Lobbying and agricultural trade policy in the United States:

"The authors study whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the United States in the manner suggested by the political economy model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). This is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data. The authors test the mo...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Gawande, Kishore 1959- (VerfasserIn), Hoekman, Bernard M. 1959- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: [Washington, D.C] World Bank 2006
Schriftenreihe:Policy research working paper 3819
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Online-Zugang:Volltext
Zusammenfassung:"The authors study whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the United States in the manner suggested by the political economy model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). This is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data. The authors test the model using a detailed cross-sectional data set of agricultural protection, subsidies, and political action committee (PAC) contributions in the late 1990s. The model is qualitatively affirmed by the data. They make a novel attempt to solve a puzzle about the model's quantitative implications, also found in recent studies. This solution makes the simple model consistent with the complicated decisionmaking process in real world government. The results imply the underpinnings of a political economy equilibrium that will be hard to dislodge. "--World Bank web site
Beschreibung:Includes bibliographical references. - Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/13/2006
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2006]
Weitere Ausgabe: Gawande, Kishore S: Lobbying and agricultural trade policy in the United States
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (39 Seiten)