Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian states

Empirical results from India suggest that politicians exert greater effort in managing public works during election years. Surprisingly, there is no evidence of a populist spending spree to sway voters just before elections

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Khemani, Stuti (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, DC World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics 2000
Schriftenreihe:Policy research working paper 2454
Schlagworte:
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Volltext
Zusammenfassung:Empirical results from India suggest that politicians exert greater effort in managing public works during election years. Surprisingly, there is no evidence of a populist spending spree to sway voters just before elections
Beschreibung:"September 2000"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 34-37). - Title from title screen as viewed on Oct. 08, 2002
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2000]
Weitere Ausgabe: Khemani, Stuti : Political cycles in a developing economy
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource