Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies:
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2011
|
| Schriftenreihe: | NBER working paper series
16899 |
| Online-Zugang: | http://www.nber.org/papers/w16899 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/9/2011. Includes bibliographical references -- "We analyze contagious sovereign debt crises in financially integrated economies. Under financial integration banks optimally diversify their holdings of sovereign debt in an effort to minimize the costs with respect to an individual country's sovereign debt default. While diversification generates risk diversification benefits ex ante, it also generates contagion ex post. We show that financial integration without fiscal integration results in an inefficient equilibrium supply of government debt. The safest governments inefficiently restrict the amount of high quality debt that could be used as collateral in the financial system and the riskiest governments issue too much debt, as they do not take account of the costs of contagion. Those inefficiencies can be removed by various forms of fiscal integration, but fiscal integration typically reduce the welfare of the country that provides the "safe-haven" asset below the autarky level"--Nati |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
| Format: | System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Mode of access: World Wide Web. |
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| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references -- "We analyze contagious sovereign debt crises in financially integrated economies. Under financial integration banks optimally diversify their holdings of sovereign debt in an effort to minimize the costs with respect to an individual country's sovereign debt default. While diversification generates risk diversification benefits ex ante, it also generates contagion ex post. We show that financial integration without fiscal integration results in an inefficient equilibrium supply of government debt. The safest governments inefficiently restrict the amount of high quality debt that could be used as collateral in the financial system and the riskiest governments issue too much debt, as they do not take account of the costs of contagion. Those inefficiencies can be removed by various forms of fiscal integration, but fiscal integration typically reduce the welfare of the country that provides the "safe-haven" asset below the autarky level"--Nati | ||
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:36:39Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| publishDate | 2011 |
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| spelling | Bolton, Patrick 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)128734906 aut Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies Patrick Bolton; Olivier Jeanne Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2011 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier NBER working paper series 16899 Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/9/2011. Includes bibliographical references -- "We analyze contagious sovereign debt crises in financially integrated economies. Under financial integration banks optimally diversify their holdings of sovereign debt in an effort to minimize the costs with respect to an individual country's sovereign debt default. While diversification generates risk diversification benefits ex ante, it also generates contagion ex post. We show that financial integration without fiscal integration results in an inefficient equilibrium supply of government debt. The safest governments inefficiently restrict the amount of high quality debt that could be used as collateral in the financial system and the riskiest governments issue too much debt, as they do not take account of the costs of contagion. Those inefficiencies can be removed by various forms of fiscal integration, but fiscal integration typically reduce the welfare of the country that provides the "safe-haven" asset below the autarky level"--Nati System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Mode of access: World Wide Web. Jeanne, Olivier Verfasser (DE-588)113083440 aut NBER working paper series 16899 (DE-604)BV002801238 16899 http://www.nber.org/papers/w16899 http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2010/arc/pdf/boj.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bolton, Patrick 1957- Jeanne, Olivier Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies NBER working paper series |
| title | Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies |
| title_auth | Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies |
| title_exact_search | Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies |
| title_full | Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies Patrick Bolton; Olivier Jeanne |
| title_fullStr | Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies Patrick Bolton; Olivier Jeanne |
| title_full_unstemmed | Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies Patrick Bolton; Olivier Jeanne |
| title_short | Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies |
| title_sort | sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies |
| url | http://www.nber.org/papers/w16899 http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2010/arc/pdf/boj.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT boltonpatrick sovereigndefaultriskandbankfragilityinfinanciallyintegratedeconomies AT jeanneolivier sovereigndefaultriskandbankfragilityinfinanciallyintegratedeconomies |