Public expenditures and environmental protection: when is the cost of funds irrelevant?

Pigou's conjecture was that under costly taxation public expenditures should not reach the point where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. In the treatment here, public expenditures (and environmental protection) may provide public goods for consumption but also collective inputs for produc...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Eskeland, Gunnar S. (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics 2000
Schriftenreihe:Policy research working paper 2507
Schlagworte:
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Volltext
Zusammenfassung:Pigou's conjecture was that under costly taxation public expenditures should not reach the point where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. In the treatment here, public expenditures (and environmental protection) may provide public goods for consumption but also collective inputs for production. When the benefits are in production, the cost of funds is irrelevant. Why? Collective inputs benefit goods that are taxed, while for public goods the shadow price of funds reduces provision as if they were
Beschreibung:"December 2000"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 26-27). - Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 30, 2002
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2000]
Weitere Ausgabe: Eskeland, Gunnar S: Public expenditures and environmental protection
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource