Verfügbarkeit: Corruption under moral hazard

Corruption under moral hazard:

Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser:	Eskeland, Gunnar S. (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Washington, DC World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics 1999
Schriftenreihe:	Policy research working paper 2204
Schlagworte:	Ökonometrisches Modell Civil service > Salaries, etc > Econometric models Political corruption > Econometric models
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Zusammenfassung:	Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits
Beschreibung:	"October 1999"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39) Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[1999] Weitere Ausgabe: Eskeland, Gunnar S: Corruption under moral hazard
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (39 p) ill 28 cm

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Datensatz im Suchindex

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illustrated	Not Illustrated
indexdate	2024-08-27T04:11:19Z
institution	BVB
language	English
oai_aleph_id	oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025444343
oclc_num	42864641
open_access_boolean
owner	DE-12 DE-1102 DE-1051 DE-521 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-522 DE-858 DE-573 DE-860 DE-1046 DE-1047 DE-Aug4 DE-2070s DE-M347 DE-1049 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-128 DE-M352 DE-70 DE-92 DE-150 DE-155 DE-BY-UBR DE-22 DE-BY-UBG DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-384 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-20 DE-703 DE-706 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-859 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-523
owner_facet	DE-12 DE-1102 DE-1051 DE-521 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-522 DE-858 DE-573 DE-860 DE-1046 DE-1047 DE-Aug4 DE-2070s DE-M347 DE-1049 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-128 DE-M352 DE-70 DE-92 DE-150 DE-155 DE-BY-UBR DE-22 DE-BY-UBG DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-384 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-20 DE-703 DE-706 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-859 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-523
physical	1 Online-Ressource (39 p) ill 28 cm
psigel	ZDB-1-WBA
publishDate	1999
publishDateSearch	1999
publishDateSort	1999
publisher	World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics
record_format	marc
series2	Policy research working paper
spellingShingle	Eskeland, Gunnar S. Corruption under moral hazard Ökonometrisches Modell
title	Corruption under moral hazard
title_auth	Corruption under moral hazard
title_exact_search	Corruption under moral hazard
title_full	Corruption under moral hazard Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele
title_fullStr	Corruption under moral hazard Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele
title_full_unstemmed	Corruption under moral hazard Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele
title_short	Corruption under moral hazard
title_sort	corruption under moral hazard
topic	Ökonometrisches Modell
topic_facet	Ökonometrisches Modell
url	http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2204
work_keys_str_mv	AT eskelandgunnars corruptionundermoralhazard AT thielehenrik corruptionundermoralhazard AT worldbankdevelopmentresearchgrouppubliceconomics corruptionundermoralhazard

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