Can no anti-trust policy be better than some anti-trust policy?:

Partial antitrust policy may lead to less competitive market structures than the total absence of such policy. There may sometimes even be a case for the government providing incentives for particular forms of merger

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Mattoo, Aaditya (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, DC (1818 H St., NW, Washington 20433) World Bank, Development Research Group, Trade 1999
Schriftenreihe:Policy research working paper 2191
Schlagworte:
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Volltext
Zusammenfassung:Partial antitrust policy may lead to less competitive market structures than the total absence of such policy. There may sometimes even be a case for the government providing incentives for particular forms of merger
Beschreibung:"September 1999"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 32-36)
Umschlagt.: Can no antitrust policy be better than some antitrust policy?
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[1999]
Weitere Ausgabe: Mattoo, Aaditya : Can no anti-trust policy be better than some anti-trust policy?
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (39 p) 28 cm