Family altruism and incentives:

In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Gatti, Roberta (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, DC World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth 2000
Schriftenreihe:Policy research working paper 2505
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Zusammenfassung:In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the family predicts. Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup whenever the non-negativity constraint on bequests is not binding
Beschreibung:"December 2000"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38). - Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 30, 2002
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2000]
Weitere Ausgabe: Gatti, Roberta : Family altruism and incentives
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (38 Seiten)