Corruption under moral hazard:
Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, DC
World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics
1999
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
2204 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits |
| Beschreibung: | "October 1999"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39) Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[1999] Weitere Ausgabe: Eskeland, Gunnar S: Corruption under moral hazard |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (39 Seiten) Illustrationen 28 cm |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Corruption under moral hazard |c Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele |
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, DC |b World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics |c 1999 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (39 Seiten) |b Illustrationen |c 28 cm | ||
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| 490 | 0 | |a Policy research working paper |v 2204 | |
| 500 | |a "October 1999"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39) | ||
| 500 | |a Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[1999] | ||
| 500 | |a Weitere Ausgabe: Eskeland, Gunnar S: Corruption under moral hazard | ||
| 520 | 1 | |a Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits | |
| 534 | |c 1999 | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Ökonometrisches Modell | |
| 653 | |a Civil service |a Salaries, etc |a Econometric models | ||
| 653 | |a Political corruption |a Econometric models | ||
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| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Reproduktion von |a Eskeland, Gunnar S. |t Corruption under moral hazard |d 1999 |
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| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| indexdate | 2025-01-23T11:01:01Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (39 Seiten) Illustrationen 28 cm |
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| spelling | Eskeland, Gunnar S. 1959- Verfasser (DE-588)133357007 aut Corruption under moral hazard Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele Washington, DC World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics 1999 1 Online-Ressource (39 Seiten) Illustrationen 28 cm txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 2204 "October 1999"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39) Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[1999] Weitere Ausgabe: Eskeland, Gunnar S: Corruption under moral hazard Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits 1999 Ökonometrisches Modell Civil service Salaries, etc Econometric models Political corruption Econometric models Thiele, Henrik 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)122448707 aut World Bank Development Research Group Public Economics Sonstige oth Reproduktion von Eskeland, Gunnar S. Corruption under moral hazard 1999 http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2204 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Eskeland, Gunnar S. 1959- Thiele, Henrik 1967- Corruption under moral hazard Ökonometrisches Modell |
| title | Corruption under moral hazard |
| title_auth | Corruption under moral hazard |
| title_exact_search | Corruption under moral hazard |
| title_full | Corruption under moral hazard Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele |
| title_fullStr | Corruption under moral hazard Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corruption under moral hazard Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele |
| title_short | Corruption under moral hazard |
| title_sort | corruption under moral hazard |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2204 |
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