Decentralization and accountability: are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections?

Voters in India are more vigilant in monitoring government at the local than at the national level. In state assembly elections voters reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for a rise in inequality, over their entire term in office. But in national elections voters behave myopic...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Khemani, Stuti (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economis 2001
Schriftenreihe:Policy research working paper 2557
Schlagworte:
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Volltext
Zusammenfassung:Voters in India are more vigilant in monitoring government at the local than at the national level. In state assembly elections voters reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for a rise in inequality, over their entire term in office. But in national elections voters behave myopically, rewarding growth in national income and a fall in inflation and inequality only in the year preceding the election
Beschreibung:"February 2001"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 16-17). - Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 17, 2002
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2001]
Weitere Ausgabe: Khemani, Stuti : Decentralization and accountability
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource