This study examines why Saddam Hussein pursued nuclear weapons and, as a basic aspect of that question, how he might have employed that capability had he acquired it, whether for deterrence, warfighting, or something else. As the key decision maker in Iraq, Saddam's own thinking was central. Hi...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Cigar, Norman L. 1948- (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Buch
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Quantico, VA Marine Corps Univ. Press 2011
Schriftenreihe:	Middle East studies occasional papers 1
Schlagworte:	Hussein, Saddam / 1937-2006 Hussein, Saddam / 1937-2006 / Political and social views Geschichte 1900-2000 Nuclear weapons / Government policy / Iraq Nuclear weapons / Iraq / History Nuclear nonproliferation / Government policy / Iraq Außenpolitik Geschichte Politik Iraq / Military policy Iraq / Foreign relations / 20th century Iraq / Foreign relations / 21st century Irak
Zusammenfassung:	This study examines why Saddam Hussein pursued nuclear weapons and, as a basic aspect of that question, how he might have employed that capability had he acquired it, whether for deterrence, warfighting, or something else. As the key decision maker in Iraq, Saddam's own thinking was central. His perception of regional threats, primarily from Iran and Israel,were a prime motivator. In addition, Saddam viewed acquiring nuclear weapons as a potent vehicle to help legitimize his regime and burnish his personal image as leader both at home and in the Arab World, as a modernizer and defender of national interests. A better understanding of the Iraqi case can also clarify the enduring issues related to how regional leaders may view nuclear weapons in this world of looming proliferation
Beschreibung:	"June 2011." Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-87) Introduction. The terms of reference -- Saddam Hussein's nuclear vision. The historical database -- Nuclear weapons and the threat environment -- Saddam and Iraq's enemies -- Iran -- Israel -- Did the Osirak airstrike trigger the military nuclear program? -- The United States as a threat? -- Nuclear weapons as a legitimizing vehicle -- Reaching the domestic audience -- Iraq's military -- The Ba'ath Party -- Iraq's scientists -- Iraq's public and students -- Nuclear weapons and the defense of the Arab nation -- Nuclear weapons and modernity -- To hide or reveal? -- Were there any skeptics? -- Iraqi perspectives on nuclear deterrence -- Contrasting western academic frameworks -- What is nuclear deterrence : the Iraqi view -- Would deterrence of Saddam have worked? -- Saddam's brinksmanship -- Deterring the United States -- Saddam's attempts at deterrence -- A more aggressive Iraqi perspective : "offensive deterrence" -- Offensive deterrence and changing the status quo -- Wielding political clout through offensive deterrence -- Changing the balance of power -- The potential impact of aggressive deterrence -- Nuclear weapons as a warfighting tool -- The linkage between deterrence and warfighting -- Iraq's concept of nuclear war -- Iraq doctrine -- Doomsday weapons or warfighting tool? -- Saddam's mirror imaging of adversaries -- The combat use of nuclear weapons : how likely? -- Saddam as decision maker -- Saddam's calculus -- The size of the arsenal : how much is enough? -- Goals and possibilities -- Numerical parity does not matter : Iraq's assessment of other cases -- Delivery and credibility -- A maturing of Iraq's perspective? -- Maturation and the superpowers -- Iraqi thinking : a different trajectory? Preparing to be a nuclear power -- Waiting for nuclear weapons : Iraq's window of vulnerability -- Creating a nuclear-free zone -- Interim WMD : binary chemical weapons -- No substitute for nuclear weapons -- Would Saddam have revived the nuclear program? -- Conclusions. Avoiding mirror-imaging : leadership matters -- Nuclear deterrence may be uncertain and unstable -- Nuclear warfighting may be an option --Even smaller nuclear arsenals can be destabilizing -- Modifying the threat environment can help
Beschreibung:	x, 89 p. map 23 cm