Regimul post-totalitar din Republica Moldova: (1990 - 2012)
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Romanian |
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Târgovişte
Ed. Cetatea de Scaun
2012
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The post-totalitarian political regime in the Republic of Moldova |
| Beschreibung: | 310 S. |
| ISBN: | 9786065371255 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804149744338993152 |
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| adam_text | Cuprins
PREFAŢĂ
.............................................................................................................7
Introducere
........................................................................................................12
Evoluţia regimului politic post-totalitar
.................................................12
Trăsăturile regimului politic post
-
totalitar
.........................................32
Capitolul
I
Guvernarea agrariano
-
frontista
(1990 -1994).................36
Capitolul
II
Guvernarea agrariano
-
socialistă
( 1994 -1998).............41
Criza instituţiilor puterii în stat
................................................................46
Primele alegeri prezidenţiale democratice
............................................48
Coabitarea Guvernării agrariano-socialiste cu preşedintele Petru
Lucinschi
.......................................................................................................51
Alegerile locale din aprilie
1995...............................................................53
Confruntarea guvernării cu problemele separatismului Problema
găgăuză
..........................................................................................................55
Chestiunea Transnistriei
............................................................................57
Regrupări politice în anul
1997................................................................60
Capitolul III Guvernarea A.D.R., de centru
-
dreapta
(1998-1999).......................................................................................................69
Adoptarea noului Cod electoral
..............................................................73
Analiza comparată a platformelor electorale
........................................76
Rezultatele alegerilor parlamentare
........................................................80
Consultări pentru formarea majorităţii parlamentare
........................81
Dificultăţi în formarea structurilor legislative şi executive
................85
Preşedintele tergiversează formarea coaliţiei majoritare
...................89
Noi demersuri vizând constituirea structurilor parlamentare şi
guvernamentale
...........................................................................................92
Finalizarea Acordului pentru formarea coaliţiei majoritare
..............94
Prevederile Acordului de constituirea Alianţei pentru Democraţie şi
Reforme (ADR)
............................................................................................95
Nemulţumirea şefului statului faţă de Acordul A.D.R
......................96
Deschiderea lucrărilor noului Parlament
...............................................98
Formarea Guvernului Ciubuc
II
...........................................................100
Validarea noului guvern de către Parlament
......................................103
Definitivarea structurilor parlamentare şi guvernamentale
............105
4
Dorin Cimpoeşu
Primele demersuri ale lui Petru Lucinschi pentru schimbarea
regimului politic
........................................................................................108
Crearea condiţiilor pentru demitere Guvernului Ciubuc
II
............110
Coaliţia de centru-dreapta intră în derivă
...........................................112
Divergenţe între şeful statului şi A.
D. R
.............................................114
Cabinetului Ciubuc
II
demisionează
....................................................115
Prima tentativă eşuată de formare a unui nou guvern ADR
..........118
Nominalizarea lui Ion Sturza pentru funcţia de
prim-mínistru....l22
Negocierile premierului desemnat pentru formarea guvernului
.124
Legislativul acordă vot de încredere Guvernului Ion Sturza
..........127
Curtea Constituţională invalidează votul Parlamentului
................128
Ion Sturza desemnat, pentru a doua oară, prim-ministru
...............130
Instalarea Guvernului Sturza
.................................................................131
Iurie Roşea, demolatorul C.D.M. şi al guvernării
de centru-dreapta
......................................................................................132
Consecinţele crizei guvernamentale pentru relaţiile cu România.
136
Noua criză politică şi demiterea Guvernului Sturza
.........................139
„Monstruoasa coaliţie acordă vot de cenzură guvernului Ion
Sturza
...........................................................................................................142
Situaţia politică internă, după căderea Guvernului Sturza
.............144
Trei tentative pentru formarea unui guvern
.......................................146
Reacţii la desemnarea noului prim-ministru
......................................150
Consultări politice privind formarea guvernului Bobuţac
..............153
Incertitudini privind constituirea guvernului Bobuţac
....................155
Desemnarea lui
Vladimir Voronin
în calitate de prim-ministru.
..157
Legislativul respinge şi a doua candidatură la postul de premier.
158
Desemnarea lui Dumitru Braghiş, al treilea candidat la funcţia de
prim-ministru
.............................................................................................159
Sfârşitul guvernării de centru-dreapta
.................................................162
Capitolul
IV
Guvernarea de tranziţie, Dumitru Braghiş
(1999-2001)....................................................................................................166
Capitolul
V
Guvernarea (restauraţia) comunistă sovietică
(2001-2009)......................................................................................................168
Campania electorală şi principalele partide înscrise în cursa pentru
putere
...........................................................................................................171
Alegerile din Republica Moldova au început la Moscova
...............179
Rezultatele alegerilor parlamentare anticipate
...................................180
Regimid
post-totaliłar
din
Republica
Moldova
1990-2012 5
Nominalizarea candidatului la preşedinţie
.........................................183
Primele tatonări
ale lui Vladimir
Voronin
cu unele partide politice
...........................................................................186
Evoluţii politice după desemnarea conducerii Parlamentului
.......187
Direcţii de acţiune
ale lui Vladimir
Voronin
.......................................189
Dubla cetăţenie
...........................................................................................189
Agricultura
..................................................................................................189
Separatismul
...............................................................................................190
înlăturarea persoanelor cu vederi pro-româneşti
..............................190
Politica externă
...........................................................................................191
Evoluţii pe scena politică
.........................................................................191
Poziţia Rusiei faţă de noua realitate politică
din Republica Moldova
............................................................................192
Situaţia forţelor politice după alegerile parlamentare anticipate
..193
Vladimir
Voronin
-
candidat oficial la funcţia supremă în stat
......198
Liderul comunist, ales preşedinte al Republicii Moldova
...............200
învestirea
lui Vladimir
Voronin
.............................................................202
Desemnarea lui Vasile Tarlev pentru funcţia de prim-ministru
...205
Evoluţii ale situaţiei politice interne
......................................................206
Primele acţiuni ale conducerii comuniste de la Chişinău
................208
Congresul Partidului Comuniştilor
......................................................209
Formarea structurilor noii puteri comuniste
.......................................211
Schimbarea legislaţiei privind limba de redactarea actelor de stare
civilă
.............................................................................................................217
Direcţiile principale ale politicii externe a noii puteri comuniste...218
Relaţiile cu Federaţia Rusă
......................................................................219
Raporturile cu Ucraina
.............................................................................221
Apelul Dumei de Stat privind aderarea Republicii Moldova la
Uniunea Rusia-Belarus
.............................................................................223
Politica Moscovei vizând menţinerea Republicii Moldova
sub tutelă rusă
............................................................................................225
Presiuni ale Rusiei asupra politicii externe a Republicii Moldova.
231
Implicaţii ale noului proiect al Concepţiei de politică externă
........235
Amestecul Rusiei în relaţiile româno-moldovene
.............................237
Izolarea diplomatică a Republicii Moldova a devenit realitate
......238
Parafarea Tratatului politic de bază dintre Republica Moldova
şi Federaţia Rusă
........................................................................................241
6
Dorin Cimpoeşu
Rezultatele vizitei preşedintelui
Vladimir Voronin
la Moscova
....243
Evoluţia regimului comunist restaurant(2001
- 2009).......................244
Capitolul
VI
Guvernarea A.I.E., de centru- dreapta
( 2009 - 2012) ....259
ABSTRACT. The post-totalitarian political
regimein
the Republic
of Moldova
(1990-20120)...............................................................................268
ANEXE
..............................................................................................................286
Anexa
nr.
1
Preşedinţii Republicii Moldova
.......................................286
Anexa nr.
2
Preşedinţii Parlamentului Republicii Moldova
..........287
Anexa nr.
3
Prim-miniştrii Republicii Moldova
.................................288
Anexa nr.
4
Guvernul Mircea Druc
.......................................................289
Anexa nr.
5
Guvernul
Valériu
Muravschi
...........................................290
Anexa nr.6 Guvernul Andrei Sangheli
(1)...........................................290
Anexa nr.
7
Guvernul Andrei Sangheli
(2)..........................................291
Anexa nr.
8
Guvernul Ion Ciubuc
(1)...................................................292
Anexa nr.
9
Guvernul Ion Ciubuc
(2)...................................................293
Anexa nr.
10
Guvernul Ion Sturza
.........................................................294
Anexa nr.
11
Guvernul Dumitru Braghiş
............................................295
Anexa nr.
12
Guvernul Vasile Tarlev
(1).............................................295
Anexa nr.
13
Guvernul Vasile Tarlev
(2)..............................................297
Anexa nr.
14
Guvernul Zinaida Greceanîi
(1).....................................298
Anexa nr.
15
Guvernul Zinaida Greceanîi
(2).....................................299
Anexa nr.
16
Guvernul Vlad Filat
(1)....................................................299
Anexa nr.
17
Guvernul Vlad Filat
(2)....................................................300
Bibliografie
......................................................................................................302
Lista Abrevierilor
...........................................................................................308
THE POST-TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL
REGIMEIN
THE REPUBLIC OF
MOLDOVA(1990-20120)
ABSTRACT
In the over twenty years that make the focus of our analysis, and that
have by and large passed since the declaration of Independence,
6
govern¬
ments have subsequently been in power in the Republic of Moldova.
Upon a simple compared analysis, it ean be observed, on the one hand,
that in the greatest part of this period
(18
years), the Republic of Moldova
was governed by left wing and extreme left wing parties, while only for a
very short period of time
(4
years) was it governed by center-right wing
democratic parties.
This demonstrates on another hand that in this whole period there was a
strong confrontation between two diametrically opposed currents concern¬
ing the Republic of Moldova development.
Unfortunately, the first current has dominated this period causing the
Republic of Moldova to lose precious time, both concerning the democratiza¬
tion of society and
EU
integration.
Coming back to the post-totalitarian governments topic, some consider¬
ations are in order to make the evolution and characteristics of the post-
soviet regime in the Republic of Moldova clearer.
One should specify from the very beginning that in the Republic of Mol¬
dova as in the other Soviet republics there were no democratically oriented
political forces, they being created in the last period of the totalitarian regime,
while civil society was not organized. A movement with a more national
character was formed under the People s Front of Moldova (FPM) name, alt¬
hough it was unable to assume power all by itself.
As a result, in the power vacuum created by the collapse of the totalitari¬
an regime, certain non-doctrine political formations have appeared under
various names such as
viata satului
( village life ),
democraţii
( the demo¬
crats ), sovietskaia Moldova ( Soviet Moldova ) and Budjac . Unlike the
democrats which actually included FPM representatives, the other three polit¬
ical movements were formed of former soviet apparatchiks, kolkhoz and
sovkhoz chairmen, Transnistrian and Gagauz separatists, most of them Rus¬
sian speakers and Russophiles.
In the conditions of a non-existent political pluralism and the absence of
a legal and democratic institutional framework, representatives of the men¬
tioned groups have modified the Soviet Constitution allowing the
organization of more or less free and democratic alternative elections- This
Regimul post-totalitar din Republica Moldova
1990-2012 269
took
place
in the February 25th
-
March
10*-1990
period. A quasi-democratic
parliament resulted, still preserving the totalitarian name Supreme Soviet.
Approximately
84%
of its constituents were Communist Party of Moldova
members, many of them top level apparatchiks of the Central Committee.
As none of the political movements managed to obtain majority, an ad-
hoc alliance was created between
viata satului
( village lite ) parliament
members also known as agrarians, and the ones of the FPM, having distrib¬
uted the main positions in the state between them. The first post-totalitarian
government, lead by Mircea Drue was invested on May 25th,
1990.
As expected, in view of its conjuncturist nature, the cooperation between
the two groups could not last too long. Actually the agrarians have used the
tactics of alliance with the FPM in order to calm the spirits in the streets and
until obtaining support from the other two political movements to which
they felt more connected due to their common Soviet political past.
In consequence, after only one year, the Mircea Drue government sup¬
ported by the FPM was dismissed while the Front went into opposition by
the end of
1991.
At the beginning of
1993,
the other FPM representatives
were dismissed from their leading positions in Parliament, power being tak¬
en over completely by the agrarians, led by Mircea Snegur, the first president
of the Republic of Moldova. They had precarious, conjuncture based parlia¬
mentary political support from the other two neo-communist political
groups. In other words, the descendants of the former communist totalitarian
regime returned to power, this time in a so-called democratic outfit.
Although it had a semi-totalitarian character, the first agrarian-fmntist
government had also marked a positive fact for the political future of the Re¬
public of Moldova. This consisted in the development of political pluralism,
26
parties and socio-political organizations being registered at the end of
1993.
There has even been delimitation inside the Front between the moderate
wing, represented by the Bessarabian political elite and the radical wing con¬
centrated around Iurie
Rosca
which resulted in the division of this extended
popular movement and the creation of two parties known as the Congress of
Intellectuals and the Christian Democrat Popular Front (FPCD).
In the same period, Moldova was a parliamentary republic for a year and
three months, first president Mircea Snegur being elected by the Supreme
Soviet on September
3rd, 1990.
Later, taking the example of Boris Yeltsin and
other leaders of former Soviet republics, Snegur imposed and obtained the
introduction of a presidential regime. The regime change occurred after the
November 8th,
1991
election which he won, in the absence of a counter-
candidate, with
98,18%
of the total votes expressed. He had a
5
year man¬
date.
270
Dorin Cimpoeşu
Yet, only approximately two and a half years later, the powers of the
president were to be widely restricted through the provisions of the Republic
of Moldova s first democratic constitution, adopted by Parliament on July 29th,
1994.
The fundamental law practically introduced a semi-presidential regime,
similar to the one in Romania and other European countries.
With support of a conjuncture-based parliamentary majority, the agrarians
managed to end the four year mandate of the neo-communist government in¬
stalled in
1990
and prepare new parliamentary elections.
This time, the elections were, for the first time in Republic of Moldova s
recent history, free and democratic, taking place in the conditions of political
pluralism and a modern electoral law which established, beside voters
rights, a
4%
electoral threshold.
The race for elections on February 27th,
1994,
was entered by
13
parties
and electoral alliances of the
26
registered as well as
20
independent candi¬
dates. Having all levers of power, the agrarians, this time organized in the
Democrat Agrarian Party of Moldova (PDAM), have won with
43,18%
of ex¬
pressed votes, respectively
56
mandates of the total 104.Three other electoral
alliances have entered the first democratically elected Parliament: the Social¬
ist Party of Moldova (PSM) and the Unitate-Edinstvo Movement (M.U.- E.)
- 28
seats; the Block of Peasants and Intellectuals (BTI)
- 11
seats; the Chris¬
tian Democrat Popular Front Alliance (AFPCD)
- 9
seats. As they only had a
simple majority which didn t insure the adoption of national importance or¬
ganic laws, the agrarians have allied in government with the members of the
Russophile socialist parliamentary group. The resulting agrarian-socialist ma¬
jority thus held
84
seats of the total
104,
the remaining
20
mandates belonging
to the opposition.
The First Democratic Parliament also played the role of Constituent Assem¬
bly, adopting the first Constitution of the Republic of Moldova on July
29*
1994.
Although it is a modern fundamental law inspired by the French Consti¬
tution, it contains a gross scientific and historic untruth. Thus, despite the
evident Romanian identity of the majority population of the Republic of
Moldova and the language spoken by it, the Constitution stipulates the false
syntagms Moldovan people and Moldovan language. It must be mentioned that
fearing a totally negative result, as well as due to the agrarian-socialist major¬
ity s totalitarian mentality, the Constitution was not subject to the approval
of the people through referendum, being instead only adopted by Parliament
as was the procedure with fundamental laws in totalitarian communist re¬
gimes.
The second agrarian government supported by its socialist allies, both
partners having deep roots in the single communist party has, singled out
the Republic of Moldova through the temporization and lagging in carrying
Regimul post-totnlitar din Republica Moldova
1990-2012 271
out
democratic
reforms and establishing the rule of law, as well as through
inconsequence and even resistance in promoting economic reforms.
The first complete electoral cycle in the contemporary history of the Repub¬
lic of Moldova ended with the first democratic presidential elections that took
place on November 17th,
1996.
Although
9
candidates entered the electoral
race, the political struggle took place between
3
protagonists: Mircea Snegur,
the incumbent president,
Petru Lucinschi,
Parliament speaker and Andrei
Sangheli, prime-minister. In the first round, M. Snegur and P. Lucinschi, both
former top-level soviet apparatchiks obtained
38,75%
and
27,66%
of the
votes, Premier A. Sangheli being left outside the race.
The second round was a mere formality for P. Lucinschi as most of M.
Snegur s opponents granted him their votes, thus managing to win the elec¬
tions by
54,02%
of the total expressed votes and becoming the second
president of the Republic of Moldova. According to an agreement prior to
the elections between
Petru
Lucinschi and the acting prime minister, A.
Sangheli has presented his resignation, the new head of state appointing Ion
Ciubuc
to who was close to him in the old totalitarian party guard Prime-
Minister on January 16th,
1997.
In the absence of parliamentary support, pres¬
ident P. Lucinschi and premier Ion
Ciubuc,
invested on January 24th,
1997
were forced to accept a government formula in which
70%
of the former
Sangheli Cabinet ministers were reconfirmed, the other
30%
of positions be¬
ing assigned to trusty people of the two high ranking state officials. It was for
the first time when a president of a different political orientation had to co-
habitate with an agrarian-socialist majority, until the end of its mandate,
during almost a year, to be precise.
The first alternation in government in the post-totalitarian history of the
Republic of Moldova occurred in
1998,
following the March
22Л<І
parliamen¬
tary elections. Eleven political organizations or
5
political parties and
6
electoral alliances entered the electoral race. Of these, only
4
managed to pass
the electoral threshold and enter the new Parliament:
-
Party of Communists of the Republic of
Moldova (PCRM) - 30,08%
of
votes or
40
seats;
-
Democratic Convention of Moldova (CDM)
- 19,31%
of votes or
26
seats;
-
The Bloc for a Prosperous and Democratic Moldova (BpMDP)
- 18,12%
of
votes or
24
seats;
-
Democratic
Torces
Party (PFD)-
8,86%
of votes, equaling
11
seats.
The elections caused two enormous surprises. The first was the crushing
defeat of the former governing party, the organizer of the elections, who
didn t succeed entering the parliament, and by anticipating things, later dis¬
appeared from the political scene. The second surprise was the victory in the
272
Dorin Cimpoeşu
elections of the communists, direct successors of the former Soviet totalitari¬
an party, who meanwhile returned on the political scene under a new name.
In this situation, President P. Lucinschi was constrained to choose be¬
tween two options: either to appoint a candidate for the position of Prime-
Minister from the majority parliamentary group of the communists, either to
appoint a so-called independent person, which would get the support of a
majority political coalition, consisting of the three anticommunist forces
irt
,
parliament. In both cases the creation of a coalition was necessary, because
none of the parties could insure parliamentary majority.
Unwilling to be accused of having brought the communists back into
power, despite his sentiment of closeness to them due to his political past, P.
Lucinschi chose the second option. In spite of his disapproval ever since the
beginning for the creation of the majority coalition with parties other than the
communists, and known under the name Alliance for Democracy and Reforms
(ADR), the head of state has taken advantage of the misunderstandings be¬
tween the constituent parties regarding the future Prime-Minister and re-
appointed acting prime minister Ion
Ciubuc
as premier on May
6*, 1998.
Thus the parliamentary majority was faced with a fait accompli, is constitu¬
ent parties being left with appointing the other positions divided according
to the algorithm established by the ADR establishment Agreement.
The
Ciubuc
II Government has received the investiture vote from the
Parliament on May 21st,
1998,
with the votes of
59
of the
61
members of the
parliamentary majority. Patriot Hie Ilascu, elected on the lists of the PFD did
not have the chance to vote as he was held in the Tiraspol prison. Losing the
Prime-Minister s seat, a position belonging to the CDM according to the al¬
gorithm made the relations between it and
Premier Ion Ciubuc
tense and
fragile
ab initio.
Therefore, towards the end of
1998,
the idea to withdraw po¬
litical support granted to the premier became increasingly popular in the
CDM. Similar ideas were shared by the other two components of the majori¬
ty, the MpMDP and the PFD.
The tensions between the Alliance and the prime-minister were also fed
by his weak performance in promoting economic reforms, lack of credibility
from the international financial organisms as well as due to the severe eco¬
nomic crisis that Moldova had to face after the collapse of the Russian Ruble
and the drastic decrease of Moldovan exports on Russia s Markets.
These were actually the causes that determined Ion
Ciubuc
to present his
resignation to the President on February 1st
1999,
which equaled with the fall
of the whole government and clearing the way for the formation of a new
Cabinet. This new political perspective lead to a sharpening of disputes be¬
tween the two components of the CDM (The Renaissance and Conciliation
Party of Moldova-PRCM and the FPCD) regarding the appointment of a sin-
Regimul
post-totalilar
din Republica
Moldova
1990-2012 273
gìe candidate
for the vacant position of prime-minister. The immediate con¬
sequences were the renunciation by M. Snegur, PRCM president, of the
parliamentary majority leader position, the medium term ones being the on¬
set of the CDM disintegration process and implicitly the loss of
parliamentary majority following the retreat of the FPCD from the ADR:
After a failed attempt to impose Chisinau Mayor
Serafim Urechean
as
prime-minister, P. Lucinschi accepted, following the precedent created, the
candidacy of Ion Sturza, deputy premier and Minister of Economy and Re¬
forms in the dismissed
Ciubuc
II government, proposed by the FPCD and
approved by the Coalition. In other words, in only one year after its creation
has the governing Coalition managed to impose its own candidate for Prime-
Minister. Nevertheless the new Cabinet faced big difficulties from the very
beginning, as the FPCD, although not leaving the coalition, retreated its polit¬
ical support, motivating their decision through the presence in the new
government structure of too many ministers suspect of corruption or with
doubtful reputations. In these conditions, the golden vote of Hie Ilascu cast
by him in written form from the prison in
Transnistria was
necessary for the
Ion Sturza government to be validated by Parliament on March
12,1999.
The new government had a brief lifetime of about eight months. Its fate
was sealed on the one hand by the exit from the parliamentary majority of
the FPCD and on the other by the initiative of president P. Lucinschi, just like
his predecessor s, to transform the Republic of Moldova into a presidential re¬
public, which amplified controversies between the adversaries and partisans
of this problem in Parliament, determining the members loyal to the head of
state to leave the parties of the ADR and declare themselves as so-called inde¬
pendents. As a direct consequence, at the end of
1999,
the Coalition lost
parliamentary majority, remaining with only
48
seats of the
101
possible,
which could not provide a solid political support for the Ion Sturza Cabinet.
Intending to restore political support, ADR leaders decided that it was
necessary for the Government to request a vote of confidence from the Par¬
liament on November 4th,
1999.
Contrary to their expectations, the
parliamentary group of the communists, supported by FPCD members of
parliament and the
11
independents have introduced a censure motion caus¬
ing the dismissal of the Ion Sturza Government. The reason for the vote of no
confidence was the lack of satisfaction of the
58
members of parliament who
voted for the motion with the economic reforms of the Cabinet. This is how
the first center-right, reformist government in the recent history of the Repub¬
lic of Moldova ended its activity.
A short-term transition government followed for approximately a year
and four months, being a democratic intermezzo before the return to power of
Soviet communists. President P. Lurinschi had
3
attempts to appoint a prime
274
Dorin Cimpoeşu
minister
and form a new government, one of the candidates being com¬
munist leader Vladimir Voronin himself, these initiatives being rejected by
the conjunctures parliamentary majority formed after the removal of the ADR
from power.
Finally, on December 21st,
1999,
this speckled and heterogeneous majori¬
ty cast a vote of confidence to appointed premier
Dumitru Braghis,
the new
Cabinet of ministers and its new program of governance. During this gov¬
ernment, the confrontation between the Presidency and the Parliament on
changing the political regime increased. The battle between the two institu¬
tions of state power was exacerbated after the approval by the legislative on
July 5
2005
of the law to modify the Constitution and the transition from a
semi-presidential political regime to a parliamentary political regime, basically re¬
turning to the situation in
1990.
The failure of Parliament to elect a new head of state after four rounds of
elections, has lead to the dissolution of the Legislative and the organization
of the first early parliamentary elections, which would also lead to electing the
next president of the Republic of Moldova.
Elections were set for February 25th,
2001.
The Central Electoral Commis¬
sion
(CEC)
registered
17
parties and electoral blocs, as well as
10
independent candidates. The electoral threshold rose from
4%
to
6%
for par¬
ties and electoral alliances, while the one for independent candidates was set
at
3%.
CEC
presented the final results of the elections on March 3rd,
2001.
They revealed the following situation:
-
PCRM
- 50,23%
of the votes or
71
seats;
-
The Braghis Alliance
-13,45%
of the votes or
19
seats;
-
Christian-Democratic People s Party (PPCD), formerly FPCD
- 8,18%
of votes or
11
seats.
It was for the first time in the Republic of Moldova s recent history when
a political party obtained a crushing victory in the elections and this was none
other than the Party of Communists, resurrected from of its own ashes just
like the Phoenix bird. This announced the return of the bolshevist communists
to power, equaling with no exaggeration to the restoration, to a great extent of
the old totalitarian regime. Therefore, for this reason also, the Republic of Moldo¬
va was a unique case in Europe and the world.
The
71
communist seats of the total
101
allowed them to exert absolute
control over the three state power institutions: Parliament, Presidency and
Government. In the good totalitarian tradition, new president Vladimir Vo¬
ronin elected April 4th,
2001,
kept his Secretary-General of the Party of
Communists position. The Parliament Leadership and new prime-minister,
Vasile Tarlev (an illustrious unknown-a.n.), invested by the Legislative on
April 19lh,
2001
reported both on a state and on a party line, to the leader of
Regimul post-totalitar din Republica Moldova
1990-2012 275
the
state
party, synonymous to the unique party in Soviet times. The low num¬
ber of opposition seats basically cancelled its role in a democratic system,
rendering it decorative, symbolical, a pale spot in a red Parliament. In order
not to sow excessive panic in the western democratic world as well as among
the domestic public opinion, communists accepted Braghis alliance repre¬
sentatives in the structure of their first government, only to exclude them
later on.
The Communist Restoration began along with governing Program Eco¬
nomic renaissance, renaissance of the country of the Vasile Tarlev Cabinet,
based on the PCRM and the Braghis Alliance electoral platforms, which set
the relaunch of the state role in economy and a rigorous control of post-
privatization as its major objectives. The Republic of Moldova development
path was to be contemporary socialism
,
a direction exposed by Vladimir Vo-
ronin at the IV Congress of the PCRM (April 21st-22nd,
2001).
In context he
mentioned that the country s economy was destroyed by the savage capital¬
ism caused in the previous ten years by reformist governments, the only
alternative for the resurrection of the country being the socialist one. The
picture of the communist restoration was completed by the return to com¬
munist symbols. Even if official state symbols were not yet replaced, a process
to replace them with communist symbols has began. Red flags with the sickle
and hammer and Lenin s portraits returned in the offices of new officials re¬
gardless of level, while the new leadership brought a pompous homage on
April 22nd,
2001
to the leader of the worla proletariat
.
Communist props were
also present at the high communist forum (Congress IV
-
a.n.), where only
Russian was spoken and Communist party representatives from
17
coun¬
tries, among which the Russian Federation, Ukraine, China and Cuba
attended.
Along with the red restoration, the communists of Bessarabia proceeded
to apply what they learned best in the period of the bolshevist totalitarian re¬
gime, most of their leaders at a central or local level being third age people,
born, educated and formed in conditions imposed by Soviet occupants hav¬
ing nothing in common with democratic values. In a still fragile democratic
construction, the communists had the fairly easy task to
reintroduce
a soviet-
type authoritarian Regime in Bessarabia, which would control all the fields of
socio-economical and political life in the Republic of Moldova.
For a firm appliance of their political objectives, the communists first of
all consolidated the role of coercive law-enforcement, structures, bringing the
soviet times secret police and militia back in the forefront, mis time dyed in
democratic colors like the Service for Intelligence and Security (SIS) and the
carabineer who restarted sowing the fear and horror among the population
as it once did. In its turn, the Prosecutor s office repeatedly became an instru-
276
Dorin Cimpoeşu
ment
of harassment and torture in the Chisinau leaders hands. Hostile to po¬
litical pluralism, the restored communist regime has unleashed, in the
conditions of a total monopoly of power an ample, tough and constant cam¬
paign against its political opponents, especially against those of liberal, pro-
European orientation leading to their police surveillance, decrial and deni¬
gration in the eyes of the domestic and international public opinion.
In the eight year period of their rule in the Republic of Moldova, the
communist have governed in a discretionary manner, their party manifesting
itself as the single party from Soviet times. Democratic values like human
rights, liberty of the press and expression, independence of justice, freedom
of gathering and many others were unfamiliar to the red governors, lack of re¬
spect to these norms and the cases of their flagrant violations becoming
omnipresent.
Three important stages were distinguished in the political evolution of
the restored communist regime:
-
The March
6*, 2005
general elections;
-
The June 3rd and 17lh,
2007
local elections;
-
The April 5th,
2009
general elections.
The March 6lh,
2005
general elections, have ended the first mandate of the
communist after their coming to power, in democratic conditions and consti¬
tuted their first test in front of the electorate after a four year governing
period. Although sufficient popular dissatisfaction has accumulated in the
respective period, the authoritarian government still gave voters, especially
ones with a Soviet mentality, the feeling of a certain internal stability, both
political and economical. Nevertheless, this situation did not exclude a cer¬
tain degree of erosion of the restored communist regime. The elections
proved exactly this, the communists winning the elections, but with a score
smaller than the one in
2001,
this time only getting
56
seats out of the total
101,
as opposed to
71
seats in the previous elections. The loss of the
15
seats
deprived the communists from holding a full monopoly of power, at least
61
votes being necessary to elect the president.
In the context of the misunderstandings between parties of the Democrat¬
ic Moldova Block (BMD), one of the three parliamentary groups, Vladimir
Voronin and Iurie
Rosea, a
faithful Moscow servant, set up an able political
diversion meant to insure a new presidential mandate for the communist
leader. Thus, under the pretext of potential economical sanctions applied by
the Russian Federation against the Republic of Moldova, determined by
Chisinau refusal to accept the
Kozak
Plan to
federalize
Bessarabia, the two
managed to convince
Dumitru Diacov
and
Oleg Serebrian,
leaders of the
Democratic Party and the Social Liberal Party, BMD components, to support
Vladimir Voronin s candidacy. The condition was for him
to
sign the
declara-
Regimul post-totalitar
dm
Republica Moldova
1990-2012 277
Hon
regarding the political partnership to achieve the European integration objective
of the Republic of Moldova.
The so-called political consensus between the PCRM and the BMD
proved to be a great bluff, in the absence of firm guarantees from Vladimir
Voronin that he would fulfill the commitments taken upon signing the Decla¬
ration. Later events proved that the communist leader not only didn t respect
the said agreement, but even lead a tough campaign to discredit and repri¬
mand the opposition, drawing the Republic of Moldova even farther from
the European democratic values. The only political leader spared by the red
power was Iurie
Rosca,
who, in exchange for his services, was offered the po¬
sition of Parliament vice-president. Actually, Vladimir Voronin declared
publicly that
Kosca
is a man of confidence in the true meaning of the word and a
credible man.
Rosca
does not wag. (stands by his word
-
a.n.).
The entry of the red regime into a free fall period was also observed seen
after the June 3rd and 17lh local elections. The communists lost the position of
Chisinau Mayor General, which was won by Liberal Party representative
Dorin Chirtoaca,
with
61,17%
of the votes, as well as the majority in the Chis¬
inau city council, which went to opposition parties. Although on a local level,
the communists have won the local elections by
34,32%,
the opposition par¬
ties and also the independent candidates have won the majority of mayoral
and local council seats. The change in the ratio of forces in the Chisinau Mu¬
nicipal Council and at a national level to the detriment of the communist
caused the communist government to implement a tough confrontational
policy in its relations with the opposition, the activity of the latter s local
structures being obstructed, inclusively through the non-allocation of neces¬
sary financial resources from the state Budget, while its leaders were
denigrated, discredited, harassed and declared main public enemies.
The April
5 , 2009
general elections were the great confrontation between
the authoritarian communist regime and the democratic opposition. The
electoral campaign took place in totally unequal conditions. The communist
leadership used all administrative levers, all financial and material state re¬
sources, including the public Television for electoral propaganda. In order to
weaken the opposition and prevent the unification of its forces before elec¬
tions, the communist majority, supported by the PPCD, its loyal ally, changed
the electoral code by raising the threshold to enter the parliament from
5%
to
6%
and banning the creation of electoral alliances.
Opposition party activists were forced, in totally unequal and undemo¬
cratic conditions, to carry out an electoral campaign from person to person, as
well as through the few mass media outlets that they had access to. The elec¬
toral message of the opposition was modern and mainly targeted pushing
278
Dorin Cimpoeşu
the
Republic of Moldova
out of the communist decay and integrating it into
the European structures.
The numbering of votes showed that the PCRM won the elections by
49,48%
taking,
coincid
entally or not,
61
seats in the new Parliament, which
represented the exact number of votes necessary to elect the head of state.
The other votes were shared between three opposition parties: the Liberal
Party
-13,13%;
the Liberal Democrat Party
- 12,43%
and the „Moldova
Noas¬
tră
Alliance
- 9,77%.
Yet, the great surprise of the elections was the failure, for the first time
since
1990
of the PPCD to enter the Parliament after having won only
3,04%
of the votes. This was the price paid for supporting the communists and for
the services provided to Moscow.
The leaders of the parliamentary opposition denounced the election fraud,
demanded the cancellation of the election results and the organization of
new elections. Their claims were supported by tens of thousands of people
who came out into the streets beginning with April the 6lh, when the first pre¬
liminary data on election results were released to the public.
To reprimand the revolt of the masses and to discredit the leaders of the
parties who have entered the new Parliament, the communist leadership ap¬
pealed to the famous bolshevist-kgb-ist methods of sad memory, staging,
through Secret police agents, the vandalizing of Presidency and Parliament
buildings and hoisting of the Romanian flag on them. Once the pretext creat¬
ed, the communist regime took police troops and undercover SIS agents into the
Square to bloodily crush peaceful protests of the population. Hundreds were
arrested, tortured and abused by law enforcement agencies. The tragic result
of the excessively brutal intervention of the authorities was three deaths and
three others missing.
To calm the spirits, the communist regime only accepted a recount of the
votes, but not also the verification of the electoral lists, as requested by the
opposition parties who considered this to be the main method to prove the
fraud in the parliamentary elections. The recount was not attended by oppo¬
sition party representatives, as a sign of protest. The April 15th
2009,
vote
recount showed the existence of a number of invalid votes that was bigger
than the one given by the Central Electoral Commission, which caused the
communists to lose one seat upon the redistribution, remaining with only
60
seats in the new Parliament. Although at first sight this didn t seem so im¬
portant, the golden vote would decide the fate of the election of the new
president of the Republic of Moldova.
Following a certain stabilization of the situation, the Communist majority
elected the leading organs of the new Parliament, a process in which all the
41
members of the parliamentary opposition refused to participate. Subsequently
Regimul
post-totalitär
din Republica
Moldova
1990-2012 279
the president of the country had to be elected in order to form the new gov¬
ernment. The communists delayed the procedures without justification, in
hope of getting the golden vote from the opposition, yet the attempts to ne¬
gotiate with its representatives have failed miserably. In these conditions, the
red majority organized two formal voting rounds, on May 20th and the June 3rd,
respectively, to elect the head of state. In both of them the communists, as if ful¬
filling democratic norms, presented two candidates, such as acting premier
Zinaida Greceanii and some fill-in personalities like Andrei Neguta and
Stani¬
slav
Groppa.
Every time, Z. Greceanii obtained
33
votes, the rest going to her
counter candidates . Both times, the opposition refused to participate in the
vote in
corpore.
Following this situation, acting president Vladimir Voronin,
who meanwhile became speaker of parliament, dissolved the recently elected
Parliament and set early elections for July 29th,
2009.
The electoral campaign of the communists for the early elections was
very harsh and aggressive, based on the accusations brought to the opposi¬
tion of allegedly intending to destroy the independence of the Republic of
Moldova.
OSCE
Observers have presented a report regarding the early elec¬
tions on July 29eh,
2009
in which they have incriminated the totalitarian
practices of the communist regime and have underlined the necessity to con¬
tinue democratic reforms for the
reestablishment
of public trust .
The results of the anticipated elections, publicized on June 31st,
2009,
have shown the defeat of the communists and the victory of the opposition parties.
Although they obtained the highest number of votes,
44,69%,
the com¬
munists received only
48
mandates in the new Parliament, or
12
less than in
the April 5lh elections, losing the parliamentary majority for the first time in
the last eight years.
The united opposition, formed by the Liberal Democrat Party (PLDM),
the Liberal Party (PL) and the „Moldova
Noastră
Alliance (AMN), obtained
38,60%
of the votes, respectively
40
seats. They were joined by another oppo¬
sition party, the Democrat Party (PDM) which entered the Parliament with
13
mandates
(12,54%
of the votes), thus totaling
53
seats out of
101.
The election resulted in the disappearance from the political scene of the
PPCD, lead by Iurie
Rosca
which suffered two consecutive searing defeats,
having received only
1,91%
of the votes in the early elections, the lowest
score in the history of this party.
With a parliamentary majority of
53
seats, the
4
opposition parties have
on August 8th
2009,
following intense and difficult negotiations, formed a
public governing coalition known under the name Alliance for European In¬
tegration
(ΑΕΙ).
The
ΑΕΙ
Declaration of Establishment had as its main objective the
reestab¬
lishment
of the rule of law in the Republic of Moldova, which equaled with a
280 .
Dorin Cimpocşu
second de-commimization
of Bessarabia after the one taking place in the
1990s,
along with the launch of the movement for the national renaissance and na¬
tional awakening of Bessarabian Romanians.
According to the established algorithm, the leading positions in the
state went to the PLDM who obtained the Prime-Minister s position and the
PL which was given the position of Parliament speaker and implicitly the
one of interim president of the Republic of Moldova, until the president s elec¬
tion by the Parliament. It is important to mention, in this context, that the
position of President became vacant on September
Π 1,
2009,
Vladimir Voro-
nin having presented his resignation. The position was assigned to
Parliament speaker Mihai Ghimpu.
The alliance formed a new government with Vladimir
Filat, PLDM
leader
as Prime-Minister and a
16
ministries and
8
agencies structure. He was in¬
vested by the new Parliament on September 25 1,
2009,
when the governing
program, titled European Integration: Liberty, Democracy, Welfare was also ap¬
proved.
On November 10th and December 7th,
2009,
two voting rounds to elect
the president of the country by the Parliament took place. Both ended in fail¬
ure, Mihai Ghimpu, PL leader and speaker of Parliament being reconfirmed
by the Constitutional Court as interim president of the Republic of Moldova.
The problem of electing the new head of state should have been solved
until June
16*, 2010
a term stipulated by constitutional norms. Therefore fol¬
lowing period, the parliamentary majority had studied various legal
possibilities to solve the issue, including negotiations with the parliamentary
group of the communists in order to obtain the necessary votes. Yet, none of
these brought any concrete results, which determined the parliamentary ma¬
jority to take the decision of consulting the people regarding the direct
election of the head of state through the direct vote of the people. The consti¬
tutional referendum took place on September 5th,
2010,
but its results were not
validated because only
30,29%
of the citizens with a right to vote presented
themselves at the voting booths, the minimum necessary number of voters
being
1/3
of the people registered in voting lists.
After this option wore out, the interim president dissolved Parliament
and established the organization of early elections for November 28th,
2010.
39
electoral competitors participated, but only
4
parties managed to enter in
the new parliament, their votes and seats being distributed as follows:
-
PCRM
- 39,34%
of votes,
42
seats respectively;
-
PLDM
- 29,42%
of votes, equaling
32
seats;
-
PD
- 12,70%
of votes or
15
seats;
-
PL
- 9,96%
of votes corresponding to
12
seats.
Regimul post-totalitnr din Republica Moldova
1990-2012 281
This time the communists also won ;he elections, yet they did not have
the majority necessary to take over government. In the same time, the elec¬
tions resulted in the disappearance from Parliament of the Moldova
Noastră
Alliance, one of the components of the previous parliamentary ma¬
jority, as well as in a notable rise in the number of PLDM seats. This was
basically
a reediting
of the
2009
situation, when none of these parties had the
necessary number of mandates to form a majority. Only this time, the PCRM
had
6
seats less than it had in
2009,
while the
3
other parties of the
ΑΕΙ
had
6
seats more.
In these conditions, the only option was a recreation of the
ΑΕΙ,
which
actually happened on December 30th,
2010,
a date when the Agreement to cre¬
ate the new
AIE
was signed by leaders of the
3
parties. According to it, Marian
Lupu,
the president of the PDM was given the function of parliament speak¬
er and in the same time the position of interim president of the Republic of
Moldova, while Vladimir
Filat, PLDM
president was given the position of
prime-minister.
The new
ΑΕΙ
government, lead by Vladimir
Filat,
had a structure similar
to the previous one, the
16
ministries being distributed as follows: PLDM
- 7,
PD
- 5
and PL
- 4.
He was invested by the Parliament on January
14*, 2011.
The only issue left to be resolved was the one of electing the chief of state by
the Parliament, which actually determined the organization of early Parlia¬
mentary elections.
During
2011,
the governing Alliance didn t find a solution to this prob¬
lem, which maintained the political instability. Negotiations with
communists failed as did talks with a group of
3
members of parliament who
left the PCRM fraction and submitted to the
ΑΕΙ
an offer to vote for an apo¬
litical candidate from outside the parliamentary majority as president.
In this situation, the Alliance decided to organize the first round of head
of state elections, on December 16lh,
2011,
supporting the candidacy of Mari¬
an
Lupu,
the current interim president of the Republic of Moldova. He only
got
58
votes of the
61
necessary, all from the Alliance. The communist mem¬
bers of parliament didn t attend the vote while the
3
communist dissidents
voted against. The second round was programmed for January 15th,
2012.
Af¬
ter the first round, in order to dismiss any suspicions regarding potential
underground talks between a party of the majority and the communists, the
leaders of the
ΑΕΙ
signed, on December 17th,
2011,
a Supplement to the Agree¬
ment to create the Alliance, excluding any separate negotiations, separate
negotiations and common vote with the PCRM which would lead to the reconfigura¬
tion of the government and creation of a new parliamentary majority.
Meanwhile, on January
12*, 2012
to be precise, replying to a claim filed
by a member of parliament, the Constitutional Court, declared the December
282
Dorin Cimpoeşu
Wh,
2011
elections for the President position as being unconstitutional, be¬
cause the secret of the vote was breached. The same Court ruled that the
Parliament s decision to establish repeated elections for January 15th,
2012
was, therefore, also unconstitutional. Following this decision, Parliament was
forced to start the procedure to elect the head of state from the beginning.
ΑΕΙ
gave its own interpretation to the January
12 , 2012
Constitutional
Court Decision regarding the interruption of the process to elect the head of
state and summoned on January 15 1,
2012
an extraordinary meeting of the
parliament, during which the two decisions of parliament were abrogated.
In the same day,
ΑΕΙ
leaders have adopted the
Déclaration
regarding the
ways to solve the constitutional crisis and insure political stability. Through it, the
components of the Governing alliance have solitarily assumed responsibility
for the achievement of some major objectives on the political agenda for the
following period, the most important one being the initiation of a referendum
for the modification of the Constitution with the purpose of giving citizens
the possibility to correct the constitutional deficiencies that cause intermina¬
ble political crises in the Republic of Moldova. This would allow for the
democratization and the simplification of the mechanism to elect the Presi¬
dent by the Parliament (with a simple majority
-
a.n.) and transforming the
governing system into an authentically parliamentary one. The referendum
was supposed to take place no later than April
2012.
However, on February 10lh,
2012,
the leaders of the
ΑΕΙ
announced that
they are coming back to electing the president in Parliament. The initiative to
renounce the referendum belonged to PLDM and PDM, PL being forced to
comply with their decision. This judgment was motivated by the fact that the
referendum would have failed because of the pressures created in society.
The interim president of the Republic of Moldova, Marian
Lupu
indicat¬
ed that the date of presidential elections will most likely be made public on
the occasion of the first winter session of Parliament, planned for February
16lh,
2012.
In context, the three leaders stated that for the election of the president
they will negotiate with the Dorfofi group of the
3
dissident communist mem¬
bers of parliament. Regarding the potential presidential candidates, Vlad
Filat
specified that We need
π
person with moral integrity, liberal Mihai Ghimpu
stating that the party he leads will give up the Parliament speaker function
that belongs to PL according to the agreement, and will not forward any
candidates for the position of President of the Republic of Moldova.
On the other hand, the
ΑΕΙ
leader mentioned that the modification of the
Constitution through the will of the people remains valid and an eventual
referendum will take place until the end of the current mandate of the Par¬
liament. A number of articles in the supreme Law need to be modified and it is
Regimul post-totalitar din
Republica
Moldava
1990-2012 283
possible that we will return to adopting a new Constitution, premier Vlad
Filat
concluded.
It is clear that the governing Alliance proved incapable in the two and a
half years since it has been in power, to find a solution to the constitutional
crisis that the Republic of Moldova severely faces. The causes of this incapa¬
bility should be sought in the unhealthy vanity of the
ΑΕΙ
leaders, their lack
of political will and their incapacity
lo
make compromise for the national in¬
terest, although there are opportunities for this.
¡ he main
/enture
of the post-totalitarian political regime is that in the con¬
ditions of losing the monopoly of power by the single party, a more or less
reformist part of the former communist nomenclature dissipated into a series
of political groups which subsequently turned into parties specific for a
democratic political regime. This category was especially joined by the
PDAM, FPM and PSM, which dominated the political life in the
1990-1998
period.
The toughest line of the totalitarian party, lead by Vladimir Voronin and
other Soviet activists, supported by the most bigot and fanatical party mem¬
bers, has conserved local structures and along with the reentry into legality
started to climb up the steps of power, managing to win all parliamentary
elections from
1998
until
2010.
Moreover, in
2001,
the communist had a
crushing victory in the elections, seizing the political power fully and on all
levels, which allowed them to restore the totalitarian regime of soviet origin
for a period of
8
years, a unique case in Europe. It can thus be fully stated that
in the
22
years which are the subject of our analysis, the successors of the
former single party, some more reformed, other less reformed, ruled the Re¬
public of Moldova for over
18
years.
Another feature consists in the fact that the center-right democratic parties
proved to be pretty weak from a political standpoint, disunited and with very
vain leaders which made their accession into power difficult and the cooper¬
ation inside governing coalitions tensioned and precarious. For these reasons
they stayed in government for short periods of time, not managing to end
their mandates.
An important feature is that the post-totalitarian political regime had an espe¬
cially sinuous evolution, which determined, especially in the later years of the
period, a constitutional crisis, for which no solution was found by the end of
2012.
Therefore, following the quasi-democratic elections of
1990,
a parliamen¬
tary political regime, was installed in the Republic of Moldova, lasting until the
end of
1991
when, also as a consequence of elections, it was transformed into
a presidential regime. The character of the regime was changed into a semi-
presidential one after the adoption of the democratic Constitution in
1994.
The
conflict between the Presidency and the Parliament, which broke out in
1999
284
Dorin Cimpoeşu
as a consequence of the head of state s wish to have his constitutional attribu¬
tions extended, determined the members of parliament to modify the
Constitution and
reintroduce,
on July 5lh,
2000
the parliamentary political re¬
gime. During the communist restoration having a solid parliamentary majority,
the regime enjoyed stability. Following the loss of power by the communists
and the takeover of government by a democratic political coalition, without a
sufficient majority, the parliamentary regime entered a constitutional crisis, de¬
termined by the impossibility to elect the president of the Republic of
Moldova.
A characteristic thing is that in those
22
years, only one party, respectively
the Communist Party was able to win the parliamentary elections (in
2001-
a.n.) in a categorical manner which would allow it to form an absolute majori¬
ty (over
2/3
of seats-a.n.). In all the other elections, either pre-electoral
alliances or post-electoral coalitions were necessary to form parliamentary
majorities and form governments. Generally, only approximately
4
parties
and pre-electoral alliances managed to pass the electoral threshold and enter
the Parliament.
On the other hand, as another feature, it should be mentioned that, except
for the
2005
and
2010
elections, which marked the second communist gov¬
ernment, respectively the maintaining of the
ΑΕΙ
in power, all the other
electoral confrontations were lost by the party/coalition, which was their organiz¬
er. Moreover, in
1998,
the PDAM didn t enter Parliament, later on
disappearing from the political life.
Usually election winners came into power following a negative vote giv¬
en to the former government by the unsatisfied electorate, rather than
through a debate on electoral platforms and projects which are feasible and
attractive for the population.
In the over
20
years of the current post-totalitarian political regime, there
were periods of both political stability as well as instability. Thus there were
8
parliamentary elections of which
5
on term and
3
early elections
(2001, 2009
and
2010).
As regards government stability, the situation was a lot different,
with
14
cabinets coming to government in the respective period, which
equals with an average of less than
2
years for each government. The longest
parliamentary stability was registered during the communist restoration, when
there were only
3
governments, of which the
2
lead by Vasile Tarlev were in
power for
7
years
(2001-2008).
Other features of the regime result from its very evolution and regard as¬
pects like:
-
the communist structure in an approximate
84%
proportion of the first
Parliament of the Republic of Moldova;
-
the passage of a complete electoral cycle;
Regimul
post-total
itar din Republica Moldova
1990-2012 285
-
insuring an alternation in government;
-
the cohabitation of a parliamentary majority with a certain political col¬
or with a president of a different political color;
-
the exercise of the censorship vote by the opposition, albeit once, as an
instrument of parliamentary democracy.
The phenomenon of parliament members migration from the opposi¬
tion to the governing forces and vice-versa depending on their opportunist
interests or the blackmail exerted upon them by the leadership, did not take a
significant dimension, and was not, in the same time absent, being registered
by all parliamentary parties, including the communists.
The almost generalized corruption at the state administration level, both
central and local and the decreased efficiency of specialized structures in
fighting it is another feature of the post-totalitarian political regime.
In conclusion, it can be stated that the slow and very sinuous course of
transition towards the construction of a democratic parliamentary regime in
the last over twenty years has positioned Moldova on the last places among
rentrai
and eastern-European countries with latent democracies, due to
greatly totalitarian mentalities. The transition to the new regime was marked
by the exponential growth of social inequalities, the aggressive and general¬
ized corruption on all levels of society, by a state with politicized and
inefficient institution as well as a political and intellectual self-interested,
manipulated and decadent pseudo-elite.
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Cimpoeşu, Dorin |
| author_facet | Cimpoeşu, Dorin |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Cimpoeşu, Dorin |
| author_variant | d c dc |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV040632759 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)823253905 (DE-599)BVBBV040632759 |
| era | Geschichte 1990-2012 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1990-2012 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Moldawien (DE-588)4039967-9 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Moldawien |
| id | DE-604.BV040632759 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:27:54Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9786065371255 |
| language | Romanian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025459983 |
| oclc_num | 823253905 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 310 S. |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publishDateSearch | 2012 |
| publishDateSort | 2012 |
| publisher | Ed. Cetatea de Scaun |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Cimpoeşu, Dorin Verfasser aut Regimul post-totalitar din Republica Moldova (1990 - 2012) Dorin Cimpoeşu Târgovişte Ed. Cetatea de Scaun 2012 310 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The post-totalitarian political regime in the Republic of Moldova Geschichte 1990-2012 gnd rswk-swf Postkommunismus (DE-588)4998161-4 gnd rswk-swf Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd rswk-swf Moldawien (DE-588)4039967-9 gnd rswk-swf Moldawien (DE-588)4039967-9 g Postkommunismus (DE-588)4998161-4 s Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 s Geschichte 1990-2012 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025459983&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025459983&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Cimpoeşu, Dorin Regimul post-totalitar din Republica Moldova (1990 - 2012) Postkommunismus (DE-588)4998161-4 gnd Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4998161-4 (DE-588)4046514-7 (DE-588)4039967-9 |
| title | Regimul post-totalitar din Republica Moldova (1990 - 2012) |
| title_auth | Regimul post-totalitar din Republica Moldova (1990 - 2012) |
| title_exact_search | Regimul post-totalitar din Republica Moldova (1990 - 2012) |
| title_full | Regimul post-totalitar din Republica Moldova (1990 - 2012) Dorin Cimpoeşu |
| title_fullStr | Regimul post-totalitar din Republica Moldova (1990 - 2012) Dorin Cimpoeşu |
| title_full_unstemmed | Regimul post-totalitar din Republica Moldova (1990 - 2012) Dorin Cimpoeşu |
| title_short | Regimul post-totalitar din Republica Moldova |
| title_sort | regimul post totalitar din republica moldova 1990 2012 |
| title_sub | (1990 - 2012) |
| topic | Postkommunismus (DE-588)4998161-4 gnd Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Postkommunismus Politik Moldawien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025459983&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025459983&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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