Democratization and clientelism: why are young democracies badly governed?

"This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government worke...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Keefer, Philip (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: [Washington, D.C] World Bank 2005
Schriftenreihe:Policy research working paper 3594
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Online-Zugang:Volltext
Zusammenfassung:"This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers. Only one theory explains the effects of democratic age on the wide range of policy outcomes examined here-the inability of political competitors in younger democracies to make credible promises to citizens. This explanation, first advanced in Keefer and Vlaicu (2004), offers a concrete interpretation of what political institutionalization might mean, and why it is that young democracies frequently fail to become older and well-performing democracies. A variety of tests support this explanation against alternatives. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies. "--World Bank web site
Beschreibung:Includes bibliographical references. - Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/23/2005
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2005]
Weitere Ausgabe: Keefer, Philip : Democratization and clientelism
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (49 Seiten)