Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises?:

"The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Feijen, Erik (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: [Washington, D.C] World Bank 2005
Schriftenreihe:Policy research working paper 3660
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:DE-522
DE-12
DE-521
DE-1102
DE-1046
DE-1047
DE-858
DE-Aug4
DE-573
DE-M347
DE-92
DE-1051
DE-898
DE-859
DE-860
DE-1049
DE-863
DE-862
DE-523
DE-2070s
DE-M352
DE-Re13
DE-70
DE-128
DE-22
DE-155
DE-150
DE-91
DE-384
DE-473
DE-19
DE-355
DE-703
DE-20
DE-706
DE-29
DE-739
Volltext
Zusammenfassung:"The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) on three-digit manufacturing industry-level data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division for about 15 industrial and developing countries in over 20 industries on average. The author shows that price-cost margins in externally more financially dependent industries are higher during crisis than in externally less dependent industries in countries with higher levels of corruption. He finds the opposite relationship for the change in the industry-level number of establishments during a crisis. The results withstand an array of robustness checks, including using different indices of corruption, different controls, and robust estimation techniques. "--World Bank web site
Beschreibung:Includes bibliographical references. - Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/19/2005
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2005]
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource