Family altruism and incentives:

In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gatti, Roberta (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, DC World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth 2000
Series:Policy research working paper 2505
Subjects:
Online Access:Volltext
Summary:In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the family predicts. Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup whenever the non-negativity constraint on bequests is not binding
Item Description:"December 2000"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38). - Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 30, 2002
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2000]
Weitere Ausgabe: Gatti, Roberta : Family altruism and incentives
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (38 Seiten)