Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Empirical Evidence from Germany
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | German |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Wiesbaden
Deutscher Universitätsverlag
2003
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | In the wake of several high profile corporate collapses the discussion about corporate governance has intensified and professional investors have become more conscious of their rights of control in the portfolio companies. Whereas Anglo-American authors have done excellent work on the relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation, there is little empirical evidence on this topic in Germany. But recent works suggest that a stricter legal environment leads to lower expected rates of return in an international cross-section of countries. Andreas Schillhofer investigates whether differences in firm-specific corporate governance also help to explain expected returns in a cross-section of firms within a single jurisdiction. Based on his Corporate Governance Rating (CGR) for German firms, the author documents a positive relationship between the CGR and firm value. In addition, there is strong evidence that expected returns are negatively correlated with the CGR if dividend yields and price-earnings ratios are used as proxies for the cost of capital |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (XXII, 190S. 21 Abb) |
| ISBN: | 9783322815606 9783824478880 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-322-81560-6 |
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| 500 | |a In the wake of several high profile corporate collapses the discussion about corporate governance has intensified and professional investors have become more conscious of their rights of control in the portfolio companies. Whereas Anglo-American authors have done excellent work on the relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation, there is little empirical evidence on this topic in Germany. But recent works suggest that a stricter legal environment leads to lower expected rates of return in an international cross-section of countries. Andreas Schillhofer investigates whether differences in firm-specific corporate governance also help to explain expected returns in a cross-section of firms within a single jurisdiction. Based on his Corporate Governance Rating (CGR) for German firms, the author documents a positive relationship between the CGR and firm value. In addition, there is strong evidence that expected returns are negatively correlated with the CGR if dividend yields and price-earnings ratios are used as proxies for the cost of capital | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a 1 Introduction and Motivation for the Study -- 2 Overview -- 3 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework -- 3.1 Theory of Principal-Agent Relationships -- 3.2 Corporate Governance -- 3.3 Preliminary Thoughts on Corporate Governance and Risk -- 4 Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance -- 4.1 Overview and Methodology -- 4.2 Ex-ante Preventive Control Mechanisms -- 4.3 Ongoing Disciplinary Control Mechanisms -- 4.4 Ex-post Corrective Control Mechanisms -- 4.5 Summary -- 5 Modeling Governance as a Reward for Risk -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Alternative Approaches to Corporate Governance and Cost of Capital -- 5.3 Explanatory Power of Governance on Firm-Level -- 5.4 Testable Hypotheses -- 6 Empirical Evidence on the Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Expected Returns on Equity -- 6.1 Introduction and Research Objectives -- 6.2 Input Data to the Model -- 6.3 Characteristics of the Corporate Governance Rating -- 6.4 Univariate Analysis -- 6.5 Portfolio Buy-and-Hold Returns -- 6.6 Corporate Governance and Firm Value -- 6.7 The Corporate Governance Rating and Expected Rates of Return on Equity -- 7 Conclusions and Outlook | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Industrial management | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Business Strategy/Leadership | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Management/Business for Professionals | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804151801196314624 |
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| any_adam_object | |
| author | Schillhofer, Andreas |
| author_facet | Schillhofer, Andreas |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Schillhofer, Andreas |
| author_variant | a s as |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV041605668 |
| classification_tum | WIR 000 |
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| contents | 1 Introduction and Motivation for the Study -- 2 Overview -- 3 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework -- 3.1 Theory of Principal-Agent Relationships -- 3.2 Corporate Governance -- 3.3 Preliminary Thoughts on Corporate Governance and Risk -- 4 Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance -- 4.1 Overview and Methodology -- 4.2 Ex-ante Preventive Control Mechanisms -- 4.3 Ongoing Disciplinary Control Mechanisms -- 4.4 Ex-post Corrective Control Mechanisms -- 4.5 Summary -- 5 Modeling Governance as a Reward for Risk -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Alternative Approaches to Corporate Governance and Cost of Capital -- 5.3 Explanatory Power of Governance on Firm-Level -- 5.4 Testable Hypotheses -- 6 Empirical Evidence on the Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Expected Returns on Equity -- 6.1 Introduction and Research Objectives -- 6.2 Input Data to the Model -- 6.3 Characteristics of the Corporate Governance Rating -- 6.4 Univariate Analysis -- 6.5 Portfolio Buy-and-Hold Returns -- 6.6 Corporate Governance and Firm Value -- 6.7 The Corporate Governance Rating and Expected Rates of Return on Equity -- 7 Conclusions and Outlook |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)863861874 (DE-599)BVBBV041605668 |
| dewey-full | 658.4092 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
| dewey-raw | 658.4092 |
| dewey-search | 658.4092 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.4092 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/978-3-322-81560-6 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| spelling | Schillhofer, Andreas Verfasser aut Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns Empirical Evidence from Germany von Andreas Schillhofer Wiesbaden Deutscher Universitätsverlag 2003 1 Online-Ressource (XXII, 190S. 21 Abb) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier In the wake of several high profile corporate collapses the discussion about corporate governance has intensified and professional investors have become more conscious of their rights of control in the portfolio companies. Whereas Anglo-American authors have done excellent work on the relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation, there is little empirical evidence on this topic in Germany. But recent works suggest that a stricter legal environment leads to lower expected rates of return in an international cross-section of countries. Andreas Schillhofer investigates whether differences in firm-specific corporate governance also help to explain expected returns in a cross-section of firms within a single jurisdiction. Based on his Corporate Governance Rating (CGR) for German firms, the author documents a positive relationship between the CGR and firm value. In addition, there is strong evidence that expected returns are negatively correlated with the CGR if dividend yields and price-earnings ratios are used as proxies for the cost of capital 1 Introduction and Motivation for the Study -- 2 Overview -- 3 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework -- 3.1 Theory of Principal-Agent Relationships -- 3.2 Corporate Governance -- 3.3 Preliminary Thoughts on Corporate Governance and Risk -- 4 Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance -- 4.1 Overview and Methodology -- 4.2 Ex-ante Preventive Control Mechanisms -- 4.3 Ongoing Disciplinary Control Mechanisms -- 4.4 Ex-post Corrective Control Mechanisms -- 4.5 Summary -- 5 Modeling Governance as a Reward for Risk -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Alternative Approaches to Corporate Governance and Cost of Capital -- 5.3 Explanatory Power of Governance on Firm-Level -- 5.4 Testable Hypotheses -- 6 Empirical Evidence on the Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Expected Returns on Equity -- 6.1 Introduction and Research Objectives -- 6.2 Input Data to the Model -- 6.3 Characteristics of the Corporate Governance Rating -- 6.4 Univariate Analysis -- 6.5 Portfolio Buy-and-Hold Returns -- 6.6 Corporate Governance and Firm Value -- 6.7 The Corporate Governance Rating and Expected Rates of Return on Equity -- 7 Conclusions and Outlook Economics Industrial management Economics/Management Science Business Strategy/Leadership Management/Business for Professionals Management Wirtschaft Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd rswk-swf Risikoprämie (DE-588)4178227-6 gnd rswk-swf Kapitalertrag (DE-588)4566178-9 gnd rswk-swf Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 gnd rswk-swf 1\p (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 g Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 s Kapitalertrag (DE-588)4566178-9 s Risikoprämie (DE-588)4178227-6 s 2\p DE-604 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-81560-6 Verlag Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Schillhofer, Andreas Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns Empirical Evidence from Germany 1 Introduction and Motivation for the Study -- 2 Overview -- 3 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework -- 3.1 Theory of Principal-Agent Relationships -- 3.2 Corporate Governance -- 3.3 Preliminary Thoughts on Corporate Governance and Risk -- 4 Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance -- 4.1 Overview and Methodology -- 4.2 Ex-ante Preventive Control Mechanisms -- 4.3 Ongoing Disciplinary Control Mechanisms -- 4.4 Ex-post Corrective Control Mechanisms -- 4.5 Summary -- 5 Modeling Governance as a Reward for Risk -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Alternative Approaches to Corporate Governance and Cost of Capital -- 5.3 Explanatory Power of Governance on Firm-Level -- 5.4 Testable Hypotheses -- 6 Empirical Evidence on the Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Expected Returns on Equity -- 6.1 Introduction and Research Objectives -- 6.2 Input Data to the Model -- 6.3 Characteristics of the Corporate Governance Rating -- 6.4 Univariate Analysis -- 6.5 Portfolio Buy-and-Hold Returns -- 6.6 Corporate Governance and Firm Value -- 6.7 The Corporate Governance Rating and Expected Rates of Return on Equity -- 7 Conclusions and Outlook Economics Industrial management Economics/Management Science Business Strategy/Leadership Management/Business for Professionals Management Wirtschaft Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd Risikoprämie (DE-588)4178227-6 gnd Kapitalertrag (DE-588)4566178-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4419850-4 (DE-588)4178227-6 (DE-588)4566178-9 (DE-588)4011882-4 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns Empirical Evidence from Germany |
| title_auth | Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns Empirical Evidence from Germany |
| title_exact_search | Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns Empirical Evidence from Germany |
| title_full | Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns Empirical Evidence from Germany von Andreas Schillhofer |
| title_fullStr | Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns Empirical Evidence from Germany von Andreas Schillhofer |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns Empirical Evidence from Germany von Andreas Schillhofer |
| title_short | Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns |
| title_sort | corporate governance and expected stock returns empirical evidence from germany |
| title_sub | Empirical Evidence from Germany |
| topic | Economics Industrial management Economics/Management Science Business Strategy/Leadership Management/Business for Professionals Management Wirtschaft Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd Risikoprämie (DE-588)4178227-6 gnd Kapitalertrag (DE-588)4566178-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economics Industrial management Economics/Management Science Business Strategy/Leadership Management/Business for Professionals Management Wirtschaft Corporate Governance Risikoprämie Kapitalertrag Deutschland Hochschulschrift |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-81560-6 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT schillhoferandreas corporategovernanceandexpectedstockreturnsempiricalevidencefromgermany |