The Regulation of Entry
The Regulation of Entry:

August 2001 - New data show that countries that regulate the entry of new firms more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods. The evidence supports the view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. Djankov and his coauthors pre...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Porta, Rafael (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C The World Bank 1999
Schlagworte:
Barriers To Entry
Economic Theories
Economic Theory and Research
Economies
Efficiency
Environment
Environmental Economics and Policies
Equity
Externalities
Information
Interest
Labor Policies
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
Market Power
Markets
Need
Outcomes
Policies
Public Sector Economics and Finance
Public Sector Regulation
Regulatory Regimes
Social Protections and Labor
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Zusammenfassung:August 2001 - New data show that countries that regulate the entry of new firms more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods. The evidence supports the view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. Djankov and his coauthors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries that regulate entry more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods (public or private). Countries with more democratic and limited governments regulate entry more lightly. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. This paper—a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department—is part of a larger effort in the department to educate policymakers on the costs of regulation. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Regulation of Small Businesses
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (1 online resource (54 p.))
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