Market discipline and financial safety net design:

It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and reg...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli 1961- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, DC World Bank, Development Research Group, Finance 1999
Schriftenreihe:Policy research working paper 2183
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:DE-522
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Volltext
Zusammenfassung:It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline, enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks
Beschreibung:"September 1999"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 28-29)
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[1999]
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (44 p) 28 cm