Corporate law and economic stagnation: how shareholder value and short-termism contribute to the decline of the Western economies
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
<<The>> Hague
Eleven International Publ.
2013
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Dovenschmidt monographs
1 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XXI, 342 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9789490947828 9490947822 9789460947070 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV040978326 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20130910 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 130502s2013 d||| m||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9789490947828 |9 978-94-90947-82-8 | ||
| 020 | |a 9490947822 |9 94-90947-82-2 | ||
| 020 | |a 9789460947070 |c EBook |9 978-94-6094-707-0 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV040978326 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-M382 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Masouros, Pavlos E. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1033668419 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Corporate law and economic stagnation |b how shareholder value and short-termism contribute to the decline of the Western economies |c Pavlos E. Masouros |
| 264 | 1 | |a <<The>> Hague |b Eleven International Publ. |c 2013 | |
| 300 | |a XXI, 342 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Dovenschmidt monographs |v 1 | |
| 502 | |a Zugl.: Leiden, Univ. Diss., 2012 | ||
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Unternehmensrecht |0 (DE-588)4078611-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Corporate Governance |0 (DE-588)4419850-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Gesellschaftsrecht |0 (DE-588)4020646-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 655 | 7 | |0 (DE-588)4113937-9 |a Hochschulschrift |2 gnd-content | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Unternehmensrecht |0 (DE-588)4078611-0 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Gesellschaftsrecht |0 (DE-588)4020646-4 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Corporate Governance |0 (DE-588)4419850-4 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Dovenschmidt monographs |v 1 |w (DE-604)BV041263992 |9 1 | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m SWB Datenaustausch |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025956377&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025956377 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804150296099684352 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | IMAGE 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE XXI
INTRODUCTION 1
1 UNDERSTANDING THE STRUCTURAL PATHOLOGIES OF THE CURRENT MODEL OF
CAPITALISM 1
2 SHOULD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BE FIXED IN THE POST-2008 WORLD? 3 3
OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH 6
3.1 OUTLINE OF CHAPTER 1: THE GREAT REVERSAL IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
THE GREAT REVERSAL IN SHAREHOLDERSHIP 6
3.2 OUTLINE OF CHAPTER 2: THE POST-KEYNESIAN THEORY OF THE FIRM 8 3.3
OUTLINE OF CHAPTER 3: CORPORATE LAW AND THE GREAT REVERSAL IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 9
3.4 OUTLINE OF CHAPTER 4: CORPORATE LAW AND THE GREAT REVERSAL IN
SHAREHOLDERSHIP 11
3.5 OUTLINE OF CHAPTER 5: THE PATH TOWARDS LONG GOVERNANCE 12
4 EMBEDDING THE RESEARCH IN THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LITERATURE 13 4.1
AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LITERATURE 13 4.2
THE RESEARCH S NOVELTIES IN RELATION TO THE EXISTING COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LITERATURE 17
4.2.1 AN ADDITIONAL POINT OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN OUTSIDER AND INSIDER
SYSTEMS 17 4.2.2 NOMINAL DIVERGENCE, BUT FUNCTIONAL AND FORMAL
CONVERGENCE BETWEEN INSIDER AND OUTSIDER SYSTEMS 20
4.2.3 EQUITY S NEW ROLE IN THE FINANCE-DOMINATED MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT 24
4.2.4 CORPORATE LAW S NEW DESIDERATUM AND EQUITY S SHARE OF BLAME IN THE
CRISIS 27
4.2A.I CAN CORPORATE LAW RESTORE TRUST IN THE ECONOMY? 27
4.2.4.2 DOES FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH OR INCREASE
MACROECONOMIC FRAGILITY? 31
1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY- HOW CHANGES
IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ORDER BROUGHT ABOUT THE GREAT REVERSAL IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE GREAT REVERSAL IN SHAREHOLDERSHIP 35
1.1 THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTRUCTURE OF THE GOLDEN AGE OF CAPITALISM:
KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 36
IMAGE 2
CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION
1.1.1 THE KEYNESIAN THEORY ON UNCERTAINTY AND THE NOTION OF CONFIDENTIAL
CRISIS 37
1.1.2 THE LIQUIDITY TRAP 39
1.1.3 KEYNESIAN RSCALISM 42
1.2 THE MACROECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE GOLDEN AGE: THE BRETTON WOODS
SYSTEM 44 1.2.1 A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENT 44
1.2.1.1 THE BITTER EXPERIENCE OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 44
1.2.1.2 EXCHANGE RATE STABILITY: PEGGING NATIONAL CURRENCIES TO THE US
DOLLAR 46 1.2.1.2.1 HOW WAS EXCHANGE RATE MANAGEMENT EFFECTUATED BY
STATES? 47
1.2.1.2.2 THE ROLE OF MONETARY POLICY IN THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM 47
1.2.2 THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM AND THE RESTRICTIONS ON CAPITAL MOVEMENT
48
1.2.2.1 THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE BEHIND CAPITAL CONTROLS: THE
IRRECONCILABLE TRINITY OF THE MUNDELL-FLEMING MODEL 48
1.2.2.2 THE MECHANICS OF CAPITAL CONTROLS 51
1.2.2.2.1 CURRENT AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT 51
1.2.2.2.2 THE EXAMPLE OF US CAPITAL CONTROLS 53
1.3 THE DECONSTRUCTION OF THE GOLDEN AGE: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BRETTON
WOODS SYSTEM 55
1.3.1 THE DEUTSCHE MARK FLOATING AND THE NIXON SHOCK : THE FULFILLMENT
OF THE TRIFFIN DILEMMA PROPHECY 55
1.3.2 THE CAUSALITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEMISE OF BRETTON WOODS
AND THE OIL SHOCKS OF THE 1970S 57
1.3.2.1 THE SMITHSONIAN AGREEMENT, THE SNAKE AND THE DIRTY FLOAT 57
1.3.2.2 INTERNATIONAL RESERVES ACCUMULATION, OIL PRICE SHOCKS, INFLATION
AND CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS 59
1.3.3 FINANCING THE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS: PETRODOLLAR RECYCLING AND
CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION 60
1.4 THE MACROECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE POST-BRETTON WOODS WORLD 62
1.4.1 THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION MOVEMENT 62
1.4.1.1 THE DEMISE OF CAPITAL CONTROLS IN THE US 63
1.4.1.2 THE DEMISE OF CAPITAL CONTROLS IN THE UK 63
1.4.1.3 THE DEMISE OF CAPITAL CONTROLS IN GERMANY 65
1.4.1.4 THE DEMISE OF CAPITAL CONTROLS IN FRANCE 67
1.4.2 THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION AND THE ERGA OMNES FREE MOVEMENT OF
CAPITAL 73
1.4.2.1 THE EMU AS A RESPONSE TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE BRETTON WOODS
SYSTEM 73 1.4.2.2 THE OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY AS THE INTELLECTUAL
FOUNDATION OF THE EMU-RELATED LIBERALIZATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 76
IMAGE 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.4.2.3 WHY LIBERALIZE CAPITAL MOVEMENTS ERGA OMNES? 79
1.4.3 THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION FOR SIPHONING CAPITAL TO
NATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 80
1.4.3.1 US S MAY DAY (AND THE ERISA PENSION REFORM) 81
1.4.3.2 UK S BIG BANG 83
1.4.3.3 THE FRENCH SMALL BANG 84
1.5 THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTRUCTURE OF THE POST-BRETTON WOODS WORLD:
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS 87
1.5.1 THE ANTIDOTE TO THE GREAT STAGFLATION: MONETARISM 88
1.5.2 THE RISE OF NEW CLASSICAL MACROECONOMICS 89
1.5.3 THE BASIC TENETS OF THE NEOCLASSICAL ORTHODOXY 90
1.5.4 NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS AND THE DEREGULATION MOVEMENT 91 1.5.5 A
CASE STUDY ON DEREGULATION: THE US BANKING REGULATION 93 1.5.5.1 MAKING
THE ASSET SIDE OF BANKS BALANCE SHEET RISKIER 94
1.5.5.2 OVERTURNING THE DIVORCE BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT
BANKING 95 1.6 THE SHIFT IN THE INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN THE POST-BRETTON WOODS WORLD 99
1.6.1 THE CHANDLERIAN CORPORATION OF THE GOLDEN AGE: RETAIN AND
INVEST 100 1.6.2 THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE IDEOLOGY: DOWNSIZE AND
DISTRIBUTE 101 1.6.2.1 THE DEPARTURE FROM THE NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF
THE FIRM AND THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS APPROACH 101
1.6.2.2 THE AGENCY THEORY 104
1.6.2.3 THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE S HANDMAIDENS: US MANUFACTURING SECTOR S
REDUCED COMPETITIVENESS, THE ANTITRUST LAW-TRIGGERED LBO BOOM OF THE
1980S, US INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN EUROPE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
107
1.7 BACKING THE FIRST HYPOTHESIS: ARE THERE INDICATIONS THAT THE
POST-BRETTON WOODS ECONOMIC STAGNATION IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE GREAT
REVERSAL IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE GREAT REVERSAL IN
SHAREHOLDERSHIP? 113
1.7.1 THE POST-BRETTON WOODS ECONOMIC STAGNATION 113
1.7.2 THE POST-BRETTON WOODS SLOWDOWN IN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 115 1.7.3
THE REDUCING RETENTION RATIO OF CORPORATIONS IN THE POST-BRETTON WOODS
ERA 119
1.7.4 DOWNSIZE AND DISTRIBUTE IN ACTION: THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE
PAYOUT POLICY IN THE POST-BRETTON WOODS ERA 120
1.7.4.1 THE INCREASING EQUITY PAYOUT RATIO OF CAPITAL-INTENSIVE FIRMS
120
IMAGE 4
CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION
1.7.4.2 THE CATERING THEORY OF DIVIDENDS AS AN INDICATION OF THE
CAUSALITY LINK
BETWEEN THE GREAT REVERSAL IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE INCREASED
EQUITY PAYOUT RATIOS 123
1.7.5 THE GREAT REVERSAL IN SHAREHOLDERSHIP I: EQUITY S REDUCED
CONTRIBUTION TO FINANCING CAPITAL FORMATION 126
1.7.5.1 INDICATIONS OF A CAUSALITY LINK BETWEEN SHORT-TERM
SHAREHOLDERSHIP AND LOW RETENTION RATIOS 127
1.7.5.2 EQUITY AS A NEGATIVE NET SOURCE OF CAPITAL: A PROXY FOR
SHORT-TERMISM 128 1.7.6 THE GREAT REVERSAL IN SHAREHOLDERSHIP II: THE
REDUCTION IN THE AVERAGE HOLDING PERIOD OF STOCK 131
1.7.7 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE FIRST HYPOTHESIS: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
FOR THE POST-BRETTON WOODS ECONOMIC STAGNATION 133
2 MODELING SHORT-TERM SHAREHOLDERSHIP S NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE DYNAMICS
OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION-THE POST-KEYNESIAN THEORY OF THE FIRM 137
2.1 THE POST-KEYNESIAN FIRM S OBJECTIVE: POWER AND GROWTH 138
2.2 THE ROLE OF PROFITS IN THE POST-KEYNESIAN THEORY OF THE FIRM 140
2.3 THE GROWTH-PROFIT TRADEOFF IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 142
2.3.1 THE FINANCE CONSTRAINT OF THE CORPORATE ACCUMULATION PROCESS 142
2.3.2 THE EXPANSION FRONTIER 146
2.3.3 INTEGRATING THE PARAMETER OF SHAREHOLDERSHIPS SHORT-TERMISM IN THE
POST-KEYNESIAN THEORY OF THE FIRM 148
3 CORPORATE LAW S CONTRIBUTION TO THE GREAT REVERSAL IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 151
3.1 THE ART OF QUANTIFYING CORPORATE LAW 153
3.1.1 THE LLSV INDEX 153
3.1.2 ALTERNATIVE SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION INDICES: THE LELE/SIEMS INDEX
154 3.1.3 CONSTRUCTING THE POST-BRETTON WOODS SHAREHOLDER VALUE INDEX
155 3.1.3.1 THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE POST-BRETTON WOODS SHAREHOLDER
VALUE INDEX WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF COMPARATIVE LAW 155
3.1.3.1.1 DESIGNING A LEGAL TREND LINE 156
3.1.3.1.2 A COMPLEMENT TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS 156
3.1.3.1.3 CONCRETE CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF THE POINTS OF
COMPARISON: CORPORATE RULES THAT MINIMIZE RESIDUAL LOSS AND CORPORATE
RULES USED BY SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISTS 156
3.1.3.2 THE MECHANICS OF THE POST-BRETTON WOODS SHAREHOLDER VALUE
(PBWSV) INDEX 158
IMAGE 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3.1.3.2.1 SOURCES OF CORPORATE LAW 158
3.1.3.2.2 MANDATORY AND DEFAULT RULES 159
3.1.3.2.3 RATING 160
3.2 THE POST-BRETTON WOODS SHAREHOLDER VALUE INDEX 161
3.2.1 THE RIGHT TO PUT ITEMS ON THE AGENDA OF THE SHAREHOLDERS MEETING
161 3.2.1.1 REASONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE INDEX 161
3.2.1.2 VARIABLES (I)-(III): PERCENTAGE REQUIRED TO PUT ITEMS ON THE
AGENDA, INCLUDABLE ITEMS AND PROXY SOLICITATIONS COSTS ALLOCATION 163
3.2.1.3 SCORE EXPLANATIONS FOR VARIABLES (I) TO (III) 164
3.2.1.3.1 FRANCE 164
3.2.1.3.2 GERMANY 165
3.2.1.3.3 THE NETHERLANDS 165
3.2.1.3.4 UNITED KINGDOM 167
3.2.1.3.5 UNITED STATES 167
3.2.2 THE RIGHT TO CALL AN EXTRAORDINARY MEETING 168
3.2.2.1 REASONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE INDEX 168
3.2.2.2 VARIABLES (IV) AND (V): PERCENTAGE REQUIRED TO CALL AN EGM AND
THE INTERFERENCE OF THE COURT IN THE CONVOCATION OF AN EGM 169
3.2.2.3 SCORE EXPLANATIONS FOR VARIABLES (IV) AND (V) 170
3.2.2.3.1 FRANCE 170
3.2.2.3.2 GERMANY 170
3.2.2.3.3 THE NETHERLANDS 171
3.2.2.3.4 UNITED KINGDOM 171
3.2.2.3.5 UNITED STATES 171
3.2.3 RIGHT TO COORDINATE WITH OTHER SHAREHOLDERS 171
3.2.3.1 REASONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE INDEX 171
3.2.3.2 VARIABLES (VI) AND (VII): THE IDENTIFICATION RIGHT, ACTING IN
CONCERT AND PROXY SOLICITATION RULES 173
3.2.3.3 SCORE EXPLANATIONS FOR VARIABLES (VI) AND (VII) 173
3.2.3.3.1 FRANCE 174
3.2.3.3.2 GERMANY 175
3.2.3.3.3 THE NETHERLANDS 176
3.2.3.3.4 UNITED KINGDOM 176
3.2.3.3.5 UNITED STATES 177
3.2.4 SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 178
3.2.4.1 REASONS FOR (AND SCOPE OF) INCLUSION IN THE INDEX 178
IMAGE 6
CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION
3.2.4.2 VARIABLES (VIII) TO (XIV): NULLIFICATION LAWSUITS, PRE-SUIT
SPECIAL AUDIT,
PRE-SUIT SCREENING DEVICES, STANDING REQUIREMENTS, ALLOCATION OF COSTS,
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR DUTY OF CARE AND DUTY OF LOYALTY 180
3.2.4.3 SCORE EXPLANATIONS FOR VARIABLES (VIII) TO (XIV) 184
3.2.4.3.1 FRANCE 184
3.2.4.3.2 GERMANY 186
3.2.4.3.3 THE NETHERLANDS 188
3.2.4.3.4 UNITED KINGDOM 190
3.2.4.3.5 UNITED STATES 193
3.2.5 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 195
3.2.5.1 REASONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE INDEX 195
3.2.5.2 VARIABLES (XV)-(XVI): STOCK OPTIONS & SAY ON PAY 198
3.2.5.3 SCORE EXPLANATION FOR VARIABLES (XV)-(XVI) 199
3.2.5.3.1 FRANCE 199
3.2.5.3.2 GERMANY 199
3.2.5.3.3 THE NETHERLANDS 200
3.2.5.3.4 UNITED KINGDOM 201
3.2.5.3.5 UNITED STATES 201
3.2.6 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 202
3.2.6.1 REASONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE INDEX 202
3.2.6.2 VARIABLE (XVII): INDEPENDENT BOARD MEMBERS 205
3.2.6.3 SCORE EXPLANATIONS FOR VARIABLE (XVII) 205
3.2.6.3.1 FRANCE 205
3.2.6.3.2 GERMANY 206
3.2.6.3.3 THE NETHERLANDS 207
3.2.6.3.4 UNITED KINGDOM 207
3.2.6.3.5 UNITED STATES 208
3.2.7 TAKEOVER REGULATION 208
3.2.7.1 REASONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE INDEX 208
3.2.7.2 VARIABLE (XVIII): THE BOARD NEUTRALITY RULE 211
3.2.7.3 SCORE EXPLANATIONS FOR VARIABLE (XVIII) 211
3.2.7.3.1 FRANCE 211
3.2.7.3.2 GERMANY 212
3.2.7.3.3 THE NETHERLANDS 212
3.2.7.3.4 UNITED KINGDOM 213
3.2.7.3.5 UNITED STATES 214
3.3 ILLUSTRATING CORPORATE LAW S ORIENTATION TOWARDS SHAREHOLDER VALUE
IN THE
POST-BRETTON WOODS PERIOD 215
IMAGE 7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4 CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDER EUGENICS-HOW CORPORATE LAW
SUSTAINS THE GREAT REVERSAL IN SHAREHOLDERSHIP 223
4.1 NON-CORPORATE LAW LEGAL CONSTRAINTS TO LONG-TERM INVESTING: INFUSING
PENSION FUNDS AND INSURANCE FIRMS WITH MYOPIA THROUGH FINANCIAL
REGULATION AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 224
4.1.1 MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING AND PENSION FUNDS 226
4.1.2 THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE IN PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT 228 4.1.3
SOLVENCY IF AND LIFE INSURERS 232
4.2 LONG-TERM INVESTORS AND RISK APPETITE: THE LOST OPPORTUNITY OF US
CORPORATE LAW TO INTRODUCE EFFECTIVE CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT 233 4.2.1
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT AND LONG-TERM
INVESTING 233
4.2.2 CORPORATE LAW AS A RISK-SEEKING LEGAL FIELD 234
4.2.3 RISK MANAGEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO CORPORATE SCANDALS 236
4.2.4 THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 237
4.3 MORE FOOD FOR SHORT-TERMIST SHAREHOLDERS: THE FACILITATION OF SHARE
REPURCHASES 244
4.3.1 SHARE REPURCHASES MECHANICS AND THE INCENTIVES THEY CREATE 245
4.3.2 WHY SHORT-TERMISTS PREFER FIRMS THAT PAY WITH STOCK BUYBACKS 247
4.3.3 WHY LONG-TERMIST SHAREHOLDERS PREFER DIVIDEND-PAYING STOCK 248
4.3.4 THE CORPORATE LAW-PROPELLED INCREASE OF EQUITY REPURCHASES 249 4.4
CORPORATE LAW AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE INTRODUCTION OF LOYALTY
STRUCTURES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 253
4.4.1 TIME-PHASED VOTING RIGHTS: HOW THEY MIGHT STUMBLE UPON THE FREE
MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AND THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE 255
4.4.1.1 HOW DOES THE MECHANISM OF TIME-PHASED VOTING RIGHTS WORK: THE
EXAMPLE OF FRENCH DOUBLE VOTING RIGHTS 256
4.4.1.2 THE FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AS A POTENTIAL REPELLENT TO THE
INTRODUCTION OF TIME-PHASED VOTING RIGHTS 257
4.4.1.3 THE MANDATORY BID RULE AS A POTENTIAL REPELLENT TO THE
INTRODUCTION OF TIME-PHASED VOTING RIGHTS 262
4.4.2 LOYALTY DIVIDENDS: HOW THEY MIGHT STUMBLE UPON THE PRINCIPLE OF
EQUAL TREATMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS 263
4.4.2.1 THE MECHANICS OF A LOYALTY DIVIDEND PLAN: THE EXAMPLE OF
KONINKLIJKE DSM N.V. 263
4.4.2.2 THE LOYALTY DIVIDEND AND ITS POTENTIAL CLASH WITH THE PRINCIPLE
OF EQUAL TREATMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS 265
IMAGE 8
CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION
5 THE PATH TOWARDS LONG GOVERNANCE 271
5.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE/STAKEHOLDER VALUE DICHOTOMY 272
5.2 AN EMERGING THIRD WAY : LONG GOVERNANCE 274
5.2.1 LONG GOVERNANCE AS MANAGEMENT THEORY 275
5.2.2 LONG GOVERNANCE AS A LEGAL CONCEPT 276
5.2.2.1 A DUTY TO WHOM? 277
5.2.2.2 LONG GOVERNANCE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS INSIDE THE
CORPORATION 280 5.3 A PRIMER ON LONG GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 281
5.3.1 THE THIRD HYPOTHESIS AS A BLUEPRINT FOR LONG GOVERNANCES
REGULATORY AGENDA 282
5.3.2 TAX REGULATION AND LONG GOVERNANCE 283
5.3.3 THE L-SHARE 284
REFERENCES 287
INDEX 329
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Masouros, Pavlos E. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1033668419 |
| author_facet | Masouros, Pavlos E. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Masouros, Pavlos E. |
| author_variant | p e m pe pem |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV040978326 |
| ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV040978326 |
| format | Thesis Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01791nam a2200409 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV040978326</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20130910 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">130502s2013 d||| m||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9789490947828</subfield><subfield code="9">978-94-90947-82-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9490947822</subfield><subfield code="9">94-90947-82-2</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9789460947070</subfield><subfield code="c">EBook</subfield><subfield code="9">978-94-6094-707-0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV040978326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-M382</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Masouros, Pavlos E.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1033668419</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Corporate law and economic stagnation</subfield><subfield code="b">how shareholder value and short-termism contribute to the decline of the Western economies</subfield><subfield code="c">Pavlos E. Masouros</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a"><<The>> Hague</subfield><subfield code="b">Eleven International Publ.</subfield><subfield code="c">2013</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XXI, 342 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Dovenschmidt monographs</subfield><subfield code="v">1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="502" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zugl.: Leiden, Univ. Diss., 2012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Unternehmensrecht</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078611-0</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Corporate Governance</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4419850-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Gesellschaftsrecht</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4020646-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4113937-9</subfield><subfield code="a">Hochschulschrift</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd-content</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Unternehmensrecht</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078611-0</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Gesellschaftsrecht</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4020646-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Corporate Governance</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4419850-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Dovenschmidt monographs</subfield><subfield code="v">1</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV041263992</subfield><subfield code="9">1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">SWB Datenaustausch</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025956377&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025956377</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| genre | (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Hochschulschrift |
| id | DE-604.BV040978326 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:36:40Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789490947828 9490947822 9789460947070 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025956377 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-M382 |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 |
| physical | XXI, 342 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publishDateSearch | 2013 |
| publishDateSort | 2013 |
| publisher | Eleven International Publ. |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Dovenschmidt monographs |
| series2 | Dovenschmidt monographs |
| spelling | Masouros, Pavlos E. Verfasser (DE-588)1033668419 aut Corporate law and economic stagnation how shareholder value and short-termism contribute to the decline of the Western economies Pavlos E. Masouros <<The>> Hague Eleven International Publ. 2013 XXI, 342 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Dovenschmidt monographs 1 Zugl.: Leiden, Univ. Diss., 2012 Unternehmensrecht (DE-588)4078611-0 gnd rswk-swf Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd rswk-swf Gesellschaftsrecht (DE-588)4020646-4 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Unternehmensrecht (DE-588)4078611-0 s Gesellschaftsrecht (DE-588)4020646-4 s Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 s DE-604 Dovenschmidt monographs 1 (DE-604)BV041263992 1 SWB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025956377&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Masouros, Pavlos E. Corporate law and economic stagnation how shareholder value and short-termism contribute to the decline of the Western economies Dovenschmidt monographs Unternehmensrecht (DE-588)4078611-0 gnd Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd Gesellschaftsrecht (DE-588)4020646-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4078611-0 (DE-588)4419850-4 (DE-588)4020646-4 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Corporate law and economic stagnation how shareholder value and short-termism contribute to the decline of the Western economies |
| title_auth | Corporate law and economic stagnation how shareholder value and short-termism contribute to the decline of the Western economies |
| title_exact_search | Corporate law and economic stagnation how shareholder value and short-termism contribute to the decline of the Western economies |
| title_full | Corporate law and economic stagnation how shareholder value and short-termism contribute to the decline of the Western economies Pavlos E. Masouros |
| title_fullStr | Corporate law and economic stagnation how shareholder value and short-termism contribute to the decline of the Western economies Pavlos E. Masouros |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corporate law and economic stagnation how shareholder value and short-termism contribute to the decline of the Western economies Pavlos E. Masouros |
| title_short | Corporate law and economic stagnation |
| title_sort | corporate law and economic stagnation how shareholder value and short termism contribute to the decline of the western economies |
| title_sub | how shareholder value and short-termism contribute to the decline of the Western economies |
| topic | Unternehmensrecht (DE-588)4078611-0 gnd Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd Gesellschaftsrecht (DE-588)4020646-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Unternehmensrecht Corporate Governance Gesellschaftsrecht Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025956377&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV041263992 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT masourospavlose corporatelawandeconomicstagnationhowshareholdervalueandshorttermismcontributetothedeclineofthewesterneconomies |