Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1938 - 1939: cztery decyzje Józefa Becka
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Polish |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Gdańsk
Wydawnictwo Oskar [u.a.]
2012
|
| Ausgabe: | Wyd. 1. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Bibliogr. s. 554-600. Indeksy |
| Beschreibung: | 625, [1] S. 22 cm |
| ISBN: | 9788363709105 9788363029081 |
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| 500 | |a Bibliogr. s. 554-600. Indeksy | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804150170173046784 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Spis treści
Wprowadzenie
...............................................................................................7
Rozdział
1.
Polityka równowagi
-
realia i dylematy
(1934-1938).......... 15
Układy o nieagresji ze Związkiem Sowieckim i Niemcami
........................ 16
Dwa projekty europejskie: pakt czterech i pakt wschodni
...........................25
Totalitarne mocarstwa ościenne w percepcji polskiej
..................................33
Sojusz z Francją- kryzys i próby rewaloryzacji
..........................................46
W konfrontacji z dyplomacją niemiecką
......................................................67
„Wojna religijna w Europie
......................................................................... 75
Wobec polityki zaspokajania
........................................................................ 83
Idee programowe i rzeczywistość
................................................................ 91
Rozdział
2.
Idea Międzymorza
-
polski plan polityczny w roku
1938.....99
Koncepcja Międzymorza i projekt współpracy
polsko-węgiersko-rumuńskiej
.................................................................... 103
Działania dyplomacji polskiej we wrześniu-październiku
1938
r
............. 118
Projekt Trzeciej Europy a stanowisko
Веска
wobec Czechosłowacji
........ 140
Koncepcja racjonalna, lecz nierealistyczna
................................................ 162
Rozdział
3.
Polska między niemcami a Związkiem Sowieckim
we wrześniu
1938
r. (fakty, hipotezy, interpretacje)
.............................. 169
Polityka sowiecka: słabość czy ekspansjonizm?
........................................ 174
Dyplomacja sowiecka między Anschlussem Austrii a konfliktem
o Sudety
...................................................................................................... 185
Pogłoski o zgodzie Rumunii na przeloty samolotów sowieckich
.............. 192
Zagrożenie sowieckie
-
rzeczy wistość czy mistyfikacja?
......................... 199
Interpretacje historyczne
............................................................................ 212
Decyzja
Beneša
........................................................................................... 219
Odwilż
-
październik
1938
r.
.....................................................................228
Intencje Sowietów
-
próba interpretacji
.....................................................236
Rozdział
4.
Żądania Hitlera i polska decyzja negatywna
(1938-1939) .... 242
Wolne Miasto Gdańsk i sprawa dostępu Polski do morza
.........................244
Niemiecki rewizjonizm terytorialny i polityka polska
.............................. 255
Dyplomacja polska wobec niemieckiej koncepcji
Gesamtlösung..............269
Polskie
non possumus .................................................................................
289
Rozdział
5.
Sojusz z Wielką Brytanią
-
decyzja i konsekwencje
.........304
U podstaw probrytyjskiej orientacji Józefa
Веска
..................................... 305
Geneza i kontekst deklaracji gwarancyjnej Chamberlaina
........................320
Rozmowy
Веска
w Londynie w kwietniu
1939
r
....................................... 336
„Punktacja z
7
kwietnia
1939
r
................................................................. 345
Czy można liczyć na Sowietów?
................................................................ 355
Walka dyplomacji polskiej o traktat sojuszniczy z Wielką Brytanią
........ 368
Rozdział
6.
Zbliżenie
Berlin-Moskwa
i żądania sowieckie
wobec Polski
..............................................................................................390
Czy zbliżenie niemiecko-sowieckie jest możliwe?
-
interpretacje polskie
.... 391
Polskie kalkulacje, opinie, przewidywania (maj-sierpień
1939
r.)
............405
W przededniu i w obliczu paktu z
23
sierpnia
1939
r.
............................... 414
„Przecieki o tajnym protokole a dyplomacja polska
.................................425
Brak alternatywnej opcji politycznej
.......................................................... 439
W obliczu żądań sowieckich z sierpnia
1939
r.
..........................................446
Rozdział
7.
Wrzesień
1939
r.
-
polskie doświadczenie opuszczenia
przez sprzymierzone mocarstwa
.............................................................460
Polskie oczekiwania
....................................................................................462
Misja gen. Kasprzyckiego w Paryżu i wojskowe zobowiązania francuskie
... 476
Misje Claytona i
Ironside a
do Polski
.........................................................496
Strategia mocarstw sprzymierzonych a Polska
..........................................509
Wrzesień
-
porzucenie sojusznika: mit czy rzeczywistość?
...................... 519
Interpretacje historyczne
............................................................................ 531
Cztery decyzje Polski
1938-1939.
Podsumowanie
.................................544
Wykaz skrótów
.......................................................................................... 552
Bibliografia
................................................................................................ 554
Summary
...................................................................................................602
Indeks osobowy
.........................................................................................607
Indeks geograficzny
..................................................................................622
6
Summary
This book consists of seven studies of the most important issues in Polish
foreign policy in the last phase of the diplomatic struggle to preserve peace
on the eve of the Second World War. What could Poland do? Was the Polish
foreign ministry merely a passive victim of circumstances or did it influence
the course of events? These are the critical questions, and even though very
many works have already addressed them, they continue to interest. This au¬
thor, a 15-year veteran of Polish interwar diplomatic history, gives a synopsis
of his thinking and of the research he has conducted in numerous Polish and
non-Polish archives. He recapitulates the findings of his two earlier books,
Polska
¡939
roku wobec paktu
Ribbentrop-
Mołotow. Problem zbliżenia nie-
miecko-sowiec kiego w polityce zagranicznej
II
Rzeczypospolitej
[Poland
1939
and the
Ribbentrop
-Molotov
pact. The issue of the German-Soviet rapproche¬
ment in the foreign policy of the Polish Second Republic]
(2002)
and
Polityka
równowagi
(¡934-/939).
Polska między Wschodem a Zachodem
[ The policy
of balance1
(1934-1939).
Poland between East and West]
(2007).
Chapter I provides an overview of the underlying principles of Polish foreign
policy in
1934-38,
its policy of balance, neutrality
vis-à-vis
both Germany and
the Soviet Union. This concept was born immediately after Poland regained its
independence in
1922,
codified by Marshal
Józef Piłsudski
in
1926
and, after his
death in
1935,
continued by Foreign Minister
Józef
Beck. The thinking behind it
represented a consensus in Polish political thought: despite its limited economic
potential and developmental delays
vis-à-vis
the countries of Western Europe,
the reborn state, lying between Germany and Russia, should be an autonomous
actor in international politics. Poland s geopolitical location dictated this ap¬
proach as the only available option. Poland could not aspire to cooperate with
either Germany or Soviet Russia. The former would have entailed making ter¬
ritorial concessions (amending the Treaty of Versailles) in favour of Germany as
a sine qua
non condition
and inevitably subordinating itself to Germany. Since
it had been Hitler s ambition from the moment the Third Reich was founded
to dominate Eastern Europe, cooperation with Germany against Soviet Russia
would necessarily have implicated Poland in his plans. Polish leaders decisively
601
rejected this pull, a momentous fact. Polish plans also did not allow for coopera¬
tion with the Soviets, which would have turned Poland into the other totalitarian
power s vassal and would inevitably have threatened with ideological invasion
from the east. Also, from a geopolitical perspective, it would be impossible to
imagine a sovereign Poland allied with the USSR. Testifying to this realism in
Polish political thought was the fact that Poland never counted on Soviet help in
a war against Germany and, vice versa, Germany s help against Russia.
Indeed, thanks to this policy of balance, in
1934-38
Poland played a stabili¬
zing role in international relations, especially in East-Central Europe. Yet this
policy has always appeared as inconsistent, fragmented and lacking long-term
planning. In fact, it was carefully thought-out and cautious and had no strate¬
gic alternatives
-
unless we consider self-destruction and self-subjugation in
relations with other countries. Criticism of its creators for their lack of realism
was uniformly ex post facto, voiced by historians of interwar relations between
European countries, which the actors in these events could not possibly have
understood in the same way.
The first tenet of the policy of balance was, evidently, neutrality between
Germany and the USSR. The second was bilateralism, favouring two-sided
agreements over multilateral obligations, which could be more complex and
questionable. The third was Polish diplomacy s
disassociation
from the Eu¬
ropean religious war brought on in the second half of the
1930s
by the of¬
fensives and rivalries between the totalitarian powers. Fourth was Minister
Beck s scepticism about the effectiveness of collective security and opposition
to all political blocs, while the League of Nations gradually became
a quantité
négligeable
to him. The most important guiding motto for Polish policy was
nothing about us without us
(nihil
de nobis
sine nobis).
The next two chapters are devoted to the principal challenges to Polish for¬
eign policy in
1938.
Chapter II discusses the idea of a Third Europe , the area
between the Baltic and Black Seas as a neutral sphere between Germany and So¬
viet Russia. This project did not have a chance, since the Romanian-Hungarian
antagonism stood in the way of such a trilateral alliance of Poland, Hungary
and Romania. The very idea of building a non-partisan zone in Central Europe
exhibits an ability to forecast the future, since subsequent events showed quar¬
relling, uncooperative countries in this region succumbing one by one to Ger¬
man and Soviet expansionism. But the Third Europe project is certain proof
that instead of waiting passively for the looming danger, Poland attempted to act.
Chapter III introduces a new analysis of the September
1938
international
crisis, focussing not only on the German but also on the Soviet roles in shaping
602
the geopolitics of the day in East-Central Europe, it concludes by determining
that in September
1938
Poland had four choices. Firstly, Poland could have sid¬
ed with Germany by moving from the normalization stage, i.e., the
26
January
1934
line of the German-Polish Non-Aggressive Pact, to active cooperation.
This, evidently, would have amounted to national suicide. Secondly, Poland
could have stood by Czechoslovakia to defend the principle of the integrity of
the Versailles system, which would only have been possible if Czechoslovakia
had itself wanted to defend itself
manu militari,
something that was out of
the question without France s help. Thirdly, Poland could have stayed neutral.
From today s perspective, this choice may appear as the most practical, yet in
the realities of the day, it would have amounted to plain passivity. Fourthly,
Poland could have fought for a privilege clause for the sake of the Polish pop¬
ulation in
Cieszyn
Silesia and exploited the disintegration of Czechoslovakia
to construct a new political system in East-Central Europe, to create the Inter-
marium project. Poland elected the fourth option and attempted to implement
it. Indeed, only the third and fourth options were realistic, a choice between
strict neutrality and Beck s eventual pick. In view of the major transformation
underway in the European balance of power, neutrality, significantly, would
have been a sort of submission. It is problematic to say today that this is the
policy the Polish government should have chosen even if, from today s per¬
spective, it may have turned out as the most advantageous.
As we know, in the wake of the resolutions of the Munich Conference and
their acceptance by the government of Czechoslovakia, Warsaw decided to
present an ultimatum to Prague on
30
September
1938
demanding the retro¬
cession of
Cieszyn
Silesia, which had been a subject of dispute between the
two countries throughout the interwar period. But it is unacceptable to call this
action open aggression , which it often is in historical literature. It is permis¬
sible to criticize this action from an ethical point of view. But judgements that
this was an immoral act contribute little to our understanding of this period,
since using ethical criteria, which are suitable in human relations, in politics
would lead to major complications. It is much more important that in the inter¬
national European crisis in the autumn of
1938,
the policy of balance was not
undermined or obliterated. Poland emerged from this crisis with a questiona¬
ble balance, but retaining its existing strategic orientation, without becoming
dependent on Germany or surrendering to foreign diktat.
Chapter IV analyzes the key problem in Poland s politics of the period, its
stand
vis-à-vis
Germany s territorial demands first presented in October
1938.
it does not intend to rework the fundamental thesis about the impossibility of
603
Polish-Nazi cooperation. But we should not forget Warsaw s concrete offer made
to Berlin. Polish compromises were basically focussed on the idea of a special
motorway , as either German property or a joint investment project. It was to be
an investment fenced off from Polish territory, but not an extraterritorial one.
Warsaw considered the idea of dividing the Free City of Gdansk/Danzig between
Poland and Germany as a sort of a definitive solution of the Polish-German dis¬
pute. The problem of the motorway did not exist, only one of the clause of extra¬
territoriality, which the Polish government had no intention of approving. But,
clearly, Polish plans to solidify peaceful neighbourly relations with Germany,
as a joint guarantee for the continuing existence of Gdansk as a Free City and
allow ing the Third Reich to construct a special motorway across
Pomerania
to
East Prussia, remain an indisputable fact. Yet they were not executed. This was
impossible while Hitler was striving to dominate Europe, something that be¬
came perfectly clear in January
1939
or perhaps earlier, as is evident in instruc¬
tions to Ambassador
Józef Lipski
in Berlin on
8
December
1938.
Chapter V is a study of the Polish-British Alliance, created thanks to Brit¬
ain s guarantees of Poland s independence on
31
March
1939,
provisionally
formulated in the secret agreement of
7
April
1939
and finally enclosed in the
Agreement of Mutual Assistance of
25
August (which also included a secret
protocol) six days before Germany launched the war. The goal of this analysis
is to revisit Polish diplomatic efforts, which historians often present as passive.
It is important to review them. The British Foreign Office struggles over the
creation and shape of an alliance contradict the thesis that the Polish state was
submissive to Britain. The mutual assistance clause in the treaty indeed was
the outcome of a compromise, but the Poles also succeeded in inserting many
of their demands. The treaty gave Poland real political benefits, but was of no
military value, since a military agreement was not signed and Britain did not
have the capacity to come to Poland s assistance in the battlefield. It would, of
course, have been optimal to gain credible military guarantees, but Beck won
no such thing. Blaming him for it is extremely questionable. From the start, he
had been dealt a bad hand, and it is debatable whether and to what extent he
was aware of his own country s military weakness. Even though it was Beck s
real accomplishment to internationalize the Polish cause, no political actions
would have been able to guarantee active assistance from the Western allies in
September
1939.
It is also unimaginable that the Polish-French alliance could
have been revitalized without an agreement with the United Kingdom.
Even though, of course, the Polish-British alliance did not spare either Po¬
land or Europe from war, it did complicate Hitler s original plans. He was
604
unable to execute either his initial primary scenario of peacefully taking over
East-Central Europe and then turning on the Western powers, or his second-
choice scenario of conquering a fully isolated and abandoned Poland in a quick
campaign.
1
September
1939
became the first day of the Second World War. If
we define politics as the art of the possible, Poland got the maximum possible,
since even with a temporary loss of territory it preserved its legal subjectivity
and a government that held rights and obligations as defined by international
law and could carry on the war.
Chapter VI re-examines the situation produced by the Hitler-Stalin pact of
23
August
1939
for Poland, a partitioning agreement that crowned the totali¬
tarian policies of exterminations of entire nations. Hitler found an effective
partner for his policy in Stalin. Nothing Warsaw did could have pre-empted
the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, nor could it have altered the inevitable course of
events leading up to the war.
The Polish perceptions of Moscow s strategy, which the author has discus¬
sed at length in his other work, did not take into account a rapprochement and
an actual alliance between the two totalitarian regimes, which seemed to want
to destroy each other. The Poles believed, unfortunately, that their neighbour
to the east might remain neutral in the first phase of the approaching European
war. In the summer of
1939
they thought that even if the talks being conducted
in Moscow by representatives of the western powers collapsed, Poland would
not suffer from it, since efforts to win over the USSR as their principal ally in
Eastern Europe would fail, while the Polish-British and Polish-French allian¬
ces would remain.
This chapter also presents a new analysis of Poland s position
vis-à-vis
the
Moscow negotiations. As we know, western and post-Soviet Russian histo¬
riography is very critical of Poland s stand on this issue, it tends to explain
it as a manifestation of nationalist pride and unjustified power ambitions.
Today, of course, with our ample understanding of the Soviet totalitarian sys¬
tem, claiming that the Poles could have received real military assistance from
Stalin shows an astounding lack of historical imagination. This author cannot
agree with A.J.P. Taylor s claim in his controversial study Origins of the Se¬
cond World War
(1961)
that the Soviet leaders wanted a close alliance with the
western powers which would defend themselves . Another historian, Phillip
Longworth wrote: Colonel Beck was himself responsible for the conclusion
of the Nazi-Soviet Pact {The Making of Eastern Europe,
1992).
Such views are
astonishing examples of misunderstanding the true Soviet strategy and foreign
policy and, especially, its totalitarian expansionism. Poland was an obstacle to
605
the Soviets4 entry into Central Europe and their shaping of power relationships
there. The Bolsheviks did not view the Polish state as a permanent component
in the international order. From
1934
to
1939
the mood in the Polish-Soviet
relationship was so bad that it could even be defined as a sort of cold war1,
even though on the eve of the war Soviet diplomats acted to warm their rela¬
tions with Poland to allay Polish suspicions of a threat from the east. Warsaw s
rejection of the Soviet demands to allow the Red Army to march across Poland
(18-22
August) was the only possible response from the Polish government,
and it had absolutely no alternative.
Poland was doing everything in its power to avoid being subjugated by Ger¬
many. Objectively speaking, this favoured Moscow since no one could attack
it from the west without Poland s participation, something that historians, in¬
cluding Adam B.
Ulam,
have noted. In the meantime, to the Soviets Poland
was an enemy, and nothing it did could change this perception. One can only
express regret that the Polish leaders did not see the inevitability of this new
partition. Had they been able to predict it, however, they could have done ab¬
solutely nothing to alter the course of events.
The final Chapter
VII
examines the Polish experience of abandonment by
the allied powers in September
1939.
Warsaw no doubt expected the allied
guarantees to be fulfilled and the western front to be open. Yet the western
powers1 defensive military strategy meant that even with concrete alliance
guarantees, Poland could not receive actual military assistance from France.
Beck believed that meeting these obligations would not be an ethical issue, but
that it lay in France s and the other powers own interests. But this proved to
be a wrong assumption.
In
1939
Poland had a rational political plan that collapsed as it confronted
reality. Events on the eve of the war led to several psychological misunder¬
standings. The allies failed to understand Poland s determination to defend its
sovereignty and its territorial cohesiveness at any price and in any conditions.
The Poles did not detect that their allies, in their own interests, would be una¬
ble to take advantage of a situation in which the German army was almost ful¬
ly engaged in fighting Poland. Neither side had enough imagination to foresee
the unforeseeable: the Blitzkrieg and the total war.
To summarize, at this time of the totalitarian offensives and the progressive
disintegration of the Versailles-Riga system, there could be no stability, regar¬
dless of anything Poland, a medium-sized peripheral country, did.
Translated by
Maja Łatyńska
606
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Kornat, Marek 1971- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)130358657 |
| author_facet | Kornat, Marek 1971- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Kornat, Marek 1971- |
| author_variant | m k mk |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV040888684 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)835560936 (DE-599)BVBBV040888684 |
| edition | Wyd. 1. |
| era | Geschichte 1938-1939 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1938-1939 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Polska / stosunki zagraniczne / 1918-1945 jhpk Polen (DE-588)4046496-9 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Polska / stosunki zagraniczne / 1918-1945 Polen |
| id | DE-604.BV040888684 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:34:40Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788363709105 9788363029081 |
| language | Polish |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025868382 |
| oclc_num | 835560936 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-M352 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-M352 |
| physical | 625, [1] S. 22 cm |
| psigel | DHB_JDG_ISBN_1 |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publishDateSearch | 2012 |
| publishDateSort | 2012 |
| publisher | Wydawnictwo Oskar [u.a.] |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Kornat, Marek 1971- Verfasser (DE-588)130358657 aut Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1938 - 1939 cztery decyzje Józefa Becka Marek Kornat Wyd. 1. Gdańsk Wydawnictwo Oskar [u.a.] 2012 625, [1] S. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Bibliogr. s. 554-600. Indeksy Geschichte 1938-1939 gnd rswk-swf Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd rswk-swf Polska / stosunki zagraniczne / 1918-1945 jhpk Polen (DE-588)4046496-9 gnd rswk-swf Polen (DE-588)4046496-9 g Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 s Geschichte 1938-1939 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025868382&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025868382&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Kornat, Marek 1971- Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1938 - 1939 cztery decyzje Józefa Becka Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4003846-4 (DE-588)4046496-9 |
| title | Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1938 - 1939 cztery decyzje Józefa Becka |
| title_auth | Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1938 - 1939 cztery decyzje Józefa Becka |
| title_exact_search | Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1938 - 1939 cztery decyzje Józefa Becka |
| title_full | Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1938 - 1939 cztery decyzje Józefa Becka Marek Kornat |
| title_fullStr | Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1938 - 1939 cztery decyzje Józefa Becka Marek Kornat |
| title_full_unstemmed | Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1938 - 1939 cztery decyzje Józefa Becka Marek Kornat |
| title_short | Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1938 - 1939 |
| title_sort | polityka zagraniczna polski 1938 1939 cztery decyzje jozefa becka |
| title_sub | cztery decyzje Józefa Becka |
| topic | Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Außenpolitik Polska / stosunki zagraniczne / 1918-1945 Polen |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025868382&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025868382&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kornatmarek politykazagranicznapolski19381939czterydecyzjejozefabecka |