Advances in financial economics, Vol. 15:
Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Bingley, U.K. Emerald 2012
Schriftenreihe:Advances in financial economics volume 15
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Beschreibung:Includes bibliographical references
SPAC performance, ownership and corporate governance / John S. Howe and Scott W. O'Brien -- Limits on convergence in international corporate governance practices / David Javakhadze, Stephen P. Ferris, Gregory Noronha -- Firm-specific factors affecting the private benefits of control in concentrated ownership economies / Ronen Barak, Beni Lauterbach -- The joint discipline of option and debt : theory and evidence from CEO's equity holding, capital structure, and executive compensation / Gang 'Nathan' Dong -- The effects of R&D expenditures on bondholders / Zhan Jiang, Kenneth A. Kim, Carl Hsin-Han Shen -- Short- and long-term share price reaction to announcements of financial restatements / Vijay Gondhalekar, Mahendra Joshi, Marie McKendall -- Government ownership, competition, and the risk-taking attitude of the GCC banking system / Ritab Al-Khouri -- CEO compensation, expropriation, and the balance of power among large shareholders / Yongli Luo, Dave O. Jackson
This volume contains eight empirical papers that examine corporate governance from a number of different perspectives. Howe et al investigate how governance can influence short- and long-term performance in the case of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies; Javakhadze et al analyze limits to convergence in international corporate governance practices; Barak and Lauterbach focus on the private benefits of control; and Dong examines the relation between the discipline of options and corporate debt and the design of executive compensation. Jiang et al measure the effect of R&D expenditures on bondholders; Gondhalekar et al examine the capital market response to financial restatements; Al-Khouri reports robust evidence that privately owned banks are more risky than government-owned banks; and Luo and Jackson conclude that the positive relationship between tunneling and executive compensation implies personal benefits for controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (viii, 238 p.)
ISBN:9781780527895
1780527896

Es ist kein Print-Exemplar vorhanden.

Fernleihe Bestellen Achtung: Nicht im THWS-Bestand! Volltext öffnen