How adverse selection affects the health insurance market:
There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics
2001
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
2574 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Zusammenfassung: | There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers |
| Beschreibung: | "March 2001"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-31). - Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 13, 2002 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (38 Seiten) |
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| language | English |
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| spelling | Belli, Paolo Verfasser aut How adverse selection affects the health insurance market Paolo Belli Washington, D.C World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics 2001 1 Online-Ressource (38 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 2574 "March 2001"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-31). - Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 13, 2002 There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers 2001 Mathematisches Modell Adverse selection (Insurance) Mathematical models Health insurance Mathematical models Managed care plans (Medical care) Mathematical models World Bank Development Research Group Public Economics Sonstige oth Reproduktion von Belli, Paolo How adverse selection affects the health insurance market 2001 http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2574 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Belli, Paolo How adverse selection affects the health insurance market Mathematisches Modell |
| title | How adverse selection affects the health insurance market |
| title_auth | How adverse selection affects the health insurance market |
| title_exact_search | How adverse selection affects the health insurance market |
| title_full | How adverse selection affects the health insurance market Paolo Belli |
| title_fullStr | How adverse selection affects the health insurance market Paolo Belli |
| title_full_unstemmed | How adverse selection affects the health insurance market Paolo Belli |
| title_short | How adverse selection affects the health insurance market |
| title_sort | how adverse selection affects the health insurance market |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2574 |
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