Obrana i pad Vukovara:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Croatian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Zagreb
Hrvatski Inst. za Povijest
2013
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica
Monografije i studije ; 61 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 464 S. Kt. |
| ISBN: | 9789537840211 |
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| 490 | 1 | |a Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica : Monografije i studije |v 61 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1806961900870696960 |
|---|---|
| adam_text |
KAZALO
PREDGOVOR
9
SUDIONICI I BOJNO POLJE
Bojno polje
11
Sudionici
14
Prethodna iskustva
39
U SUSRET RATU
Vukovar i stočna Slavonija do veljače
1990.
godine
41
Od višestranačkih izbora do travnja
1991.
godine
43
NI RAT NI MIR
Masakr u Borovu Selu
59
Od masakra u Borovu Selu do proglašenja hrvatske neovisnosti
62
Nastajanje bojnog polja
72
RAT
Slavonija u vrijeme proglašenja neovisnosti
75
Prvi dani srpnja
82
Hrvatski problemi pri organiziranju obrane
87
Sigurnosno stanje od sredine do kraja srpnja
92
Ulazak
51.
mehanizirane brigade u Slavoniju
98
Zatišje pred buru
100
Početak kampanje JNA za osvajanje Vukovara
104
Istočna Hrvatska u odsudnoj obrani
113
Stanje u Vukovaru tijekom borbi za vojarne i priprema JNA
za napadnu operaciju
116
Početak i propast napadne operacije JNA u istočnoj Hrvatskoj
124
Organizacijske promjene unutar hrvatske oružane sile
131
Stvaranje kontinuirane crte od Sida do Mirkovaca
135
6
Davoí
Marijan
OBRANA I
PAD VUKOVARA
VINKOVCI
-
ŽUPANJA
-
VUKOVAR
Prelazak JNA na reducirani plan napadne operacije
141
Hrvatske pripreme za obranu istoka zemlje
142
Presijecanje prometnice Vinkovci
-
Vukovar
144
Pojačanja za deblokadu Vukovara
150
Borbe za Nuštar
152
Borbe za
Marince
-
između velikih zahtjeva i malih mogućnosti
155
Okupacija iločkog džepa
169
Osnivanje i organizacija Operativne grupe Vukovar, Vinkovci, Županja
173
Od osnivanja Operativne grupe do pada Tordinaca
179
Od pada Tordinaca do napada na Karadžićevo
182
Drugi pokušaj deblokade Vukovara
190
Operacija "Bosutske šume"
199
OPERACIJA "VUKOVAR"
Pripreme za bitku
211
Prvi dani operacije "Vukovar"
216
Napadi
16.
i
17.
listopada
226
Borbe u drugoj polovici listopada
230
Od pada Lušca do pada Bogdanovaca
235
Obrana i pad Bogdanovaca
245
Posljednji dani obrane grada
248
Dileme u političkom vrhu Hrvatske
257
Kraj obrane
259
Protjerivanje preživjelog stanovništva
262
HRVATSKO RATIŠTE TIJEKOM BITKE ZA VUKOVAR
265
GRAD I DRŽAVA
Zajednice, vojske i rat
273
Grad i država: kronologija "nerazumijevanja"
284
Medijska potpora
300
Izdani grad
309
Optužnica,
HOS,
KOS i Manolićeva komisija
312
Vojna pomoć gradu
326
Sanitetski konvoji
336
Kazalo
/
Gubici zaraćenih snaga
341
Zločin i kazna
346
Asanacija i saniranje Vukovara
354
Simbol
356
ISKUSTVA, POUKE, "ODMORIŠTA", PUTOKAZI
Vukovar na razmeđu strategija i taktika
361
Zapovijedanje
372
Uporaba snaga
385
Moral i bojna spremnost
390
Obavještajna prosudba
400
Uporaba važnijih rodova i službi
405
DIGRESIJA
О
124.
1
204.
BRIGADI HRVATSKE VOJSKE
425
REZIME I ZAKLJUČCI
431
IZVORI I LITERATURA
437
KRATICE
447
SUMMARY
KAZALO IMENA
Summary
451
SUMMARY
The Battle for
Vukovar
was an important event of the Homeland War. Through
it, all the phases of the Serb uprising can be traced, as well as the aggression of the
Yugoslav Peoples Army
(JNA)
and Serbia, including the psychological prepara¬
tions for war. From the Croatian point of view, it is possible in large measure to
follow the creation and growing military might of the Croatian army.
Vukovar
is a county along the Danube River, on the border of Croatia and
Serbia, or
Vojvodina.
The city is located in a place of little military value, outside
of key transportation lines, and is not a point of strategic significance. The most
important links in terms of transportation significance in the county are the
bridge on the Danube between
Ilok
and
Bačka Palanka.
In the spring
1990
elections the absolute victor was the SKH-SDP, for whom,
other than the Serbs, a large number of Croats also voted. Yet the county govern¬
ment was unstable primarily due to increasing cooperation among members of
the opposition, including the president of the county assembly, the choice of the
Serbian Democratic Party.
From the beginning of
1990
the population of
Vukovar
was dividing along
national lines. The split was initiated by the local representatives of the Serb
population, which, certainly, led to a Croatian response. Nevertheless, until March
1991
there were no important security problems. The uprising of the Serbs in
Pakrac
made
Vukovar
into a transit point for Serbs from
Slavonia
and
Srijem
headed to Serbia, on the one hand due to the propaganda needs of the Serbian
media, on the other due to a real feeling of victimization. The arrest of the leader
of the
Vukovar
SDS
in
Plitvica
further increased feelings of insecurity and led to
a deterioration of the political-security situation.
Vukovar
became the defining symbol of contemporary Croatian history on
2
May
1991
when
12
Croatian policemen were massacred at an ambush in
Borovo
Selo.
Following this incident, the
JNA
created a security corridor in
Borovo Selo
using a battle group from
Osijek.
With this massacre, the Serbs of Eastern Cro¬
atia began an open revolt. Insurgent Serbs took the initiative in the area of
Vuko¬
var,
but they failed to take control of the city. The Serbian villages around
Vuko¬
var
served as staging points from which the Serbs would later attack the city with
the aid of the
JNA.
The
JNA
used the unrest to strengthen its forces in
Vukovar
and neighbouring
Vinkovci
with the addition of two mechanized battalions from
Serbia. The guidelines for the use of this tactic in
JNA
military doctrine fell under
the rubric of a "battle within space" and the measures were implemented accord-
452 Davor
Marijan | OBRANA
!
PAD VUKOVARA
ing to the regulations concerning the use of armed forces of the
SFRJ
in extra¬
ordinary conditions.
From May to the middle of July
1991
Croats were gradually assuming control
of the institutions of power in the city. By the middle of August the city's defences
were completed by bringing
Borovo Naselje
and
Lužac
under observation. In this
way, by mid August the pressure exerted by the
JNA
and the insurgent Serbs was
met with an organized defense.
Until the end of August the city was defended by the incomplete 4th battalion
of the 3rd brigade and armed citizens equivalent to a battalion, labelled the 4th bat¬
talion of the 109th brigade nominally under the command of the National Guard
of the Republic of Croatia, though it functioned as an independent battalion.
Smaller contingents of the 1st brigade of the National Guard also came to assist.
By the end of September the defensive organization had systematically grown to
a level sufficient to form a defense brigade of the Croatian Army (HV) which in
the city was numbered as the 204th, while in Zagreb it was known as the 124th.
Outside of
Vukovar,
in the command offices of the Croatian Army in
Vinkovci,
Osijek,
and Zagreb, the brigade was exclusively known as the 124th. The discrep¬
ancy in numbering was not an issue to those from
Vukovar
until after the fall of
the city, when some of them realized that because of it they could not have an
influence on the larger military organization. Following this the 204th brigade was
officially established in
1992.
At the time of the formation of the 124th brigade (or
204th)
1500
to
1800
people were engaged in the defense of
Vukovar.
The city was
home to the police department of
Vukovar
and it received help from detachments
from
Varaždin
and
Slavonski Brod.
In mid-October, in order to increase the com¬
mand effectiveness of Croatian forces in western
Srijem,
an Operational Group
for
Vukovar, Vinkovci,
and
Županja
was established. It contained the 109th, the
124th (defenders of
Vukovar),
and the 131st brigades of the HV; these were joined
by the 3rd brigade of the National Guard and the 105th brigade of the HV in Nov¬
ember.
The Croatian forces represented an army in the making that under the condi¬
tions of embargo was armed from confiscated
JNA
materiel, which as insufficient.
In relation to the
JNA
forces is was fighting the Croatian forces went through dif¬
ficult birthing pains: partially organized brigades, an evolving command struc¬
ture, too great an interference by local politics the military and tactical prepara¬
tions, undeveloped logistical organization relying too heavily on civilian potential.
The Croatian formations displayed higher morale in relation to the
JNA,
but also
an unwillingness to engage outside of their home counties. The offensive capabil¬
ity was at a minimum and it relied on volunteerism.
Until the middle of August
1991
the leading individual in the defense of the
town was the secretary of national defense
Tomislav MerČep.
This period was
Summary
453
characterized by a lack of cohesion in command and an uneven defense of the
city and county. At the end of August a former Lieutenant Colonel of the
JNA,
Mile
Dedaković,
was put in command. On
11
October he left for
Vinkovci,
leav¬
ing Captain
Branko Borković
in charge.
Borković
left the city on the evening of
16/17
November. Both left their posts with permission from high command, the
only instances of desertion in the Croatian Army. They were not sanctioned be¬
cause the command structure of the Army was in the process of forming and
self-initiative was still common.
The engineers' battalion of the 12th proletarian mechanized brigade was sta¬
tioned at the barracks in
Vukovar.
In May, the battle group of the 12th proletarian
mechanized brigade from
Osijek
was stationed in
Borovo Selo,
and following this
the mechanized battalion of the 453rd mechanized brigade was transferred there
from the base in
Srijemska Mitrovica.
At the beginning of August, contingents of
the 51st mechanized brigade from
Pančevo
reached
Borovo Naselje.
At the end of
August attacks began on the city which were carried out by parts of the 453rd, 51st,
and the 12th proletarian and the 1st proletarian guards mechanized brigades. Fol¬
lowing the collapse of the strategic offensive, the
JNA
committed two newly cre¬
ated groups to the conquest of
Vukovar:
the Operative group Jug (South) and the
Tactical Group
Sjever
(North). The guards division was charged with the block¬
ade and attack on
Vinkovci,
and corps from
Novi Sad
were committed to perform
the same task
vis-à-vis
Osijek.
The basic tasks of the
JNA
were: establish a border with Serbia, the ground for
which had been prepared well by the insurgent local Serbs, constant overwhelm¬
ing of Croatian forces, and development of plans for military action and develop¬
ment of logistical support. The weaknesses were: lack of clear aims, because it
fought nominally for the defense of Yugoslavia, poor choice of personnel for the
operation, disregard for the principles laid out for the use of force, lack of morale,
immature officer and military organization.
Systematic battles for
Vukovar
began on
25
August. The battles in September
revealed the weaknesses of the
JNA,
which with forces equivalent to two mechan¬
ized brigades (not including artillery support) failed to capture the city which was
defended by infantry groups equivalent to a light brigade. The operational plan of
the
JNA
set out for the second half of September which called for a thrust deep
into Croatia,
Vukovar
was to be blockaded by one mechanized brigade, and if
possible, occupied. Following the failure of mobilization in Serbia, the
JNA
re¬
formed its plans, and
Vukovar
became the main goal of its plan to conquer east¬
ern Croatia. Following long battles, it captured the city on
19
November
1991.
In the attack by the
JNA
and the insurgent Serbs on
Vukovar
1739
people
died, of which
1436
were men and
303
women.
632
members of the Croatian
armed forces and police died, while
178
are listed as missing. To February
1992,
454 Davor
Marijan | OBRANA
!
PAD VUKOVARA
the total losses for the units of the
JNA
for the 1st military region numbers
894
killed and
5056
wounded. As compared to Croatian military and official esti¬
mates, these numbers appear small. They claim that in
Vukovar
alone the
JNA
lost
8,000-15,000.
The material losses of the
JNA
in
Vukovar
as estimated by the
general staff of the HV runs to
100
tanks,
60
armoured combat vehicles, and
27
aircraft. In the records of the command of the 1st military region of the
JNA
con¬
cerning the disposition of forces from February
1992
reference is made to the loss
of
45
military and other vehicles and the transport of
45
damaged and repaired
military and other vehicles to other locations, but for the whole of eastern Croatia
in the period after July
1991.
In the wider region of the county seven
JNA
aircraft
were brought down (one MIG-21, two
Galeb G-4S,
and four
Jastreb)
while the
Croatian forces lost one light aircraft (AN-2).
The destruction of
Vukovar
in
1991
is tragic witness to the failure of the Yugo¬
slav idea and an indication of how unacceptable an independent Croatian state
was for the majority of Serbs in Croatia. In no other part of Croatia, other than
Dubrovnik,
is it more obvious that the motive of the Serbian war was an ethnic¬
ally cleansed territory. All
non-
Serb villages in the county were attacked by the
JNA
and the insurgent Serbs, and some were completely destroyed. In
Ilok
the
JNA
put on a show which was supposed to show that the inhabitants of the town
had left willingly.
The long-lasting defense of
Vukovar
on first glance is hard to fathom. Its geo¬
graphic position, its unfavourable national composition in terms of the demo¬
graphics of the city and surrounding villages, alongside the relative strength of
the
JNA,
did not bode well for its chances of success. Yet, this did happen and the
defense of the city is a phenomenon rare in the annals of world events, let alone
national history. From the moment it was besieged,
Vukovar
became an oper¬
ational worry in terms of the potential encirclement of
Osijek
and
Vinkovci,
and
a worry of strategic significance in Zagreb. From the middle of September, Zagreb
would issue to
Osijek,
and then
Osijek
to
Vinkovci
and
Vukovar,
orders that were
some years ahead of the capabilities of the Croatian forces in
1991.
Poorly
equipped, and later technically unprepared (primarily in terms of armoured com¬
bat vehicles), which in part came from within Croatia, Croatian forces showed
that they were more capable on the defense than the offense, which after October
1
became the key to the saving of
Vukovar.
Despite all hopes and attempts, these
forces were insufficient and incapable of breaking through territory held by at
least four brigades of the
JNA.
The military potential of the Croatian Army in this
period was unequal to the task of lifting the siege of
Vukovar
even through the
concentration of all of the forces of the
Vinkovci
region. Croatian intelligence on
the engagement of the forces of the
JNA
was unreliable. This is especially import¬
ant in consideration of the material support which was sent from within Croatia
Summary
455
to
Vinkovci.
In comparison to the other battlefields in Croatia, the amount of
artillery sent to
Vinkovci
and
Vukovar
was massive. It must not be forgotten that
the city was besieged for
50
days and that, other than
Dubrovnik,
it differs from
all other cities before which the
JNA
was brought to a halt. All the others were
linked by transportation lines to the homeland and accessible in terms of logis¬
tical support and reinforcement.
The media elevated
Vukovar
to a special status in the Croatian battlefields
even before the defense of the city drew to an end.
Vukovar
was promoted to a
central place in the legend of the war, the city that created the state! Years of rep¬
etition in the manner of a slogan
-
and a slogan is the mother of teaching, formed
such an image. Somewhat less frequently, but frequent enough for it to enter into
the perception of the average citizen of Croatia, is the claim that the city was be¬
trayed as a reward for it contribution. Serbian, that is,
JNA
interpretations, treat
Vukovar
as the place where the Croatian army was defeated and forced to accept
the peace process laid out by the United Nations. According to prevailing Cro¬
atian interpretations
Vukovar
is where the Croatian army "bought" time to or¬
ganize and arm itself in order to be able to survive the war. Is this really the
case?
The claim that
Vukovar
is the city on which Croatia was created stands on its
assumption. War is a conflict of two or more sides. These sides have their various
attributes, the forces which it wielded, the plans it held, and the manner which it
carried them out. On some of these things, Croatian and Serbian historiography
has spoken somewhat, on others, not at all. This is to be expected, and is quite
logical
-
a system which seeks to protect itself and its secrets, particularly its mil¬
itary ones, shields what it can from the eyes of the public. In the context of the
disintegration of the Croatian archival system at the beginning of the 21st century,
for a short time the documents of the HV were accessible and it was clear from
these that the city was not betrayed and that it could not be defended. Accessible
documents from the
JNA
shed light on the other side and for the most part elim¬
inate all speculation. On the basis of these it is clearly not the case that
Vukovar
was the point on which Croatia was created, nor was it the place that the
JNA
defeated the Croatian forces. It is clear that the tactical situation here did not re¬
direct the course of the war.
Was the "spine" of the
JNA
broken at
Vukovar?
Would the
JNA
have been able
to cross the river Bosut in the days before or after the fall of
Vukovar
and establish
a foothold between
Đakovo
and
Osijek?
On the other hand, the
JNA
claims on
the basis of uncertain grounds that after the conquest of
Vukovar
it could have
easily concluded the war because it could have easily broken through to Zagreb.
To reach such conclusions it is hard to see why the conquest of
Vukovar
was ne¬
cessary at all, since it does not stand in the war of a push deep into the territory of
456 Davor
Marijan | OBRANA
I PAD
VUKOVARA
Croatia. The assault on
Vukovar
bears witness to the rapid collapse of the strategy
of attacking Croatia in depth and the shift in strategy to the conquest of particular
territories. The claim that with the conquest of
Vukovar
a watershed was reached
would only be supported if after that fact the other territories also fell. Rather, the
facts speak to the unsuccessful attempt of the
JNA
to attack the cities of Croatia
after its launch of operations in the middle of September
1991.
In terms of the suggestion that Croatia gained time to mobilize and develop
new forces while
Vukovar
was defending itself, this would make sense only if it
was the sole battlefield at the time. This naturally is not the case, so the question
remains as to why the defense of
Vukovar
is more meaningful than the defense of
Vinkovci, Osijek, Nova Gradiška, Pakrac, Novska, Sisak, Karlovac, Gospić, and
Zadar.
Unlike
Vukovar,
all of these cities and towns had strategic importance.
Even the battle for
Vukovar
cannot be seen as an isolated event from the defense
of eastern
Slavonia
which, along with a series of other weaknesses, was directed
from
Osijek,
a fact that cannot be denied. Certainly, this is challenged only by the
leaders of the defense of
Vukovar,
but without evidence. Thanks to them and the
media it is "forgotten" that the operational zone
Osijek
and its predecessor, the
Command of the National Guard for
Slavonia,
Srijem,
and
Baranja,
from the be¬
ginning of September led the strategic defensive operation in eastern Croatia.
For the allegation that
Vukovar
is a betrayed city no evidence is given. Rarely
has anyone had the courage to go to the limit and allege who had the power to
betray a city. Here the answer is very simple
-
the President
Tuđman.
Only he had
the power to cut off support for the city and doom it to a slow death. The rationale
for this action is deemed to have been international recognition for the state of
Croatia. Were this allegation to be true, the decision would have to have been
made, no matter how callous, on a very high level of strategic planning and pol¬
iticking, where in the interests of the greater good a small minority was sacrificed.
Besides this, one other point needs to be made: the longer
Vukovar
held out, the
more sympathy it would generate, every day it would gain stature as a heroic city
in the eyes of the outside world, a Stalingrad that would daily garner more awe
and sympathy.
The first years of the 21st century were marked by a flood of presidential tran¬
scripts in which that compromised President
Tuđman
came to the surface. Yet, in
this mass
ofinformation
there was nothing that pointed to his having sacrificed
Vukovar.
Other transcripts, among which those that were mentioned in the text,
show how complicated the historical record truly is in comparison to overly-sim¬
plified public opinion or that of journalists who behave as if they were social-
political workers during the socialist era.
A shadow has been cast on the battle by speculation in some of the media that
the city was sacrificed by the political leadership of Croatia. A special commission
Summary
457
was even formed which indicated a conjunction between the Croatian Party of
Right and the Directorate of Security of the
JNA
to bring down the legally consti¬
tuted government of Croatia.
What is beyond doubt is the power of the symbol, the psychological role that
Vukovar
played has not lost its potency even twenty years later. The defense of the
city had on influence on the civilian population particularly in regions which
were not exposed to the horrors of the war. And spiritual symbols in war contrib¬
ute to victory.
In the war against Croatia the
JNA
enjoyed an initial advantage because it was
prepared for war. In the concluding phase it happened that the HV took advan¬
tage of its far more modest potential, human and material. Even though the
JNA
was far better equipped it managed to put forth an insufficient minimum effort.
In western
Srijem
in
1991,
like in the rest of Croatia, a battle for Croatia was
carried out in which
Vukovar
played an important part. Speculations about a
betrayed city have no basis in fact, just as it is untrue that
Vukovar
was the key to
the creation of the Republic of Croatia. |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Marijan, Davor 1966- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1152099639 |
| author_facet | Marijan, Davor 1966- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Marijan, Davor 1966- |
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| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV041357999 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)889999521 (DE-599)BVBBV041357999 |
| era | Geschichte 1991 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1991 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Kroatien (DE-588)4073841-3 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Kroatien |
| id | DE-604.BV041357999 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-08-10T01:25:54Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789537840211 |
| language | Croatian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-026806415 |
| oclc_num | 889999521 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-12 |
| physical | 464 S. Kt. |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publishDateSearch | 2013 |
| publishDateSort | 2013 |
| publisher | Hrvatski Inst. za Povijest |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica |
| series2 | Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica : Monografije i studije |
| spelling | Marijan, Davor 1966- Verfasser (DE-588)1152099639 aut Obrana i pad Vukovara Davor Marijan Zagreb Hrvatski Inst. za Povijest 2013 464 S. Kt. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica : Monografije i studije 61 Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Geschichte 1991 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawienkriege (DE-588)4875209-5 gnd rswk-swf Operation Militär (DE-588)4203217-9 gnd rswk-swf Schlacht um Vukovar (DE-588)4450184-5 gnd rswk-swf Kroatien (DE-588)4073841-3 gnd rswk-swf Schlacht um Vukovar (DE-588)4450184-5 s Geschichte 1991 z DE-604 Kroatien (DE-588)4073841-3 g Jugoslawienkriege (DE-588)4875209-5 s Operation Militär (DE-588)4203217-9 s Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica Monografije i studije ; 61 (DE-604)BV010859037 61 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=026806415&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=026806415&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Marijan, Davor 1966- Obrana i pad Vukovara Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica Jugoslawienkriege (DE-588)4875209-5 gnd Operation Militär (DE-588)4203217-9 gnd Schlacht um Vukovar (DE-588)4450184-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4875209-5 (DE-588)4203217-9 (DE-588)4450184-5 (DE-588)4073841-3 |
| title | Obrana i pad Vukovara |
| title_auth | Obrana i pad Vukovara |
| title_exact_search | Obrana i pad Vukovara |
| title_full | Obrana i pad Vukovara Davor Marijan |
| title_fullStr | Obrana i pad Vukovara Davor Marijan |
| title_full_unstemmed | Obrana i pad Vukovara Davor Marijan |
| title_short | Obrana i pad Vukovara |
| title_sort | obrana i pad vukovara |
| topic | Jugoslawienkriege (DE-588)4875209-5 gnd Operation Militär (DE-588)4203217-9 gnd Schlacht um Vukovar (DE-588)4450184-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Jugoslawienkriege Operation Militär Schlacht um Vukovar Kroatien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=026806415&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=026806415&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV010859037 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT marijandavor obranaipadvukovara |