |a Political economy of institutions and decisions | |
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
| 500 | |a Machine generated contents note: 1. Institutions and political corruption: a framework; 2. Institutional design and the case for mechanism-based analysis; 3. Ballot structure, political corruption, and the performance of proportional representation; 4. An approach to overcoming the fundamental problem of inference in corruption studies; 5. Political career paths in the bureaucracy and the use of institutional resources in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile; 6. Conclusion | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Gingerich, Daniel W. |
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| bvnumber | BV041618039 |
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| edition | 1. publ. |
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| genre_facet | Fallstudiensammlung |
| geographic | South America fast Südamerika (DE-588)4078014-4 gnd |
| geographic_facet | South America Südamerika |
| id | DE-604.BV041618039 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:01:00Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027059130 |
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| physical | XVIII, 282 S. graph. Darst. 24 cm |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publishDateSearch | 2013 |
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| publisher | Cambridge Univ. Press |
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| series2 | Political economy of institutions and decisions |
| spelling | Gingerich, Daniel W. Verfasser aut Political institutions and party-directed corruption in South America stealing for the team Daniel W. Gingerich 1. publ. New York Cambridge Univ. Press 2013 XVIII, 282 S. graph. Darst. 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Political economy of institutions and decisions Includes bibliographical references and index Machine generated contents note: 1. Institutions and political corruption: a framework; 2. Institutional design and the case for mechanism-based analysis; 3. Ballot structure, political corruption, and the performance of proportional representation; 4. An approach to overcoming the fundamental problem of inference in corruption studies; 5. Political career paths in the bureaucracy and the use of institutional resources in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile; 6. Conclusion "An important question for the health and longevity of democratic governance is how institutions may be fashioned to prevent electoral victors from drawing on the resources of the state to perpetuate themselves in power. This book addresses the issue by examining how the structure of electoral institutions - the rules of democratic contestation that determine the manner in which citizens choose their representatives - affects political corruption, defined as the abuse of state power or resources for campaign finance or party-building purposes. To this end, the book develops a novel theoretical framework that examines electoral institutions as a potential vehicle for political parties to exploit the state as a source of political finance. Hypotheses derived from this framework are assessed using an unprecedented public employees' survey conducted by the author in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile"-- Political corruption / South America / Case studies Political parties / South America / Case studies Power (Social sciences) / South America / Case studies Political corruption fast Political parties fast Power (Social sciences) fast Politische Institution (DE-588)4132693-3 gnd rswk-swf Demokratisierung (DE-588)4124941-0 gnd rswk-swf Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd rswk-swf South America fast Südamerika (DE-588)4078014-4 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content Südamerika (DE-588)4078014-4 g Demokratisierung (DE-588)4124941-0 s Politische Institution (DE-588)4132693-3 s Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 s DE-604 |
| spellingShingle | Gingerich, Daniel W. Political institutions and party-directed corruption in South America stealing for the team Political corruption / South America / Case studies Political parties / South America / Case studies Power (Social sciences) / South America / Case studies Political corruption fast Political parties fast Power (Social sciences) fast Politische Institution (DE-588)4132693-3 gnd Demokratisierung (DE-588)4124941-0 gnd Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4132693-3 (DE-588)4124941-0 (DE-588)4032524-6 (DE-588)4078014-4 (DE-588)4522595-3 |
| title | Political institutions and party-directed corruption in South America stealing for the team |
| title_auth | Political institutions and party-directed corruption in South America stealing for the team |
| title_exact_search | Political institutions and party-directed corruption in South America stealing for the team |
| title_full | Political institutions and party-directed corruption in South America stealing for the team Daniel W. Gingerich |
| title_fullStr | Political institutions and party-directed corruption in South America stealing for the team Daniel W. Gingerich |
| title_full_unstemmed | Political institutions and party-directed corruption in South America stealing for the team Daniel W. Gingerich |
| title_short | Political institutions and party-directed corruption in South America |
| title_sort | political institutions and party directed corruption in south america stealing for the team |
| title_sub | stealing for the team |
| topic | Political corruption / South America / Case studies Political parties / South America / Case studies Power (Social sciences) / South America / Case studies Political corruption fast Political parties fast Power (Social sciences) fast Politische Institution (DE-588)4132693-3 gnd Demokratisierung (DE-588)4124941-0 gnd Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Political corruption / South America / Case studies Political parties / South America / Case studies Power (Social sciences) / South America / Case studies Political corruption Political parties Power (Social sciences) Politische Institution Demokratisierung Korruption South America Südamerika Fallstudiensammlung |
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