Public Finance: a normative theory
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Amsterdam [u.a.]
Acad. Press
2015
|
| Ausgabe: | 3. ed. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XVI, 517 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780124158344 |
Internformat
MARC
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804151358395252736 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Pretace
XV
Part I
Introduction: The Content and
Methodology of Public Sector Theory
1.
Introduction to Normative Public
Sector Theory
The Fundamental Normative Questions
4
Government Expenditure Theory: Philosophical
Underpinnings
5
Humanism, Consumer Sovereignty, Capitalism,
and the Government
5
The Legitimate Functions of Government
6
The Goals of Government Policy
6
Efficiency
6
Equity
6
The Government as Agent
8
Government Expenditure Theory and Market
Failure
9
The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare
Economics
9
The Distribution of Income
9
The Allocation of Resources
10
Private or Asymmetric Information
10
The Government Sector in the United States
12
The Theory of Taxation
14
Fiscal Federalism
15
The Theory of Public Choice
15
Behavioral Public Finance
17
Summary
18
2.
A General Equilibrium Model
for Public Sector Analysis
A Baseline General Equilibrium Model
22
Individual Preferences
22
Production Technologies
23
Market Clearance in the Aggregate
23
Efficiency: The Pareto-Optimal Conditions
23
Equity: The Social Welfare Function and the
Optimal Distribution of Income
24
The
Bergson-Samuelson
Social Welfare
Function
25
Limitations of the Social Welfare Function
26
Maximizing Social Welfare
27
Necessary Conditions for Social Welfare
Maximization
27
The First-Best Efficiency-Equity Dichotomy
28
The Pareto-Optimal Conditions
29
Condition PI
(=
Marginal Rate of Substitution)
29
Condition P5
(=
Marginal Rate of Technical
Substitution)
29
Condition P6 (MRS
=
Marginal Rate of
Transformation)
30
Pareto Optimality and Perfect Competition
32
The Interpersonal Equity Conditions
33
How Many Goods to Redistribute?
33
Lump-Sum Redistributions
34
The Social Marginal Utility of Income
35
Policy Implications and Conclusions
35
3.
First-Best and Second-Best Analyses
and the Political Economy of Public
Sector Economics
Lump-Sum Redistributions and Public
Sector Theory
37
First-Best Analysis
38
The Two Dichotomies in First-Best Models
38
Second-Best Analysis
40
Constrained Social Welfare Maximization
40
The Most Common Policy and Market
Constraints
41
Distorting Taxes and Transfers
42
Fixed Budget Constraints
42
Drafting Resources or Giving away Goods
42
Maintained Monopoly Power
42
Asymmetric or Private Information
43
Further Implications of Second-Best Modeling
43
The Scope of Government Intervention
43
Interpreting Second-Best Results
43
Model and Policy Sensitivity
44
vi
Contents
Similarities between First-Best and Second-Best
Analyses
44
The Political Economy of the Social Welfare
Function
45
The Form of the Social Welfare Function:
from Utilitarian to Rawlsian
45
Utiltarianism
45
Rawlsianism
46
A Flexible Social Welfare Function
47
Arrow s Impossibility Theorem
48
Arrow s Five Axioms
48
Cycling Preferences
50
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
51
Reactions to the Arrow and Gibbard—
Satterlhwaite Theorems
52
Conclusion
53
Part II
The Theory of Public Expenditures
and Taxation: First-Best Analysis
4.
The Social Welfare Function in Policy
Analysis
Social Welfare and the Distribution of Income:
The Atkinson Framework
58
The Atkinson Assumptions
58
Utilitarian Social Welfare
58
Same Preferences
58
Diminishing Marginal Utility of Income
58
The Bias Toward Equality
59
Okun s Leaky Bucket
60
The Atkinson Social Welfare Function
60
The Private Marginal Utilities of Income
60
Society s Aversion to Inequality
60
Okun s Leaky Bucket Again
61
Social Welfare Indexes of Inequality
61
Generalized
Lorenz
Dominance
63
Crossing
Lorenz
Curves
63
Atkinson s Index of Inequality
63
Inequality versus Social Welfare: Sen s Critique
64
Inequality of Income
64
Inequality of Utility
64
Social Welfare
64
The Atkinson Framework and Inequality in the
United States
64
Social Welfare and Consumption:
The Jorgenson Analysis
65
The Estimating Share Equations
65
Social Welfare
67
Income Measures of Social Gain and Loss
68
The Expenditure Function, HCV, and HEV
68
Hicks Compensating and Equivalent Variations
68
Jorgenson s Social Expenditure Function
70
Social HCV and HEV
71
Two Applications for the US Economy
71
Social Welfare and Social Mobility
73
Social Mobility and the Distribution of Income
73
Structural Mobility, Circulation Mobility,
and Social Welfare
74
Utilitarian Social Welfare and Circulation
Mobility
75
Weighted Social Welfare and Circulation
Mobility
75
Social Mobility in the United States
Π
5.
The Problem of Externalities
—
An
Overview
Policy-Relevant Externalities
The Terminology of Externalities
The Analysis of Externalities: Modeling
Preliminaries
The Interpersonal Equity Conditions
The Pareto-Optimal Conditions
6.
Consumption Externalities
79
80
81
82
82
84
How Bad Can Externalities Be?
The Worst of All Worlds—All Goods (Factors)
Are Pure Public Goods (Factors)
85
Interpersonal Equity Conditions
85
Pareto-Optimal Conditions
86
The Existence of At Least One Pure Private
Good
86
Interpersonal Equity Conditions
86
Pareto-Optimal Conditions
86
Externalities as Market Failure: The Missing
Side Markets
88
Bargaining and the
Coase
Theorem
89
The Tax/Subsidy Solution
90
Limited Externalities
91
Nonexclusive Goods—The
Samuelson
Model
91
The Government in a General Equilibrium
Model
92
Allocating a Nonexclusive Good
93
Interpersonal Equity Conditions
93
Pareto-Optimal Conditions
93
The First-Best Dichotomy: The Private Goods
and Factors
94
Policy Problems with Nonexclusive Goods
94
Paying for the Public Good
95
The Benefits-Received Principle of Taxation
96
Preference Revelation and Taxation:
The Mechanism Design Problem
98
Do People Free Ride?
99
Contents
vii
Kindness, Confusion, or a Warm Glow from
Giving?
101
Positive versus Negative Framing
101
Aggregate Externalities
102
The Pigovian Tax
103
Interpersonal Equity Conditions
103
Pareto-Optimal Conditions
104
Finding the Optimum by Trial and Error
105
Two Caveats to the Pigovian Tax
106
7.
Production Externalities
The Condensed Model for Production
Externalities
Aggregate Production Externalities
The First-Order Conditions—
Parete
Optimal ity
The Pigovian Tax
Three Geometric Interpretations of the
Pareto-Optimal Conditions
The Market for the Pollutant
The Market for Goods That Pollute
The Optimal Reduction in Pollution
Internalizing the Externality
Additional Policy Considerations
Taxing the Externality
Taxing and Subsidizing Everything Else
Subsidizing or Compensating the Victims
Partial Taxes and Subsidies
Entry, Exit, and Optimally in the Long Run
Bargaining in the Long Run with Entry and
Bargaining Costs versus Property Rights
Concluding Comments: The Problem of
Nonconvex Production Possibilities
8.
An Application of Externality Theory:
Global Warming
Consumption—Production Externalities
The Interpersonal Equity Conditions
The Pareto-Optimal Conditions
Legislating Pollution Standards
The Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen
Accord
Cost Minimizing under the Standards
Approach to Reducing Pollution
The CAC Approach
Marketable Permits
Marketable Permits, Taxes, and Uncertainty
The Preference for Taxes over Marketable
Permits for
СОэ
Emissions
Defensive
Antipollution
Strategies
Equalizing Marginal Costs in Reducing
Pollution
135
Additional Complicating Issues
135
Long-Lived Externalities
136
9.
The Theory of Decreasing Cost
Production
Decreasing Cost in General Equilibrium
Analysis
140
The Pareto-Optimal Conditions
141
Decreasing Cost and Competitive Markets
142
The Optimal Pricing Rule
143
The Optimal Investment Rules
143
The Easy Case
144
110
The Hard Case
144
111
The Sufficient Condition: The Easy Case
145
Break-even Production
145
111
The Necessary Condition: The Hard Case
146
113
The Necessary Condition and the
Compensated Demand Curve
148
113
Marshallian Consumer s Surplus and HCV
149
113
Decreasing Cost Services and Public Goods
151
114
Reflections on U.S. Policy Regarding Decreasing
114
Cost Services: The Public Interest in
115
Equity and Efficiency
152
116
Equity Considerations
153
116
Efficiency Considerations
154
117
Appendix: Returns to Scale, Homogeneity,
117
and Decreasing Cost
155
117
118
10.
The First-Best Theory of Taxation
Exit
119
and Transfers
120
Public Choice and Pareto-Optimal
121
Redistribution
158
Pareto Optimality and the Overall
V
Distribution of Income
159
7
Pareto-Optimal Redistribution and the Poor
160
What Motivates Charity: Should Aid Be In
123
Kind or Cash?
161
125
Recipients Preference for Cash
162
125
Limited Aid: Cash Equivalent In-Kind
126
Transfers
162
Are Pareto-Optimal Redistributions Enough?
163
127
Altruism, Free Riding, and Crowding out
of Private Charity
164
128
Do People Free Ride?
164
129
Does Public Assistance Crowd Out Private
130
Giving?
166
131
Other Motivations for
Redistributive
Transfers
166
132
Public Insurance
166
133
Social Status
167
Equal Access
167
The Prospect of Upward Mobility Hypothesis
167
viii Contents
11.
Applying First-Best Principles of
Taxation—What to Tax and How
Designing Broad-Based Taxes: The Economic
Objectives
171
Ability to Pay: Theoretical Considerations
173
Two Preliminary Considerations
173
Horizontal Equity
174
From Horizontal Equity to the Ideal
Tax Base
174
The Three Principles of Tax Design
174
Haig—Simons Income
175
The Sources and Uses of Income
175
Real versus Nominal Income
176
Other Tax Bases
176
Criticisms of Haig—Simons Income
176
A Flawed Surrogate Measure of Utility?
176
A Better Alternative to Haig-Simons
Income?
177
Consumption or Expenditures as the
Preferred Alternative
178
Consumption versus Income Taxes:
An Example
179
The Tax Reform Act of
1986:
Income
Taxation versus Expenditures Taxation
180
Haig—Simons Income versus Expenditures:
Musgrave s Perspective
180
Horizontal Equity and
lhe
Interpersonal
Equity Conditions
Ш)
Vertical Equity
182
Progressive, Proportional, and Regressive
Taxes
182
Vertical Equity and the Interpersonal Equity
Conditions
183
Sacrifice Principles of Vertical Equity
183
Minimize Aggregate Sacrifice
183
Equal Sacrifice
184
Young s Prescription for Vertical Equity
184
Young s Six Principles of Taxation
184
Proportional Taxation
186
Progressive Taxation
186
Vertical Equity in the United States
186
Reflections on the Haig-Simons Criterion in
Practice: The Federal Personal Income Tax
187
Personal Income
187
Capital Gains
188
The Taxation of Personal Income: The Tax
Loopholes
188
Tax Loopholes, Tax Capitalization, and
Horizontal Equity
189
Tax Loopholes, Vertical Equity, and
Inefficiency
190
The Taxation of Capital Gains: Inflation
Bias and Realization
191
The Inflationary Bias against Income
from Capital
192
Taxing Realized Gains: Auerbach s
Retrospective Taxation Proposal
193
A Two-Period Example
193
The Vickrey Proposal
194
The Auerbach Proposal
194
Capital Gains Taxation: A Postscript
195
The Taxation of Human Capital
196
Summary
197
Part III
The Theory of Public Expenditures
and Taxation: Second-Best Analysis
12.
Introduction to Second-Best
Analysis
A Brief History of Second-Best Theory
202
Second-Best Tax Theory
203
Second-Best Expenditure Theory
203
Private Information
204
Philosophical and Methodological
Underpinnings
206
Preview of Part III
206
13.
The Second-Best Theory of Taxation
in One-Consumer Economies with
Linear Production Technology
General Equilibrium Price Models
210
The Measurement of Loss from Distorting
Taxes
211
The Geometry of Loss Measurement: Partial
Equilibrium Analysis
211
The Geometry of Loss Measurement: General
Equilibrium Analysis
212
The Analytics of General Equilibrium Loss
Measurement
214
Marginal Loss
215
Total Loss for Any Given Pattern of Taxes
216
Policy Implications of the Loss Measures
218
Zero-Tax Economy versus Existing-Tax
Economy
218
Proportional Taxes Generate No
Deadweight Loss
218
Efficiency Properties of Income Taxes
219
Direct versus Indirect Taxation
220
If the Government Chooses to Collect All
Revenue by Imposing a Single Distorting
Tax, Which Good or Factor Should
It Tax?
220
Contents
¡χ
The Issue of Tax Avoidance
221
Single-Market Measures of Loss
221
Gruber
and Saez on the Elasticity on
TI
223
Efficiency Cost of the Personal Income Tax
224
The Optimal Pattern of Commodity Taxes
225
Policy Implications of the Optimal Tax Rule
226
Broad-Based Taxation
226
The Exemption of Necessities
228
Percentage Charge Rules for Ordinary
Demand (Factor Supply) Relationships
228
The Inverse Elasticity Rule
228
Substitutions Among Taxes: Implications
For Welfare Loss
229
The Corlett and Hague Analysis
230
14.
The Second-Best Theory of Taxation
with General Production
Technologies and Many Consumers
A One-Consumer Economy with General
Technology
233
Dead-Weight Loss from Taxation
233
Pure Profits and Losses
234
Market Clearance
235
Marginal Loss: General Technology
236
Optimal Commodity Taxation
238
Many-Person Economics: Fixed Producer
Prices
240
Social Welfare Maximization versus Loss
Minimization
240
Optimal Commodity Taxation in a
Many-Person Economy
242
A Covariance Interpretation of Optimal
Taxation
244
A Two-Class Tax Rule
245
US Commodity Taxes: How Far from
Optimal?
245
Many-Person Economy with General
Technology
246
Social Welfare and Preferences
246
Production Technology
247
Market Clearance
247
The Model
247
Walras Law and the Government Budget
Constraint
247
Optima! Taxation
247
The Social Welfare Implications of Any
Given Change in Taxes
248
15.
Taxation under Asymmetric
Information
Lump-sum Redistributions and Private
Information
252
Redistribution through Commodity
Taxations
253
Optimal Taxation, Private Information,
and Self-Selection Constraints
255
Elements of the Model
256
Preferences
256
Self-Selection Constraints
257
Government Budget Constraint
257
Pareto-Efficicnt Taxation
257
Self-Selection Constraints Not Binding
258
Self-Selection Constraint on the High-Ability
Class Binding
258
An Extension: The Direct-Indirect Tax Mix
259
Optimal Income Taxation
260
The Shape of the Tax Schedule
262
A U-Shaped Tax Schedule?
262
Concluding Observations
264
Tax Evasion
264
Increasing the Penalty
266
Increasing Monitoring
266
Revenue-Raising Strategies
266
Tax Amnesties
268
Concluding Remarks
268
16.
The Theory and Measurement
of Tax Incidence
Tax Incidence: A Partial Equilibrium Analysis
271
First-Best Theory, Second-Best Theory,
and Tax Incidence
272
Methodological Differences in the
Measurement of Tax Incidence
273
Theoretical Measures of Tax Incidence
274
Impact Equals Incidence
274
Changes in Relative Prices
274
Changes in Welfare
274
General Principles of Tax Incidence
274
The Disposition of the Tax Revenues
275
Save the Tax Revenues
275
Balanced Budget Incidence
275
Pure Tax incidence: Differential Incidence
276
The Incidence of a Single Tax
276
Differential Incidence
276
Welfare Measures of Tax Incidence:
One-Consumer Economy
276
The Relative Price Measure of Differential Tax
Incidence: One-Consumer Economy
278
Hicks Compensating Variation versus Hicks
Equivalent Variation Welfare Measures
279
The Relative Price Change Measure of
Incidence
279
The Equivalence of General Taxes
280
Theorem: The Equivalence of General Taxes
280
χ
Contenîs
Implications
281
Measuring Tax Incidence: A Many-Consumer
Economy
282
The Individual Perspective on Incidence
283
Individual
Deadweight
Loss
283
Change in Relative Prices
283
One Person s Deadweight Loss
283
The Aggregate Social Welfare Perspective on
Incidence
284
The Harberger Analysis
284
Geometric-Intuitive Analysis
285
The Harberger Analytics
287
The Demand Equations
287
The Goods—Supply and Input—Demand
Equations
287
Market Clearance
288
Additional Price Relationships
288
Summary
289
Comments on the Solution
289
Important Modifications of the Harberger
Model
293
Variable Factor Supplies
293
Mobile versus Immobile Factors
293
Taxing the Demand versus the Supply Side
293
The Incidence of Local Property Taxes
294
Oligopoly and the Corporation Income Tax
294
Heterogeneous Consumers
295
17.
Expenditure Incidence and
Economy-Wide Incidence Studies
The Incidence of Government Transfer
Payments
299
Tax and Expenditure Incidence with
Decreasing-Cost Services
300
Samuelsonian Nonexclusive Goods
300
The Incidence of Nonexclusive Goods:
Empirical Evidence
302
Economy-Wide Incidence Studies
303
The Sources and Uses Approach
304
Annual Incidence Studies
304
The
Pechman—
Okner Studies
304
Central-Variant Assumptions
305
Alternative Assumptions
306
Mixing Annual and Lifetime Incidence
307
Whalley s Critique of the Sources and Uses
Approach
307
Pure Lifetime Tax Incidence
308
Lorenz—
Gini
Measures of Tax Incidence
309
Tax Concentration Curve
309
Change in the Before-Tax and After-Tax
Gini
Coefficients
310
Change in a Before-Tax and After-Tax Social
Welfare Index of Inequality
310
Vertical and Horizontal Inequities
310
Lorenz
Measures and Tax Progressivity
312
Computable General Equilibrium Models
of Tax Incidence
313
Dynamic Tax Incidence
314
The Auerbach-Kotlikoff
OLG
Model
315
Fiscal Policy Options
316
A Selection of Results
318
Concluding Caveats
319
The Fullerton-Rogers Lifetime CGE Model
321
Appendix
322
Tax Reform and Tax Theory
322
Reforming the Tax Base: The Contenders
322
Should Income from Capital be Taxed?
324
Classical versus Newer Tax Theory
326
Varying Tax Rates by Age
326
Commitment
327
18.
The Second-Best Theory of Public
Expenditures: Overview
19.
Transfer Payments and Private
Information
First-Best Insights
335
IE Conditions
335
Pareto-Optimal Redistributions
336
Cash Transfers: Broad Based or Targeted?
336
An Acceptable Public Assistance Program?
338
The EITC
339
Special Needs, In-Kind Transfers, and
Universality
339
Private Information and In-Kind Transfers
340
The
В
lackorby—Donaldson Model of In-Kind
Transfers
340
The First-Best Frontier
341
Government Provision of Medical Care
341
Subsidizing Medical Care
342
The Besley—
Coate
Model of Workfare
343
Unobservable Earnings
344
Welfare Stigma
345
Elements of the Model
346
Statistical Discrimination
346
A Political Note
347
20.
Social Insurance: Medical Care
The Demand for Insurance
349
Without Insurance
350
With Insurance
350
The Supply Side
350
The Pareto-Optimum
351
Private or Asymmetric Information
352
Moral Hazard
353
Contents
xi
The Competitive Outcome
The Public Policy Response
Ex Post Moral Hazard
Déductibles
and Co-payments
The Value of Access
Adverse Selection
Ex Post versus Ex Ante Efficiency
The Nature of Adverse Selection
Advantageous Selection
A Two-Policy Model
Is an Equilibrium Possible?
Conclusions
Policy Response to Adverse Selection
U.S. Policies
Medicare and Medicaid
Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act
21.
Social Insurance: Social Security
The U.S. Social Security System
Benefits
Spousal Benefits
Payroll Tax Contributions
Coverage
Social Security as Social Insurance
The
Macroeconomic
Effects of Social
Security
Social Security and Saving
The
Samuelson
Consumption-Loan Model
Adding Capital to the
OLG
Model: The
Diamond Model
The Structure of the Economy: Consumption,
Production, and Market Clearance
Consumption
Production
Market Clearance
The Social Welfare Optimum
Saving with an Unfunded Social Security
System
U.S. Social Security and Saving
Saving with a Defined Contribution Social
Security System
The lntergeneration Redistributional Effects
of Social Security
The Discount Factor
Capital Income Taxes
Variable Labor Supply and Deadweight Loss
Social Security Reform: Switching to a
Defined Contribution Plan
The Legacy Debt in the United States
Concluding Observations
354
22.
Externalities in a Second-Best
355
Environment
355
356
The Second-Best Allocation of Samuelsonian
356
Nonexclusive Goods
385
357
Preferences and Social Welfare
386
357
Production and Market Clearance
386
358
Social Welfare Maximization
386
359
Relationships between First-Best and
360
Second-Best Allocations
388
361
Concluding Comment
389
362
The
Coase
Theorem, Bargaining, and
362
Private Information
389
363
Bargaining Set Stability and the
Coase
363
Theorem
390
364
368
368
369
369
369
369
370
370
370
371
371
371
372
372
374
375
376
376
377
378
.378
379
379
381
381
Private Information
391
Concluding Comments
394
23.
Decreasing Costs and the Theory
of the Second-Best
—
The
Boiteux
Problem
The
Boiteux
Problem: The Multiproduct
Decreasing-Cost Firm
397
Constrained Government Agencies
402
24.
General Production Rules in a
Second-Best Environment
The Diamond—Mirrlees Problem:
One-Consumer Economy
406
The Private Sector
406
The Government Sector
406
Market Clearance
407
Loss Minimization
407
Optimal Taxation
407
Optimal Government Production
408
Production Decisions with
Nonoptimal
Taxes
409
Tax Rules
410
Production Rules
411
Special Cases
411
Balanced-Budget Changes in
ŕ
and
Z
412
Second-Best Production Rules When Equity
Matters
413
Concluding Comments
416
25.
Behavioral Public Sector Economics
The Behavioral Anomalies
417
Prospect Theory: The Rejection of Expected
Utility Maximization
418
Present-Biased Preferences: Self-Control
Issues
418
xii
Contents
Social Preferences
418
Framing Effects or Context Dependence
419
Mainstream Reactions
420
Positive and Normative Public Sector
Economics
422
Prospect Theory
423
Applying Prospect Theory
425
Nudges and Standard Policy Prescriptions
426
Standard Agents Only
426
Behavioral Agents Only
427
Nudges
427
A Mixture of Standard and Behavioral Agents
428
Can Mainstream and Behavioral Economic
Theory Be Reconciled?
429
Refinements
430
Part IV
Fiscal Federalism
26.
Optimal Federalism: Sorting the
Functions of Government within
the Fiscal Hierarchy
The Potential for Incompatibilities and
Destructive Competition
435
The Two Fundamental Sorting Questions of
Fiscal Federalism
436
Social Welfare within Fiscal Federalism
436
Sorting the Functions of Government
within the Fiscal Hierarchy
437
Stigler s Prescription for an Optimal
Federalism
437
Oates Perfect Correspondence
438
Oates Decentralization Theorem
438
Misperceived Preferences
439
Local Autonomy in a First-Best
Environment?
440
Optimal Federalism and the Distribution
Function
440
Redistribution, the Competition Problem,
and Potential Incompatibilities
440
Criticisms of the Prevailing Model
441
Decreasi
ng-Cost Services
441
Politics and the Social Welfare Function
442
Redistributions in Reality
443
The Need for Local Social Welfare
Functions
444
Optimal Redistribution in a Federalist
System: An Alternative Model
444
Comments on Our Alternative Model
445
27.
Optimal Federalism: The Sorting
of People within the Fiscal
Hierarchy
The Modeling Dimensions
448
The Underlying Economic Environment
448
The Local Government Sector
449
The Public Services
449
The Knowledge Set
449
jurisdiction Formation in Accordance
with the Theory of Clubs
449
Reaching the Optimum
452
Fixed Communities and Housing Sites:
Adding the Housing Market
453
The
Pauly
Model of the Housing Market
453
The Hohaus—
Konrad—
Thum Model of
Housing Market Distortion
454
The Housing Market Equilibrium
455
The Median Voter
455
The Social Welfare Optimum
455
Sophisticated Voters
455
Empirical Estimates of Public Services
Capitalization
456
Tiebout Sorting from an Historical
Perspective
456
Anything Is Possible
457
The Stiglitz Model
457
Production
457
Preferences
457
The Optimal
С
457
The Optimal
N 457
The Henry George Theorem
458
Community Formation: Varying
N
and
G
458
Possible Equilibrium Outcomes
458
Mobility and Redistribution
460
The Brown-Oates Model
460
Simulation Results
461
Uncertain Incomes
461
No Mobility
462
Mobility
462
The Epple—
Romer
Model of Redistribution
463
All Renters
463
Homeowners
464
Simulation Results
464
28.
The Role of Grants-in-Aid in a
Federalist System of Governments
Optimal Federalism and Grants-in-Aid:
Normative Analysis
467
First-Best Policy Environment
467
Second-Best Policy Environment
468
Contents
xiii
Alternative Design Criteria
470
The LeGrand Guidelines
470
Applying LeGrand s Principles:
Bradbury
et al.
471
Redistributing through Matching Grants
472
Estimating the Demand for State and
Local Public Services
473
The Median Voter Model
473
The Political Assumptions
474
The Economic Assumptions
475
Whose Equation?
476
Further Conceptual Difficulties
477
The Results
477
Econometric Problems: Tiebout Bias
478
Surveys
479
The Threshold Effect
480
The Results
480
Tiebout Bias
481
The Response to Grants-in-Aid
481
The Flypaper Effect
481
Possible Explanations of the Flypaper Effect
483
Fiscal Illusion
483
Combining Grant and Tax Effects
483
Project Grants and Bureaucrats
484
29.
International Public Finance
The Taxation of Mobile Capital
488
Preliminaries: Normative Foundations
488
The ZMW Model
490
Utility Maximization—Small Country
Assumption with
ρ
Constant
491
Fiscal Externalities
491
Utility Maximization
—
The Large Country
Case with
ρ
Variable
492
Summary
495
Multinational Enterprises
495
Tax Avoidance
496
The Firms Perspective
496
Strategic Considerations
—
The Countries
Perspective
497
Concealing Information
498
Concluding Observations
500
Appendix
Index
501
507
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Tresch, Richard W. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)170173054 |
| author_facet | Tresch, Richard W. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Tresch, Richard W. |
| author_variant | r w t rw rwt |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV041293237 |
| classification_rvk | QL 000 QL 201 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)904123411 (DE-599)BVBBV041293237 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 3. ed. |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV041293237 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:53:33Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780124158344 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-026742174 |
| oclc_num | 904123411 |
| open_access_boolean | |
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| owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-1047 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-20 DE-384 |
| physical | XVI, 517 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publishDateSearch | 2015 |
| publishDateSort | 2015 |
| publisher | Acad. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Tresch, Richard W. Verfasser (DE-588)170173054 aut Public Finance a normative theory Richard Tresch 3. ed. Amsterdam [u.a.] Acad. Press 2015 XVI, 517 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Kosten-batenanalyse gtt Finanzwirtschaft Finance, Public Finanzwissenschaft (DE-588)4121273-3 gnd rswk-swf Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 gnd rswk-swf Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd rswk-swf Finanztheorie (DE-588)4154425-0 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 s DE-188 Finanzwissenschaft (DE-588)4121273-3 s Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 s 1\p DE-604 2\p DE-604 Finanztheorie (DE-588)4154425-0 s 3\p DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=026742174&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 3\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Tresch, Richard W. Public Finance a normative theory Kosten-batenanalyse gtt Finanzwirtschaft Finance, Public Finanzwissenschaft (DE-588)4121273-3 gnd Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 gnd Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Finanztheorie (DE-588)4154425-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4121273-3 (DE-588)4017214-4 (DE-588)4059787-8 (DE-588)4154425-0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Public Finance a normative theory |
| title_auth | Public Finance a normative theory |
| title_exact_search | Public Finance a normative theory |
| title_full | Public Finance a normative theory Richard Tresch |
| title_fullStr | Public Finance a normative theory Richard Tresch |
| title_full_unstemmed | Public Finance a normative theory Richard Tresch |
| title_short | Public Finance |
| title_sort | public finance a normative theory |
| title_sub | a normative theory |
| topic | Kosten-batenanalyse gtt Finanzwirtschaft Finance, Public Finanzwissenschaft (DE-588)4121273-3 gnd Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 gnd Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Finanztheorie (DE-588)4154425-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Kosten-batenanalyse Finanzwirtschaft Finance, Public Finanzwissenschaft Theorie Finanztheorie USA |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=026742174&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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