Developing Countries And Enforcement of Trade Agreements: Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough
Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal World Trade Organization trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This paper examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries,...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2008
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| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal World Trade Organization trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This paper examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries, and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce World Trade Organization rules and disciplines against small and poor members, bolstering the transparency function of the World Trade Organization is important for making trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. Although the paper focuses on the World Trade Organization system, the arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (33 Seiten) |
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| 520 | 1 | |a Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal World Trade Organization trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This paper examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries, and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce World Trade Organization rules and disciplines against small and poor members, bolstering the transparency function of the World Trade Organization is important for making trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. Although the paper focuses on the World Trade Organization system, the arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements | |
| 534 | |c 2008 | ||
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| 653 | |a Transparency | ||
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| spelling | Bown, Chad P. 1972- Verfasser (DE-588)124652689 aut Developing Countries And Enforcement of Trade Agreements Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough Bown, Chad P Washington, D.C The World Bank 2008 1 Online-Ressource (33 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal World Trade Organization trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This paper examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries, and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce World Trade Organization rules and disciplines against small and poor members, bolstering the transparency function of the World Trade Organization is important for making trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. Although the paper focuses on the World Trade Organization system, the arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements 2008 Dumping Economic Theory and Research Economics Literature Emerging Markets Externality Free Trade Generalized System Of Preferences International Economics & Trade International Trade LDCS Law and Development Macroeconomics and Economic Growth Private Sector Development Trade Law Trade Liberalization Transparency WTO World Trade Organization Hoekman, Bernard M. 1959- Sonstige (DE-588)124833691 oth Reproduktion von Bown, Chad P., 1972- Developing Countries And Enforcement of Trade Agreements 2008 http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4450 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bown, Chad P. 1972- Developing Countries And Enforcement of Trade Agreements Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough |
| title | Developing Countries And Enforcement of Trade Agreements Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough |
| title_auth | Developing Countries And Enforcement of Trade Agreements Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough |
| title_exact_search | Developing Countries And Enforcement of Trade Agreements Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough |
| title_full | Developing Countries And Enforcement of Trade Agreements Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough Bown, Chad P |
| title_fullStr | Developing Countries And Enforcement of Trade Agreements Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough Bown, Chad P |
| title_full_unstemmed | Developing Countries And Enforcement of Trade Agreements Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough Bown, Chad P |
| title_short | Developing Countries And Enforcement of Trade Agreements |
| title_sort | developing countries and enforcement of trade agreements why dispute settlement is not enough |
| title_sub | Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4450 |
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