Market discipline and financial safety net design:

It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and reg...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli 1961- (Author), Huizinga, Harry (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, DC World Bank, Development Research Group, Finance 1999
Series:Policy research working paper 2183
Subjects:
Online Access:Volltext
Summary:It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline, enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks
Item Description:"September 1999"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 28-29)
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[1999]
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (44 Seiten) 28 cm