Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | German |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Wiesbaden
Deutscher Universitätsverlag
2001
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Beiträge zur betriebswirtschaftlichen Forschung
97 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | The influence of market structure on competition and firms' behaviour is explored in economic theory since decades. Until recently, the focus was on the structures within one single market, in which decisions of firms were taken by one single decision maker. However, due to the globalization and integration of markets and the diversification of firms a more comprehensive approach is necessary. Silke Neubauer analyses the implications of multimarket contact and organizational devices for market strategies and market results within a game-theoretic framework. The focus is on delegation possibilities, pre-commitment and internal structures in (multi-stage) games without repetition. The impact of (dis-)economies of scope and delegation on the sustainability of multimarket collusion is analysed in the framework of an infinitely repeated game |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (XVIII, 175S. 35 Abb) |
| ISBN: | 9783663059790 9783824490639 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-663-05979-0 |
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| 490 | 0 | |a Beiträge zur betriebswirtschaftlichen Forschung |v 97 | |
| 500 | |a The influence of market structure on competition and firms' behaviour is explored in economic theory since decades. Until recently, the focus was on the structures within one single market, in which decisions of firms were taken by one single decision maker. However, due to the globalization and integration of markets and the diversification of firms a more comprehensive approach is necessary. Silke Neubauer analyses the implications of multimarket contact and organizational devices for market strategies and market results within a game-theoretic framework. The focus is on delegation possibilities, pre-commitment and internal structures in (multi-stage) games without repetition. The impact of (dis-)economies of scope and delegation on the sustainability of multimarket collusion is analysed in the framework of an infinitely repeated game | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a 1 Introduction -- 2 The impact of multimarket contact on the strategic behavior of firms -- 2.1 Classical concepts -- 2.2 The role of organization for multimarket firms -- 3 The basic game with centralized decision making -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The basic model -- 3.3 The Cournot-Nash outcome -- 3.4 The outcome of joint profit maximization -- 3.5 Summary -- 4 Strategic delegation and multimarket contact -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The delegation game -- 4.3 Welfare effects -- 4.4 Summary -- 5 Commitment and multimarket contact -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Strategic cost allocation in multimarket firms -- 5.3 Commitment through endogenous timing -- 5.4 Conclusion -- 6 Interdivisional information sharing and multimarket contact -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The general setting -- 6.3 The Cournot game -- 6.4 The information game -- 6.5 Welfare Effects -- 6.6 Information costs -- 6.7 Endogeneizing the incentive choice? -- 6.8 Summary -- | |
| 505 | 0 | |a 7 Collusion and multimarket contact in a repeated game -- 7.1 A general framework -- 7.2 Collusion by centralized firms with cost linkages -- 7.3 Sustainability of collusive outcomes in decentralized firms -- 7.4 The impact of the organizational structure on collusion -- 7.5 Summary -- 8 Conclusion -- A.A Appendix to Chapter 3 -- A.B Appendix to chapter 4 -- A.B.1 The incentive game -- A.B.2 Welfare effects -- A.B.3 Upper boundary for g -- A.0 Appendix to chapter 5 -- A. C.1 Strategic cost allocation -- A.C.1.1 Solution of the last two stages -- A.C.1.2 The delegation game -- A. C.2 Welfare effects -- A. C. 3 Endogenous timing -- A.C.3.1 Solution of the second stage -- A.C.3.2 Welfare applying to equilibrium timing situations -- A.C.3.3 Welfare differences -- A.D Appendix to chapter 6 -- A.D.1 Restrictions on g -- A.D.2 Delegation vs. centralization -- A.D.3 Linear strategy equilibrium without information sharing -- | |
| 505 | 0 | |a A.D.4 Linear strategy equilibrium for asymmetric information structures -- A.D.5 Calculations leading to proposition 6.2 -- A.E Appendix to chapter 7 -- A.E.1 One market collusion and output shares -- A. E. 2 One market collusion with and without cost linkages -- A.E.3 Pooled vs. separated incentive constraints -- A.E.4 Two market collusion and output shares -- A.E.4.1 Deviation profit minimizing output shares -- A.E.4.2 The minimal critical discount factor in the case of diseconomies of scope -- A. E. 5 Equal output shares in case of divisional ization -- A.E.6 Critical discount factors for two market collusion -- A.E. 7 The impact of ? -- References | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economics | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Neubauer, Silke |
| author_facet | Neubauer, Silke |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Neubauer, Silke |
| author_variant | s n sn |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV041613597 |
| classification_tum | WIR 000 |
| collection | ZDB-2-SWI ZDB-2-BAD |
| contents | 1 Introduction -- 2 The impact of multimarket contact on the strategic behavior of firms -- 2.1 Classical concepts -- 2.2 The role of organization for multimarket firms -- 3 The basic game with centralized decision making -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The basic model -- 3.3 The Cournot-Nash outcome -- 3.4 The outcome of joint profit maximization -- 3.5 Summary -- 4 Strategic delegation and multimarket contact -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The delegation game -- 4.3 Welfare effects -- 4.4 Summary -- 5 Commitment and multimarket contact -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Strategic cost allocation in multimarket firms -- 5.3 Commitment through endogenous timing -- 5.4 Conclusion -- 6 Interdivisional information sharing and multimarket contact -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The general setting -- 6.3 The Cournot game -- 6.4 The information game -- 6.5 Welfare Effects -- 6.6 Information costs -- 6.7 Endogeneizing the incentive choice? -- 6.8 Summary -- 7 Collusion and multimarket contact in a repeated game -- 7.1 A general framework -- 7.2 Collusion by centralized firms with cost linkages -- 7.3 Sustainability of collusive outcomes in decentralized firms -- 7.4 The impact of the organizational structure on collusion -- 7.5 Summary -- 8 Conclusion -- A.A Appendix to Chapter 3 -- A.B Appendix to chapter 4 -- A.B.1 The incentive game -- A.B.2 Welfare effects -- A.B.3 Upper boundary for g -- A.0 Appendix to chapter 5 -- A. C.1 Strategic cost allocation -- A.C.1.1 Solution of the last two stages -- A.C.1.2 The delegation game -- A. C.2 Welfare effects -- A. C. 3 Endogenous timing -- A.C.3.1 Solution of the second stage -- A.C.3.2 Welfare applying to equilibrium timing situations -- A.C.3.3 Welfare differences -- A.D Appendix to chapter 6 -- A.D.1 Restrictions on g -- A.D.2 Delegation vs. centralization -- A.D.3 Linear strategy equilibrium without information sharing -- A.D.4 Linear strategy equilibrium for asymmetric information structures -- A.D.5 Calculations leading to proposition 6.2 -- A.E Appendix to chapter 7 -- A.E.1 One market collusion and output shares -- A. E. 2 One market collusion with and without cost linkages -- A.E.3 Pooled vs. separated incentive constraints -- A.E.4 Two market collusion and output shares -- A.E.4.1 Deviation profit minimizing output shares -- A.E.4.2 The minimal critical discount factor in the case of diseconomies of scope -- A. E. 5 Equal output shares in case of divisional ization -- A.E.6 Critical discount factors for two market collusion -- A.E. 7 The impact of ? -- References |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)863871252 (DE-599)BVBBV041613597 |
| dewey-full | 330 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
| dewey-raw | 330 |
| dewey-search | 330 |
| dewey-sort | 3330 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/978-3-663-05979-0 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Beiträge zur betriebswirtschaftlichen Forschung |
| spelling | Neubauer, Silke Verfasser aut Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design von Silke Neubauer Wiesbaden Deutscher Universitätsverlag 2001 1 Online-Ressource (XVIII, 175S. 35 Abb) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Beiträge zur betriebswirtschaftlichen Forschung 97 The influence of market structure on competition and firms' behaviour is explored in economic theory since decades. Until recently, the focus was on the structures within one single market, in which decisions of firms were taken by one single decision maker. However, due to the globalization and integration of markets and the diversification of firms a more comprehensive approach is necessary. Silke Neubauer analyses the implications of multimarket contact and organizational devices for market strategies and market results within a game-theoretic framework. The focus is on delegation possibilities, pre-commitment and internal structures in (multi-stage) games without repetition. The impact of (dis-)economies of scope and delegation on the sustainability of multimarket collusion is analysed in the framework of an infinitely repeated game 1 Introduction -- 2 The impact of multimarket contact on the strategic behavior of firms -- 2.1 Classical concepts -- 2.2 The role of organization for multimarket firms -- 3 The basic game with centralized decision making -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The basic model -- 3.3 The Cournot-Nash outcome -- 3.4 The outcome of joint profit maximization -- 3.5 Summary -- 4 Strategic delegation and multimarket contact -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The delegation game -- 4.3 Welfare effects -- 4.4 Summary -- 5 Commitment and multimarket contact -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Strategic cost allocation in multimarket firms -- 5.3 Commitment through endogenous timing -- 5.4 Conclusion -- 6 Interdivisional information sharing and multimarket contact -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The general setting -- 6.3 The Cournot game -- 6.4 The information game -- 6.5 Welfare Effects -- 6.6 Information costs -- 6.7 Endogeneizing the incentive choice? -- 6.8 Summary -- 7 Collusion and multimarket contact in a repeated game -- 7.1 A general framework -- 7.2 Collusion by centralized firms with cost linkages -- 7.3 Sustainability of collusive outcomes in decentralized firms -- 7.4 The impact of the organizational structure on collusion -- 7.5 Summary -- 8 Conclusion -- A.A Appendix to Chapter 3 -- A.B Appendix to chapter 4 -- A.B.1 The incentive game -- A.B.2 Welfare effects -- A.B.3 Upper boundary for g -- A.0 Appendix to chapter 5 -- A. C.1 Strategic cost allocation -- A.C.1.1 Solution of the last two stages -- A.C.1.2 The delegation game -- A. C.2 Welfare effects -- A. C. 3 Endogenous timing -- A.C.3.1 Solution of the second stage -- A.C.3.2 Welfare applying to equilibrium timing situations -- A.C.3.3 Welfare differences -- A.D Appendix to chapter 6 -- A.D.1 Restrictions on g -- A.D.2 Delegation vs. centralization -- A.D.3 Linear strategy equilibrium without information sharing -- A.D.4 Linear strategy equilibrium for asymmetric information structures -- A.D.5 Calculations leading to proposition 6.2 -- A.E Appendix to chapter 7 -- A.E.1 One market collusion and output shares -- A. E. 2 One market collusion with and without cost linkages -- A.E.3 Pooled vs. separated incentive constraints -- A.E.4 Two market collusion and output shares -- A.E.4.1 Deviation profit minimizing output shares -- A.E.4.2 The minimal critical discount factor in the case of diseconomies of scope -- A. E. 5 Equal output shares in case of divisional ization -- A.E.6 Critical discount factors for two market collusion -- A.E. 7 The impact of ? -- References Economics Economics/Management Science Economics/Management Science, general Management Wirtschaft Marktmodell (DE-588)4245169-3 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd rswk-swf Wettbewerbsstrategie (DE-588)4200234-5 gnd rswk-swf 1\p (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 s Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 s Wettbewerbsstrategie (DE-588)4200234-5 s Marktmodell (DE-588)4245169-3 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s 2\p DE-604 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-05979-0 Verlag Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Neubauer, Silke Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design 1 Introduction -- 2 The impact of multimarket contact on the strategic behavior of firms -- 2.1 Classical concepts -- 2.2 The role of organization for multimarket firms -- 3 The basic game with centralized decision making -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The basic model -- 3.3 The Cournot-Nash outcome -- 3.4 The outcome of joint profit maximization -- 3.5 Summary -- 4 Strategic delegation and multimarket contact -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The delegation game -- 4.3 Welfare effects -- 4.4 Summary -- 5 Commitment and multimarket contact -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Strategic cost allocation in multimarket firms -- 5.3 Commitment through endogenous timing -- 5.4 Conclusion -- 6 Interdivisional information sharing and multimarket contact -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The general setting -- 6.3 The Cournot game -- 6.4 The information game -- 6.5 Welfare Effects -- 6.6 Information costs -- 6.7 Endogeneizing the incentive choice? -- 6.8 Summary -- 7 Collusion and multimarket contact in a repeated game -- 7.1 A general framework -- 7.2 Collusion by centralized firms with cost linkages -- 7.3 Sustainability of collusive outcomes in decentralized firms -- 7.4 The impact of the organizational structure on collusion -- 7.5 Summary -- 8 Conclusion -- A.A Appendix to Chapter 3 -- A.B Appendix to chapter 4 -- A.B.1 The incentive game -- A.B.2 Welfare effects -- A.B.3 Upper boundary for g -- A.0 Appendix to chapter 5 -- A. C.1 Strategic cost allocation -- A.C.1.1 Solution of the last two stages -- A.C.1.2 The delegation game -- A. C.2 Welfare effects -- A. C. 3 Endogenous timing -- A.C.3.1 Solution of the second stage -- A.C.3.2 Welfare applying to equilibrium timing situations -- A.C.3.3 Welfare differences -- A.D Appendix to chapter 6 -- A.D.1 Restrictions on g -- A.D.2 Delegation vs. centralization -- A.D.3 Linear strategy equilibrium without information sharing -- A.D.4 Linear strategy equilibrium for asymmetric information structures -- A.D.5 Calculations leading to proposition 6.2 -- A.E Appendix to chapter 7 -- A.E.1 One market collusion and output shares -- A. E. 2 One market collusion with and without cost linkages -- A.E.3 Pooled vs. separated incentive constraints -- A.E.4 Two market collusion and output shares -- A.E.4.1 Deviation profit minimizing output shares -- A.E.4.2 The minimal critical discount factor in the case of diseconomies of scope -- A. E. 5 Equal output shares in case of divisional ization -- A.E.6 Critical discount factors for two market collusion -- A.E. 7 The impact of ? -- References Economics Economics/Management Science Economics/Management Science, general Management Wirtschaft Marktmodell (DE-588)4245169-3 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Wettbewerbsstrategie (DE-588)4200234-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4245169-3 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4043774-7 (DE-588)4061963-1 (DE-588)4200234-5 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design |
| title_auth | Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design |
| title_exact_search | Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design |
| title_full | Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design von Silke Neubauer |
| title_fullStr | Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design von Silke Neubauer |
| title_full_unstemmed | Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design von Silke Neubauer |
| title_short | Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design |
| title_sort | multimarket contact and organizational design |
| topic | Economics Economics/Management Science Economics/Management Science, general Management Wirtschaft Marktmodell (DE-588)4245169-3 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Wettbewerbsstrategie (DE-588)4200234-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economics Economics/Management Science Economics/Management Science, general Management Wirtschaft Marktmodell Spieltheorie Organisation Unternehmen Wettbewerbsstrategie Hochschulschrift |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-05979-0 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT neubauersilke multimarketcontactandorganizationaldesign |