Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions: An Application To Romania
Romania was one of the first transition countries in Europe to introduce auctions for allocating standing timber (stumpage) in public forests. In comparison with the former system in the country-administrative allocation at set prices-timber auctions offer several potential advantages: greater reven...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2007
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
Zusammenfassung: | Romania was one of the first transition countries in Europe to introduce auctions for allocating standing timber (stumpage) in public forests. In comparison with the former system in the country-administrative allocation at set prices-timber auctions offer several potential advantages: greater revenue generation for the government, a higher probability that tracts will be allocated to the firms that value them most highly, and stronger incentives for technological change within industry and efficiency gains in the public sector. Competition is the key to realizing these advantages. Unfortunately, collusion among bidders often limits competition in timber auctions, including in well-established market economies such as the United States. The result is that tracts sell below their fair market value, which undermines the advantages of auctions. This paper examines the Romanian auction system, with a focus on the use of econometric methods to detect collusion. It begins by describing the historical development of the system and the principal steps in the auction process. It then discusses the qualitative impacts of various economic and institutional factors, including collusion, on winning bids in different regions of the country. This discussion draws on information from a combination of sources, including unstructured interviews conducted with government officials and company representatives during 2003. Next, the paper summarizes key findings from the broader research literature on auctions, with an emphasis on empirical studies that have developed econometric methods for detecting collusion. It then presents an application of such methods to timber auction data from two forest directorates in Romania, Neamt and Suceava. [Fortsetzung 1. Abstract] This application confirms that data from Romanian timber auctions can be used to determine the likelihood of collusion, and it suggests that collusion reduced winning bids in Suceava in 2002 and perhaps also in Neamt. The paper concludes with a discussion of actions that the government can take to reduce the incidence of collusion and minimize its impact on auction outcomes |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (58 Seiten) |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV040618710 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
005 | 20241216 | ||
007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
008 | 121206s2007 xxu o|||| 00||| eng d | ||
035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)093226578 | ||
035 | |a (OCoLC)874235419 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM00546272X | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-1102 |a DE-1051 |a DE-521 |a DE-863 |a DE-862 |a DE-522 |a DE-858 |a DE-573 |a DE-860 |a DE-1046 |a DE-1047 |a DE-Aug4 |a DE-2070s |a DE-M347 |a DE-1049 |a DE-898 |a DE-128 |a DE-M352 |a DE-70 |a DE-92 |a DE-150 |a DE-155 |a DE-22 |a DE-91 |a DE-384 |a DE-473 |a DE-19 |a DE-739 |a DE-20 |a DE-703 |a DE-706 |a DE-355 |a DE-29 |a DE-859 |a DE-Re13 |a DE-523 | ||
100 | 1 | |a Saphores, Jean-Daniel |d 1962- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)171839196 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions |b An Application To Romania |c Saphores, Jean-Daniel |
264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 2007 | |
300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (58 Seiten) | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
520 | 1 | |a Romania was one of the first transition countries in Europe to introduce auctions for allocating standing timber (stumpage) in public forests. In comparison with the former system in the country-administrative allocation at set prices-timber auctions offer several potential advantages: greater revenue generation for the government, a higher probability that tracts will be allocated to the firms that value them most highly, and stronger incentives for technological change within industry and efficiency gains in the public sector. Competition is the key to realizing these advantages. Unfortunately, collusion among bidders often limits competition in timber auctions, including in well-established market economies such as the United States. The result is that tracts sell below their fair market value, which undermines the advantages of auctions. This paper examines the Romanian auction system, with a focus on the use of econometric methods to detect collusion. It begins by describing the historical development of the system and the principal steps in the auction process. It then discusses the qualitative impacts of various economic and institutional factors, including collusion, on winning bids in different regions of the country. This discussion draws on information from a combination of sources, including unstructured interviews conducted with government officials and company representatives during 2003. Next, the paper summarizes key findings from the broader research literature on auctions, with an emphasis on empirical studies that have developed econometric methods for detecting collusion. It then presents an application of such methods to timber auction data from two forest directorates in Romania, Neamt and Suceava. | |
520 | 1 | |a [Fortsetzung 1. Abstract] This application confirms that data from Romanian timber auctions can be used to determine the likelihood of collusion, and it suggests that collusion reduced winning bids in Suceava in 2002 and perhaps also in Neamt. The paper concludes with a discussion of actions that the government can take to reduce the incidence of collusion and minimize its impact on auction outcomes | |
534 | |c 2007 | ||
653 | |a Access to Markets | ||
653 | |a Administered Prices | ||
653 | |a Advertising | ||
653 | |a Auction | ||
653 | |a Auctions | ||
653 | |a Bidding | ||
653 | |a Competition | ||
653 | |a Debt Markets | ||
653 | |a Direct Marketing | ||
653 | |a E-Business | ||
653 | |a Economic Theory and Research | ||
653 | |a Emerging Markets | ||
653 | |a Environment | ||
653 | |a Fair | ||
653 | |a Finance and Financial Sector Development | ||
653 | |a Forestry | ||
653 | |a Industry | ||
653 | |a International Economics & Trade | ||
653 | |a Inventory | ||
653 | |a Investment and Investment Climate | ||
653 | |a Macroeconomics and Economic Growth | ||
653 | |a Market | ||
653 | |a Market Economies | ||
653 | |a Market Economy | ||
653 | |a Market Prices | ||
653 | |a Markets and Market Access | ||
653 | |a Private Sector Development | ||
653 | |a Rural Development | ||
653 | |a Wildlife Resources | ||
700 | 1 | |a Zinnes, Clifford |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
700 | 1 | |a Abrudan, Ioan |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
700 | 1 | |a Vincent, Jeffrey R. |e Sonstige |0 (DE-588)170855244 |4 oth | |
700 | 1 | |a Bouriaud, Laura |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
700 | 1 | |a Marochko, Valy |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Reproduktion von |a Saphores, Jean-Daniel |t Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions |d 2007 |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4105 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025446209 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
DE-BY-FWS_katkey | 461419 |
---|---|
_version_ | 1819742295969234944 |
adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Saphores, Jean-Daniel 1962- |
author_GND | (DE-588)171839196 (DE-588)170855244 |
author_facet | Saphores, Jean-Daniel 1962- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Saphores, Jean-Daniel 1962- |
author_variant | j d s jds |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV040618710 |
collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)093226578 (OCoLC)874235419 (DE-599)GBVNLM00546272X |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Electronic eBook |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nam a2200000 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV040618710</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20241216</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">121206s2007 xxu o|||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)093226578</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)874235419</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM00546272X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1102</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1051</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-522</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-858</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-860</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1046</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1047</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Aug4</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-2070s</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1049</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-898</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-128</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M352</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-70</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-92</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-150</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-155</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-22</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-859</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Saphores, Jean-Daniel</subfield><subfield code="d">1962-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)171839196</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions</subfield><subfield code="b">An Application To Romania</subfield><subfield code="c">Saphores, Jean-Daniel</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (58 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Romania was one of the first transition countries in Europe to introduce auctions for allocating standing timber (stumpage) in public forests. In comparison with the former system in the country-administrative allocation at set prices-timber auctions offer several potential advantages: greater revenue generation for the government, a higher probability that tracts will be allocated to the firms that value them most highly, and stronger incentives for technological change within industry and efficiency gains in the public sector. Competition is the key to realizing these advantages. Unfortunately, collusion among bidders often limits competition in timber auctions, including in well-established market economies such as the United States. The result is that tracts sell below their fair market value, which undermines the advantages of auctions. This paper examines the Romanian auction system, with a focus on the use of econometric methods to detect collusion. It begins by describing the historical development of the system and the principal steps in the auction process. It then discusses the qualitative impacts of various economic and institutional factors, including collusion, on winning bids in different regions of the country. This discussion draws on information from a combination of sources, including unstructured interviews conducted with government officials and company representatives during 2003. Next, the paper summarizes key findings from the broader research literature on auctions, with an emphasis on empirical studies that have developed econometric methods for detecting collusion. It then presents an application of such methods to timber auction data from two forest directorates in Romania, Neamt and Suceava.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">[Fortsetzung 1. Abstract] This application confirms that data from Romanian timber auctions can be used to determine the likelihood of collusion, and it suggests that collusion reduced winning bids in Suceava in 2002 and perhaps also in Neamt. The paper concludes with a discussion of actions that the government can take to reduce the incidence of collusion and minimize its impact on auction outcomes</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="534" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Access to Markets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Administered Prices</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Advertising</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Auction</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Auctions</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bidding</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Competition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Debt Markets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Direct Marketing</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">E-Business</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Economic Theory and Research</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Emerging Markets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Environment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Fair</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Finance and Financial Sector Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Forestry</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Industry</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">International Economics & Trade</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Inventory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Investment and Investment Climate</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Macroeconomics and Economic Growth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Market</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Market Economies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Market Economy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Market Prices</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Markets and Market Access</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Private Sector Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Rural Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Wildlife Resources</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zinnes, Clifford</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abrudan, Ioan</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Vincent, Jeffrey R.</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)170855244</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bouriaud, Laura</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Marochko, Valy</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Reproduktion von</subfield><subfield code="a">Saphores, Jean-Daniel</subfield><subfield code="t">Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions</subfield><subfield code="d">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4105</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025446209</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV040618710 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-12-29T04:04:50Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025446209 |
oclc_num | 874235419 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 DE-1102 DE-1051 DE-521 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-522 DE-858 DE-573 DE-860 DE-1046 DE-1047 DE-Aug4 DE-2070s DE-M347 DE-1049 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-128 DE-M352 DE-70 DE-92 DE-150 DE-155 DE-BY-UBR DE-22 DE-BY-UBG DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-384 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-20 DE-703 DE-706 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-859 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-523 |
owner_facet | DE-12 DE-1102 DE-1051 DE-521 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-522 DE-858 DE-573 DE-860 DE-1046 DE-1047 DE-Aug4 DE-2070s DE-M347 DE-1049 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-128 DE-M352 DE-70 DE-92 DE-150 DE-155 DE-BY-UBR DE-22 DE-BY-UBG DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-384 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-20 DE-703 DE-706 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-859 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-523 |
physical | 1 Online-Ressource (58 Seiten) |
psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
publishDate | 2007 |
publishDateSearch | 2007 |
publishDateSort | 2007 |
publisher | The World Bank |
record_format | marc |
spellingShingle | Saphores, Jean-Daniel 1962- Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions An Application To Romania |
title | Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions An Application To Romania |
title_auth | Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions An Application To Romania |
title_exact_search | Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions An Application To Romania |
title_full | Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions An Application To Romania Saphores, Jean-Daniel |
title_fullStr | Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions An Application To Romania Saphores, Jean-Daniel |
title_full_unstemmed | Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions An Application To Romania Saphores, Jean-Daniel |
title_short | Detecting Collusion In Timber Auctions |
title_sort | detecting collusion in timber auctions an application to romania |
title_sub | An Application To Romania |
url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4105 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT saphoresjeandaniel detectingcollusionintimberauctionsanapplicationtoromania AT zinnesclifford detectingcollusionintimberauctionsanapplicationtoromania AT abrudanioan detectingcollusionintimberauctionsanapplicationtoromania AT vincentjeffreyr detectingcollusionintimberauctionsanapplicationtoromania AT bouriaudlaura detectingcollusionintimberauctionsanapplicationtoromania AT marochkovaly detectingcollusionintimberauctionsanapplicationtoromania |