Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale:
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Romanian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Iaşi
Casa Ed. Demiurg
2010
|
| Ausgabe: | Ed. 2., rev. şi adăugită |
| Schriftenreihe: | Colecţia Istorici ieşeni
1 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 238 S. |
| ISBN: | 9786069250235 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804149797600362496 |
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| adam_text | CUPRINS
Cuvânt înainte
.................................................................................................. 7
Partea întâi: ANTECEDENTE
..................................................................... 9
Cap.
I.
Introducere în problemă
.............................................................. 11
Cap.
II.
Noi orientări diplomatice
........................................................... 27
Cap. III. Relaţii germano-poloneze
......................................................... 43
Cap.
IV. Roosevelt
şi
Chamberlain
intervin fără succes
........................ 71
Cap.
V.
Acţiuni diplomatice în preajma semnării pactului
..................... 83
Partea a doua: CONSECINŢE
..................................................................... 93
Cap.
VI.
Semnarea pactului
-
Fapte şi ecouri imediate
.......................... 95
Cap. VII. Pactul de la
28
septembrie
1939.
Cucerirea Ţărilor Baltice
... 129
Cap. VIII. Războiul sovieto-finlandez
.................................................... 139
Cap.
IX.
Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi consecinţele sale reflectate în
documente din Arhivele secrete sovietice (august 1939-mai
1940).. 151
Concluzii
.......................................................................................................... 199
Abstract
(translated by
Irina
Croitoru)
............................................................ 209
Bibliografie
...................................................................................................... 218
Indice general (Alexandrina Ioniţă)
................................................................ 226
CONCLUSIONS
„The Bomb of
1939
was in our opinion not the outbreak of the 2nd World
War. It was predictable from the conduct of the international relations and the
people, especially in Europe, were expecting this outcome. „The Bomb of
1939
was the assignment of the Sowjet-German Non-Aggression Pact and its secret
Annex regarding the division of the interests spheres in Europe. It was, as the recent
successful appreciation of the Romanian historiography, the act of century s
brigandage . The Pact, kept strictly secret has opened the door of war, of the most
dreadful carnage known to humanity. Adolf Hitler wanted it to obtain the vital
space
(Lebensraum),
the supremacy in Europe and even beyond this, and Stalin, to
trigger the world communist revolution, a Soviet version of the same kind of vital
space . The ideological differences have not been a barrier in proximity of the two
political regimes, although before
1939,
they were severe criticized. When the
international situation was favorable to the division of the interests spheres, the
-
Nazi and Communist
-
ideologies have only played the role of the shield for petty,
antidemocratic, anti-human, imperialist, criminal purposes.
One of the disastrous effects of the Stalin-Hitler agreement was the
destroying of the European equilibrium, providing a spectacular entrance of the
Bolshevism for a period of
50
years in international life. The Communism
-
specifies a document of the Secret Intelligence Service (SBS) in Bucharest, in
October
1939 -
defeated until yesterday everywhere in relation to doctrine,
reappeared under the German auspices in the Europe s Arena . Grigore Gafencu
also insists on the same aspect: The only power that can oppose on the continent
to the Soviet Union after the collapse of Poland and its defensive system
-
Baltic
-
Black Sea
-
is now Germany. It is like an irony of fate this power that made the
first, as the most important goal of its policy to combat the Comintern, opened the
gates of Europe to the Bolshevism and gave the Soviet Union the consciousness of
its enormous opportunities for expanding and unleashed the
pansláv
Bolshevist
imperialism . Likewise, the English journalist Alexander Werth writes that the Pact
of
23
August
1939,
raised the USSR to the continental power and in the future
world power, realized by Hitler, but wanted by his opponents
-
in particular, France
and Britain
-
Europe has been discarded for several years under Nazi s rule
...
which will be substituted later
-
as the result that the Western Powers led by
Britain and the United States of America will have to ally from 1941with the USSR
to eliminate Hitler and his continental and extra continental partners.
The extremely difficult conditions after the First World War made that in some
countries, like Russia, Italy and Germany to be imposed the political authoritarianism,
the dictatorship, with the adverse consequences for the democratic system, for the
human beings, for the values of civilization. The victory of communism in Russia
209
Emilian
BOLD Hie SEFTIUC
must be made in tandem with the development of fascism and Nazism. The three
elements
-
the American political scientist
Zbigniew Brzeziński
of Polish origin
says
-
have been generically, historical related and from the political point of view,
quite similar. The trauma and the post war tensions, the class hatred was sustained,
causing the collapse of values and political order such as in Russia and Germany.
The social movements have placed the concept of social justice around a message
of social hatred and proclaimed the violence organized by the state as an instrument
of social value . If, initially, the communism was conceived as a social emancipation
message, hence the attraction to it of some prominent intellectuals in Western
Europe later this attraction was wasted, because Lenin and Stalin gave the world
not social emancipation, but Gulags. For the Soviet citizens, they made one of the
most terrible instruments of state oppression of all time. The hypocrisy and lies
have been features of the Soviet regime, impassable gulf between what was written
in the Constitution of
1936
and the horrors of camps, the forced collectivization,
the massive purges. Instead, we can t reproach the Nazism totally for political
hypocrisy, but just in some aspects. The reality of the Nazi regime, the Fiihrer s
principle
(Führerprinzip)
at all levels of state and society, the racial discrimination,
the racial purification
-
all these were at the same time, part of the ideology, but
also of the practice. Hitler tried to build, with rudimentary means, at biological
level, the myth of the superior race, without any scientific or spiritual coverage.
In turn, Lenin and Stalin viewed the development of human society through the
prism of the class struggle, just as an economic struggle of classes, bad, inhuman
policy, by killing the capable elements, but against the regime.
In terms of methods and management procedures, the communist and Nazi
regimes are on the same level.
The consolidation of power has not been achieved by democratic means but
by awful crimes, by abolishing the democratic regime, the multiparty system and
the freedoms, through the absolute disregard for human beings. The affinities
between the two regimes have been shaped over time and from itself. Both
ideologies were forcing themselves to convince the public opinion about the
promoting of human principles, about the defense of peace, about the building of
the true socialism . Grigore Gafencu accurately outlined in a report from Moscow
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest: Same authoritarian rule and same
care of the dictators to keep power in their hands, the same independence against
the public opinion and its reactions, which gives rulers the same freedom of
movement in international politics, the same concept about mass politics, which
replaced all individualistic views so far
...
same trend to incorporate the small states
in their vital area of their mass, the same predilection for the simple and long
geographic boundaries lines... the same resignation of cutting, for the moment the
globe in vertical slices, unable to swallow it whole immediately, the same cult of
power, of power of hitting and of pushing through as many masses as possible and
as thoroughly organized, as perfect mechanized and motorized... . Both Stalin and
Hitler, were avoiding to refer to the doctrinal issues before the war
-
pangermanism
and
panslavism
-
of which in reality were deriving and were important starting
210
Pactul
Rìbbentrop-Molotov
şi implicaţiile internaţionale
points
for the
imperialist
goals. These goals, the Nazism and the Communism owed
them more than any other ideology. The fact is evident in the foreign policy. In this
area, Nazi Germany s and Soviet Russia s strategies have followed strictly the known
programs of conquest, drawn by the pannationalist movements before and during
the First World War, so that the totalitarian aims have been mistakenly interpreted
as seeking some permanent German or Russian interests. Since neither Hitler nor
Stalin had ever recognized the tribute to the imperialism in the development of the
government s methods, none of them did hesitate to acknowledge their debt to the
ideology of the pannationaliste movements or to imitate their slogans.
The complicated evolution of the events of the years
1936-1939,
England
and France couldn t remain uninvolved in one way or another. The problem was,
that, compared to Germany, the two Western countries were not sufficiently
prepared for the war, and especially for the requirements of a modern conflict.
Since the first postwar decade, France was considered to have the most powerful
army in Europe. It was simply deliberated and widespread organized information.
In fact, France was down, in addition to serious demographic problems, a serious
political and financial crisis, something which led to the passage of the background
of defense systems. Also, it was proved that France
-
the moment of the Rhine
crisis in
1936
remains conclusive
-
could not act alone, without the support of
England and the countries of central and southeastern Europe that were part of its
alliance system, a system not too coagulated and not too strong militarily. On the
other hand, England, with an improved internal stability, consistently helped by the
Empire {Commonwealth) and by its strong fleet, promoting the principle of balance
of powers, sought to undermine the hegemony of French policy, while they were
looking suspiciously the totalitarian regimes in Europe. The paradox is evident
when England and France sought to avoid a conflict with the Soviets, their foreign
policy priority. Compared to the West, however, Stalin showed obvious reserves
and suspicions, especially after the Munich Conference, when the principle of collective
security has utterly collapsed. Although there were suspicions of one side or
another, the searching for ways of understanding has not ceased. The Anglo-French
diplomacy, believing that an imminent threat was coming from beyond the Rhine,
has sought an understanding with the USSR against the Nazis. The First World
War has demonstrated that the strike action and defeat of Germany was, however,
needed Russian support. Now, in the calculations of the Western politicians raised
again the issue of an alliance like that of
1914.
But the events of
1938-1939
were
no longer resembled to those of
1914.
They have evolved quite rapidly and
devious, so that none of the countries threatened by an aggression could find
Practical means to prevent the war or to shelter of its ravages.
The pretext of the outbreak of the World War was Germany s claim to annex
the free city of Danzig (now Gdansk). It is true that this city had a majority of German
Population, but its status had been fixed by the Treaty of Versailles. The mtenfton
to merge this city to the Reich, to construct a road and a railway a long *eO>mdor
with extraterritorial character, plus the German-Soviet Pact in
^1939^
sharply increased the danger of war, some countries, including
211
Emilian
BOLD Hie SEFTIUC
on guard and were showing a real concern. Romania, for example, was facing the
alternative: either becoming Germany s ally, like Hungary or Bulgaria, or was
liable to be divided between the USSR and Germany. Romania was also threatened
by Hungary that it wanted Transylvania, and Bulgaria, which, in tandem with the Soviet
Union wanted to impose the submitting Dobrudja and Bessarabia. As you know,
Romania has chosen the alliance with Germany, not for sympathy for the regime of
this country, but for the stringent requirements to protect the national existence in
front of the Soviet expansion and the revisionism of the east and west neighbors.
Also Poland, threatened to the east and west, although it signed an
agreement with England, has not managed to avoid territorial division, or to
maintain the stability of the free city of Danzig. There are some mistakes that the
Polish foreign policy has committed in the interwar period, which partly explain
the momentary disappearance from the map of Europe. First, Poland s intention to
consider a kind of regional great power and to maintain a balance in the central
and southeastern Europe was not based and backed by a military, economic,
political force, that it really lie in this role and wanted to play. Second, Poland,
through its Foreign Minister Josef Beck, did not understand the true value of the
need for European solidarity, instead Warsaw s diplomacy has affected as it could
the collective security system after
1934
and especially after the Munich Conference
and the Sudeten crisis. The Soviet government had not forgotten the war of Poland
against the Soviet Union in
1920
and could not admit that Poland took advantage
of the Czechoslovak crisis, participating in its territorial disintegration. At Munich
in September
1938,
the Soviet government was not invited to attend the conference for
the Sudeten area, being ignored, although it was, undoubtedly, part of the great powers
and was still formally promoting the policy of collective security. The displayed
open discontent and resentment against the decisions of Munich were preparing the
way for German-Soviet rapprochement, which, in the summer of
1939,
got an
amazing emerge. It is symptomatic that Maxim
Litvínov,
referring to the isolation
imposed on the Soviet Union, it intuited perfectly that it will have unfavorable
consequences for Poland. On
4
October
1938,
he said to France s ambassador to
Moscow: I note simply that the Western powers deliberately kept the USSR out of
the negotiations. My poor friend, what have you done? In what regards us, I do not
see other exit than the fourth partition of Poland. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
sealed this division, Poland was abolished as a state and the war, wanted both of
Berlin, and Moscow began to make an inexhaustible number of victims on the front, in
the Nazi or Soviet camps or in the depths of Siberia s isolated and frozen forests.
In the speeches arising from national or international events, both Hitler and
Stalin, do not hesitate to talk about their honest intention to preserve peace and
avoid war. At one time in England they were thought by VIPs such as the Bishop of
York, Temple, Clifford Allen, John M. Keynes, Lord Lothian, etc. The Nazi-Soviet
Pact of August
1939
was presented to public opinion as a document with the purpose
of defending peace and give peace to mankind. Official newspaper
Pravda
wrote
that the understanding between Germany and the Soviet Union contributed
to the relaxation of the tensioned atmosphere in the international situation ,
212
Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale
so agitated and so uncertain. Or, as the media of the two extremes
-
left or right
-
inserted in Moscow or Berlin s dispositions that the two powers signed the Pact,
in their peaceful intent , they are thinking at the good of the Polish people, the
good of humanity, and Stalin and Hitler were presented as providential people,
people with a strong sense of justice and honesty
(!?),
in the press you could only
read about German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty, the other
-
the secret annex
-
was omitted to be made public in order not to expose their imperialists intentions.
It seemed that the German diplomatic representatives know almost nothing about
the secret agreement. They have got some news just by indiscretion of some
officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs {Auswertigesamt).
However, the information services, announced immediately after the
signing of the Treaty, the existence of a secret treaty under which Poland, the Baltic
Countries and Romania were to be slaughtered. The news recorded in some
American or English newspapers, as well as the statements of
Molotov
and Hitler
on the radio about the existence of the non-aggression pact has disrupted the
diplomatic world and the communist labor movement in Europe, has created a deep
fear, fact that has been considered incredible, and some communist militants have
left the party. Others, however, fled to Moscow and during the war have made
propaganda against their own countries, continuing practically his previous work,
of betraying national interests.
The German-Soviet tend to close was made in time and was not without some
rough. We do not deny the existence of some mutual sympathy of the two leaders
in Berlin and Moscow, and no similarity between the methods of management
outlined in a totalitarian sovereign contempt towards the right of people and to
national existence. Some reluctance manifested in intimate discussions or official
statements could not cover the traditional Russian-German feelings of respect and
admiration. Some of Hitler s private statements and some of his partners are not
evidence of an anti-Soviet emphasis, but an understanding of the regime in Russia,
where it could be found different affinities with the National Socialist ideology.
Joseph
Goebbels,
for example, has recognized, even before taking the power, the
existence of a close link between the National Socialism and Bolshevism. Equally,
various Gauleiters or generals were not afraid to foresee a German-Soviet alliance,
seeking to strengthen the economic, politic and military relations with the USSR.
In turn, Hitler s belief (as well as Mussolini, in fact) that Bolshevism will become
in time a kind of national socialism and that between the two ideologies would find
more common grounds than differences. Therefore, he had provided dispositions
that his party to get former Communists in which he had more confidence than
m
the little social-democratic bourgeois or in the unions leaders . Some reserves,
as we mentioned earlier, existed, and they were affirmed by Hitler, but the reason
and current or further interest in resumption of the normal relations with the Soviets
were not ideological elements, but practical, of large economic and strategic
interests. If we accept the allegations of Hermann Rauschnmng, for a while close
friend of Hitler, the
Führer
did never rejected the possibility of an alliance
;
with
the Soviets, although in
Mein Kampf
ma
in many of his speeches the
antì-Bolshevuc
213
Emilian
BOLD Hie
SEFTIUC
tendency was serious and always scored. Hermann Rauschnning Hitler confided
that the alliance with Russia will be for him one last trump card. Hitler confessed to
Hermann Rauschnning that the alliance with Russia will be for him a last advantage.
And if I decide to bet on Russia, nothing can stop me to change my mind and to
attack it, while my goals towards the West will be achieved. The evolution of
Hitler s political thinking has gone steadily up to these parameters. The crusade
initiated by him against Bolshevism, tried to draw to his side France, England or
Poland, or at least to make them not to become too close to Moscow. The initiative
of some firm alliances failed and Hitler himself acknowledged his approaches
failure. When the efforts were directed towards the Soviet Union, they were
coming in reaction to the Soviet s territorial demands. He succeeded and signed the
complained document of division of interests spheres, supporting the Soviet
Russia to rebuild the old pre-war territorial space and forcing the West to intervene.
Our assertion is supported by Grigore Gafencu, Minister of Romania in Moscow.
He wrote that Soviet Russia was afraid of Germany, whose goals came, among
others, Ukraine, with its huge agricultural land and coals, and the Caucasus, rich in
oil. However, he knew the power of military action and modern technology. When
collective security policy has collapsed
-
obvious with the Soviet support
-
Stalin didn t believe anymore in the possibility of a collective effort to slow down
the tendencies of the German conquest. He understood that the Western countries,
abandoning the principle of collective security, have fully abandoned the Eastern
Europe to Germany and that the country was pushed towards an
anti-
Soviet attack.
To pave the way towards reconciliation and dialogue with Germany, Stalin fired
Litvinov and replaced him with Veaceslav
Molotov,
to promote a political
approach to the Reich. The replacement in the Soviet Foreign Ministry was the
signal for a radical foreign change that all accredited diplomats in Moscow,
Warsaw, Paris, London and other capitals have realized. The approximation,
leaving intact the principles of Nazi or communist ideology, has resulted in the
Pact of
23
August
1939
and then from September
28
the same year. In this way,
Hitler agreed that the Russian borders to be set at those who were before the war.
The peace, which followed the war, confirmed the boundaries of legal terms, the
action was not signed by Hitler, who committed suicide, but of the representatives
of major allied powers of Soviet Russia, namely USA, Britain and France, powers
of United Nations coalition, which promised to respect the right of peoples to self-
determination, peace, democracy, to repair flagrant historical injustices.
What results were collected by each of the two powers that signed the pact?
Germany has gained in terms of economic relations with the USSR: Toward the
Third Reich, from the Soviet Union were coming large quantities of raw materials
and food needed by the
Reichswehr
and war industry, plus the transit, also through
the Soviet Union of goods from the Orient. It is considered that the success of the
1940
German offensive in the West and the Balkans in
1941
was made possible
largely due to the supplies coming from the Soviet territories. Hitler was content,
for now, having secured the back with the delimitation line that should, by the signed
Protocol to separate the two powers, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. It was not
214
Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale
only a short time and the delimitation line formed the area of attack of the German
army against
-
its ally
-
the Soviet Union.
For Stalin, the price demanded for the understanding with Germany was
much higher and more favorable. First, the Soviet Union was considering itself
neutral, so without being accused of intervening in the war process. The paradox is
precisely that this „neutrality allowed him to occupy eastern Poland, Baltic States,
Bessarabia and Northern
Bukovina,
to clash with Finland in an attempt to occupy it
on the way of weapons and to impose its political regime. In this conflict, however,
it could be seen the weakness of the Red Army and the inability of some generals,
made by Stalin, to finish with Finland in
12
days. The war lasted three months.
The Baltic States were occupied and sovietised by the pressure, fraud and
demagoguery. Compared to them,
Molotov,
as representative of a great power, he
acted with brutality and lack basic of civilized sense. With Romania it was done in
the same brutal way. Late at night
(26
June
1940)
Molotov
summoned to Moscow
the Romanian Minister and, in front of the map, where it was already draw the new
Romanian-Soviet border, he asked that within three days the civil and military
authorities to leave Bessarabia and Northern
Bukovina.
Romania yielded to force
and, in this way, the national and territorial unity of the country would be severely
affected starting with the summer of
1940.
The third point puts into practice the
secret pact. Then, internationally, Romania was isolated and surrounded only by
enemies. The hope of aid from France or England was shattered. France had fallen,
and demanded an armistice to Germany, England, suffered a serious failure to
Dunquerque,
it removed the remains of the army towards Britain s coasts, being
later saved by the radar and by the aircraft.
Romanians lived a hard time in their history. For months we see the
tensioned storm
-
wrote Grigore Gafencu in his magazine,
Timpul
-
that has fallen
on the world, shaking the foundations of human settlements (the war
-
our note).
Now, the fate knocks at our door. In fact, the occupation troops have behaved
brutally, ignoring the agreed terms for withdrawal, attacking with the inhumanity
military, civilians, clergy, ordinary people, many churches have become ruins, an
numerous people of Bessarabia or
Bukovina
have hardly managed to cross the border.
The Romanian people have shown a great understanding, sheltering refugees.
The state assured jobs to the refugee officials.
The press accurately reflected the mood of the Romanian people in those
days full of tragic. On July
3, 1940,
when the last Romanian soldiers left the earth
of Bessarabia and Northern
Bukovina,
the country was in a period of mourning.
In the middle
ofthat
day, throughout Romania was held a minute of silence. In the
capital, the people stopped on the streets, men were found and many eyes have
wept. All heads bowed..., demonstrating that the two provinces, could not been broken
by the heart of neither Romanian. This was the true atmosphere of the Romanians,
regardless of their social, economic or political position. Beside some lost people
or opportunistic people that called them communists and revolutionary
,
no
Romanian enjoyed when hearing the news that Bessarabia and Northern
Bukovina
were alienated. The notifications from the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest, regarding
215
Emilian
BOLD Hie SEFTIUC
the joy that should appear on the faces of the workers when the Soviet troops entered
Bessarabia, information from the archives of the former USSR, not only do not
reflect the truth at all, but are even a blasphemy, a lie at a large scale. The reports
sent to Moscow had to match or to coincide with what the Soviet leaders thought it
would be a bourgeois-landlord country.
The Romanian public opinion was urged not to resign in anguish over the
loss of two provinces. In this regard it is important the publication, in
1940,
of a
declaration made by the historian Gheorghe
Brătianu
in
1933,
in the Chamber of
Deputies, regarding the Romanian s rights over the provinces united with the Country
in
1918:
In our future requirements, the tragedy is also possible: the hour of need,
in which our country would be found in almost all besieged by enemies on its borders.
And yet, beyond the present borders and future threats, beyond the concerns
that shuddered us, the past lesson reinforces our belief that nothing is lost as long
as we keep, relentless and intact, the eternal consciousness of this nation and its
land, as long as we will find a „voice , or as an expression of universal consensus,
or even as a determined Manifestation of a isolated sacrifice, that asserts strongly in
front of the nation and history, the rights that can not expire, which may cover the
adverse circumstances temporary, but without preventing the triumph of justice,
which often delays, but never misses .
„The time of trouble about Gh.
Brătianu
has already talked. The submitting of
Bessarabia and Northern
Bukovina
was the first act of a drama that would come
upon Romania. The Romanian proverb that a misfortune never comes alone comes
true. Romania, in a very bad situation had to renounce at the northern Transylvania
in May and southern Dobrudja. And all this arose from the agreement of August
1939
between Germany and the USSR, an act which completely ignores the right
of peoples to life and undo the most important principles of coexistence among
states. The application of force s right in international relations has produced serious
economic, social and political imbalances, sufferings that are incalculable to peoples.
The outbreak of the Second World War is the most eloquent and cruel example.
After what happened on
23
August
1939,
Europe was left on a heavy, tragic
silence, where, as the famous Romanian journalist Tudor
Teodorescu-Branişte
wrote, it was heard just the large uninterrupted sound of the big arms factories .
The euphoria that swept the Soviet-German friendship has begun to fade
not after long. Both sides that signed the Act of August
23, 1939
were considering
since then that the understanding was temporary and that a clash between them was
inevitable. The Soviet-Finnish War was nothing but the beginning of future
hostilities between Nazi Germany and Bolshevik Russia. In mid-November
1940,
Molotov
visited Berlin and asked for one new division of the interests spheres.
Molotov
was thinking not only to restore the borders of the former Russian Empire
of
1914,
but the occupation of the Middle East, of the Bosphor and Dardanelles
straits, a new organization of the exploitation of the Danube, the final possession of
the eastern Poland occupied on
17
September
1939,
the occupation of Finland,
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Sweden and many ports in the Baltic
216
Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale
Sea.
Hitler
rejected such claims, because he also desired these territories. His goal
did not stop here: he wanted Europe, which he saw, German, and went beyond the
Mediterranean Sea, in Africa and the Atlantic Ocean. Hitler saw the North
America dominated by that class of future owners , who could not be other than
German-Americans, he wanted the conquest of Mexico, with its oil and minerals,
then South America
-
Eldorado of the Nazi colonization. In his drawer, Hitler
already had plans to populate the inferior nations and the transplanting of the
new masters ; he prepared with German women, a strong population growth
through the birth of those inflexible masters that will require the German force to
the defeated and inferior people in terms of race . The extension of Soviet Russia
would be eclipsed Germany and would be canceled the fancy Nazi s intentions.
Since then, Barbarosa plan should enter the scene and achieve what he often said
-
the destruction of Bolshevism, before the defeat of England and imposing of a
new order , the German superior race in Europe and beyond the borders of Asia.
The German invincibility s foolishness and faith, constantly publicized, caused, as
it has been said, the beginning of the war. Maybe nobody thought that he will
interrupt the life of over
50
million people and bring the world unimaginable
sufferings. And it all started with a piece of paper
-
the document in four points,
secret, signed in an atmosphere of bacchic delight.
Translated by
Irina Croitoru
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Bold, Emilian Seftiuc, Ilie |
| author_facet | Bold, Emilian Seftiuc, Ilie |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Bold, Emilian |
| author_variant | e b eb i s is |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV040670171 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)828789234 (DE-599)BVBBV040670171 |
| edition | Ed. 2., rev. şi adăugită |
| era | Geschichte gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV040670171 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:28:44Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9786069250235 |
| language | Romanian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025496753 |
| oclc_num | 828789234 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 238 S. |
| psigel | DHB_BSB_DDC1 DHB_JDG_ISBN_1 |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publishDateSearch | 2010 |
| publishDateSort | 2010 |
| publisher | Casa Ed. Demiurg |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Colecţia Istorici ieşeni |
| series2 | Colecţia Istorici ieşeni |
| spelling | Bold, Emilian Verfasser aut Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale Emilian Bold ; Ilie Seftiuc Ed. 2., rev. şi adăugită Iaşi Casa Ed. Demiurg 2010 238 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Colecţia Istorici ieşeni 1 Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt (DE-588)4011957-9 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte gnd rswk-swf Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt (DE-588)4011957-9 u Geschichte z DE-604 Seftiuc, Ilie Verfasser aut Colecţia Istorici ieşeni 1 (DE-604)BV040759459 1 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025496753&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025496753&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Bold, Emilian Seftiuc, Ilie Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale Colecţia Istorici ieşeni Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt (DE-588)4011957-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4011957-9 |
| title | Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale |
| title_auth | Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale |
| title_exact_search | Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale |
| title_full | Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale Emilian Bold ; Ilie Seftiuc |
| title_fullStr | Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale Emilian Bold ; Ilie Seftiuc |
| title_full_unstemmed | Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale Emilian Bold ; Ilie Seftiuc |
| title_short | Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov şi implicaţiile internaţionale |
| title_sort | pactul ribbentrop molotov si implicatiile internationale |
| topic | Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt (DE-588)4011957-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025496753&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025496753&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV040759459 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT boldemilian pactulribbentropmolotovsiimplicatiileinternationale AT seftiucilie pactulribbentropmolotovsiimplicatiileinternationale |