Verfügbarkeit: The rules of thought

The rules of thought:

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser:	Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins (VerfasserIn), Jarvis, Benjamin W. (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Buch
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Oxford Univ. Press 2013
Ausgabe:	1. ed.
Schlagworte:	Knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of mind Erkenntnistheorie
Online-Zugang:	Inhaltsverzeichnis Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext
Beschreibung:	Includes bibliographical references and index
Beschreibung:	XII, 354 S.
ISBN:	9780199661800 0199661804

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Datensatz im Suchindex

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adam_text	IMAGE 1 CONTENTS INTRODLLETION: OHJEETIVE RLLLES OFTHOLLGHT XL PHILOSOPHIEAL ANTI-EXCEPTIONALISLLL PURE RATIONAL THINKING PHILOSOPHIEAL TRADITIONALISILL EXPERIENTIAL RATIONALISM THE INTERSUBJECTIVE VALIDITY AND OBJECTIVITY OF RATIONAL INGUIRY 3 5 7 9 10 PART I: PROPOSITIONS, FREGEAN SENSE, AND RATIONAL MODALITY 2. A THEORY OF RATIONAL MODALITY 1. A FREGEAN THEORY OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES ~1.1. ~1.2. ~ 1.3. ~1.4. ~1.5. ~1.6. ~1.7. ~ I.X. ~ 1.9. ~ 1.10. ~ 1.11. ~1.12. ~1. U. ~2.1. ~2.2. ~2.3. ~2.4. ~2.5 ~2.(,. ~2.7 ~2.X. ~2.9. ~2.1O. ~2.11. ~2.12. PROPOSITIONS AS STRUCTURES OF CONCEPTS CONCEPTS USE AND REPRESENTATIONAL CONTENT THE LANGUAGC OF THOUGHT CONC1USIVE RATIONAL RELATIONS TROUBLE FROM THE PREFACE PARADOX) PROOF AND REIILTATION FREGEAN SENSES AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF FREGEAN SENSES DISTINGUISHING SENSES OF RATIONAL COMLLLITLLLENT REALIZING PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES RULES AND RATIONAHTY CONC1USIVE RATIONALITY AND DEFEASIBILITY RATIONAL ENTAILLLLENT RATIONAL POSSIBILITY AND OTHER F:LLLLILY NOTIONS RATIONAL AND METAPHYSICAL ENTAILMENT COHERENCE AND RATIONAL L1LODALITY RATIONALLY POSSIBLE SCENARIOS AND TRUTH CONDITIONS RATIONAL ENTAILMENT AND REVISION R-POSSIBILITY, EPISTEL1LIC POSSIBILITY, AMI NEO-RUSSELLIANISL1L THE RATIONALITY VERSION OFFREGE S PUZZLE R-POSSIBILITY AND FREGE S PUZZLE KRIPKE S A PUZZLE ABOUT BELIEF AND FREGE S PUZZLE DAVID CHALL1LERS S EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITIES AGAINST TWO-DILLLENSIONALISLLL 15 15 17 19 21 22 23 24 26 29 32 35 39 42 47 47 50 52 53 54 55 58 61 65 67 68 69 IMAGE 2 §3.1. §3.2. §3.3. §3.4. §3.5. §3.6. §3.7. §3.R. VI F:ONTENTS 3. THE PSYCHOLOGIE AL REALIZATION OF FREGEAN SENSE ONTOLOGY QUINEAN REVISABILITY HARMAN ON BONJOUR TWO DOGMAS OFEMPIRICISM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY OF RATIONAL ENTAILMENT OUR THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY CONTRASTED: PEACOCKE OUR THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY CONTRASTED: DAVIDSON OUR THEORY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY OF RATIONAL ENTAILMENT RECAPITULATED §3.9. GENERAL SECOND-ORDER INFERENTIAL COMPETENCIES §3.1O. THEORY-BUILDING §3.11. INDETERMINATE RATIONAL RELATIONS §3.12. KRIPKE AND PROPER NAMES §3.13. INDETERMINATE SINGULAR CONCEPTS §3.14. FREGEAN SENSE. DESCRIPTIVISM, AND CONCEPTUAL ROLE §3.15. NON-INTENTIONAL RULE-FOLLOWING 4. THE SOCIABILITY OF A FREGEAN THEORY §4.1. SOCIAL ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM §4.2. ANALYTICITY AND SOCIAL ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM §4.3. THE PUBLICITY OF PROPOSITIONS AND CONCEPTS §4.4. SOCIAL FREGEANISM §4.5. DEFERENTIAL AND NON-DEFERENTIAL CONCEPT POSSESSION §4.6. PROPER NAMES AGAIN §4.7. TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON ON CONCEPTUAL TRUTHS §4.R. CONCEPTUAL REFINEMENT §4.9. SOCIALLY EXTERNALIZING RATIONALITY §4.1O. PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE ASCRIPTIONS AND TESTIMONY §4.11. A NAIVE NEO-RUSSELLIAN THEORY OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE ASCRIPTIONS 5. FREGEAN SENSE FIRST §5.1. THE MINIMALIST EXPLANATION §5.2. INHERENT AND ESSENTIAL RATIONAL RELATIONS §5.3. REDUCTIVE STRATEGIES §5.4. REDUCTION, FACTORIZATION, AND ANALYSIS §5.5. BOGHOSSIAN AND CONCEPT POSSESSION §5.6. PEACOCKE AND METASEMANTICS §5.7. WRIGHT, ENOCH AND SCHECHTER, AND PRAGMATISM §5.R. FIELD AND EVALUATIVISM PART II: RATIONALITY, APRIORITY, AND PHILOSOPHY 6. A THEORY OF THE APRIORI §6.1. APRIORITY AND PROPOSITIONAL JUSTIFICATION §6.2. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: ALBERT CASULLO 75 75 75 77 79 HL H6 H7 H9 90 93 95 97 100 102 105 LOH 109 110 111 113 115 117 11H 120 121 125 12H 132 133 134 136 137 139 143 147 154 161 162 164 IMAGE 3 9. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OFTHOUGHT-EXPERIMENT]UDGMENTS 10. RATIONAL IMAGINATION AND MODAL EPISTEMOLOGY §4.1. CONTENT AND INFERENTIAL COMPETENCIES §4.2. RELIABILITY AND KNOWLEDGE ABOUT IMAGINARY SCENARIOS § J.3. TWO POINTS §9.4. KNOWLEDGE OF NECESSITY §4.5. CATEGORIZATION AND APRIORITY §4.6. ON CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS § 10.1. IMAGINATION AS SUPPOSITION §10.2. IMAGINATION AND POSSIBILITY §1O.3. COHERENT IMAGINATION §1O.4. RATIONAL IMAGINATION §1O.5. DEFEASIBLE INFERENCE IN IMAGINATION §10.6. R-MODALITY AND METAPHYSICAL MODALITY CONTENTS VB 165 166 169 170 171 174 176 177 179 179 181 184 186 187 18X LX9 191 194 198 199 201 202 203 204 206 209 212 213 214 216 217 218 221 224 225 226 231 232 234 235 236 239 240 FORMALIZING THOUGHT-EXPERIMENT ARGUMENTS: NECESSITY? TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON S COUNTERFACTUAL FORMULATION AGAINST THE COUNTERFACTUAL FORMULATION ATTEMPTED PATCHES THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS AS FICTIONS FICTIONS FIXING CONTENT DISANALOGIES BETWEEN THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS AND FICTIONS REASONING AND THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS OTHER ARGUMENTATIVE ROLES FOR THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS NON-ARGUMENTATIVE ROLES FOR THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS APRIORI TRANSITIONS IN THOUGHT EXPERIENCE IN A WARRANTING ROLE EXPERIENCE AND D-JUSTIFICATION APRIORITY AND R-NECESSITY APRIORITY AND EMPIRICAL INDEFEASIBILITY* IS APRIORITY HOMOGENEOUS? IS OUR THEORY OF THE APRIORI VACUOUS? THE NATURE OF EXPERIENCE §H.L. §H.2. §H.3. §H.4. ~H.5. §X.6. §H.7. §H.H. §H.4. §X.LO. ~6.3. ~6.4. §6.5. §6.6. §6.7. §6.H. §6.4. §6.1O. 7. APRIORI PHILOSOPHY: RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS §7.1. APOSTERIORI KNOWLEDGE OF APRIORI FACULTIES §7.2. LIMITING THE CHALLENGE: NON-BASIC METHODS? §7.3. KNOWLEDGE AND KNOWLEDGE OFKNOWLEDGE §7.4. APRIORI RELIABILITY OF APRIORI METHODS §7.5. PHILOSOPHY AND KNOWLEDGE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ABILITIES §7.6. THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS AND THE QUOTIDIAN §7.7. PERCEPTUAL FACULTIES IN IMAGINATION §7.H. PEEKING AS SELF-EXPERIMENTATION? §7.4. MISLEADING A PRIORI FEELINGS X. THE CONTENT OFTHOUGHT- EXPERIMENT ]UDGMENTS IMAGE 4 V1L1 C:ONTENTS §1O.7. THE COHERENT IMPOSSIBLE § 1O.H. FROM RATIONAL TO METAPHYSICAL POSSIBILITY §1O.9. MORAL THEOREMS § 10.10. MATHEMATICAL TRUTHS § 10.11. APRIORI KNOWLEDGE OF RATIONALMODALITY §10.12. OVERSTIPULATION APPENDIX A: THE MISIDENTIFICATION RESPONSE APPENDIX B: NATURAL KINDS PART III: INTUITIONS AND PHILOSOPHY 11. THE NATURE OF INTUITIONS 242 243 246 247 24X 250 252 255 261 12. AGAINST STRONG EXPERIENTIAL RATIONALISM 13. INTUITION AS A SOURCE OFEVIDENCE? §11.L. §11.2. § 11.3. § 11.4. § 11.5. §11.6. § 12.1. §12.2. §12.3. §12.4. §12.5. §12.6. §12.7. §12.H. §12. ). §12.1O. §12.11. §12.12. §12.13. §13.1. §13.2. §13.3. § 13.4. §13.5. §13.6. §13.7. §13.H. §13.9. ELIMINATIVISM REDUCTIONISM THE ROBUST PICTURE OF INTUITIONS WILLIAMSON ON PHENOMENOLOGY EARLENBAUGH AND MOLYNEUX REDUCTIONISM WITHOUT INSIGNIFICANCE STRONG EXPERIENTIAL RATIONALISM INTUITIONS AND EVIDENCE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BLIND IRRATIONALITY WHAT YOU CAN T SEE, CAN T RATIONALLY CONSTRAIN YOU THE INTERSUBJECTIVE VALIDITY OF RATIONAL NORMS THE OBJECTIVITY OF RATIONAL NORMS RELIABILIST STRONG EXPERIENTIAL RATIONALISM AGAINST PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM AGAINST GENERAL FOUNDATIONALISM AGAINST SUBJECTIVE FOUNDATIONALISM INTUITIONS AND EVIDENCE REVISITED INTUITIONS AND PURELY RATIONAL INQUIRY A SIMPLE ARGUMENT BLIND IRRATIONALITY RECONSIDERED EPISTEMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY APRIORITY AMI THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM PERCEPTUAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SPECKLED HCN FAILURE OFJUSTIFIED BELIEF INTUITING AND PERCEIVING COMPARED INTUITING AND PERCEIVING CONTRAS TED THE BENACERRAF-FIELD CHALLENGE 262 263 2M 265 267 271 274 275 277 279 2X1 2X2 2X4 2X5 2XX 290 294 295 297 2 )9 301 301 303 304 307 309 312 314 315 317 IMAGE 5 CONTENTS IX 14. EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHIE AL METHODOLOGY 319 §14.1. POSITIVE EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 319 §14.2. NEGATIVE EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 322 §14.3. THE USE OFINTUITIONS IN PHILOSOPHY 324 §14.4. THE CRITIQUE GENERALIZED? 325 §14.5. EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY 329 §14.O. TRADITIONAL METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 330 §14.7. PHILOSOPHY AND THE QUOTIDIAN 332 R~FERENCES 335 INDEX 351 Contents A Preface xi Introduction: Objective Rules ofThought 1 §1. Philosophical anti-exceptionalism 3 §2. Pure rational thinking 5 §3. Philosophical traditionalism 7 §4. Experiential rationalism 9 §5. The intersubjective validity and objectivity of rational inquiry 10 Part I: Propositions, Fregean Sense, and Rational Modality 1. A Fregean Theory of Propositional Attitudes 15 §1.1. Propositions as structures of concepts 15 §1.2. Concepts 17 §1.3. Use and representational content 19 §1.4. The language of thought 21 §1.5. Conclusive rational relations 22 §1.6. Trouble from the Preface Paradox? 23 §1.7. Proof and refutation 24 §1.8. Fregean senses 26 §1.9. An alternative theory of Fregean senses 29 §1.10. Distinguishing senses of “rational commitment” 32 §1.11. Realizing propositional attitudes 35 §1.12. Rules and rationality 39 §1.13. Conclusive rationality and defeasibility 42 2. A Theory of Rational Modality 47 §2.1. Rational entaihnent 47 §2.2. Rational possibility and other family notions 50 §2.3. Rational and metaphysical entailment 52 §2.4. Coherence and rational modality 53 §2.5. Rationally possible scenarios and truth conditions 54 §2.6. Rational entailment and revision 55 §2.7. R-Possibility,“epistemic possibility,” and neo-Russellianism 58 §2.8. The rationality version of Freges puzzle 61 §2.9. R-Possibility and Frege s puzzle 65 §2.10. Kripke s “A Puzzle about Belief” and Frege s puzzle 67 §2.11. David Chalmers s “epistemic possibilities” 68 §2.12. Against two-dimensionalism 09 VI CONTENTS 3. The Psychological Realization of Fregean Sense 75 §3.1. Ontology 75 §3.2. Quinean revisability 75 §3.3. Harman on Bonjour 77 §3.4. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” 79 §3.5. The psychological reality of rational entailment 81 §3.6. Our theory of psychological reality contrasted: Peacocke 86 §3.7. Our theory of psychological reality contrasted: Davidson 87 §3.8. Our theory of the psychological reality of rational entailment recapitulated 89 §3.9. General second-order inferential competencies 90 §3.10. Theory-building 93 §3.11. Indeterminate rational relations 95 §3.12. Kripke and proper names 97 §3.13. Indeterminate singular concepts 100 §3.14. Fregean sense, descriptivism, and conceptual role 102 §3.15. Non-intentional rule-following 105 4. The Sociability of a Fregean Theory 108 §4.1. Social anti-individualism 109 §4.2. Analyticity and social anti-individualism 110 §4.3. The publicity of propositions and concepts 111 §4.4. Social Fregeanism 113 §4.5. Deferential and non-deferential concept possession 115 §4.6. Proper names again 117 §4.7. Timothy Williamson on conceptual truths 118 §4.8. Conceptual refinement 120 §4.9. Socially externalizing rationality 121 §4.10. Propositional attitude ascriptions and testimony 125 §4.11. A naïve neo-Russellian theory of propositional attitude ascriptions 128 5. Fregean Sense First 132 §5.1. The minimalist explanation 133 §5.2. Inherent and essential rational relations 134 §5.3. Reductive strategies 136 §5.4. Reduction, factorization, and analysis 137 §5.5. Boghossian and concept possession 139 §5.6. Peacocke and metasemantics 143 §5.7. Wright, Enoch and Schechter, and pragmatism 147 §5.8. Field and evaluativism 154 Part II: Rationality, Apriority, and Philosophy 6. A Theory of the A Priori 161 §6.1. Apriority and propositional justification 162 §6.2. An alternative approach: Albert Casullo 164 CONTENTS VÜ §6.3. A priori transitions in thought 165 §6.4. Experience in a warranting role 166 §6.5. Experience and d-justification 169 §6.6. Apriority and r-necessity 170 §6.7. Apriority and empirical indefeasibility* 171 §6.8. Is apriority homogeneous? 174 §6.9. Is our theory of the a priori vacuous? 176 §6.10. The nature of experience 177 7. A Priori Philosophy: Responses to Objections 179 §7.1. A posteriori knowledge of a priori faculties 179 §7.2. Limiting the challenge: Non-basic methods? 181 §7.3. Knowledge and knowledge of knowledge 184 §7.4. A priori reliability of a priori methods 186 §7.5. Philosophy and knowledge of philosophical abilities 187 §7.6. Thought-experiments and the quotidian 188 §7.7. Perceptual faculties in imagination 189 §7.8. Peeking as self-experimentation? 191 §7.9. Misleading “a priori” feelings 194 8. The Content of Thought-Experiment Judgments 198 §8.1. Formalizing thought-experiment arguments: Necessity? 199 §8.2. Timothy Williamson’s counterfactual formulation 201 §8.3. Against the counterfactual formulation 202 §8.4. Attempted patches 203 §8.5. Thought-experiments as fictions 204 §8.6. Fictions fixing content 206 §8.7. Disanalogies between thought-experiments and fictions? 209 §8.8. Reasoning and thought-experiments 212 §8.9. Other argumentative roles for thought-experiments 213 §8.10. Non-argumentative roles for thought-experiments 214 9. The Epistemology of Thought-Experiment Judgments 216 §9.1. Content and inferential competencies 217 §9.2. Reliability and knowledge about imaginary scenarios 218 §9.3. Two points 221 §9.4. Knowledge of necessity 224 §9.5. Categorization and apriority 225 §9.6. On conceptual analysis 226 10. Rational Imagination and Modal Epistemology 231 §10.1. Imagination as supposition 232 §10.2. Imagination and possibility 234 §10.3. Coherent imagination 235 §10.4. Rational imagination 236 §10.5. Defeasible inference in imagination 239 §10.6. R-modality and metaphysical modality 240 Vlll CONTENTS §10.7. The coherent impossible 242 §10.8. From rational to metaphysical possibility 243 §10.9. Moral theorems 246 §10.10. Mathematical truths 247 §10.11. A priori knowledge of rational modality 248 §10.12. Overstipulation 250 Appendix A: The misidentification response 252 Appendix B: Natural kinds 255 Part III: Intuitions and Philosophy 11. The Nature of Intuitions 261 §11.1. ELiininativistn 262 §11.2. Reductionism 263 §11.3. The robust picture of intuitions 264 §11.4. Williamson on phenomenology 265 §11.5. Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 267 §11.6. Reductionism without insignificance 271 12. Against Strong Experiential Rationalism 274 §12.1. Strong experiential rationalism 275 §12.2. Intuitions and evidence 277 §12.3. Evidence concerning the psychological 279 §12.4. Blind irrationality 281 §12.5. What you can’t sec, can’t rationally constrain you? 282 §12.6. The intersuhjective validity of rational norms 284 §12.7. The objectivity of rational norms 285 §12.8. Reliabilist strong experiential rationalism 288 §12.9. Against phenomenal conservatism 290 §12.10. Against general foundationalism 294 §12.11. Against subjective foundationalism 295 §12.12. Intuitions and evidence revisited 297 §12.13. Intuitions and purely rational inquiry 299 13. Intuition as a Source of Evidence? 301 §13.1. A simple argument 301 §13.2. Blind irrationality reconsidered 303 §13.3. Epistemology and psychology 304 §13.4. Apriority and the “New Evil Demon” problem 307 §13.5. Perceptual justification and the Problem of the Speckled Hen 309 §13.6. Failure of justified belief 312 §13.7. Intuiting and perceiving compared 314 §13.8. Intuiting and perceiving contrasted 315 §13.9. The Bcnacerraf-Field challenge 317 CONTENTS IX 14. Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology 319 §14.1. Positive experimental philosophy 319 §14.2. Negative experimental philosophy 322 §14.3. The use of intuitions in philosophy 324 §14.4. The critique generalized? 325 §14.5. Epistemology and methodology 329 §14.6. Traditional methodology and experimental philosophy 330 §14.7. Philosophy and the quotidian 332 References 335 Index 351 The Rules of Thought develops a rationalist theory of mental content while defending a traditional epistemology of philosophy. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis contend that a capacity for pure rational thought is fundamental to mental content itself and underwrites our quotidian reasoning and extraordinary philosophical engagement alike. Part I of the book develops a Fregean theory of mental content, according to which rational relations between propositions play a central role in individuating contents; the theory is designed to be sensitive not only to Frege s puzzle and other data that have motivated rationalist conceptions of content, but also to considerations in the philosophy of mind and language that have motivated neo-Russellian views. Part II articulates a theory of the a priori, and shows that, given the framework of Part I, it is very plausible that much philosophical work of interest is genuinely a priori. Notably, it is no part of the picture developed that intuitions have an important role to play, either in mental content, or in the epistemology of the a priori; Part III defends this departure from rationalist orthodoxy.
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isbn	9780199661800 0199661804
language	English
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physical	XII, 354 S.
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spelling	Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins Verfasser (DE-588)1036527913 aut The rules of thought Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis 1. ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2013 XII, 354 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index Knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of mind Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Jarvis, Benjamin W. Verfasser (DE-588)1036527972 aut Digitalisierung UB Erlangen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025876780&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025876780&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025876780&sequence=000004&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext
spellingShingle	Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins Jarvis, Benjamin W. The rules of thought Knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of mind Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd
subject_GND	(DE-588)4070914-0
title	The rules of thought
title_auth	The rules of thought
title_exact_search	The rules of thought
title_full	The rules of thought Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis
title_fullStr	The rules of thought Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis
title_full_unstemmed	The rules of thought Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis
title_short	The rules of thought
title_sort	the rules of thought
topic	Knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of mind Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd
topic_facet	Knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of mind Erkenntnistheorie
url	http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025876780&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025876780&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025876780&sequence=000004&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
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