Stany Zjednoczone i Polska 1939 - 1945:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Polish |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Warszawa
Wydawnictwo Neriton
2013
|
| Ausgabe: | Wyd. 1. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The United States and Poland, 1939 - 1945 |
| Beschreibung: | 502 s. 24 cm. |
| ISBN: | 9788375432497 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804150252857458688 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Spis
tresei
Wstęp
CZĘŚĆ I
Stany Zjednoczone na przełomie wydarzeń.
Problematyka polska w polityce amerykańskiej
(wrzesień
1
939-grudzień
1941
roku)
Rozdział I: Ostatni rok drugiej kadencji prezydenta
Franklina D.
Roosevelta.
Problematyka polska w Stanach Zjednoczonych
(wrzesień
1
939-listopad
1940
roku)
..................
u
1.
Wybuch wojny w Europie. Problemy i wyzwania amerykańskiej polityki
wewnętrznej i zagranicznej. Przypadek Polski
.................. 11
2.
Definicja celów prezydenta
Roosevelta.
Nowa kadencja prezydencka i pod¬
ważenie sojuszu sowiecko-niemieckiego
..................... 19
3.
Walka
Roosevelta o
realizację wytyczonych celów. Problematyka polska w
polityce amerykańskiej (styczeń-lipiec
1940
roku)
............... 26
4.
Ostatni wysiłek. Ku porozumieniu z ZSRR i zwycięstwu wyborczemu (sier-
pień-listopad
1940
roku)
..............................
49
Rozdział
II:
Bilans zysków i strat porozumienia z ZSRR i polski test
rosyjskiej polityki Waszyngtonu (październik/listopad
1940-
-czerwiec
1941
roku)
.............................
63
1.
Prorosyjska ewolucja polityki Stanów Zjednoczonych i przypadek dr. Ludwika
Rajchmana
.....................................· ·
*>3
2.
Enigma
polityki sowieckiej. Sprawa pierwszej wizyty premiera Sikorskiego
w Stanach Zjednoczonych (styczeń-kwiecień
1941
roku)
.......· · · ·
82
3.
Pierwsza wizyta premiera Sikorskiego w Stanach Zjednoczonych (kwiecień
1941
roku)
......................................
92
4.
Ku rewizji sowieckiej polityki Stanów Zjednoczonych. Amerykańska pomoc
humanitarna testem polityki sowieckiej
......................
500
Spis treści
Rozdział III: Stany Zjednoczone i Polska wobec ataku Niemiec na
ZSRR. Przypadek zależności i współzależności (czerwiec-gru-
dzień
1941
roku)
................................ 102
1.
Atak Niemiec na ZSRR i rola Polski w polityce amerykańskiej
........ 102
2.
Pragmatyka
Roosevelta.
Misja Hopkinsa w Moskwie i Karta Atlantycka (sier¬
pień
1941
roku)
................................... 114
3.
Sprawa pomocy dla Rosji i trudności Polski w ZSRR. Misja
Beaverbrooka-
Harrimana i list Ciechanowskiego (wrzesień-październik
1941
roku)
.... 117
4.
Usankcjonowanie pomocy dla ZSRR i kulisy przychylności amerykańskiej dla
Polski. Sprawa wizyty premiera Sikorskiego w ZSRR (listopad-grudzień
1941
roku)
.......................................... 129
5.
Ochronny parasol amerykański i wizyta premiera Sikorskiego w ZSRR (gru¬
dzień
1941
roku)
................................... 147
CZĘŚĆ
II
Stany Zjednoczone w
II
wojnie światowej
i problematyka polska
(7
grudnia
1941-2
sierpnia
1945
roku)
Rozdział I: Meandry polityki prezydenta
Roosevelta i
konsekwencje
dla Polski (grudzień
1941
-grudzień
1942/
styczeń
1943
roku)
143
1.
Stany Zjednoczone między ideami Karty Atlantyckiej i żądaniami Moskwy.
Sprawa podpisania paktu brytyjsko-sowieckiego i kwestia polskiej granicy
wschodniej (grudzień
1941/
styczeń-marzec
1942
r.)
.............. 143
2.
Fortel
Roosevelta
i druga wizyta premiera Sikorskiego w Waszyngtonie
(marzec-kwiecień
1942
roku)
........................... 153
3.
Próba realizacji planów militarnych z udziałem polskim i zwrot
Roosevelta
ku zagadnieniom przyszłościowym. Sprawa zaginionych oficerów polskich
. 160
4.
Zagrożenia dla współpracy amerykańsko-sowieckiej i sprawa zaginionych
oficerów. Fikcja interwencji w Moskwie
-
misja Harrimana i Willkiego (czer-
wiec-październik
1942
roku)
............................ 166
5.
Plany przyszłościowe i przeszkody wewnętrzne. Wystąpienia Polonii i sprawa
wizyty premiera Sikorskiego w Stanach Zjednoczonych (listopad-grudzień
1942
roku)
.... !................................. 175
6.
Trzecia wizyta premiera Sikorskiego w Stanach Zjednoczonych (grudzień
1942-styczeń
1943
roku)
.............................. 184
Rozdział
II:
Klęska polityki porozumienia ze Stalinem. Problematyka
polska w amerykańskiej polityce zagranicznej i wewnętrznej
(styczeń-czerwiec
1943
roku)
....................... 193
1.
Sprawa współpracy z ZSRR i kwestia polskiej granicy wschodniej
...... 193
2.
Konflikt polsko-sowiecki jako problem w amerykańskiej polityce wewnętrznej
i zagranicznej
..................................... 204
3.
Ku porozumieniu z ZSRR. Nadzieje, przeszkody i klęska
........... 209
Spis treści
501
Rozdział III: Przełom w stosunkach amerykańsko-sowieckich i degra¬
dacja sprawy polskiej (lipiec-grudzier)
1943
roku)
........ 223
1.
Wątpliwości i przełom w stosunkach amerykańsko-sowieckich. Sprawa zagi¬
nionego dokumentu (lipiec-sierpień
1943
roku)
................ 223
2.
W przededniu konferencji w Moskwie. Budowa porozumienia z Moskwą
i eliminacja sprawy polskiej (wrzesień-październik
1943
roku)
........ 234
3.
Szczyt ministrów spraw zagranicznych w Moskwie. Pakt czterech i dalsza
degradacja sprawy polskiej (październik
1943
roku)
.............. 240
4.
Ocena sytuacji Polski i „front polski przeciwko ustaleniom konferencji
w Moskwie. Reakcja
Roosevelta
.......................... 245
5.
Konferencja w Kairze i szczyt w Teheranie (listopad-grudzień
1943
roku)
. 250
Rozdział
IV:
Stany Zjednoczone między współpracą z Moskwą i opinią
publiczną. Wybór prezydenta i koszty Polski (styczeń-listopad
1944
roku)
..................................... 257
1.
Amerykańsko-sowiecka współpraca militarna i polityczna. Ograniczenia
wewnętrzne i zagrożenia zewnętrzne (styczeń-czerwiec
1944
roku)
..... 257
2.
Wizyta premiera Mikołajczyka w Waszyngtonie w czerwcu
1944
roku i kon¬
sekwencje odejścia Stanów Zjednoczonych od udziału w rekonstrukcji rządu
polskiego
....................................... 279
3.
Polityka amerykańska w uścisku między Związkiem Sowieckim a opinią
publiczną. Przypadek powstania warszawskiego (sierpień-październik
1944
roku)
.......................................... 291
4.
Lot
18
września. Geneza i konsekwencje. Niewykorzystana szansa modyfikacji
rosyjskiej polityki Stanów Zjednoczonych
.................... 300
5.
Cel prezydenta: zdobycie głosów polskich w wyborach oraz porozumienie ze
Stalinem (październik-listopad
1944
roku)
................... 309
Rozdział
V:
Stany Zjednoczone i problem polski w dobie Jałty (listo¬
pad 1944-luty
1945
roku)
......................... 322
1.
Sprawa polska jako problem amerykańskiej polityki wewnętrznej (listopad
1944-styczeń
1945
roku
............................... 322
2.
Konferencja w Jałcie
(4-Ю
luty
1945
roku). Powstanie nowej organizacji
międzynarodowej i ostateczne ustalenia dotyczące utworzenia nowego rządu
polskiego
....................................... 343
3.
Ocena i recepcja konferencji w Jałcie
.......................
363
Rozdział
VI:
Realizacja postanowień konferencji jałtańskiej. Sprawa
polska w polityce amerykańskiej (luty-czerwiec
1945
roku)
. 366
1.
Próba realizacji postanowień konferencji jałtańskiej i kryzys w stosunkach
amerykańsko-sowieckich (luty-kwiecień
1945
roku)
..............
366
2.
Sprawa utworzenia rządu polskiego a powołanie organizacji międzynarodo¬
wej. Pragmatyka Trumana (kwiecień-maj
1945
roku)
..........· · ·
377
3.
Ku porozumieniu ze Związkiem Sowieckim i misja
Harry ego
L.
Hopkinsa
w Moskwie (maj
1945
roku)
............................
391
502
Spis treści
4.
Ku konferencji Wielkiej Trójki. Powstanie Tymczasowego Rządu Jedności
Narodowej i utworzenie ONZ
(
czerwiec
1945
roku)
.............. 391
Rozdział
VII:
Konferencja w Poczdamie: Stany Zjednoczone wobec
wyborów Polsce i ustanowienia granicy zachodniej (lipiec-sier-
pień
1945
roku)
................................. 406
1.
Epilog Poczdamu
................................... 431
Zakończenie
............................. 446
The United States
and Poland,
1939-1945.
Conclusions .....
469
Bibliografia
............................. 478
Wykaz skrótów
........................... 487
Indeks osób
............................. 489
I
Йй /агЬг>Ка
The United States and Poland,
1939-1945
Conclusions
In
1939
the United States was a nation whose previous serious involvements beyond
its borders, with the exception of World War I, had been in its own hemisphere. Limited
interest in international affairs was the main source of the United States approach to
the war in Europe. German attack on Poland on September
1, 1939
from American
perspective was not a significant political event. The United States announced its posi¬
tion on the war in Europe on September 5th when Great Britain and France decided to
enter the war. When this information was confirmed and the war in Europe became
global conflict the United States declared neutrality. This decision was broadly accepted
by American public. Americans belived that neutrality would serve their country the
best. President Roosevelt
s
approach to the war in Europe was more complex. Although
he wished to keep America out of the war he opposed strict neutrality and supported
the revision of neutrality laws. The President promoted the repeal of arms embargo and
aiding European allies.
Roosevelt belived that the war in Europe-in fact the global conflict-should lead to
major changes in American foreign policy. Although the war in Europe was far away
from American shores, in September the United States for the first time in its almost
200-year history was not a safe place. The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact concluded on
August 23rd and the Soviet-Japanese truce signed on September 16th shaked traditional
American feeling of safety. As the result of new alliances on the Eurasian continent, the
United States faced a block of totalitarian states extending from the Rhine to the coast of
the Pacific. Partition of Poland by the Soviet Union and Germany in September was the
strong evidence how dangerous collaboration of Berlin and Moscow could be. American
policy makers understood that in new global situation the Soviet Union, Germany s politi¬
cal partner, would be the number one problem of the United States policy. President
Roosevelt and secretary of state
Cordel!
Hull shared certain hopes coming out of Soviet
status of non-belligerence. Americans hoped to weaken Moscow s ties with the Axis
powers or detach her from them completely. The United States governments basic rule
consequently applied to the Soviet Union was to avoid confrontation and-as secretary
Hull noted-not to push Moscow into the arms of Berlin. In the fall of
1939
the United
States decided to maintain cautious course toward the Soviet Union and looking forward
for contacts with the Soviet Union. This decision was justified since the Department of
470
Conclusions
State planned to get out American citizens from the Soviet Union. It was a part of broader
program designed for assistance and repatriation of American citizens from war areas
in Europe. Conversations and permanent meetings with Soviet officials gave Americans
the unique opportunity to keep an eye on Moscow s ambiguous policy.
Considering American problems involving national security the defeat of Poland,
a very distant country, seemed to be a marginal problem. In fact, the issue of Poland
was not so distant and unimportant as the Democratic administration tried to see it.
The defeat of Poland crushed by Germany and the Soviet Union shocked Americans.
Sympathy and admiration for the heroic fight of Poles was overwhelming. Americans
despite their attachment to the idea of isolation decided that the United States should
not refuse arms to European allies, Great Britain and France. The Presidents program
of arms repeal in Polish case found a strong argument. In September
1939
the defeat of
Poland became an important factor affecting the United States internal policy.
The United States, a power engaged but not participating in the war and Poland,
actively fighting and the first ally of Great Britain, shared the same approach to Germany.
However, American approach and the one represented by the Polish government in
London differed as far as the Soviet Union was concerned. Americans had important
reasons to exercise cautious policy constantly looking for an opportunity for contacts
with Moscow even at the cost of American prestige. It was the main reason of American
reactions to Soviet aggressions in Eastern Europe. After Moscow s aggression against
Finland in winter
1939/1940
the United States decided to impose moral embargo. The
Polish government treated Moscow as an aggressor and full ally of Germany. The differ¬
ences in American and Polish approach toward the Soviet Union appeared in full light
during Secretary Welles mission to Europe in spring of
1940.
When the United States
government showed great interest in terminating hostilities and contributing to peace
talks between Moscow and Helsinki, the Polish government was ready to actively sup¬
port the Finnish cause.
At that time, one more important problem affecting American-Polish relations should
have been considered. In January
1940
the Polish government decided to send to the
United States a mission of general
Józef
Haller
with the goal of obtaining the support of
Polish Americans as well as the American government for the people in Poland. As the
mission developed, American officials decided that the mission didn t serve American
interests. Firstly, because it was hurting American neutrality. Secondly, because gen¬
eral
Hallers
close contacts with the Polish American community and former President
Hoover were considered as a support for Mr. Hoovers presidential ambitions. Polish
government policy was not in line with the objectives of American policy and President
Roosevelt as well.
Despite certain problems created by the Polish government policy the United States
government looked for Polish assistance when revelations from the German White Book
were published in America and threatened the political career of President Roosevelt.
Similarly, in spring of
1940
when the strange war in Europe was over and the President
decided to continue the armament program and aiding the allies, the inconvenient at
the moment mission of general
Haller»
brought blessed results. Polish ethnic minority
alerted by general
Haller
showed unprecedented support for the presidential program
of Americas preparedness to war. The administration used their exemplary enthusiasm
Conclusions
471
as well as the Polish-German war of September
1939
as an excellent argument to con¬
vince Americans to support the policy of speeding up war preparations and Congress
appropriation of financial means.
In the summer
1940
American hopes for change of Soviet policy failed. In June
1940
the Soviet Union, taking advantage of German victories in Western Europe, terminated
the last reminders of the Baltic States independence and invaded Romania. America
strongly condemned Moscow s action calling her predator . In the first days of July, the
President decided to curb this aggressiveness and introduced Proclamations imposing
restrictions on American export to the Soviet Union. The same restrictions were applied
toward Tokyo whose aggressive intentions were demonstrated in announcement of the
Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The Department of State decided to reverse from
its firm policy toward the Soviet Union when American intelligence found out that the
Japanese attack was a close and most likely event. Under this pressure the Department of
State decided to look for rapprochement with Moscow. Within a few days the Department
of State officials prepared a Memorandum that addressed Soviet economic problems in
the United States and indicated American problems in the Soviet Union. In the begin¬
ning of August, conversations with the Soviet ambassador in Washington,
Constantin
Oumansky started. During two week talks with Oumansky Under Secretary Welles
decided to soften restrictions imposed on trade with the Soviet Union. Ambassador
Oumansky reciprocated and on his part promised to facilitate repatriation of American
citizens from USSR. By the end of
1940
the United States developed high hopes for fur¬
ther improvement of American-Soviet political relations.
The Department of State certainly did not overlook that the improvement of the
American-Soviet political climate contributed to the reduction of Japanese threat in the
Far East. Improvement of American-Soviet relations gave President Roosevelt an excel¬
lent foundation for next steps in promoting the policy of aiding the allies. In August
Destroyers-for-Bases agreement with the Great Britain was concluded and later that month
the US-Canada agreement was signed in Ogdensburg. President Roosevelt having all these
advantages on his mind started to think about inauguration the Lend-Lease program.
American hopes for the shift of Soviet policy went high when Moscow did not join the
Tripartite Pact in September of
1940.
However, these hopes failed shortly. Despite the
numerous concessions, the Soviets did not facilitate the repatriation of American citizens.
Soviet conduct alerted Washington and reminded of Moscow s ambiguous policy. Some
of the American officials were convinced that relying on the most solemn Soviet promises
is risky and unadvisable. Under Secretary Sumner Welles had a different approach. He
thought that better relations with the Soviet Union gave the United States a great benefit
in the Far Eastern policy. Under Secretary Welles opinion prevailed and conversations
with ambassador Oumansky were continued. Indeed, the United States officials were
satisfied since Oumansky permanently stressed common interest of the United States
and the Soviet Union in the Far Eastern area. In addition, American officials also got
Oumansky
s
reiteration of Soviet assistance in American citizens repatriation from the
Soviet Union. In January
1941
better relations with the Soviet Union helped Washington
to check Japans combative policy. President could safely introduce in Congress the Lend-
Lease Bill. The Department of State considering all these advantages decided to lift the
moral embargo on trade with Soviet Union.
472
Conclusions
In Washington the improvement of American-Soviet relations was the most wel¬
comed news but constant doubts about Soviet policy were not eliminated. In January
1941
Americans got strong evidence of the Soviet government s trade contacts with Germany. It
was highly disappointing but again under the pressure of Japan and the threat of conclu¬
sion of the Moscow-Tokyo neutrality pact, Americans decided to continue conversations
with Oumansky. The Department of State constantly willing to improve the climate with
the Soviet Union decided to eliminate difficulties on the way to Soviet-American rap¬
prochement. The most important and also complicated was the problem of repatriation
since repatriation program covered also families of American citizens. The Department
of State intention was to terminate these practices and separate repatriation of American
citizens of Polish descent from assistance given to the families and relatives of American
citizens. By the end of
1940
the Polish government in London was requested to remove
Dr.
Ludwik Rajchman,
the government s official for Polish deportees in the Soviet Union.
This decision brought unexpected consequences. Although the Rajchman s duties were
terminated the Polish American community in the United States raised the problem of
Polish deportees in the Soviet Union and made an issue out of it. Under the pressure
of the public opinion, Under Secretary Welles requested from ambassador Oumansky
that the American Red Cross would assist Poles in the Soviet Union. In a confrontation
between administration policy toward Soviet Union and the demands of public opinion,
the voice of public opinion prevailed.
The United States constant drive for improvement with the Soviet Union affected
the upcoming visit of general Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister in Washington in April
1941.
The Department of State imposed a strict control on the visit. American officials
did not wish Prime Minister Sikorski to get in touch with the Polish American commu¬
nity openly protesting against Soviet policy toward Poles in Soviet Union.
Despite certain problems the results of the visit were satisfactory for both sides. From
President Roosevelt s point of view, Prime Minister Sikorski s visit in Washington did
not disturb American-Soviet relations. It was beneficiary because Sikorski didnt refuse
to use his influence in the Polish community in promoting preparedness and aiding the
allies policy. From the point of view of Prime Minister Sikorski his stay in Washington
was a success since he got the promise of Poland s participation in the Lend Lease pro¬
gram as well as American Red Cross assistance to Polish deportees in the Soviet Union.
Prime Minister Sikorski s achievements might have been more satisfactory if he had taken
advantage ot the great Polish American movement for the Poles in Russia.
In spring
1941
American high hopes and long efforts to draw Soviet Union away
from the Axis powers failed. On April 13th Moscow signed a neutrality pact with Tokyo.
At the same time the Department of State got the information that Soviets used the pro¬
gram of repatriation to establish on American soil vast network of agents threatening
the United States national security. The Department of State was highly disappointed
and used this lesson to formulate in June
1941
a new policy toward the Soviet Union.
This policy was on the threshold when on June
22, 1941
Germany attacked Soviet
Union. Administrations first reactions to Soviet-German war were very cautious. President
Roosevelt was more sympathetic. He thought the Soviet Union and the United States
were converging toward similar social democracies. The President as well as the British
Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill was ready to assist Russia. However, Roosevelt s
Conclusions
473
desire to aid Russia did not easily translate into action. The American public saw the
Soviet-German conflict as a contest between Satan and Lucifer. In particular Americans
couldn t accept Russia s attitude to religion.
General Sikorski played certain role in changing this approach. On June 23rd Prime
Minister Sikorski announced a new policy toward the Soviet Union. From President
Roosevelt s point of view this declaration was important. In Sikorski
s
declaration President
Roosevelt found a sound base for inauguration of unpopular policy of aid for the Soviet
Union. Shortly after Sikorskis declaration as the first and significant move in this direc¬
tion the President received ambassador Oumansky in the White House. On June 30th
Under Secretary Welles took into consideration the official Soviet request for supplies
and credit to pay for them. Then Roosevelt accepted Soviet military mission of general
Filip
I, Golikov and made a decision to send to Moscow Harry Hopkins as his special
representative.
In the summer of
1941
the United States one more time focused on Polish govern¬
ment. When Harry Hopkins was on his way to Moscow on the Presidents road to give
aid to Soviet Union appeared serious obstacles. Negotiations in London on the conclu¬
sion of the Polish-Soviet pact showed irreconcilable differences on the issue of future
borders. Lack of the agreement in territorial issues created obstacles in conclusion of
Polish-Soviet pact. It is most likely that crisis in negotiations
w
London halted Hopkins
mission. On July 30th the Polish-Soviet pact was concluded. Poland did not manage
to defend her Eastern borders but the Presidents envoy could continue his mission to
Moscow. It opened the way to President Roosevelt s policy of aiding the Soviet Union. At
the same time the United States considering difficult and highly controversial problem
oi Polish-Soviet border decided to apply non-recognition and postponement principle.
In the fall of
1941
the attention of American policy makers turned again to Polish
government in London. In October Roosevelt s policy of aid to the Soviet Union caused
serious difficulties with public opinion, in particular in October when the American-
British mission guided by Lord Beaverbrook and Averell W. Harriman went to Moscow to
nnd out about Soviet needs. When Americans protested Prime Minister Sikorski decided
to assist President Roosevelt and produced a document known as the
Ciechanowski
letter. The letter was important because it stated that Soviet citizens enjoy freedom of
religion. This declaration helped the President to eliminate reservations of American
public opinion. A few weeks later when protests calmed down Congress approved the
Lend-Lease program to Russia.
The first Polish-American contacts proved that the Polish government in London
had certain assets and Americans most gladly took advantage of them. At the same time
the Polish government in London could expect American favors only
ifit
would be ben¬
eficial to the United States interests. In November just before voting in the Congress
°n Lend-Lease aid to Russia, President Roosevelt supported the Polish cause: Prime
Minister Sikorski
s
visit to Moscow and the exodus of the Polish Army from the USSR,
residents step was a calculated move since passing Lend-Lease program to the Soviet
Union could have been questioned when the Polish Army and civilians in Soviet Union
suffered from cold and hunger.
On December
7, 1941
Japan attacked the United States base in Pearl Harbor. On
this day the United States and Soviet Union became full allies. The coalition partners
474
Conclusions
had a lot in common but differed a lot. Territorial issues were the main source or dif¬
ferences. Soviets did not hide their territorial claims and urged that the planned Soviet-
British pact included provisions confirming Soviet borders of
1941.
The United States
opposed. The Atlantic Charter signed by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 14th for¬
mulated strong opposition to imposed or undemocratic territorial changes. The Atlantic
Charter was the foundation of the December
1941
and February
1942
Department of
State Memoranda s. Both documents indicated that the United States would not accept
the
Curzon
line as the post-war Polish border.
Polish war aims coincident with the United States stand on territorial issues. It was
fully justified that Prime Minister Sikorski tried to find American support when the
British-Soviet pact with territorial provisions was discussed. However, Prime Minister
Sikorski
s
visit to the United States in March
1942
caused in Washington certain con¬
cerns connected with Moscow s territorial demands as well as internal problems created
by Polish American community calling for establishing the
1939
Polish-Soviet border.
President Roosevelt under domestic as well as foreign pressure decided to avoid present¬
ing publicly the American position on territorial problems. Just before Prime Minister
Sikorski
s
arrival in Washington the President proposed the opening of a new front in
Western Europe to divert large German forces from Russian fronts. In the Presidents
opinion this plan would have the advantage of resisting Stalin s territorial demands. This
plan also had certain consequences to Sikorski s visit in Washington since the President
developed fantastic prospects of using the Polish army leaving the USSR on the new
European front.
The Presidents project was suddenly dropped when Washington got the news that
Moscow was irritated and the problem of missing Polish officers started to be an issue.
When the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav M.
Molotov
arrived in May
to Washington, the President decided not to mention about Polish plans and to introduce
his ideas on policing the post war world and four policemen concept. In addition, the
President promised
Molotov
to open the second front in Europe in
1942.
Shortly after
Molotov s departure it surfaced that it was a premature commitment. In August Prime
Minister Churchill and Harriman went to Moscow to inform Stalin about the allies ina¬
bility to keep their promise. At that time Polish Prime Minister Sikorski convinced that
the President was still interested in military operations in Europe, insisted on American
intervention in Moscow. Although the President agreed to intervene, his envoy Harriman
did not raise the issue. In September the next mission of Wendell Willkie ended up with
the same effect. Roosevelt did not wish to irritate Stalin with Polish problems and miss¬
ing officers in particular.
Stalin s assurance
oř
Soviet interest in post-war planning turned to be the major push
for the President who in the winter of
1942-1943
began focusing on future. The President
expected that a personal meeting with Stalin would be the way to reach strategic deci¬
sions as well as an excellent opportunity to discuss post-war problems. In December
1942
he urged Stalin to a tripartite meeting in January. Stalin was not so eager and refused to
participate in the conference in Casablanca.
Since President Roosevelt s post-war plans were taking shape, Ray Atherton from the
European Division of the Department of State presented in December
1942
an analysis
of the Soviet foreign policy. Atherton suggested that the Soviet decision and
participa-
Conclusions
475
tion
in world affairs would depend on the Soviet border with Poland and recommended
to support Russian claims to Polish Eastern territories. From this time on the American
stand on Polish Eastern border was clear and firm. However nothing was revealed to
Prime Minister Sikorski, who in December paid the third visit in Washington. When
in March
1943
President Roosevelt discussed with Minister Anthony Eden the post-war
policy, both politicians agreed that Soviet territorial claims are justified because the Soviet
Union was a great power. At the same time Roosevelt avoided to announce publicly that
the United States would support Soviet claims. Appeals of the Polish American commu¬
nity for clarification of American position were in vain. In addition the President con¬
stantly and falsely assured Prime Minister Sikorski about his great sympathy for Poland
and sincere attempt to stand up for the Polish cause in Moscow.
Roosevelt s experience during the war with Stalin certainly gave him reason to believe
that he could not outwit and outmaneuver the Soviet leadership. Stalin saw that impor¬
tunate demands and irascible behavior were consistently rewarded and that Roosevelt
invariably catered to his whim and proved to be a diffident and expedient democrat.
Nothing had stopped President Roosevelt from looking for Stalin s cooperation. This policy
prevented him from taking honest position when in April
1943
graves of Polish offic¬
ers in the Katyn Forest were discovered. Roosevelt preferred to forget about the missing
officers problem which haunted American policy in
1942.
Later Roosevelt accepted the
Soviet decision to terminate political relations with the Polish government in London.
In May
1943
he sent Joseph E. Davies Americas former ambassador to Moscow and the
blind admirer of the Soviet Union to invite Stalin to a summer meeting with Roosevelt.
In addition, Davies had to inform Stalin that the United States would accept Soviet ter¬
ritorial claims at the expense of Poland.
President Roosevelts efforts didn t help. Roosevelt couldn t break
Stalins
unwilling¬
ness to cooperate closely with the United States. In late May when the Trident conference
concluded with the decision of postponement of a second front until
1944
the crisis was
serious. The Trident conference decision evoked Stalin s angry response.
In June and July
1943
the prolonged silence of Stalin, the news about Soviet-German
peace talks as well as unilateral decisions concerning the future of Eastern Europe gave
the President ground to think that Stalin might step out of the coalition. When the Soviet
Union policy was not clear and participation of the Red Army in the war questioned
Roosevelt considered introducing the Polish Home Army into the war. However, when
Stalin in the first days of August dispelled Roosevelts doubts and confirmed his willing¬
ness to fight in the war and cooperate closely in post-war plans the President started to
think about materialization of four powers cooperation. The President beloved that four
powers cooperation was the first step leading to inauguration his post-war plans with
the participation of the Soviet Union. Roosevelt saw his grand design real. The foreign
ministers conference in Moscow in October produced high hopes for the Soviet Unions
involvement in the post-war planning.
American-Soviet rapprochement brought Poland devastating results. In fact Four
Powers Declaration was a threat to Poland s independence and created fatal prospects
for Poland s future. Later in Teheran during the first encounter with Stalin Roosevelt
did not hesitate to sacrifice territorial interests of Poland and agreed to new Poland s
Eastern border passing in line with Stalin s demands. In
1944
the spirit of Teheran led
476
Conclusions
to American involvement into reconstruction of the Polish government according to
Stalin s whishes.
It should be pointed out that Roosevelt s foreign policy had its limits. The American
public opinion was aware of Stalin s nature. Facts were clear enough in the light of the
Soviet-Nazi alliance, the Soviet attack on Poland, Finland and the Baltic States, and the
Katyn Forest massacre. The Polish American community and American citizens of Polish
descent were aware in particular. When the news on the Katyn Forest massacre was
published they developed an enormous information campaign. In
1943
this campaign
directed attention of American public toward the Soviet Union policy. Similarly in
1944
during the Warsaw Uprising Polish Americans turned again the attention of American
public to Soviet policy. They pointed out that the Soviet approach the Warsaw Uprising
had nothing in common with President Roosevelt s ideas of the United Nations coopera¬
tion. Soviet approach to the Warsaw Uprising proved that cooperation was non-existent
since great powers could not get on together and provide help to the Poles fighting in
Warsaw. It was a devastating conclusion and seriously threatening President Roosevelt s
post-war plans.
For President Roosevelt the Soviet conduct during the Warsaw Uprising might have
been the breaking point in his pro Soviet policy. It wasn t. When Roosevelt understood
that involvement in aid to Warsaw is against Stalin s will, he stopped listening to the
voice of public opinion. The President made a choice and decided to continue policy
of cooperation with Stalin. This policy deprived fighting Poles of help and contributed
to the Uprising defeat.
President Roosevelts decisions had far-reaching consequences to American inter¬
nal policy. In the fall
1944
Americans watching great powers policy and Soviet policy
in Poland in particular were highly critical and formulated reservations to the idea of
the United Nations cooperation. President Roosevelt seriously feared that isolation sen¬
timents might come back and Americans might reject the United States participation
in the world organization. By the end of
1944
the Polish problem became-as Harry
Hopkins put it-an issue affecting American policy. The conclusion was obvious: without
honest solution of the Polish problem American post-war goals might be questioned.
The President as well as the Department of State officials took special interest in solv¬
ing the problem of Poland.
The Yalta conference in February
1945
was the consequence of President Roosevelts
long-term policy toward the Soviet Union. It represented also the climax of Roosevelts
policy of attempting to cooperate with Stalin at the expense of Poland. American leaders
knew well enough that Stalin wanted Poland to be placed under his authority but did
not seriously oppose Stalin s design. In fact they had assented to it before Yalta. During
the Crimean conference the President again did not hesitate to sacrifice vital interests of
Poland to obtain Stalin s participation in the United Nations Organization.
In April
1945
Harry Truman followed President Roosevelt. Although the new
President tried to be firm with the Soviet Union he gave up and later made the same error
in appeasing Stalin. Before his envoy, Harry Hopkins left for Moscow in May
1945
it was
decided that Soviet violations of Yalta agreement would be overlooked. It was the price
of cooperation with Stalin which President Truman was ready to pay. Truman belived
that American-Soviet cooperation would open the way to the fulfillment of Roosevelt s
Conclusions
477
great dream of the United Nations Organization. At the same time Americans gave their
assent to establishment of a new Polish government according to Stalins wish as well
as sacrificed the fate of
16
Underground leaders imprisoned by the Soviets. In Potsdam
the United States-after the successful test of the atom bomb-the most powerful nation
around the world showed impotence of omnipotence and followed the old pattern of
looking for the Soviet Union s friendship and cooperation.
American policy did not serve well interests of Poland. In fact American decisions
were costly and tragic, contributed to depriving Poland of a true victory in the war and
benefits of peace.
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Cytowska-Siegrist, Ewa |
| author_facet | Cytowska-Siegrist, Ewa |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Cytowska-Siegrist, Ewa |
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| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV040947808 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)844063958 (DE-599)BVBBV040947808 |
| edition | Wyd. 1. |
| era | Geschichte 1939-1945 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1939-1945 |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV040947808 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:35:59Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788375432497 |
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| physical | 502 s. 24 cm. |
| publishDate | 2013 |
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| spelling | Cytowska-Siegrist, Ewa Verfasser aut Stany Zjednoczone i Polska 1939 - 1945 Ewa Cytowska-Siegrist Wyd. 1. Warszawa Wydawnictwo Neriton 2013 502 s. 24 cm. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The United States and Poland, 1939 - 1945 Geschichte 1939-1945 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Polen (DE-588)4046496-9 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Polen (DE-588)4046496-9 g Geschichte 1939-1945 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025926404&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025926404&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Cytowska-Siegrist, Ewa Stany Zjednoczone i Polska 1939 - 1945 |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4078704-7 (DE-588)4046496-9 |
| title | Stany Zjednoczone i Polska 1939 - 1945 |
| title_auth | Stany Zjednoczone i Polska 1939 - 1945 |
| title_exact_search | Stany Zjednoczone i Polska 1939 - 1945 |
| title_full | Stany Zjednoczone i Polska 1939 - 1945 Ewa Cytowska-Siegrist |
| title_fullStr | Stany Zjednoczone i Polska 1939 - 1945 Ewa Cytowska-Siegrist |
| title_full_unstemmed | Stany Zjednoczone i Polska 1939 - 1945 Ewa Cytowska-Siegrist |
| title_short | Stany Zjednoczone i Polska 1939 - 1945 |
| title_sort | stany zjednoczone i polska 1939 1945 |
| topic_facet | USA Polen |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025926404&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025926404&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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