"Minimum wages are generally thought to be unenforceable in developing rural economies. But there is one solution - a workfare scheme in which the government acts as the employer of last resort. Is this a cost-effective policy against poverty? Using a microeconometric model of the casual labor...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Hauptverfasser:	Murgai, Rinku (VerfasserIn), Ravallion, Martin 1952- (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	[Washington, D.C] World Bank 2005
Schriftenreihe:	Policy research working paper 3640
Schlagworte:	Garantiertes Mindesteinkommen Indien Casual labor > India Minimum wage > India Poverty > India Transfer payments > India
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	"Minimum wages are generally thought to be unenforceable in developing rural economies. But there is one solution - a workfare scheme in which the government acts as the employer of last resort. Is this a cost-effective policy against poverty? Using a microeconometric model of the casual labor market in rural India, the authors find that a guaranteed wage rate sufficient for a typical poor family to reach the poverty line would bring the annual poverty rate down from 34 percent to 25 percent at a fiscal cost representing 3-4 percent of GDP when run for the whole year. Confining the scheme to the lean season (three months) would bring the annual poverty rate down to 31 percent at a cost of 1.3 percent of GDP. While the gains from a guaranteed wage rate would be better targeted than a uniform (untargeted) cash transfer, the extra costs of the wage policy imply that it would have less impact on poverty. "--World Bank web site
Beschreibung:	Includes bibliographical references. - Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/23/2005 Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2005]
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (40 Seiten)