Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity
Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity:

Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord supervision. When tenant effort is obse...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Jacoby, Hanan G. (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C The World Bank 2007
Schlagworte:
Accounting
Adverse Selection
Communities & Human Settlement
Contract Law
Contracts
Debt Markets
E-Business
Economic Theory and Research
Effects
Efficiency
Equity
Family Labor
Finance and Financial Sector Development
Incentive Problems
Incentives
Information
Investment and Investment Climate
Labor Allocation
Labor Policies
Law and Development
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
Monitoring
Municipal Housing and Land
Political Economy
Private Sector Development
Social Protections and Labor
Urban Development
Urban Housing
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Zusammenfassung:Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost to the landlord, otherwise identical share-tenants can receive different levels of supervision and have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from sharetenants in rural Pakistan confirm that, controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants are significantly more productive than "unsupervised" ones. Landlords' decisions regarding the intensity of supervision and the type of incentive contract to offer depend importantly on the cost of supervising tenants
Beschreibung:Weitere Ausgabe: Jacoby, Hanan G : Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
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