Enforceability of Labor Law: Evidence From A Labor Court In Mexico
The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismis...
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2008
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
Zusammenfassung: | The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial |
Beschreibung: | Weitere Ausgabe: Kaplan, David S : Enforceability of Labor Law |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten) |
Internformat
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spelling | Kaplan, David Scott Verfasser (DE-588)129260630 aut Enforceability of Labor Law Evidence From A Labor Court In Mexico Kaplan, David S Washington, D.C The World Bank 2008 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Weitere Ausgabe: Kaplan, David S : Enforceability of Labor Law The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial 2008 Adjudication Assets Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress Confidence Corruption Finance and Financial Sector Development Information Security and Privacy Judicial process Judicial system Law and Development Lawyer Lawyers Legal Products Legal framework Microfinance Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures Trial Sadka, Joyce Verfasser aut Reproduktion von Kaplan, David S. Enforceability of Labor Law 2008 http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4483 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Kaplan, David Scott Sadka, Joyce Enforceability of Labor Law Evidence From A Labor Court In Mexico |
title | Enforceability of Labor Law Evidence From A Labor Court In Mexico |
title_auth | Enforceability of Labor Law Evidence From A Labor Court In Mexico |
title_exact_search | Enforceability of Labor Law Evidence From A Labor Court In Mexico |
title_full | Enforceability of Labor Law Evidence From A Labor Court In Mexico Kaplan, David S |
title_fullStr | Enforceability of Labor Law Evidence From A Labor Court In Mexico Kaplan, David S |
title_full_unstemmed | Enforceability of Labor Law Evidence From A Labor Court In Mexico Kaplan, David S |
title_short | Enforceability of Labor Law |
title_sort | enforceability of labor law evidence from a labor court in mexico |
title_sub | Evidence From A Labor Court In Mexico |
url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4483 |
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