The EU law of competition:
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| Previous Title: | Faull, Jonathan: The EC law of competition |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2014
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| Edition: | Third edition |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | cccxxxiii, 2134 Seiten Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9780199665099 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The EU law of competition |c edited by Jonathan Faull ; Ali Nikpay. Assistant editor: Deirdre Taylor |
| 246 | 1 | 3 | |a Faull & Nikpay The EU law of competition |
| 250 | |a Third edition | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford |b Oxford University Press |c 2014 | |
| 300 | |a cccxxxiii, 2134 Seiten |b Diagramme | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Concurrence - Droit - Pays de l'Union européenne | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Antitrust law |z European Union countries | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Competition, Unfair |z European Union countries | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Restraint of trade |z European Union countries | |
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| 700 | 1 | |a Taylor, Deirdre |0 (DE-588)1060992809 |4 edt | |
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CONTENTS—
SUMMARY
List of Abbreviations
lxxv
Tables of Court of Justice and the General Court of the European Union Cases
lxxvii
Tables of European Commission Decisions cxxxviii
Table of National and Other Cases clxxv
Table ofEU/EC Treaties clxxix
Tables of 'EUIEC Legislation clxxxiii
Tables of
EU
/EC Notices, Guidelines and Other Informal Texts ccxi
Table of National Legislation ccxxxi
Table of International Treaties
ccxxxïït
I GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1.
The Economics of Competition
3
Luc Peeperkorn and Vincent Verouden
2.
The Enforcement System under Regulation
1 /2003 91
Eddy
De
Smij
ter
andAilsa Sinclair
3.
Article
101 183
Jonathan Faull,
Lars Kjolbye, Henning
Leupold, and
Ali Nikpay
4.
Article
102 329
ÌVÌiguelde
ЫМапо,
Renato
Nazzini, and Hans Zenger
5.
Mergers
539
Claes Bengtsson,
Josep Maria Carpi
Badia,
andMassimiliano
Kadar
6.
Article
106—
Exclusive or Special Rights and Other Anti-Competitive
State Measures
809
José Luis
Buendia Sierra
II SPECIFIC PRACTICES
7.
Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
883
Matthew Bennett, Francisco Enrique Gonzalez Diaz,
Henning
Leupold,
Anna
Vernét,
andDonncadh Woods
8.
Cartels
1023
Antoine
Colombani,
Jindřich Kloub,
andEwoud
Sakkers
9.
Vertical Agreements
1363
Andrei Gurin and Luc Peeperkorn
xi
Contents—
Summary
10.
Intellectual Property
1443
Kevin
Coates,
Lars Kjelbye, and Luc Peeperkorn
III SPECIAL SECTORS
11.
Financial Services
1513
Nicholas Banasevic, Stephen Ryan, and Rita
Wezenbeek
12.
Energy
1581
Céline
Gauer
and Lars Kjelbye
13.
Communications (Telecoms and Internet)
1647
David Gabathuler and
Eduardo
Martinez
Rivero
14.
Media
1709
Krzysztof
Kuik and Anthony Dawes
15.
Transport
1779
Hubert
de Broca,
Marta
Mielecka Riga, and Anatoly
SuboČs
16.
Pharma
1869
Harald Mische,
Elena
Kamifórova,
and
Dominik SchnicheL·
IV STATE AID
17.
State Aid
1923
Tim Maxian
Rusche,
Claire Micheau, Henri Piffaut, and
Koen
Van
de
Casteele
Index
2033
xu
CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations
Tables of Court of Justice and the General Court of the European Union Cases
Tables of European Commission Decisions
Table of
Nationaland
Other Cases
Table ofEU/EC Treaties
Tables ofEUIECLegisUtion
Tables of
EU
I EC Notices, Guidelines and Other Informal Texts
Table of National LegisUtion
Table of International Treaties
lxxv
lxxvii
cxxxviii
clxxv
clxxix
clxxxiii
ccxi
ccxxxi
ccxxxiii
I GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1.
The Economics of Competition
Luc Peeperkorn and Vincent Verouden
A. Introduction
1.01
B. Structure, Conduct, Performance
1.06
(1)
Early Developments
1.06
(2)
The Harvard School
1.09
(3)
The Chicago School
1.12
(4)
More Recent Developments
1.16
C. Static Welfare Analysis of Market Power
1.21
(1)
Introduction
1.21
(2)
Basic
Microeconomic
Concepts
1.27
(a) Consumer Surplus
1.28
(b) Production Costs
1.29
(c) Short-Run Production Costs
1.31
(d) Profit Maximization
1.36
(e) Long-Run Production Costs
1.41
(f) Economies of Scale and Minimum Efficient Scale
1.43
(g) Entry Barriers
1.50
(h) Contestability
1.56
(3)
Perfect Competition
1.58
(a) The Model
1.58
(b) The Outcome
1.62
(4)
Monopoly
1.65
(a) The Model
1.65
(b) The Outcome
1.68
(5)
Oligopoly
1.78
(a) Introduction
1.78
(b) Game Theory
1.83
(c) The Scope for Collusion Illustrated with the Prisoner's Dilemma
1.93
D. Dynamic Welfare Analysis of Market Power
1.120
( 1 )
Innovation and Welfare
1.120
Xlii
Contents
(2)
Different
Views 1.122
(3)
Some Empirical Results
1.125
(4)
The'New Economy'
1.127
(5)
Some Concluding Remarks
1.133
E. Market Definition
1.134
( 1 )
Product Market Definition
1.139
(a) Demand-Side Substitution
1.141
(b) The
SSNÏP
Test
1.147
(c) Elasticity Concepts and the Diversion Ratio
1.153
(d) Supply-Side Substitution
1.160
(2)
The Relevant Geographic Market
1.169
(a) Demand-Side Substitution
1.170
(b) Supply-Side Substitution
1.172
(3)
Specific Issues in the Context of Market Definition
1.175
(a) Chains of Substitution
1.176
(b) Price Discrimination
1.178
(c) Captive Production
1.181
(4)
Further Considerations
1.184
(a) Market Definition in Practice
1.184
(b) Defining the Market: Not an End in Itself
1.188
F. Market Power and Dominance
1.190
(1)
Market Power
1.192
(a) Concept
1.192
(b) Identification of (Static) Market Power
1.202
(2)
Dominance
1.211
(a) Single Dominance
1.212
(b) Collective Dominance
1.219
(3)
Enhancing Market Power
1.225
(a) Merger with a Competitor: Unilateral vs Coordinated Effects
1.227
(b) Exclusionary Strategies
1.240
G. Empirical Methods for Market Definition and the Assessment
of Market Power
1.249
(1)
Analysis of Prices and Price Movements
1.253
(a) Price Correlation Analysis
1.254
(b) Extension: Stationarity/Co-Integration
1.263
(2)
Analysis of Price Elasticities of Demand
1.265
(3)
Critical Loss Analysis
1.289
(4)
UPP
1-295
(5)
Event Analysis
1.302
(6)
Assessment Methods Relating Price to Market Structure
1.306
(a) Price Concentration Analysis
1.307
(b) Direct Evaluation of Competitive Constraints
1.313
(7)
Analysis of Bidding Data
1.314
(8)
Merger Simulation
1.325
2.
The Enforcement System under Regulation
1 /2003
Eddy
De Smijter
andAiha Sinclair
A. Direct Application of Articles
101
and
102 2.01
(1)
Introduction
2.01
xiv
Contents
(2)
The Aims and Results of the
System
Change
2.04
(a) Increased Application of Articles
101
and
102
at Member State Level
2.05
(b) The Commission's Focus on Enforcement
2.09
(3)
Self-assessment and Legal Certainty
2.12
(4)
The Direct Effect of Articles
101
and
102 2.20
(5)
Burden and Standard of Proof
2.25
B. The Relationship Between
EU
Competition Law and National
Competition Law
2.30
(1)
Introduction
2.30
(2)
Article
3(1):
The Obligation to Apply Articles
101
and
102 2.33
(a) Scope of Article
3(1) 2.34
(b) Primary Functions of Article
3(1) 2.40
(3)
The Convergence Rule of Article
3(2) 2.45
(4)
The Legal Consequences of Infringing Article
3(1)
and
(2) 2.52
(5)
Article
3
and the Primacy Rule
2.55
(6)
Exceptions to Article
3 2.58
(a) National Competition Laws
2.59
(b) National Laws Implementing
EU
Law Directives
2.66
(c) Member State Measures Covered by Article
106 2.68
(d) National Merger Control Laws
2.70
(e) Criminal Sanctions on Natural Persons
2.72
C. Powers and Decisions of National Competition Authorities
2.77
(1)
Introduction
2.77
(2)
TheNCA
2.78
(3)
The Decisions of an NCA
2.83
(a) Scope of Article
5 2.84
(b) The Decisions Listed in Article
5 2.88
(4)
Triggering a Decision by an NCA
2.91
(a) The NCA Acts on its Own Initiative or on a Complaint
2.91
(b) National Notification Systems
2.93
D. Commission Powers and Decisions
2.96
(1)
Introduction
2.96
(2)
Article
7:
Finding and Termination of Infringements
2.99
(a) The Power to Find Infringements
2.100
(b) The Power to Impose Remedies
2.103
(i) General Principles
2.104
(ii) Structural and Behavioural Remedies
2.1 07
(iii)
Break-ups
2.110
(c) Complaints
2.114
(3)
Article
8:
Interim Measures
2.116
(4)
Article
9:
Commitments
2.1 18
(a) Introduction
2.118
(b) The Nature of Article
9
Decisions
2.121
(c) The Purpose of Article
9
Decisions
2.126
(d) The Procedure for Adopting Article
9
Decisions
2.129
(e) Adoption of the Decision and Reopening of the Proceedings
2.135
(f) The Scope for Legal Challenge
2.143
(5)
Article
10:
Finding of Inapplicability
2.145
(a) Introduction
2.145
(b) The Nature and Purpose of Article
10
Decisions
2.146
xv
Contents
(с)
The Legal Effects of Article
10
Decisions
2.150
(i) The Relationship Between Articles
9
and
10 2.152
E. Cooperation Between Enforcers
2.154
(1)
Introduction
2.154
(2)
Cooperation within the ECN
2.155
(a) The Sharing of Work Amongst the Competition Authorities
2.156
(b) An NCA's Request to Another NCA to Carry Out an Investigation
2.160
(c) Exchange
ofinformation
and Its Use in Evidence
2.163
(i) Exchange of Information within the ECN
2.165
(i) Empowering ECN Members to Exchange Information
2.165
(it) Allowing ECN Members to Exchange Information
2.167
(iii)
Exchanging Information Voluntarily Submitted by a Leniency
Applicant
2.170
(ii) The Use of the Exchanged Information in Evidence
2.173
(i) the ReLition Between Article
12
and the National Law
Provisions Prohibiting NCAsfrom Divulging Confidential
Information
2Л74:
(ii) A Wider Umbrella for the Protection of Confidential Information
2.176
(iii)
The Use in Evidence of the Information Exchanged within the ECN
2.177
(i) The General Principles of
EU
Law
2.179
(ii) Information Exchanged Can Only Be Used in Evidence for the
Application of
EU
Competition Rules
2.182
(Hi) Information Exchanged Can Only Be Used in Evidence in
Respect of the Subject Matter for Which it was Collected
2.185
(iv)
The Limitations With Regard to the Use
ofinformation
in
Evidence to Impose Sanctions on Natural Persons
2.187
(v) Experience with Article
12 2.191
(d) The Obligation of Professional Secrecy and the Need to
Disclose Information
2.192
(i) Wbich Information is Covered by Professional Secrecy?
2.194
(i) The Wide Coverage of Professional Secrecy
2.194
(it) Specific Sub-Category Within the Wider Concept of
Professional Secrecy: Business Secrets and Other
Confidential Information
2.197
(Hi) Business Secrets
2.198
(iv)
Other Confidential Information
2.201
(ii) The Disclosure of Information Acquired or Exchanged
Pursuant to Regulation
1/2003 2.202
(i) Disclosure Necessary to Prove an Infringement of
Article
101
or
102 2.205
(iii)
Disclosure in granting access to the file
2.207
(i) A ccess to the File
f o r
the Addressee of
a Sta
temen t
of Objections
2.207
(ii) Access to Information by Other Parties with Legitimate Interest,
in Particular Comp^nants
2.209
(3)
Coherent Application within the ECN
2.210
(a) Introduction
2.210
(b) Information under Article
11 (3) 2.213
(c) The Procedure in Article
11 (4) 2.214
(i) The Scope of the Article
1 1 (4)
Procedure
2.216
(ii) The Article
11 (4)
Process and its Objective
2.222
(iii)
The Legal Consequences of Failure to Comply with Article
11 (4) 2.225
xvi
Contents
(d) Article
11 (6):
The Commission's Power to Withdraw a Case
2.229
(i) The Legal Nature of Article
11 (6) 2.231
(ii) The Authorities Covered by Article
11 (6) 2.234
(iii)
Circumstances in Which Withdrawal may be Envisaged
2.238
(iv)
The Procedure for Applying Article
11 (6) 2.248
(4)
Coherent Application by National Courts
2.251
(a) The Competence of National Courts to Apply
EU
Competition Rules
2.251
(b) The Coherent Application of
EU
Competition Rules by
National Courts
2.254
(i) Commission Initiatives towards Coherent Application of
EU
Competition Rules
2.258
(i) The Commissions Policy Notices and Guidelines
2.259
(ii) Co-Financing the Training of National Judges in
EU
Competition Rules
2.261
(Hi) A Database on National Judgments
2.263
(ii) Consistency in the Case of Parallel or Consecutive Application of
EU
Competition Rules
2.264
(c) Cooperation Between the Commission and the National Courts
2.270
(i) The Opportunity for the National Courts to ask the Commission
for Information or for its Opinion
2.274
(i) The Opportunity to Ask the Commission for Information
2.275
(ii) The Opportunity to Ask the Commission for Its Opinion
2.284
(ii) The Submission of Observations
2.285
3.
Article
101
Jonathan Faull,
Lars Kjelbye, Henning
LeupoId, and
Ali Nikpay
A. Introduction
3.01
B. Scope of Article
101 3.02
(1)
Scope
3.02
(2)
Coal and Steel
3.04
(3)
Defence
3.05
(4)
Environment and Culture
3.12
(5)
Sport
3.16
C. Article
101(1) 3.23
(1)
Undertakings
3.27
(a) Definition
3.27
(b) Professions
3.34
(c) Public Bodies Exception
3.39
(d) The Single Economic Unit Doctrine (No Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy
in
EU
Law)
3.49
(i) A
Subsidiary Wholly-Owned, or Almost Wholly-Owned, By
Its Parent
3.53
(ii) A Parent Holding a Majority Shareholding in a Subsidiary But Less
than
100
Per Cent
3.59
(iii)
Parent Liability in the Context of Joint Control
3.62
(iv)
Companies with Non-Controlling Stakes in Another Company
3.67
(e) Successor Undertakings
3-68
(2)
Agreements
3.74
(a) General Definition
3.74
xvii
Contents
(b)
Requires At Least Two Undertakings
3-75
(c) Form Irrelevant
3-76
(d) Notion of'Agreement'and Limitation of Freedom of Action
3.84
(e) Single Continuous Infringement Doctrine
3.87
(f) Tacit Acquiescence in Vertical Cases
3.101
(
i) Volkswagen II
3.104
(ii) What Does Tacit Acquiescence Require?
3.109
(iii)
Care Should be Taken in Applying the Bayer/Volkswagen II
Approach
3-П4
(g) Formal Termination May Not be Sufficient
3.118
(h) Judicial Settlement
3-121
(3)
Decisions by Associations of Undertakings
3.122
(4)
Concerted Practices
3.126
(a) Definition
3-126
(b) Can a Concerted Practice be Inferred from Circumstantial
Evidence Alone?
3.140
(c) Vertical Concerted Practices
3.143
(i) 'Hub and Spoke'Concerted Practices
3.147
(5)
Distinction Between Agreements and Concerted Practices
3.150
(6)
State Compulsion
3.155
(7)
The Notion of Restriction of Competition under
EU
Competition Law
3.160
(8)
Restriction by Object
3.184
(a) Concept of Restriction by Object
3.184
(b) Restriction by Object and Appreciability
3.209
(i) The
Ύκ
-Expedia
Case Law
3.210
(ii) The Commission's Approach to Appreciability in Object Cases
3.215
(iii)
The
Expedia
Judgment
3.217
(9)
Restriction by Effect
3.219
(a) The Commission's Traditional Approach
3-223
(b) Modifications by the
EU
Courts
3.230
(c) Restrictions of Rivalry Must Be Assessed in Their Market Context
3.231
(d) Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
3.235
(i) Commercial Ancillarity
3.236
(ii) Public Interest Ancillarity
3.243
(iii)
The Narrow Scope of the Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
3.248
(i) Directly Rekted and Subordinate
Ъ.1Ъ\
(ii) Necessary
Ъ.^ЪЪ
(Hi) Objective Necessity for the Implementation of the
Main Operation
Ъ.1ЪА
(iv)
Proportionality
3.266
(iv)
Concluding Remark: Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
3.269
(e) Exclusivity Necessary for Supply
3.271
(i) Exclusivity Must be Objectively Necessary
3.273
(ii) It is Unclear Whether this Doctrine Applies to Agreements
Between Competitors
3-274
(iii)
Doctrine Only Likely to Apply in Clear-Cut Cases
3.279
(iv)
Does the Approach Apply to Object' Cases?
3.288
(v) Difference Between Exclusivity Necessary for Supply and Ancillary
Restraints Doctrines
3.289
(f) Appreciability
3.294
XVIII
Contents
(g) Cumulative
Effects
Doctrine
3.298
(h)
The Purpose of the Market Analysis
3-303
(і)
No Rule ofReasonundet Article
101(1) 3.303
(ii) Gottrup-Klim
3.311
(iii)
Wouters
3.314
(iv)
Metro I and II
3.320
(v) O2
3.324
(i) Does O2 Signal a Change in Direction?
3.327
(vi)
Explicit Rejection of the Rule of Reason under Article
101 ( 1 )
by
the General Court
3.337
(i) Extent of Market Analysis
3-338
(j) Restrictive Clauses Are Not a Necessary Condition for the Application
of Article
101(1) 3.344
(k) The Commission's Policy as set out in the Article
101(3)
Guidelines
3.347
(i) Step
1:
The Counterfactual
3.350
(ii) Step
2:
Assessment of the Likely Effect of the Agreement
3-359
(1)
The Current State of Affairs: Developments in the Commission's
Policy and the
EU
Courts' Case Law Subsequent to the Article
101 (3)
Guidelines
3.366
(i) Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
3.375
(ii) Block Exemption Regulations
3-380
(¡ii)
De Minimis
Notice
3.381
D.
Jurisdiction
3.385
(1)
General
3.385
(2)
The Concept of Trade Between Member States
3.388
(3)
The Link Between Trade and the Agreement or Practice
3.392
(4)
The Notion of'May Affect'
3-395
(a) Introduction
3.395
(b) A Sufficient Degree of Probability
3397
(c) An Influence on the Pattern of Trade
3.404
(i) Direct or Indirect, Actual or Potential
3.406
(5)
Appreciability
3.413
(a) General Principles
3.413
(b) Quantification
3.416
(6)
Assessment of Various Types of Agreement and Practices
3.427
(a) Introduction
3.427
(b) Agreements and Practices Concerning Imports and Exports and
Agreements and Practices Implemented in Several Member States
3.428
(c) Agreements and Practices Confined to the Whole or Part of a
Member State
3.429
(d) Agreements and Practices Covering Part of a Member State
3-432
(e) Agreements and Practices Involving Third Countries
3.435
E. Article
101(2) 3.442
F. The Article
101(3)
Exception
3-445
(1)
Introduction
3.445
(2)
The Relationship Between Article
101(1)
and Article
101(3) 3.452
(3)
General Principles for the Application of Article
101 (3) 3.455
(a) Introduction
3.455
(b) The Nature of the Benefits that Can Be Taken into Account
3.458
xix
Contents
(c)
The Relevant Market as the Proper Framework for Applying
Article
101(3) 3.461
(d) The Temporal Application of Article
101(3) 3.464
(e) Block Exemptions
3.467
(4)
The Four Conditions of Article
101 (3) 3.472
(a) Introduction
3.472
(b) The First Test of
Arride
101 (3):
Efficiency Gains
3.473
(i) Examples of Relevant Types of Efficiencies
3.480
(ii) The Substantiation of Efficiency Claims
3.483
(c) The Second Test of Article
101 (3):
Indispensability
3-489
(d) The Third Test of Article
101(3):
A Fair Share for Consumers
3.495
(e) The Fourth Test of Article
101(3):
No Elimination of Competition in
Respect of a Substantial Part of the Products in Question
3.506
4.
Article
102
Miguel
de la Afano, Renato
Nazzini, and Hans Zenger
A. The System of Enforcement of Article
102 4.01
(1)
Introduction
4.01
(a) Elements of Article
102 4.01
(b) Relationship Between Article
101
and Article
102 4.08
(c) Purpose of Article
102:
Protection of Competition or Protection of
Competitors?
4.10
(d) Role of Efficiencies in Article
102
Assessment
4.14
(2)
Categorization of Abuses: Exploitative vs Exclusionary
4.16
(a) Prohibition of Customer Exploitation
4.17
(b) Prohibition of Exclusionary Practices
4.23
(3)
Consequences of Infringement of Article
102 4.29
(a) Introduction
4.29
(b) Guiding Principles
4.31
(c) Types of Sanctions and Remedies in Article
102
Cases
4.35
(i) Fines
4.35
(ii) Cease and Desist Orders
4.45
(iii)
Behavioural Remedies
4.46
(iv)
Structural Remedies
4.48
(v) Which Remedy is Most Appropriate?
4.51
(d) Procedural Issues
4.52
(4)
Commitment Decisions (Article
9
of Regulation
1/2003) 4.53
(a) Basic Principles
4.54
(b) Importance of Commitment Decisions in Article
102
Cases
4.57
(c) Concerns Regarding the Use of Commitment Decisions in
Article
102
Cases
4.61
(5)
Judicial Review of Article
102
Decisions
4.68
(a) Re vie
w
of Facts and Law
4.71
(b) Review of'Complex Economic Matters'
4.76
B. The Article
102
Enforcement Priorities Guidance
4.83
(1)
The Emergence of the Effects-Based Approach
4.83
(a) Traditional Approach under
EU
Law
4.83
(b) Form-vs Effects-Based Approach
4.86
(c) Pros and Cons of an Effects-Based Approach
4.89
(d) The Recent Adoption by the
EU
Courts of a More Explicitly Effects-
Based Approach
4.92
XX
Contents
(2)
The Commission's
Review
of
Artide
102
Policy
4.93
(a) Purpose of the Review
4.93
(b) The Staff Discussion Paper
4.95
(3)
The Article
102
Enforcement Priorities Guidance
4.98
(a) Adoption of Guidance as opposed to Guidelines
4.98
(b) Economics-Based Approach to Enforcement
4.99
(c) Impact of the Guidance on Future Cases
4.103
(d) Overview of the Guidance
4.106
(e) Brief Summary of the Approach to Abuse
4.108
(i) Anti-Competitive Foreclosure
4.112
(ii) Assessment of the Effect on Consumers
4.114
(iii)
Objective Justifications and Efficiencies
4.119
C. Dominance
4.122
(1)
Concept of Single Dominance
4.123
(a) Legal Definition of Single Dominance
4.123
(b) Concerns Regarding the Elements of the Definition of Dominance
4.124
(c) Approach Taken in the Guidance to the Test Elements
4.127
(d) Assessment of Market Power
4.130
(e) How Does the Guidance Approach Fit with the Legal Approach
4.133
(2)
Factors Relevant to Single Dominance
4.139
(a) Economic Measurement of Market Power
4.140
(b) Factors Under the Case Law and the Commission's Guidance
4.143
(i) The Position of the Undertaking Concerned and
Its Competitors
4.144
(i) Market Definition
4.145
(ii) Market Shares
4.149
(Hi) Profitability of the Undertaking
4.169
(iv)
Conduct of the Undertaking
4.172
(v) The Position of Competitors
4.175
(ii) Barriers to Entry and Expansion
4.180
(i) Regulatory Barriers to Entry
4.186
(ii) Capacity Constraints
4.191
(Hi) Economies of ScaL· and Scope
4.192
(iv)
Network Effects
4.197
(v) Switching Costs
4.201
(vi)
Vertical Integration and Exclusive or Preferential Access to
Inputs or Customers
4.202
(vii)
Financial Strength
4.205
(viii)
Spare or Excess Capacity
4.207
(ix)
Other Factors
4.211
(iii)
Countervailing Buyer Power
4.216
(3)
Concept of Collective Dominance
4.218
(a) Definition of Collective Dominance
4.218
(b) Non
-Oligopolistic Collective Dominance
4.221
(c) Vertical Non-Oligopolistic Collective Dominance
4.229
(d) Oligopolistic Collective Dominance
4.231
(4)
Abuse of a Collective Dominant Position
4.241
(a) Joint Abuses
4.242
(b) Single Abuses
4.243
(5)
Dominance and Abuse in Neighbouring Markets
4.244
(6)
Dominance in New Economy Markets
4.248
xxi
Contents
D.
Concept
of Abuse
4.252
(1)
General Concept of Abuse
4.252
(2)
Definition of Abuse Under the
EU
Courts' Case Law
4.254
(3)
The Test for Abuse
4.261
(a) Exploitative and Discriminatory Abuses
4.262
(b) Exclusionary Abuses
4.263
(i) Potential Tests Based on Economic Principles
4.265
(ii) Approach Taken in the Commission's Guidance
4.266
(i) Anti-Competitive Foreclosure: General
4.268
(ii) Test for Foreclosure in Pricing Cases
4.270
(Hi) When is Foreclosure Enough to be Anti-Competitive?
4.275
(iv)
Likely Harm to Consumers
4.280
(4)
The Special Responsibility of the Dominant Undertaking
4.283
(5)
Objective Justification
4.290
(a) General
4.290
(b) Objective Necessity
4.291
(c) Efficiency Defence
4.292
E. Predatory Pricing
4.298
(1)
What is Predatory Pricing?
4.298
(a) Definition
4.298
(b) Economic Theories of Predatory Pricing
4.299
(c) Distinguishing Predatory Pricing From Normal Competition
4.300
(2)
Prédation
Under
EU
Law: The
AKZO
Test
4.302
(a) Whether and How to Assess the Intent of the Dominant Firm
4.306
(b) What is the Appropriate Cost-Based Benchmark?
4.309
(c) Is a Below Cost Test Appropriate?
4.315
(i) Above-Cost Price Cuts as Part of a Wider Exclusionary Strategy
4.321
(ii) Above-Cost Price Cuts by a Quasi-Monopolist Liable to Exclude
its Only Competitor
4.324
(iii)
Above-Cost Price Cuts Restricting Free Trade
4.326
(d) Difficulties With Relying on Price-Cost Tests
4.328
(i) Below Cost Pricing May Not Be a Necessary Condition
4.329
(ii) Below Cost Pricing May Not Be a Sufficient Condition
4.331
(iii)
Below Cost Pricing May Be Pro-Competitive
4.333
(iv)
Below-Cost Pricing Tests Create Measurement Difficulties
4.335
(e) The PostDanmarkTest
4.341
(f) The Role of Recoupment?
4.343
(3)
The
Prédation
Test in the Article
102
Enforcement Priorities Guidance
4.348
(a) Profit Sacrifice
4.351
(b) Exclusion of an Equally Efficient Competitor
4.363
(c) Consumer Harm and Recoupment
4.367
(i) Entry is Unlikely After the Prey is Excluded or Disciplined
4.372
(ii) Re-Entry is Unlikely
4.376
(iii)
Assessment of the Competitive Constraint Exercised by the
Excluded Rival
4.378
(iv)
Dominance Is Not Evidence of Recoupment
4.379
(d) Objective Justification
4.384
(i) Market-Expanding Efficiencies
4.389
(ii) To Facilitate Learning and Awareness of a Product
Among Consumers
4.392
(iii)
To Improve the Firm's Positioning as a Low-Price Company
4.393
xxii
Contents
(e) Meeting
Competition Defence
4.395
(f)
Other Loss-Minimizing Strategies
4.396
F. Exclusive Dealing: Exclusivity Obligations and Loyalty Rebates
4.397
(1)
Case Law and Commission Decisional Practice
4.397
(a) Definition andTypes of Exclusivity
4.397
(i) Legal and
De
Facto Exclusivity
4.398
(ii) Requirements Contracts
4.401
(iii)
English Clauses
4.402
(iv)
imposition of Exclusive Obligations on Suppliers
4.405
(v) Exclusivity Imposed by Distributors
4.406
(b) The Abuse Test in Exclusivity Cases
4.407
(c) Objective Justification
4.411
(d) Definition andTypes of Conditional Rebates
4.413
(e) Abuse Test in Rebates Cases
4.416
(i) Rebates That Are Presumptively Lawful (Quantity Rebates)
4.416
(ii) Rebates That Are Nakedly Exclusionary A AM
(iii)
Fidelity Rebates
4.418
(iv)
Individualized Target Rebates
4.421
(v) Standardized Rebates
4.426
(2)
Policy and Effects-Based Approach
4.429
(a) Commission's Approach Under the Article
102
Enforcement Priorities
Guidance
4.429
(b) The Logic of the Commission's Approach Towards Loyalty Rebates and
Exclusive Dealing
4.435
(i) Economic Reasoning for Use of Rebate Schemes
4.437
(ii) Possible Anti-Competitive Harm From Use of Rebate Schemes
4.443
(c) Identifying Anti-Competitive Foreclosure Under the Article
102
Enforcement Priorities Guidance
4.446
(i) Step
1 :
The As-Efficient Competitor Test
4.447
(ii) Step
2:
Assessment of Anti-Competitive Foreclosure
4.450
(iii)
Countervailing Efficiencies and Objective Justification
4.454
(d) The Limits of the Article
102
Enforcement Priorities
Guidance Approach
4.460
(e) The Commission's Application of the New Approach
4.468
G. Tying and Bundling
4.474
(1)
Introduction
4.474
(a) Definition of Tying and Bundling
4.474
(b) Relationship with Article
101 4.477
(2)
Legal Analysis and Case Law on Tying
4.478
(a) A Dominant Position on the Tying Market
4.480
(b) The Two-Product Test
4.482
(c) Coercion
4.488
(d) Anti-Competitive Effect
4.492
(i) The Requirement to Prove Foreclosure of As-Efficient Competitors
4.492
(e) Objective justification
4.502
(i) Reduction in Transaction Costs
4.503
(ii) Preservation of Goodwill, Quality Assurance, and Ensuring
Compliance with Safety Requirements
4.510
(iii)
Dynamic Efficiency
4.511
(iv)
Standardization
4.514
xxiii
Contents
(3)
Case Law on Mixed Bundling
4.519
(4)
Policy and Effects-Based Approach
4.522
(a) The Article
102
Enforcement Priorities Guidance Approach Towards
Tying and Bundling
4.522
(b) No Presumption of Anti-Competitive Harm
4.529
(c) Anti-Competitive Tying and Bundling
4.538
(d) Price Discrimination and Multi-Product Rebates
4.553
H. Refusal to Supply
4.558
(1)
Concept of Abusive Refusal to Supply
4.558
(2)
Basic Elements
4.561
(a) Competitive Advantage on Downstream Market
4.561
(b) Enforcement of Other Abuse
4.563
(c) Constructive Refusal to Supply
4.565
(d) De novo
Refusals vs Withdrawal of Supply
4.567
(3)
Types of Refusal to Supply
4.569
(a) Refusal to Supply a Physical Product or Service
4.570
(b) Refusal to Provide Access to an Essential Facility
4.571
(c) Refusal to License IP Rights
4.572
(d) Refusal to Supply Information Needed for Interoperability
4.575
(4)
Potential Anti-Competitive Effects of Refusals to Supply
4.577
(5)
The Case Law on Refusal to Supply
4.581
(a) General Framework
4.581
(b) Indispensability
4.585
(c) The Foreclosure Effect
4.594
(d) Raising Rivals' Costs as Exclusionary Effect?
4.599
(e) The Foreclosure Effect and the 'Essential Facilities' Doctrine in
Commission Practice
4.602
(f) Consumer Harm
4.606
(g) Interoperability Cases Since Microsoft
4.609
(h) Refusal to Supply an Existing Customer
4.610
(i) Defences (Objective Necessity and Objective Justification)
4.613
(6)
The Approach Under the Commission's Guidance
4.620
(a) General Approach
4.620
(b) Necessary Conditions
4.624
(i) Objective Necessity
4.628
(ii) Elimination of Effective Competition
4.630
(iii)
Consumer Harm (and Incentives Balancing Test)
4.631
(iv)
Objective Justifications (Efficiencies)
4.634
(7)
Refusal to Supply and Patents
4.636
I. Margin Squeeze
4.638
(1)
Concept of a Margin Squeeze Abuse
4.638
(2)
Legal Analysis of Margin Squeeze
4.642
(a) The Early Case Law
4.642
(b) Elements of the Abuse
4.646
(i) Margin Squeeze is
a Stand-Alone
Abuse
4.651
(ii) The Need to Demonstrate an Anti-Competitive Effect
4.652
(iii)
Factors Relevant to Assessing Potential Anti-Competitive Effect
4.657
(iv)
The As-Efficient Competitor'Test
4.660
(v) Basis for Calculating Potential Effects
4.662
(vi)
Objective Justification
4.664
(vii)
Relevance of Level of Dominance
4.665
xxiv
Contents
(3)
Economie
Assessment
4.667
(a) General
4.667
(b) The Cost Benchmark
4.671
(c) Profitability Analysis
4.674
(d) Assessment of the Spread
4.679
(e) Specific Considerations in Start-Up Phases
4.682
(4)
Interplay Between Margin Squeeze and Refusal to Deal: Indispensability
4.683
(5)
Interplay Between Margin Squeeze and Regulatory Obligations
4.693
J. Specific Abusive Practices in Relation to IP Rights
4.694
(1)
Introduction
4.694
(a) Complementary Aims of IP Rights and Antitrust
4.694
(b) Appropriateness of Antitrust Intervention in the IP Rights Arena
4.696
(c) Potential Competition Concerns Arising out of IP Rights
4.702
(2)
Supply of Misleading Information to Extend Patent Validity
4.707
(a) Nature of the Abuse
4.713
(b) Intent Not Determinative
4-716
(c) Evidence of Actual Effects
4.720
(3)
Withdrawal of Marketing Authorization to Restrict Entry of Generics
4.722
(4)
Patent Filing Strategies
4.729
(a) Early Cases on Strategic Use of Patents
4.729
(b) Defensive Patent Strategies: Blocking Patents
4.731
(c) Other Strategic Behaviour
4.736
(5)
Patent Settlements With Reverse Payments (Pay for Delay)
4.738
(a) Overview: Potential Benefits and Harms From Patent Settlements
4.738
(b) Commission Practice
4.740
(6)
Patent Hold-Up in the Context of Standard Setting
4.746
(a) Context: Standard Setting and Patent Hold-Up Possibilities
4.746
(b) Patent Ambush
4.751
(i) Definition
4.751
(ii) Anti-Competitive Effects of Patent Ambush
4.752
(iii)
Conditions for Abuse: The Rambus Decision
4.753
(c) FRANDHold-Up
4.763
(i) Definition ofFRANDHold-Up: The Quakomm Case
4.763
(ii) Particular Issues Surrounding Article
102
Enforcement in
FRAND Licensing
4.765
(i) FRAND is Not a Static or Pre-Defined Concept
4.765
(ii) What Constitutes'Fair'and'Reasonable?
4.771
(Hi) What Constitutes'Non-Discriminatory'?
4.781
(iii)
Importance of FRAND
4.784
(7)
Anti-Competitive Litigation in Relation to Standard Essential Patents
4.787
(8)
Issues Applicable Across IP Rights Cases
4.797
(a) Assessing Dominance in Pharmaceutical IP Rights Cases
4.797
(i) Inferring Dominance from Level of Rents
4.799
(ii) Dominance Relative to a Competitive Counterfactual Post-Loss of
Exclusivity
4.805
(b) Anti-Competitive Foreclosure and Objective Justification in IP Rights
Cases
4.806
(c) Applicability of Article
102
to 'Standard' Strategies/Tactics Available
Under IP Rights
4.810
(d) Intervention under Article
] 02
vs Enforcement of IP Law
4.814
xxv
Contents
К.
Exploitative
Abuses
4.821
(1)
Concept of Excessive Pricing
4.821
(2)
The Test for Excessive Pricing Under
EU
Case Law
4.827
(a) The United Brands Test
4.827
(b) Difficulties in the Application of the United Brands^e.sxr. Port of
Helsingborg
4.833
(c)
Alternative Approaches under the Case Law
4.836
(3)
Imposing Other Unfair Terms
4.844
(4)
Economic Approach to Excessive Pricing
4.850
(a) Circumstances Suitable for Intervention
4.850
(i) To Restore Dynamic Competition
4.856
(ii) Exploitative Prices as a Result of Exclusionary Conduct
4.858
(iii)
Exploitation of Dominance Resulting from
Non-Competitive Forces
4.862
(b) Determining Whether Prices are Abusive
4.863
(i) The Price-Cost Difference is Excessive
4.864
(ii) Unfair Price in Itself or Compared to Others
4.867
(i) Discrimination-Based Benchmarks
4.875
(ii) Direct Price- Cost Co mpa
riso ns
4.879
(5)
Unfairly Low Prices Extracted by Dominant Buyers
4.882
(6)
Limiting Production, Markets, or Technical Development
4.884
L. Price Discrimination
4.889
(1)
Concept of Price Discrimination
4.889
(2)
Competition Concerns Regarding Price Discrimination
4.891
(3)
Case Law and Commission Practice on Article 102(c) Discriminatory
Pricing Abuses
4.896
(a) Discrimination Based on Nationality
4.897
(b) Geographical Price Discrimination
4.899
(c) Market-Distorting Price Discrimination
4.907
(i) Definition
4.907
(ii) Equivalent Transactions
4.908
(iii)
Dissimilar Conditions
4.911
(iv)
Competitive Disadvantage
4.915
(4)
Policy and Effects-Based Approach
4.935
(a) The Commission's Current Enforcement Approach
4.935
5.
Mergers
Claes Bengtsson,
Josep Maria Carpi
Badia,
and Massimiliano
Kadar
A. Introduction
5.01
(1)
Origins and Evolution of
EU
Merger Control
5.0 1
(a) Introduction of an
EU
Merger Control System
5.01
(b) The First Decade of Application of
EU
Merger Control
5.03
(c) The Judgments in Airtours,
Tetra Laval,
and Schneider
5.07
(d) The
2004
Reform
5.09
(e) Evolution of
EU
Merger Control Following the
2004
Reform
5.11
(2)
Core Principles of
EU
Merger Control
5.15
(a) Compulsory Ex Ante Notification
5.15
(b) One-Stop Shop
5.17
(c) One-Tier Administrative Procedure Subject to Judicial Review
5-20
(d) Enforcement Objectives
5.22
(3)
Statistics on Enforcement Over Time
5.24
xxvi
Contents
В.
Jurisdiction
5.31
(1)
Overview
5.ЗІ
(a) Two-Limbed Test to Determine Jurisdiction
5-32
(i) The Concept of a'Concentration'
5-33
(ii) The Requirement of an
'EU
Dimension'
5.35
(b) Regulatory Framework: The Merger Regulation and the
Jurisdictional Notice
5-36
(c) Discussions with the Commission on Jurisdiction in Individual Cases
5.38
(2)
The Concept of a Concentration: Merger
5.43
(3)
The Concept of a Concentration: Acquisition of Control
5.48
(a) Overview
5.48
(b) Control
5.49
(i) Who Acquires Control?
5.52
(ii) How Can Control Be Acquired?
5.57
(iii)
The Object of Control
5.62
(iv)
The Lasting Nature of the Change in Control
5.67
(v) Internal Restructurings and Concentrations Involving
State-Owned Undertakings
5.73
(c) The Acquisition of Sole Control
5.78
(i) De
Jure Sole Control
5.79
(ii)
De
Facto Sole Control
5.80
(d) The Acquisition of Joint Control
5.87
(i) Equal Voting Rights
5.89
(ii) Veto Rights
5.90
(iii)
Joint Exercise of Voting Rights
5.93
(e) Changes in the Structure and/or Quality of Control
5.95
(f) Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings (Structural Links)
5.100
(g) Exceptions Under Article
3(5)
of the Merger Regulation
5.106
(4)
Joint Ventures
5.111
(a) Introduction
5.
HI
(b) Concept of Joint Venture
5.114
(c) Relevant Jurisdictional Test
5.120
(i) Creation of a Joint Venture
5.121
(ii) Joint Acquisitions of an Undertaking or Business
5.122
(iii)
Other Operations Involving Join
t
Ventures
5.127
(d) The Requirement of Full-Functionality
5-128
(i) Overview
5.128
(ii) Sufficient Resources to Operate Independently on the Market
5.131
(iii)
Relations Between the Joint Venture and its Parent Companies
5.132
(iv)
Operating on a Lasting Basis
5-137
(5)
Interrelated and Staggered Operations
5.139
(a) Interdependent Transactions
5.1-41
(b) Consecutive Transactions Between the Same Parties
(Staggered Transactions)
5.149
(6)
Ancillary Restraints
5.152
(7)
The Requirement of an
EU
Dimension
5.153
(a) The Purpose of Turnover Thresholds
5.154
(b) The Principal Threshold under Article
1(2)
of the Merger Regulation
5.157
(c) The Alternative Threshold under Article
1 (3)
of the Merger Regulation
5.160
(d) Appraisal of the Operation of the Turnover Thresholds
5.163
xxvii
Contents
(8)
The Calculation of Relevant Turnover
5.168
(a) Step
1 :
Identifying the Undertakings Concerned
5.169
(i) General Rule
5.171
(ii) Specific Scenarios on the Acquiring Side
5.175
(iii)
Specific Scenarios on the Acquired Side
5.180
(b) Step
2:
Methodology for the Calculation of Turnover
5.184
(i) Concept of Turnover
5.185
(ii) Attribution of Turnover Between Undertakings in a Group
5.188
(iii)
Treatment of Internal Turnover
5.196
(iv)
Geographic Allocation of Turnover
5.199
(c) The Relevant Date and Financial Accounts
5.204
C. Interaction with Member States and Third Countries
5.207
(1)
Introduction
5.207
(2)
Reallocation
of Jurisdiction between the Commission and Member
States ('Referrals')
5.208
(a) Purpose of the Referral System
5.208
(b) Use of the Referral System Over Time
5.211
(c) Guiding Principles Applied when Considering Referral Requests
5-216
(d) Operation of the Referral System in Practice
5.222
(i) Referrals from the Commission to One or More NCAs
5.224
(i) Pre-Notification ReferraL· Requested by the Parties (Article
4(4))
Ъ-11Ъ
(ii) Post-Notification ReferraL· Requested by an NCA (Article
9) 5.239
(ii) Referrals From One or More NCAs to the Commission
5.255
(i) Pre-Notification ReferraL· Requested by the Parties
(Article
4(5)) 5.256
(ii) Post-notification ReferraL· Requested by an NCA (Article
22) 5.266
(e) Evaluation and Reform of the Referral System
5.277
(3)
Member State Action on Non-Competition Grounds
5.281
(a) Introduction
5.281
(b) Assessment of Legitimate Interests
5-283
(i) Recognized Interests
5.284
(ii) Non-Recognized Interests
5.290
(4)
Concentrations in the Defence Sector
5.294
(5)
Cooperation Between the Commission and Member States
5.298
(a) General Cooperation Obligations
5.299
(b) Cooperation During Specific Phases of an Investigation
5.303
(i) During the Referral Process
5-303
(ii) During Phase I
5.304
(iii)
During Phase II
5.306
(c) Enhancing Cooperation Between Member States Through the ECN
5-309
(6)
Merger Control in the EEA Context
5.310
(a) The Scope of the Merger Control System under the EEA
5.310
(b) Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the Commission and the
EFTA
Surveillance Authority
5-312
(c) Cooperation Between the Commission and the
EFTA
Surveillance Authority
5.316
(7)
International Cooperation in Merger Control
5.318
(a) Framework for International Cooperation
5-318
(b) Practical Aspects of International Cooperation in Merger Cases
5-322
(c) Statistics on International Cooperation
5.328
xxvui
Contents
D.
Merger
Control
Procedure
5.331
(1)
Introduction
5.331
(2)
Principal Features
of the Procedural Framework
5.332
(a) Underlying Rationale: Proportionate, Effective Control
5.332
(b) Binding Procedural Deadlines
5.338
(c) The Instruments of the Procedural Framework
5-341
(d) The Different Actors in
EU
Merger Proceedings
5.342
(i) The Notifying Parties and Other Involved Parties
5.343
(ii) The Commission
5-348
(iii)
Third Parties
5-356
(iv)
Member State NCAs
5.357
(v) Non-EU Agencies
5-358
(vi)
The
EU
Courts
5.359
(3)
The Main Steps and Timetable for
EU
Merger Control Proceedings
5.360
(4)
The Pre-Notification Phase
5.362
(a) Introduction
5-362
(b) Timing of Pre-Notification Contacts
5.366
(c) Initial Contact and Request for a Case Team
5.368
(d) Confidentiality
5.371
(e) Discussions on Jurisdiction
5.373
(0
Discussions on Substance, Procedure, and Timing
5.375
(g) Review of Draft(s) Form CO and Requests for Waivers
5.379
(h) Submission of Internal Documents
5.381
(i) Fact Finding: Contacts with Third Parties
5.384
(j) Green Light for Notification
5.385
(5)
Notification of a Concentration
5.388
(a) Introduction
5.388
(b) Obligation to Notify and Standstill Obligation
5.389
(i) Automatic Exceptions: Public Bids and Series of Transactions
insecurities
5.391
(ii) Ad Hoc Derogations at the Request of the Parties
5.392
(iii)
Preventing Early Implementation
5.396
(c) Consequences of Failure to Notify
5.398
(d) Timing of Notification
5.399
(e) Notifying Parties
5.403
(f) Submission of Form CO
5.404
(g) Incompleteness
5.412
(h) Publication of the Fact of the Notification
5.415
(6)
Phase I
5.417
(a) Introduction
5.417
(b) Timetable and Deadlines
5-418
(c) Fact-Finding
5.422
(d) Where Competition Concerns are Identified
5-427
(e) Decision
5.430
(f) Notification and Publication
5.431
(i) Notification To The Parties
5.431
(ii) Publication
5.433
(7)
Phase II: In-Depth Investigation
5.437
(a) Introduction
5.437
(b) Procedural Safeguards in Phase II
5.439
(c) Timetable and Deadlines
5.440
xxix
Contents
(d)
Initial
Stage:
Review
of Key Documents, Reply to the Article 6(l)(c)
Decision and State of Play Meeting
5.445
(e) In-Depth Investigation
5.447
(f) Where the Competition Concerns are Dispelled
5.450
(g) Where Competition Concerns Remain
5.451
(h) The Statement of Objections
5.452
(i) Purpose and Content
5.452
(ii) Timing
5.454
(Hi) Scope of the SO
5.455
(iv)
Other Parties
5.457
(i) Access to File
5.459
(i) Purpose
5.459
(ii) Timing
5-461
(iii)
Scope
5.462
(i) Internal Documents
5.463
(ii) Business Secrets and Confidential Information
5.466
(iv)
Protection of Business Secrets and Confidential Information
5.469
(v) Use of the Information/Access to Documents
5.476
(j) Reply to the SO and Oral Hearing
5.478
(i) Reply to the SO
5.478
(ii) Oral Hearing
5.480
(i) Attendees
5.480
(ii) Preparation
5.481
(Hi) Conduct of the Hearing
5.482
(iv)
Post-Hearing Report
5.486
(k) The Post-SO/Oral Hearing Stage
5.487
(i) Final State of Play Meetings
5-487
(ii) Peer Review Panel
5.489
(iii)
Advisory Committee
5.494
(1)
Decision
5.499
(m) Notification and Publication
5.503
(n) Post-Decision Remedies Process
5-505
(8)
The Simplified Procedure
5.506
(a) Overview and Rationale
5.506
(b) The Commission's Discretion in Applying the Simplified Procedure
5-509
(c) Use of the Simplified Procedure in Practice
5.510
(d) Impact of the Simplified Procedure on Deadlines
5.511
(e) The Scope of the Simplified Procedure: Categories of Suitable Cases
5.512
(i) Five Categories of Suitable Cases
5.512
(ii) Exclusions
5.520
(f
)
Procedural Aspects
5.521
(g) Decision
5-527
(9)
Abandonment of a Concentration, Withdrawal and Re-submission of a
Notification, Change of an Authorized Transaction
5-529
(a) Abandonment
5-529
(b) Withdrawal of a Notification
5-530
(c) Change in the Transaction Structure
5.531
(10)
Particular Procedures
5-532
(a) Interim Measures
5.534
(i) General
5.534
(ii) Conditions Necessary for the Imposition of Interim Measures
5.536
xxx
Contents
(iii)
Scope of
Interim
Measures
5.538
(iv)
Process
5.541
(b) Revocation of a Clearance Decision
5.542
(c) Inspections and Requests for Information by Decision
5-544
(d) Imposition of Fines and Periodic Penalties
5.548
(i) Fines
5.548
(ii) Periodic Penalty Payments
5.554
E. Substantive Assessment
5.556
(1)
Main Elements of the Assessment under Article
2
of the
Merger Regulation
5-556
(a) A concentration'
5.557
(b) 'which would'
5.559
(c) 'impede effective competition'
5-562
(i) Intermediate and Ultimate Consumers
5.564
(ii) Concept of Consumer Welfare
5-565
(d) 'significantly'
5.568
(e) 'in the common market or in a substantial part of it,'
5.577
(f) 'in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant
position.'
5.581
(2)
Definition of the Relevant Market
5.587
(a) Relevant Product Market
5.591
(i) Demand-Side Substitution
5.593
(ii) Supply-Side Substitution
5.595
(b) Relevant Geographic Market
5-602
(0
Defining the Geographic Market on the Basis of Location of
Customers or Producers
5-607
(c) The SSNIP Test and Critical Loss Analysis
5-612
(d) Price Discrimination Markets
5.618
(e) Factors Relevant to Market Definition and Types of Evidence
Relied On
5.626
(i) Views on Functionality
5.630
(ii) Commercial Strategies and Marketing Material
5.635
(iii)
Analysis of Price Levels
5.638
(iv)
Analysis of Price Correlation
5.645
(v) Event Analysis
5.654
(f) Market Definition for Merger Cases and Antitrust Cases are Similar
but Distinct
5.657
(g) Market Definition in an Effects-Based Analysis
5.661
(3)
Analysis of the
Effectsofa
Concentration
5.666
(a) The Move to a More Effects-Based Approach
5.667
(b) Gravitation Towards Unilateral Horizontal Effects
5-669
(c) Increasingly Complex Assessments
5.675
(4)
Horizontal Mergers
5.680
(a) Non-Coordinated Effects (Unilateral Effects)
5.680
(i) Market Share Thresholds
5.680
(i) Which Market Shares are Relevant for the Assessment?
5.682
(ii) Market Shares Indicating a Lack of Substantive Concern
5.684
(iii)
Market Shares Indicating a Likelihood of Substantive Concerns
5.687
(ii) Intervention Thresholds: Removal of a Significant Competitive
Constraint
5.691
(iii)
Assessment of Effect: Additional Factors
5.700
xxxi
Contents
(iv)
Differentiated Product Markets: Closeness of Competition
5.703
(i) Views of the Market Participants
5.709
(it) Internal Documents
5.714
(Hi) Bidding Data
5.715
(iv)
Switching Data
5.720
(v) Price Analysis
5.722
(vi)
Cross-Price Elasticities
5-724
(vii)
Modelling the Market
5.726
(v) Homogeneous Product Markets: Capacity
5-730
(vi)
Multi-Sourcing
5.736
(vii)
Ability to Hinder Expansion
5.738
(viii)
Merger with a Potential Competitor
5.746
(ix)
Buyer Power Created by the Merger
5.755
(b) Coordinated Effects
5.764
(i) Concept and History
5.764
(i) Collective Dominance Under the
1989
Merger
Regufótion
5.767
(ii)
The
Airtours
Benchmark
5.769
(Hi)
lhe
SONY
/BMG
Jurisprudence
5.771
(ii) Analytical Framework
5.776
(i) The Airtours Criteria
5.777
(ii) The Approach Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
5.778
(iii)
Creating Coordination or Strengthening Existing
Coordination
5.782
(i) Creating Coordination
5-783
(ii) Strengthening Coordination
5-787
(iv)
The Criteria for Coordination
5.791
(i) Reaching Terms of Coordination (A Conducive Market
En
vir
on
ment)
5.792
(ii) Monitoring Deviations
5.793
(Hi) Adequate Deterrent Mechanisms
5.800
(iv)
Reactions of Outsiders
5.805
(5)
Non-Horizontal Assessment
5.810
(a) Non-Coordinated Effects (Unilateral Effects)
5.810
(i) Theories of Harm
5.813
(i) Example of Input Foreclosure: UTC/Goodrich
5-817
(ii) Example of Customer Foreclosure: Mobile Wallet Platform
5.821
(Hi) Example of Conglomerate Effects: Intel/McAfee
5.826
(ii) Who is Entitled to Protection From the Potential Effects of
Non-
Horizontal Mergers?
5.830
(iii)
Framework for Analysing ForecJ
osure
5.836
(і)
Ability to Foreclose
5.839
(H) Incentive
5.847
(Hi) Effect
5.852
(iv)
The Diminished Role of Dominance in Non-Horizontal
Cases
5.860
(b) Coordinated Effects
5.867
(i) Reaching Terms of Coordination
5.868
(ii) Monitoring Deviations
5.869
(iii)
Deterrent Mechanisms
5.870
(iv)
Reactions From Outsiders
5.871
xxxu
Contents
(6)
Countervailing Factors
5.874
(a) Buyer Power
5.877
(i) The Exercise of Buyer Power
5.883
(i) Immediately Switch Supplier
5.884
(ii) Vertically Integrate Upstream
5.886
(iii)
Sponsor Entry
5.889
(iv)
Refuse to Buy Other Products
5.890
(ii) Buyer Power Must Benefit All Customers
5.893
(b) Entry
5.898
(i) Types of Entry Barrier
5.900
(ii) Link Between Entry Barriers and Market Definition
5.902
(iii)
Conditions for Entry to be Sufficient Countervailing Factor
5-904
(i) Entry Must Be Likely
" 5.905
(ii) Entry Must Be Timely
5.916
(iii)
Entry Must Be Sufficient
5.918
(c) Efficiencies
5.921
(i) Historic Treatment of Efficiencies: The 'Efficiency Offence'?
5.924
(ii) Recent Practice
5.931
(iii)
Criteria for an Efficiency Defence
5.942
(i) Efficiencies Must Benefit Consumers
5.942
(ii) Efficiencies Must Be Merger-Specific
5.952
(Hi) Efficiencies Must Be Verifiable
5.956
(d) Failing Firm Defence
5.961
(i) Conditions Necessary for Failing Firm Defence
5.963
(i) Exit Due to Financial Difficulties
5.968
(ii) No Less Anti-Competitive Solution
5.969
(Hi) Exit From the Market
ЪЭ1\
(ii) Failing Division
5-973
(iii)
Parties Must Provide the Evidence
5-976
F. Remedies
5.980
(1)
Overview
5.980
(2)
General Principles
5.984
(a) Roles of Notifying Parties and Commission
5.984
(b) Attachment to Decision as Conditions or Obligations
5.988
(c) Distinction Between Remedies, 'Take-Note' Commitment, and
Facts Taken Into Account
5.991
(i) Take-Note Commitments
5.992
(ii) Facts Taken Into Account
5.994
(iii)
Potential Remedy for Breach
5.996
(3)
Conditions That Remedies Must Meet
5.997
(a) Remedies Must Eliminate the Competition Concerns
5.998
(b) Remedies Must Be Proportionate
5.1000
(c) Remedies Must Be Capable of Effective Implementation
5.1005
(i) Timely Implementation
5-1006
(ii) Lasting and Workable Solution
5.1010
(iii)
Capable of Adequate Monitoring
5.1012
(d) Remedies Must Not Lead to New Competition Concerns
5.1014
(4)
Remedies in Phase I and Phase II
5.1015
(a) Phase I Remedies
5.1016
(i) Substantive Requirements
5-1016
(ii) Formal Requirements
5.1018
xxxiii
Contents
(iii)
liming
5.1022
(iv)
Assessment Process
5.1024
(v) Modifications
5.1029
(vi)
Outcome
5.1032
(b) Phase II Remedies
5.1034
(i) Substantive Requirements
5.1034
(ii)
t'ormai
Requirements
5.1037
(iii)
Time Limits
5.1038
(iv)
Assessment Process
5.1042
(v)
Modificat
iotis
5.1043
(vi)
Outcome
5.1045
(S) Types of Remedies
5.1047
(a) Typology and lerminology
5-1047
(b) Acceptability
oí
the Various
(
Categories
5.1050
(c) Divestiture of a Business
5.1055
(i) Overview
5.1055
(ii) Purpose
5.1058
(iii)
Divestiture or a Viable and Competitive Stand-Alone Business
5.1060
(iv)
Carve-Out Divestitures
5.1067
(v) Alternative to Carve-Outs
5.1071
(vi)
Alternative Divestitures: Crown Jewels
5.1072
(vii)
Suitable Purchaser
5.1075
(i) Standard Requirements
5.1076
(ii) When a Suitable Purchaser Must Be Identified
5.1078
(d) Removal of Links with Competitors
5.1083
(e) Access Remedies
5.1086
(f) Commitments to Enter Into, Modify, orTerminate Long-Term
Agreements
5.1091
(g) Conduct Remedies in Conglomerate Cases
5.1095
(h) Other Conduct Remedies
5.1096
(6)
Implementation and Modification of Remedies Post-Decision
5.1098
(a) Implementation of Remedies
5.1098
(i) Timing
5.1098
(ii) Obligations of the Parties in the Interim Period
5.1100
(iii)
Hold-Separate Manager
5-1102
(iv)
Monitoring Trustee
5.1Ю4
(v) Proposal for a Suitable Purchaser
5.1107
(vi)
Divestiture Trustee
5.1108
(b) Modification of Remedies Post-Decision
5.1111
(i) Extension of First Divestiture Period
5.1112
(ii) Other Modifications Requested by the Parties
5.1114
(iii)
Other Modifications Requested by the Commission
5.1116
(c) Breach of Remedies
5.1117
(i) Breach of Obligations
5.1118
(ii) Breach of Conditions
5.1120
(iii)
Fines
5.1123
G. Judicial Review
5.1125
(1)
Introduction
5.1125
(2)
Types of Acts That Can Be Reviewed
5-1129
(3)
Legal Standing in Actions for Annulment
5
Л
137
(a) Member States, Parliament, and Council
5.1138
xxxiv
Contents
(b)
Natural and Legal Persons
(І)
The Notifying Parties
(ii) Other Parties to the Concentration
(iii)
Third Parties
(4)
Grounds for Challenge
(a) Lack of Competence
(b) Infringement of an Essential Procedural Requirement
(c) Infringement of the Treaties or of Any Rule of Law Relating to
Their Application
(d) Misuse of Powers
(5)
Procedure
(a) General
(b) Interim Measures
(c) Expedited Procedure
(d) Appeals from the General Court to the Court of Justice
(6)
The Scope of Review
(a) Introduction
(b) Burden of Proof
(c) Standard of Proof
(d) Standard of Review: The Margin of Appreciation
(e) Full Jurisdiction Over Fines and Periodic Penalty Payments
(7)
Consequences of Annulment
(a) Introduction
(b) The New Examination
(8)
Actions for Damages
(a) Introduction
(b) Unlawful Conduct
(c) Harm
(d) Causal Link
6.
Article
106—
Exclusive or Special Rights and Other Anti-Competitive
State Measures
José
Luis Buendia Sierra
A. Introduction
(i) Competition Law Normally Deals Only With the Behaviour of
Undertakings
(ii) State Defence Doctrine
(iii)
State Liability Under Competition Law
B. Application of Articles
4(3)
and
3(3)
TEU
and Articles
101
and
102
TFEU to Anti-Competitive State Measures
(i) Initial Position (Broad Interpretation)
(ii) Court Narrows Interpretation
(iii)
Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
(iv)
Application of Articles
106, 107,
and
108
to Anti-Competitive
State Measures
C. Article
106(1):
State Measures in Respect of Public or
Privileged Undertakings
(1)
Addressees and Regulatory Content
(2)
State Measures
(3)
Related to Public or Privileged Undertakings
5.1139
5.1144
5.1145
5.1146
5.1151
5.1152
5.1153
5.1162
5.1163
5.1164
5.1164
5.1170
5.1175
5.1178
5.1182
5.1182
5.1184
5.1188
5.1190
5.1195
5.1197
5.1197
5.1200
5.1203
5.1203
5.1205
5.1209
5.1210
6.01
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.08
6.09
6.09
6.10
6.15
xxxv
Contents
(a) 'Economic Activity'
6.16
(і)
Article 106(
1)
Applies to State Regulation of Economic Activities
6.16
(ii) Definition of'Economic Activity*
6.17
(iii)
Criteria Used By the Court of Justice
6.18
(iv)
'Public' Undertaking
6.26
(v) Definition of Public Undertaking
6.27
(vi) A
Separate Legal Entity is Not Necessary
6.28
(vii)
Public Undertakings After Privatization
6.29
(viii)
'Privileged' Undertakings
6.30
(b) Exclusive Rights
6.31
(i) Notion of
'Exclusive
Right'
6.31
(ii) Exclusive Right and Dominant Position are
Différent 'Inings
6.33
(iii)
Exclusive Rights are Created by State Measures
6.34
(iv)
Need for a Discretionary Decision by the State
6.35
(v) Special Rights
6.37
(c) 'Ihe Connection Between the Measure and the Undertaking
6.42
(i) Types or Connection Required by Article
106(1) 6.42
(ii) State Measures Which Benefit the Undertaking
6.44
(iii)
State Measures Which Use the
Undertakingas
an Instrument
6.45
(iv)
State Measures Granting an Exclusive Right
6.46
(v) The Dual Role of Exclusive Rights Within Article
106(1) 6.48
(vi)
General Measures Do Not Fall Under Article
106(1) 6.49
(4)
Contrary to Another Provision of the TFEU
6.50
(5)
Article
1
06(
1 )
in Combination with the Competition Rules Addressed to
Undertakings
6.53
(a) Article
106(1)
in Combination with Article
102 6.54
(i) Dominant Position
6.55
(ii) State Measures Leading to Actual Abusive Behaviour of the
Undertakings
6.56
(iii)
Different Types of Abuse
6.57
(iv)
Only the State is Responsible for State-Imposed Abuses
6.59
(v) Both the State and the Undertaking are Liable for State-Induced
Abuses
6.60
(vi)
State Inactivity
6.61
(b) State Measures Aifecting the Structure of Competition and Leading to
Potential Abusive Behaviour of Undertakings
6.62
(i) No Requirement for Actual Abuse
6.62
(ii) The Granting of Regulatory Powers to an Undertaking
6.63
(iii)
The 'Bundling' of Regulatory and Commercial Activities
6.64
(iv)
The Granting of an Exclusive Right
6.65
(v) The Demand Limitation Doctrine
6.66
(vi)
The Conflict of Interest Doctrine
6.67
(vii)
Presumption of Causal Link
6.69
(viii)
Effects Similar to Those of Abusive Behaviour
6.70
(ix)
The Doctrine of the Extension of a Dominant Position
6.71
(x) The Automatic Abuse Doctrine
6.77
(xi)
The
La Crespelle Case
6.82
(xii)
More Recent Cases
6.83
(xiii)
The Current Status Quo
6.86
(xiv)
Effect on Intra-EU Trade
6.91
xxxvi
Contents
(с)
Article
106(1) in
Combination with
Article
101 6.93
(6)
Article
106(1)
in Combination with the Treaty Rules Addressed to the
Member States
6.98
(a) The Double Function of Article
1
06(
1 ) 6.98
(i) Article
106(1)
as a 'Reminder' of Prohibitions
6.99
(ІІ)
'Lifting the Veil'
6.100
(b) Article
106(1)
in Combination with the Rules on Free Movement of
Goods: Articles
34
and
37 6.104
(i) The General Regime: Measures of Equivalent Effect and Article
34 6.106
(ii) The Special Regime: State Monopolies and Article
37 6.110
(iii)
'State monopolies of a commercial character'
6.111
(iv)
Obligations Contained in Article
37 6.112
(v) Obligations During the Transitional Period
6.113
(vi)
Obligations After the Transitional Period
6.117
(vii)
The Borderline Between the General and Special Regimes
6.124
(c) Article
106(1)
in Combination with the Rules on Freedom to Provide
Services and on Establishment: Articles
49
and
56 6.126
(i) Article
1
06(
1 )
in Combination with Article
56 6.127
(it) Article
106(1)
in Combination with Article
49 6.129
(iii)
Obligation to Select the Operator of a Public Service Concession
Through a Competitive Tender
6.133
(iv)
Need for a Cross-Border Element
6.134
(7)
Direct Effect
6.135
D. Article
106(2):
Services of General Economic Interest and Other
Public Interest Objectives
6.136
(1)
The Undertakings to which Article
106(2)
Relates
6.138
(i) Undertakings
6.139
(ii) Undertakings Entrusted With the Operation of Services of
Generai
Economic Interest
6.141
(iii)
Services of General Economic Interest
6.144
(iv)
Entrustment
6.155
(v) Revenue-Producing Monopolies
6.162
(2)
Article
106(2)
as an Exception Applicable to the Behaviour of Undertakings
and to State Measures
6.163
(3)
Conditions for the Application of Article
106(2) 6.167
(i) The Necessity of the Measure
6.168
(ii) The Proportionality Principle
6.169
(iii)
The Old Approach: A Strict Interpretation of the
Proportionality Test
6.175
(iv)
The Need for a More Flexible Interpretation
6.176
(v) Universal Service as a Justification for Exclusive Rights
6.178
(vi)
The
Corbeau
Case
6.184
(vii)
The
Almelo
Case
6.188
(viii)
Other Cases
6.193
(ix)
Case law of the General Court
6.198
(x) Need for an Economic Analysis
6.207
(xi)
The Dynamic Character of Proportionality
6.208
(xii)
Different Approaches Depending on the Sector
6.209
(xiii)
The Strict Approach and the Flexible Approach
6.210
xxxvii
Contents
(xiv) Universal Services
and Other Services of General
Economic Interest
6.212
(xv)
Examples or Measures Considered Non-Proportional
6.213
(xvi)
'Ihe Interest of the
EU 6.214
(4)
Invocation of Article
106(2)
and Burden of Proof
6.216
(5)
Relationship between Article
106(2)
and Other Exceptions
6.218
(i) 'Mandatory Requirements' Within the Framework of
Article
106(2) 6.218
(ii) Article
101(3) 6.221
(6)
Relationship between Article
106(2)
and Article
14 6.222
E. Article I
06(3):
Procedural Rules Applying to Anti-Competitive State
Measures
6.228
(1)
Article
106(3)
Decisions
6.229
(i)
Cenerai
Issues
6.229
(ii) Analogy With Other Procedures
6.230
(¡ii) Discretionary Character of the Procedure Under Article
106(3) 6.231
(iv)
Lodging of Complaints and
Ex Officio
Cases
6.236
(v) Dismissal or Complaints
6.237
(a) The Infringement Procedure
6.242
(i) Interim Measures
6.242
(ii) Letter of Formal Notice
6.243
(iii)
The Rights of the Member State and of the Undertaking that
Benefits from the Measure
6.244
(iv)
End of the Procedure Without a Formal Decision
6.245
(v) The Formal Decision and Its Effects
6.246
(vi)
Binding Effects
6.248
(vii)
Action for Annulment Against an Article
106(3)
Decision
6.249
(viii)
Action for Failure to Implement an Article
106(3)
Decision
6.250
(2)
Article
1 06(3)
Directives
6.252
(i) Preventive Functions of Article
106(3)
Directives
6.252
(ii) Article
106(3)
Directives as Instruments for Detecting Future
Infringements
6.256
(iii)
Article
106(3)
Directives as Instruments for 'Specifying' the
Provisions of the Treaty
6.257
(3)
Legal Regime of Article
106(3)
Directives
6.260
(i) The Exclusive Competence of the Commission
6.260
(ii) Limits to the Commission's Competence
6.261
(iii)
Article
106(3)
Directives Cannot Deal With the Autonomous
Behaviour of Undertakings
6.262
(iv)
Formal Limits to the Commission's Power under
Article
106(3) 6.263
(v) Binding Effects
6.265
(vi)
Lack of Direct Effect
6.266
(vii)
Relationship Between Directives Under Article
106(3)
and
Harmonizing Directives
6.267
(viii)
Article
106(3)
Overlaps With Other Treaty Provisions
6.268
(ix)
Article
106(3)
Overlaps with Article
14 6.269
(x) The Dissuasive Role of Article
106(3) 6.271
XXXVIII
Contents
II
SPECIFIC
PRACTICES
7.
Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
Matthew Bennett, Francisco Enrique Gonzalez Diaz,
Henning
Leupold,
Anna
Vernét,
andDonncadh Woods
A. Introduction
7.01
(1)
Definition of Horizontal Agreements and Practices
7.01
(2)
Background to Horizontal Agreements and Practices
7.02
B. Assessment of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements under Article
101 7.07
( 1 )
Purpose and Scope
7.07
(2)
Framework of Analysis
7.18
C. Joint Ventures Involving Joint Control
7.29
(1)
Definition and Constitution of a Joint Venture
7.29
(a) Definition
7.29
(b) Constitution of a Joint Venture
7.30
(2)
Distinction Between Cooperative and Concentrative Joint Ventures
7.37
(3)
The Rationale Behind the Difference in Treatment Between Full-Function
Concentrative and Full-Function Cooperative Joint Ventures
7.39
(4)
The Application of Article
101(1)
by the Commission to Cooperative
Joint Ventures Prior to the Entry into Force of the
1997
Amendment
to the First Merger Regulation
7.51
(5)
The Notion and Role of Potential Competition in Assessing the Validity of
Joint Ventures under Article
101 7.66
(6)
Conditions Leading to the Incentive to Coordinate (Spillover Effects)
7.78
(a) Introduction
7.78
(b) Spillovers on the Same Market As That of the Joint Venture
7.85
(c) Spillovers on to Other Markets
7.92
(i) Spillovers on to Downstream Markets
7.93
(ii) Spillovers on to Adjacent Product Markets
7.95
(iii)
Spillovers on to Adjacent Geographic Markets
7.98
(d) Network Effects
7.99
(7)
Direct Contractual Restrictions Between Parents
7-103
(8)
Intra-Group Agreements and Joint Ventures
7.105
(9)
Spillovers under the Merger Regulation
7.123
D. Research and Development Agreements
7.143
(1)
Overview
7.143
(2)
Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
7.145
(a) Relevant Markets
7.145
(b) Calculation of Market Shares
7.149
(c) Competitive Assessment under Article
101(1) 7.154
(d) Competitive Assessment under Article
101(3) 7.158
(e) Time of Assessment
7.159
(3)
TheR&DBER
7.162
(a) Background and Overview
7.162
(b) Key Concepts oftheR&D
BER
7.168
(і)
Article
1
of the R&D
BER:
Definitions
7.169
(ii) Article
2
of the R&D
BER:
Scope of Application
7.185
(iii)
Article
3
of the R&D
BER:
Positive Exemption Criteria
7.188
XXXIX
Contents
(iv)
Article
4
of the R&D
BER:
Market Share Threshold and Duration
of Exemption
7.197
(v) Article
5
of the R&D
BER:
Hardcore Restrictions
7.206
(vi)
Article
6
of the R&D
BER:
Excluded Restrictions
7.222
(vii)
Article
7
of the R&D
BER:
Application of the Market Share
Threshold
7.227
E. Production Agreements
7.235
(1)
Introduction
7.235
(2)
Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
7.238
(a) Main Changes Compared to the
2001
Text
7.238
(b) Scope
7.239
(c) Relevant Markets
7.242
(3)
Competitive Assessment under Article
101 (1) 7.244
(a) Main Competition Concerns
7.244
(b) Restrictions of Competition by Object
7.246
(c) Restrictions of Competition by Effect
7.248
(d) Safe Harbour
7.264
(4)
Competitive Assessment under Article
101(3) 7-266
(5)
The Specialisation
BER
7.269
(a) Background and Overview
7.269
(b) Key Concepts of the Specialisation
BER
7-276
(і)
Article
1:
Definitions
7.277
(i) Specialization Agreement: Article l(l)(a)
7-27
S
(ii)
Unilateral Specialization Agreement: Article
1(1
)(b)
7.279
(iti)
Reciprocal Specialization Agreement: Article
1(1
)(c)
7.281
(iv)
Agreements on Joint Production: A rticle
1 (1)
(d)
7.282
(v) Agreement: Article l(l)(e)
7.283
(vi)
Product: Article
1
(l)(f)
7.284
(vii)
Production: Article
1(1
)(g)
7.285
(viii)
The Preparation of Services: Article l(l)(h)
7-286
(ix)
Rekvant Market: Article 1(l)(i)
7.287
(x) Specialization Product: Article l(l)(j)
7.288
(xi)
Downstream Products: Article l(l)(k)
7.289
(xii)
Competing Undertaking: Article
1
(l)(l); Actual
Competitor: Article l(l)(m); and Potential Competitor: Article
l(l)(n)
7.290
(xiii)
Exclusive Supply Obligation: Article
1(1
)(o)
7-292
(xiv)
Exclusive Purchase Obligation: Article
1(1
)(p)
7.293
(xv)
Joint: Article l(l)(q)
" ' 7-294
(xvi)
Distribution: Article
1(1
)(r)
7-295
(xvii)
Undertaking, Parties, and Connected Parties: Article
1(2) 7.296
(ii) Article
2:
The Exemption
—
Scope of Application
7-298
(i) Assignment or Licensing of IP Rights
7-301
(iii)
Article
3:
Market Share Threshold
7.303
(i) The Different Market Share Thresholds
7304
(iv)
Article
4:
Hardcore Restrictions
7.308
(i) Price-ReUted Restrictions: Article 4(a)
7.310
(ii) Limitation of Output or Sales: Article 4(b)
7311
(Hi) The Allocation of Markets and Customers: Article 4(c)
7315
(v) Article
5:
Application of the Market Share Thresholds
7.316
xl
Contents
(і)
The Calcuhtion of Market Shares: ArticL· 5(a), (b), and (c)
7.317
(vi)
Article
6:
Transitional Period
7.321
(vii)
Article
7:
Period of Validity
7.322
F. Joint Selling Agreements
7.323
(1)
Introduction
7.323
(a) Definition
7.323
(b) Potential or Actual Competitors
7.325
(c)
Consortia
7.327
(d)
Main Competition Issues
7.328
(2)
Application of Article
101(1)
to Joint Selling Agreements
7-329
(a) Restrictions of Competition By Object
7.329
(b) Restrictions of Competition By Effect
7.330
(c) Safe Harbour
7.333
(3)
Factors Addressed in Commission Decisions and the Guidelines
7.335
(a) Market Structure; Oligopolistic Markets
7.336
(b) Market Entry
7.341
(c) Price Restrictions
7.342
(d) Output Restrictions
7.344
(e) Exclusivity Clauses
7.347
(0
Collusion
7.352
(4)
Application of Article
101(3)
to Joint Selling Agreements
7.354
(a) Efficiencies
7.354
(b) Specific Circumstances Allowing for an Exemption of Price Fixing
7.359
G. Joint Purchasing Agreements
7.362
(1)
Introduction
7.362
(a) Definition
7.362
(b) Relevant Markets
7.364
(c) Potential or Actual Competitors
7.367
(d) Main Competition Issues
7-369
(e) Buying Power
7.371
(2)
Application of Article
101(1)
to Joint Purchasing Agreements
7.375
(a) Restrictions of Competition By Object
7-375
(b) Restrictions of Competition By Effect
7.377
(c) Safe Harbour
7.378
(d) Collusive Outcome
7.382
(3)
Factors Addressed in Commissions Guidelines and Decisions
7-384
(a) The Existence of Downstream Market Power
7.385
(b) The Existence of Upstream Market Power
7.391
(c) Measurement of Buyer Power
7-393
(d) SMEs
7.398
(e) Countervailing Power of Strong Suppliers
7-399
(f) Exclusive Purchasing Obligations
7.400
(4)
Application of Article
101(3)
to Joint Purchasing Agreements
7.404
H. Information Exchange Agreements
7.407
(1)
Introduction
7.407
(2)
Main Competition Issues
7-412
(a) Information Exchanges May Facilitate Coordination
7.413
(b) Information Exchanges That Exclude Competitors
7-422
(c) Competition Issues Absent Coordination or Exclusionary Concerns
7.424
xli
Contents
(3)
Potential Benefits
7.427
(a) Enhanced Consumer Transparency
7.429
(b) Enhanced Allocative Efficiencies
7.432
(c) Reduction in Asymmetric Information Problems
7.435
(d) Benchmarking
7.437
(4)
Criteria for Assessment
7-438
(a) Restrictions of Competition By Object
7.439
(b) Meaning of Future Intentions
7.442
(c) Frequency as a Determinative Criteria for Object Assessment
7.445
(d) Cartel Agreements vs Exchange of Information Agreements
7.446
(e) Concerted Practices
7.448
(5)
Assessment of Likely or Actual Effects
7.455
(a) Characteristics of Relevant Market
7.457
(i) Degree of Concentration
7.458
(ii) Stability of Supply and Demand
7.464
(iii)
Symmetric Costs and Market Structures
7.466
(iv)
Frequency of Firms'Interactions
7.468
(v) Barriers to Entry
7.469
(b) Characteristics of Information Exchanged
7.471
(i) Coverage of Relevant Market
7.471
(ii) Strategic Significance of Information
7.474
(iii)
Public vs Non-Public Information
7.478
(iv)
Exchanges Made Publicly vs Exchanges Made Non-Publicly
7.482
(v) Degree of Aggregation
7.484
(vi)
Age of Data
7.491
(vii)
Frequency of Exchange
7.497
I. Standardization Agreements
7.498
(1)
Introduction
7.498
(2)
Recent Investigations in the Area of Standard-Setting Agreements
7-501
(3)
Agreements on Standards under the
2010
Horizontal
Cooperation Guidelines
7.510
(a) Definition
7.510
(b) Relevant Markets
7.511
(c) Theories of Harm
7.512
(d) When Could There Be a Restriction By Object?
7.516
(e) The Safe Harbour Principles
7.517
(f) FRAND Benchmarks
7.526
(g) Effects-Based Assessment
7.528
(h) Article
101(3):
Efficiencies
7.534
J. Standard Terms
7.538
(1)
Introduction
7.538
(2)
Standard Terms under the
2010
Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
7.539
(a) Relevant Markets
7.540
(b) Theories of Harm
7.541
(c) Restriction By Object
7-542
(d) Effects-Based Assessment
7.543
(e) Efficiency Gains
7.548
(f) Indispensability
7.549
(g) Pass-On to Consumers
7.550
(h) No Elimination of Competition
7.551
xlii
Contents
8.
Cartels
Antoine
Colombarii,
Jindřich Kloub, andEwoud
Sakkers
A. Introduction
8.01
(1) Definition 8.01
(2)
The
Per Se
Prohibition of Cartels in
EU
Competition Law
8.03
(3)
Harm Caused by Cartels
8.05
B. Typology of Cartel Arrangements and Common Features of Collusion
8.07
(1)
Typology of Cartel Arrangements
8.07
(a) Direct or Indirect Fixing of Purchase or Selling Prices or Any Other
Trading Conditions
8.08
(i) Uniform Prices and Price Formulae
8.09
(ii) Minimum Prices
8.11
(iii)
'Target' Prices
8.12
(iv)
Recommended Prices
8.13
(v) Discussion of Prices for Individual Customers/Customer Lists
8.14
(vi)
Agreement on Part of the Price or on Price Supplements
8.15
(vii)
Maximum Rebates
8.16
(viii)
Agreements on Other Trade Conditions
8.17
(ix)
Agreement on the Purchase Price of Raw Materials
8.18
(x) Coordinated Price Increase'Campaigns'
8.19
(b) Limitation or Control of Production, Markets, Technical Development,
or Investment
8.22
(i) Production or Sales Quotas
8.23
(ii) Other Types of Joint Limitation or Control of Production
8.24
(iii)
The Control or Limitation of Commercial Investment
8.25
(iv)
Collusive Product Specialization
8.26
(v) Channelling Output/Grant of Reciprocal Selling Rights and Joint
Sales Arrangements
8.27
(vi)
Standard Setting
8.28
(vii)
Other Practices Limiting Production or Technological Development
8.29
(c) Sharing of Markets, Customers, or Sources of Supply
8.30
(i) Allocation of Market Shares
8.31
(ii) Allocation of Territories or Distribution Channels
8.32
(iii)
Allocation of Customers and Other Customer-Specific Practices
8.33
(iv)
Bid Rigging
8.36
(v) Sharing Sources of Supply
8.37
(d) Coordinated Boycotts, Bans on Imports, Concerted Refusal to Deal
8.38
(i) Keeping Competitors Away From the Cartel's Market
8.39
(ii) Placing Certain Competitors at a Competitive Disadvantage
8.40
(iii)
Boycott of Reluctant Undertakings
8.41
(e) Exchange of Commercially Sensitive Information/Unilateral Signalling/
Hub-and-Spoke Cartels
8.42
(i) Exchange of Information
8.42
(ii) Focusing on the Object'
8.43
(iii)
The
2010
Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
8.44
(iv)
Collusion With Only an Indirect Effect on Prices Also Prohibited
8.45
(v) Form of Collusion is Immaterial if Object is Established
8.46
(vi)
Information Exchanges Illicit Based on Evidence of'Effect'?
8.47
(vii)
Conclusion as to Information Exchange
8.48
xliii
Contents
(viii) Unilateral
Signalling
8.49
(ix) 'Hub-and-Spoke'
Cartels
8.50
(0 The Problem
of'Tacit Collusion'
8.51
(i) The Theory of Tacit Collusion
8.51
(ii)
Does Tacit Collusion Amount to Cartel Behaviour?
8.52
(iii)
Conclusion on Tacit Collusion
8.55
(g) Assessment of Cartels under Article
101(3) 8.56
(2)
Common Features of Collusion
8.57
(a) Factors Conducive to the Establishment of Cartels
8.58
(i) Oligopolistic Markets
8.59
(ii) Collusive Business Values and Established Communication
Channels
8.60
(iii)
Exogenous Triggering Events
8.62
(iv)
The Determining Role of Instigators
8.63
(b) Organizational Aspects of Cartels
8.64
(i) Regular Meetings
8.65
(i) From Informal Contacts to Highly Institutionalized Schemes
8.66
(ii) Multiple Working Levels
8.67
(in) 'Pre-Meetings'and'AdHoc Meetings'
8.68
(ii) The Role ofTrade Associations and Fiduciary Companies and
Their Liability
8.70
(i) Liability of Trade Associations in Earlier Cases
8.71
(ii) Towards a Discretionary Approach in Trade Association Liability
8.72
(iii)
Addressing the Role PUyed by Certain Fiduciary Companies in
Facilitating Collusion: Earlier Cases
8.73
(iv)
Towards a Systematic Sanctioning of Facilitating Companies as
Co-Perpetrators
8.74
(iii)
Concealment Measures
8.75
(i) Covering the Cartels Tracks
8.76
(ii) Paperless Policy
8.77
(Hi) Storing Cartel Documents in Private Homes
8.78
(iv)
Using Code Names
8.79
(v) Other Measures
8.80
(c) Running the Business of Collusion
8.81
(i) Managing the Elimination of Competition
8.82
(i) Getting Other Market Operators on Board
8.82
(ii) Achieving Comparability of the Products
8.83
(iii)
Collection of Data and Circulation of Detailed Implementation
Documents
8.84
(iv)
'Coordinators'and'MarketLeaders'
8.85
(ii) Enforcing Cartel Arrangements between the Participants
8.87
(i) Monitoring Schemes
8.88
(ii) Penalties and Compensation Measures
8.89
(Hi) Threats, Boycotts and Coordinated Attacks on Competitors
8.90
(iii)
The Instability of Collusive Schemes
8.91
(i) CUimsfar Higher Quotas
8.92
(ii) Mutual Suspicion of Cheating
8.93
(Hi) Leniency Programmes as an Additional Factor of Instability
8.94
C. Investigating Hardcore Cartels
8.95
(1)
The Initiation of a Case: Information Sources
8.95
xliv
Contents
(a)
Market Monitoring and Information
From Other Investigations
8.96
(і)
Sector Inquiries
8.99
(b)
Information Received From Other Authorities
8.100
(i) Pre-Investigation Exchanges
ofinformation
within the European
Competition Network
8.100
(ii) Exchange of Information with Third Country Authorities
8.101
(c) Complaints (Formal and Informal)
8.103
(d) Informants/Whistleblowers
8.104
(e) Applications under the Leniency Notice
8.105
(2)
Leniency: Inducing Insiders to Break Rank
8.106
(a) Rationale and Origins of the
EU
Leniency Policy
8.106
(i) The Problem of Detecting and Deterring Cartel Behaviour
8.106
(ii) Difficulties in Detecting and Proving Cartels
8.107
(iii)
The Rationale for a Leniency Policy: The Prisoner's Dilemma
8.108
(iv)
Introduction and Development of the Commission's
Leniency Policy
8.109
(v) Temporal Scope of the Notices
8.110
(vi)
Structure
8.111
(b) The
2002
and
2006
Leniency Notices and the Reasons for Revision of
the
1996
Policy
8.112
(i) Content and Application of the
1996
Leniency Notice
8.112
(i) Basic Principles
8.112
(ii) Section B:
75— 100
Per Cent Reduction (Total Exemption) in
the Fine
8.113
(Hi) Section C:
50—75
Per Cent Reduction in the Fine
8.114
(iv)
Section D: Reductions of 1
0-50
Per Cent of the Fine
8.115
(v) Retraction of Non-Contestation
8.119
(vi)
Procedural Aspects (Sectio
n E)
8
Л
20
(ii) Issues Regarding the Effectiveness of the
1996
Leniency Notice
8.121
(iii)
The
2002
Leniency Notice and its
2006
Revision
8.122
(i) Principles Governing the
2002
Revision of the
1996
Leniency No
tice
8.122
(ii) Changes Introduced in the
2006
Leniency Notice
8.129
(Hi) Content and Implementation of the
2002
and
2006
Leniency
Notices
8.131
(iv)
Criteria for immunity under the
2002
and
2006
Leniency Notices
8.133
(i) Su bstantive
Tests
8.133
(ii) The Scope of the Leniency Policy: A re Stand-Abne Concerted
Practices Covered?
8.139
(Hi) Only One Immunity Per Cartel
8.140
(iv)
Other Conditions Which Must Be Satisfied in Order to Qualify
for Immunity
8.141
(v) Procedural Aspects
8.150
(v) Reduction in the Fine under the
2002
and
2006
Leniency Notices
8.175
(i) Substantive Tests
8.176
(ii) AvaiUble Bands of Reduction and Relevant Criteria
8.181
(Hi) Procedural Aspects
8.184
(iv)
Non-Contestation of Facts is Not Rewarded Under the
2006
and
2002
Leniency Notices
8.195
(v) Significant Added Value' Test: Commission Practice
8.196
xlv
Contents
(vi) Judicial
Review
of the Commission's Leniency Policy Under the
2002
and
2006
Notices
8.210
(i) Significant Court Approval of the Commissions Practice under
the
2002
Leniency Notice
8.211
(ii) Legality of the Leniency Notice
8.212
(Hi) The Commissions Discretion in the Assessment of Leniency
Applications 8.213
(iv)
Limits to the Commissions Discretion: Manifest Error
8.214
(v) Leniency and Equal Treatment
8.215
(vi)
Cooperation Under the Leniency Notice Must Be Differentiated
from Cooperation as an 'Attenuating Circumstance'
8.216
(vii)
Protection
ofinformation
Submitted Under the
2002
and
2006
Leniency Notices and Incentives for Applications
8.217
(i) A Sensitive Aspect of the Commissions Leniency Policy
8.217
(it) Identity of Immunity Applicants
8.218
(Hi) Limitations in the Conditions of Access to Corporate Statements
8.220
(iv)
Consequences of Violation of the Limitation Imposed in Respect
of A cce
ss
to the File
8.221
(v) Len
iency and Public Access to Documents ^.Tli
(vi)
Can Leniency Documents be Protected from Public Access?
8.224
(vii)
Communication of Leniency Documents to Other Enforcement
Authorities
Ů.Tlb
(viii)
Disclosure of Leniency Documents in Civil Litigation S.12G
(c) Leniency and Settlements
8.229
(i) Leniency and Settlements are Complementary in Nature
8.230
(ii) The Reductions Granted Under Each Policy are Cumulative
8.231
(iii)
Interactions Between Leniency and Settlements
8.232
(d) Leniency within the ECN
8.233
(i) Advantages of the New System and Measures Taken to Tackle
Potential Risks
8.234
(ii) Leniency Applications and Article
11
of Regulation
1/2003 8.237
(iii)
Leniency Applications and Article
12
of Regulation
1/2003 8.238
(iv)
Guarantees to be Provided by the Receiving Authority
8.239
(v) Guarantees Regarding Information Relating to Individuals
8.240
(vi)
Binding Nature of the Policy Set Out in the Network Notice
8.241
(vii)
Leniency Applications and Transmission
ofinformation
to
National Courts
8.242
(viii)
Where (Best) to File a Leniency Application within the ECN
8.243
(ix)
Favouring Convergence: The ECN Model Leniency
Programme
8.246
(x) A Significant Tool of Convergence: The 'Summary Application
System'
8.247
D. The Commission's Powers of Investigation: Information Requests,
Interviews, Inspections
8.248
(1)
Preliminary Observations
8.248
(a) Documented Evidence as the Principal Basis for Commission Cartel
Decisions
8.251
(b) Applicability to the Transport Sector
8.252
(c) Relevance of Interpretation Under Regulation
17 8.253
(d) Outline for Discussion
8.254
xlvi
Contents
(2) General
Aspects
of the
Commissions
Fact-Finding
Powers 8.255
(a) Principles of Law and Fundamental Plights Applicable to Commission
Investigations
8.255
(i) The Applicability of General Principles of Law and Fundamental
Rights
8.255
(ii) General Principles and Fundamental Rights Particularly Relevant
to Cartel Investigations
8.256
(b) The Rights of Defence
8.257
(i) The Privilege Against Supplying Self-Incriminating Information
8.258
(i) An EU Compétition
Law Version of'the Right to Remain Silent'
8.258
(ii) Compatibility of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as
Established in Orkem with the ECHR and its Case Law
8.262
(Hi) Precise Scope of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The
Elements of'Compulsion' and 'Admission'
8.263
(iv)
Pre-Existing Documents and Factual Information Must
Be Supplied
8.265
(ii) Legal Professional Privilege
8.269
(i) The Right to the Protection of Lawyer—Client Correspondence
8.269
(ii) Scope ofLPP under
EU
Law
8.271
(iii)
Summaries of External Advice Prepared by In-House Counsel
May Be Protected
8.275
(iv)
The Commission Is Not Permitted to Read a Document for
Which Legal Privilege is Claimed ^.Ild
(v) Procedure for Claiming Legal Privilege
8.278
(vi)
'Cursory Look' and Envelope Procedure in Inspections
8.279
(vii)
Role of the Hearing Officer
8.282
(viii)
Abusive Claims for Legal Privilege
8.283
(iii)
The Right to Legal Assistance
8.284
(iv)
The Right to be Informed on the Subject Matter and Purpose of
the Investigation
8.285
(v) No Right to be Heard Prior to Investigative Measures
8.286
(c) Other General Features of the Commissions Investigative Powers
8.287
(i) Application of the Principle of Proportionality:
Practical Implications
8.287
(i) The Investigative Action Must Be Proportionate to the
Goal Pursued
8.287
(ii) 'Necessity
8.288
(Hi) The Principle of Proportionality and the Quantity of
Information Requested/Burden on the Undertaking
8.289
(ii) The Content and Form of Information/Business Records That
May Be Requested
8.290
(i) Content
8.291
(ii) Form
8.292
(iii)
The Undertakings From Which Information May Be
Sought: Suspected Cartel Participants As Well As Other Parties
8.293
(iv)
The Territorial Scope of the Commission's Investigation Powers
8.294
(i) The furisdictional Scope of the Commissions Investigative
Powers: Subject Matter Jurisdiction vs Enforcement Jurisdiction
8.296
(ii) State Sovereignty
8.297
(v) The Timing of Any Investigative Steps/Application of Limitation
Periods
8.300
xlvii
Contents
(vi)
The Duty of Active Cooperation and its Implication for Requests
for Information and Inspections
8.301
(d) Requests for Information: Article
18 8.302
(i) The Use of Requests for Information in Cartel Cases
8.302
(ii) Two Types of Request for Information: 'Simple Requests' and
'Requests by Decision'
8.305
(i) Procedural Requirements: The Duty to State the Legal Basis and
Purpose of the Request and to Set a Time Limit
8.306
(ii) Sanctions for Late, Incomplete, Incorrect, or Misleading Replies
8.307
(Hi) Incomplete or Untruthful Replies are Considered to Obstruct the
Investigation
8.310
(iv)
Article
18
Requests, the Duty of Cooperation, and Reductions of
Fines for Voluntary Submissions
8.311
(v) Various Other Aspects of 'Requests for Information
8.312
(e) Interviews (the Power to Take Statements): Article
19 8.316
(i) Rationale
8.316
(ii) Legal Basis
8.318
(iii)
Possible Interviewees: Natural and Legal Persons
8.319
(iv)
Procedural Aspects and Rights of the Interviewee
8.321
(f) Inspections of Business Premises: Article
20 8.322
(i) The Difference Between Announced' and 'Unannounced'
Inspections
8.327
(ii) General Aspects Common to Inspections by Authorization and
Inspections by Decision
8.330
(i) Commission Inspections and the Principle of the Protection of
the Private Sphere of the Undertaking
8.331
(ii) Determining the Addressee of an inspection Decision: The
Notion of 'Undertaking'for the Purpose of Inspections
8.334
(Hi) Notification of the Inspection Decision
8.337
(iv)
The Commissions On-the-SpotPowers
8.339
(v)
'
To en
ter
any premises,
Und
and means of transport of
undertakings and associations of undertakings'
8.343
(vi)
'Means of transport of undertakings'
8.346
(vii)
'To examine the books and other records refoted to the business,
irrespective of the medium on which they are stored'
8.347
(viii)
'To take or obtain in any form copies of or extracts from such
books or records'
8.354
(ix)
'To seal any business premises and books or records for the period
and to the extent necessary for the inspection
8.358
(x) 'To ask any representative or member of staff of the undertaking
or association of undertakings for explanations of facts or
documents relating to the subject-matter and purpose of the
inspection and to record the answer
' 8.362
(iii)
Other Practical Aspects Relating to Inspections
8.375
(i) Procedure Upon Arrival of the Commission Inspectors
8.375
(ii) Activity of Inspectors During the Inspection
8.377
(Hi) Right to Legal Assistance
8.379
(iv)
Penalties in the Case of a Refusal to Submit to (or Obstruct) an
Inspection by Decision
8.380
(v) Commission Present During Normal Business Hours
8.381
xlviii
Contents
(vi)
ProtocoL· Made Up During an Inspection and the Possibilities
for Submitting Exculpatory Information
8.382
(vii) Takingof
Copies and Creating a Document Inventory
8.383
(viii)
Treatment of Business Secrets and Confidential Information
8.384
(ix)
End of the Inspection
8.385
(x) Post-Inspection Procedure
8.387
(iv)
The Adoption oflnspection Decisions under Article
20(4) 8.388
(i) Requirements
Refóting
to the Substance of the Inspection
Decision
8.388
(it) Procedural Formalities Reding to the Adoption oflnspection
Decisions
8.394
(v) Additional Substantive and Procedural Aspects of Inspections by
Written Authorization (Announced Inspections)
8.396
(i) Substantive Elements of the Authorization
8.397
(it) Prior Notice To
—
Not Consultation Of—the Member State
Concerned
8.398
(vi)
Opportunities to Challenge the Inspection Decision and/or the
Use of the Evidence Collected in Inspections
8.399
(i) Little Scope in Practice for Preventing the Inspection From
Going Forward
8.399
(it) Challenging the Admissibility and Use of Evidence Colkcted
8.400
(vii)
The Role of the Member States in Commission Inspections
under Article
20 8.403
(i) General Duty to Provide Assistance
8.403
(ii) Role in Case of Opposition
8.404
(Hi) Review by National Courts is Limited to the Arbitrariness and
Proportionality of the Coercive Measures
8.40 5
(iv)
Coercive Measures Can Lead to Sanctions Under National
Law
—
Even Against Private Persons
8.406
(viii)
Inspections Carried Out by the Competition Authorities of the
Member States on Behalf of the Commission: Article
22(2) 8.407
(i) Member States are Obliged to Execute Article
22(2)
Inspections When Requested
8.409
(it) Inspections Under Article
22
are Executed Under National Law
8.410
(Hi) Commission OfficiaL· May Participate in the Inspection
Carried Out By the Member State
8.411
(g) Inspections on Other Premises (Private Homes): Article
21 8.412
(i) Rationale and Use
8.412
(i) Meaningof'Other Premises', Land, and Means of Transport
8.413
(it) Applicability of Principles of Law and Fundamental Rights
8
Al
4
(iii)
'Reasonable Suspicion About Information Being Stored at the
Premises
8.415
(iv)
Only To Be Used in Case of'Serious Violations'
8.416
(ii) Legal Framework
8.417
(i) A
Two-Part Basis Required for Executing an Inspection under
Article
21
~
' 8.417
(iii)
Procedural Aspects
8.419
(i) The Commission Decision
8.419
(ii) Authorization by a National Judicial Authority
8.420
(Hi) Addressee of the Decision
8.421
(iv)
Notification of the Decision and the Judicial Authorization
8.422
xlix
Contents
(v)
On-The-Spot Powers 8.423
(vi)
Assistance by OfficiaL· From the National'Authorities
8.424
(vii)
Sanctions for Non-Compliance, Pursuant to National Law
8.425
(iv)
Other Aspects
8.426
(i) Right to Legal Assistance
8.426
(it) A Duty of Active Cooperation for the Addressee?
S
.427
(h)
European and InternarionaJ Cooperation in Cartel Investigations
8.428
(i) European Cooperation
8.429
(i) TheECN
8.429
(ii) Cooperation with the
ESA 8.433
(ii)
International Cooperation, Multilateral and Bilateral
8.434
(i) Multilateral Cooperation
8.435
(ii) Bilateral Cooperation
8.441
E. Evidence in Cartel Cases
8.445
(1)
Introduction
8.445
(2)
What Needs to be Proven
8.449
(a) The Concept of Cartel Offence
8.449
(b) The
EU
Courts' Purposive View of What Constitutes Illegal 'Cartel'
Behaviour
8.450
(c) Agreement vs Concerted Practice
8.451
(d) Cartels are Infringements By Object: No Need to Prove Actual Effects
8.452
(e) No Market Definition Required
8.453
(f) No Need to Demonstrate the Precise Mechanism By Which the
Restrictive Object was Attained
8.454
(g) No Requirement to Prove Subjective Intent
8.455
(h) Complex Infringement
8.456
(i) Single and Continuous Infringement
8.457
(i) Liability for a Single and Continuous Infringement
8.458
(ii) Consequences of Lack of Awareness of the Overall Conduct
8.459
(iii)
'Single' and 'Continuous'
8.460
(iv)
The 'Single' Nature of an Infringement
8.461
(v) The 'Continuous' Nature of an Infringement
8.463
(vi)
The'Repeated'Nature of an Infringement
8,464
(vii)
Duration of an Undertaking's Participation in an Infringement
8.465
(3)
The Burden of Proof
8.466
(a) The Burden of Proof on the Commission
8,466
(b) 'Shifting'ofthe Burden of Proof
8.467
(4)
The Standard of Proof
8.469
(a) The
EU
Courts' Reluctance to Use the Term 'Standard of Proof'
8.469
(b) What Matters is the Balance of Evidence as a Whole
8.470
(5)
Admissibility of Evidence
8.471
(a) Evidence Collected or Used in Contravention of General Principles or
Fundamental Rights is Not Admissible
8.473
(i) Information Covered by Legal Privilege
8.474
(ix)
Self-Incriminating Information
8.475
(iii)
Evidence on Which the Undertakings Have Not Been Heard is
Inadmissible
8.476
(b) Documents Obtained in an Inspection That Turned Out to be
Unlawful are Inadmissible
8.477
(c) Documents Which Do Not Fall Within the Scope of an Inspection
Decision are Inadmissible
8.478
1
Contents
(d)
Confidential
Information
¡s Admissible as Evidence
8.479
(e)
Evidence
Provided Orally is Admissible
8.480
(f) Anonymous Evidence Can Be Admissible
8.481
(g) Lack of Cross-Examination of Witnesses Does Not Render Their
Statements Inadmissible
8.482
(6)
Probative Value of Evidence
8.484
(a) Whether, On Its Face, the Evidence Appears Sound and Reliable
8.487
(b) The Time When the Evidence Came Into Being
8.488
(c) The Level of Detail of the Evidence
8.489
(d) The Source of the Information Has Direct Knowledge
8.490
(e) Evidence Which Goes Against the Interests of the Source Providing it
has Greater Probative Value
8.491
(f) Evidence From an Undertaking That Has Resolved to Cooperate With
the Investigation Has High Probative Value
8.493
(g) Evidence Provided Where There is a Risk of Sanction
8.494
(h) Evidence Provided After Mature Reflection is More Credible
8.495
(i) Evidence or Statements Provided by Executives of Companies are of
Greater Probative Value
8.496
(j) Evidence Supplied by One Entity May Be Used Against Another
8.497
(k) Motives of the Witness
8.499
(1)
Information Provided by Applicants for Immunity or for a Reduction
ofFines
8.500
(m) Anonymous or Unidentified Sources of Evidence
8.501
(7)
Types of Evidence
8.502
(a) Documentary Evidence
8.504
(b) Oral Evidence
8.506
(i) Qualified Obligation to Hear Witnesses
8.506
(ii) Traditional Reliance on Documentary Evidence: Increased Use of
Oral Evidence
8.507
(c) Direct and Indirect (Circumstantial) Evidence
8.509
(d) When is Corroboration Necessary?
8.510
(e) Economic Evidence
8.512
(i) The Use of Economic Evidence as an Exculpatory Factor
8.514
F. Establishing Liability
8.515
( 1 )
The 'Undertaking' as the Infringing Entity
8.515
(2)
Attribution of Liability to the Undertaking as a Whole: Underlying Reasons
8.5 19
(3)
Principal Grounds for Liability
8.521
(a) Parent Company Liability: The Concept of the Actual Exercise of
Decisive Influence'
8.525
(i) The Parent Company's Shareholding in the Subsidiary
8.527
(i) Subsidiary Wholly Owned (or Almost Wholly Owned) by the
Parent: Existence of a RebuttabL· Presumption
8.528
(ii) Subsidiary Owned (Significantly) Less Than
100
Per Cent by
the Parent
8.530
(iii)
Joint Ventures
8.531
(ii) The Articles of Association/Statutes
8.532
(iii)
The Parent Entity Being Active on the Same or Adjacent Markets
8.533
(iv)
The Use of the Same Commercial Name By the Parent and
Subsidiary
8.534
(v) Instructions From a Parent Company to a Subsidiary
8.535
(vi)
Functional Links Through Personnel
8.536
li
Contents
(vii)
The Attitude of the Parent Company During the Administrative
Procedure
8.537
(b) Sister Companies
8.538
(4)
Liability in Cases of Succession
8.539
(a) Cases of Change of Legal Denomination, Resulting in the Dissolution
of the Previous Legal Person
8.541
(b) Transfer of a Liable Entity, Which Remains in Existence, To Another
Undertaking
8.542
(c) Transfer of Assets/Activities to Another Undertaking, the Entity
Previously Operating the Business Remaining in Existence
8.543
(d) Transfer of a Legal Entity or of Assets/Activities, the Entity Previously
Operating the Business Ceasing to Exist
8.544
(e) Scenarios of Intra-Group Restructuring and Succession
8.545
(5)
Voluntary Acceptance of Liability by the Acquiring Undertaking
8.546
(6)
Determination of Liability and the Application of the Leniency Notice
8.547
G. Cartel Fines
8.548
(1)
Overview
8.548
(2)
The Basic Amount of the Fine
8.551
(a) Calculation of the Value of Sales
8.552
(i) General Principles
8.552
(ii) Sales of Products or Services To Which the Infringement Relates
8.554
(iii)
SaJes in the Relevant Geographic Area Within the EEA
8.557
(iv)
Last Full Year Before the End of the Infringement
8.560
(b) Gravity: The Percentage Applicable to the Value of Sales
8.561
(i) General Principles
8.561
(ii) Nature of the Infringement
8.564
(iii)
Geographic Scope
8.567
(iv)
Combined Market Share
8.568
(v) Implementation
8.569
(c) Duration of the Infringement
8.570
(i) General Principles
8.570
(ii) Previous Practice
8.572
(iii)
Method for Calculating Duration
8.574
(d) Additional Amount
8.578
(i) General Principles
8.578
(e) Conclusion on the Basic Amount
8.581
(3)
Individualizing 'Subjective' Responsibility: Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances
8.582
(a) Individual Conduct vs Overall Gravity of the Infringement
8.583
(b) The Commission is Bound by the Fining Guidelines, But Not By Prior
Decisions
8-584
(c) Method of Calculation When Both Aggravating and Attenuating
Circumstances Apply
8.585
(i) Aggravating Circumstances
8.588
(i) General Principles
8.588
(ii) Repeated Infringements of the Same Type by the Same
Undertaking
' 8.590
(iii)
Refusal to Cooperate With or Obstruction of the Commission in
Carrying Out its Investigations
8.596
(iv)
Role of Leader in, or Instigator of the Infringement
8.599
lii
Contents
(v)
Steps
to Coerce Other Undertakings and/or Retaliatory Measures
Against Other Undertakings with a View to Enforcing the
Practices Constituting the Infringement
8.610
(vi)
Other Aggravating Circumstances
8.614
(ii) Mitigating Circumstances
8.617
(i) Termination of the Infringement As Soon As the Commission
Intervenes (Not Applicable to Cartels)
8.618
(ii) Infringement Committed as a Result of Negligence
8.621
(Hi) Substantially Limited Involvement in the Infringement
8.622
(iv)
Effective Cooperation by the Undertaking Outside the Scope of
the Leniency Notice and Beyond Its Legal Obligation To Do So
8.632
(v) Anti-Competitive Conduct Authorized or Encouraged by Public
Authorities or by Legislation
8.638
(vi)
Other Accepted Attenuating Circumstances
8.643
(vii)
Rejected Arguments
8.649
(4)
Specific Increase for Deterrence
8.661
(a) Increase for Undertakings With a Large Turnover
8.662
(i) Concept and Rationale
8.662
(ii) Commissions Practice
8.663
(b) Legality of the Deterrence Multiplying Factor
8.666
(c) Limited Scope of the Duty to State Reasons
8.669
(d) Basis for the Assessment and Level of the Deterrence
Multiplying Factor
8.670
(e) Increase to Exceed the Improper Gains
8.673
(5)
Legal Maximum of
10
Per Cent of Annual Group Turnover
8.674
(a) Upper Limit Set By Article
23(2) 8.674
(b)
10
Per Cent of the Total Turnover
8.675
(c) Preceding Business Year
8.676
(d) Application to Each Infringement
8.679
(e) Joint and Several Liability Within the Same Undertaking
8.680
(0
The
10
Per Cent Cap is Calculated Before Leniency
8.681
(g) The
10
Per Cent Cap Applies Only to the Final Amount
(Before Leniency)
8.682
(h) Impact of the Legal Maximum
8.683
(6)
Application of the Leniency Notice
8.684
(7)
Application of the
10
Per Cent Reduction of the Settlement Notice
8.685
(8)
Ability to Pay
8.686
(a) Inability to Pay Claims Systematically Rejected before
2006
Fining
Guidelines
8.687
(b) Application of Inability to Pay Reductions by the Commission
8.690
(c) Procedure for Inability to Pay Requests
8.691
(d) Commission Analysis of Inability to Pay Claims under the
2006
Fining Guidelines
8.692
(e) Court Review
8.695
(f) Assessment of the Ability to Pay Policy
8.696
(9)
Other Factors That May Be Taken into Account
8.697
(a) Ad Hoc Adjustments
8.698
(b) Poor Financial Situation and Previous Payment of Fines in Other
Proceedings
8.700
(c) Excessive Duration of Administrative Procedure
8.703
liii
Contents
H.
Procedural Aspects of the Adoption of Decisions in Cartel Cases and
'Direct Settlements'
8.704
( 1 )
Main Common Aspects of the Adoption of Cartel Decisions
8.704
(a) The Commission
'201 1
Best Practices' and Outline of the Procedure
Leading to a Decision
8.704
(i) The Adoption of a Cartel Decision Follows a Model That Is
Common For All Commission Decisions
8.704
(ii)
Cenerai
Outline of the Standard Procedure Followed Between the
Fact-Finding Stage and the Final Decision
—
and the Alternative of
the Settlement Procedure
8.705
(iii)
The Commission May Halt an Investigation at Any Stage
8.706
(b) Particular Aspects Relating to Access to File in Cartel Cases
8.708
(c) The Statement of Objections and Indications on the Parameters
of the Fine
8.709
(d)
1Ъе
Oral Hearing and State of Play Meetings
8.710
(2)
Direct Settlements in Cartel Cases
8.712
(a) The Lead Up to the Adoption of the
2008
System of'Direct
Settlements' in Cartel Cases
8.712
(b) Sequence of the Regular Procedure and Potential Benefits of the
Settlement Process
8.713
(c) The Main Features of the Settlement System
8-714
(і)
Stakes on Both Sides: the Parties and the Commission
8.714
(ii) Not To Be Mistaken for 'Commitment' Decisions
8.715
(iii)
Based on a 'Common Understanding' Between the Parties and the
Commission, But Not a Negotiation
8.716
(d) The Settlement Procedure Dissected
8.717
(i) Based on a Full Investigation
8.717
(ii) Deciding That a Case is Fit for Settlement/ Initial Contact with
the Parties
8.718
(iii)
Start of the Settlement Process
8.719
(iv)
Three Rounds of Meetings
8.720
(v) Confidentiality of Discussions
8.721
(vi)
Formal Settlement Submission, Statement of Objections, Decision
8.722
(vii)
Interaction with Leniency
8.723
(viii)
Lessons from Settlement Decisions/Hybrid Cases
8.724
(ix)
Miscellaneous Aspects
8.725
9.
Vertical Agreements
Andrei Gurin and Luc Peeperkorn
A. Introduction
9-01
(1)
Applicability of Article
101
to Vertical Restraints
9.01
(2)
Early Application of Article
101
to Vertical Restraints
9.05
(3)
Theory of Active/Passive Sales
9.09
(4)
System of Block Exemption Regulations
9.12
(5)
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints
9.15
(6)
Two Council Regulations Enabling the Adoption of the
Commission's Policy
9.18
(7)
A New Type of Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines
9.28
B. The New Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines
9.31
(1)
Background
9.31
liv
Contents
(2) The De
Minimis
Notice
9.38
(3)
Agency Agreements
9.40
(a) Introduction
9.40
(b) Agency Agreements in the Vertical Restraints Guidelines
9.44
(c) Agency Agreements and the Internet
9.57
(4)
Subcontracting Agreements
9.60
(5)
The Underlying Philosophy of the
BER
and the Vertical Restraints Guidelines
9.61
(6)
The Scope of the
BER
and Guidelines
9.68
(a) Definition of Vertical Agreements
9.68
(b) Vertical Agreements between Competitors
9.72
(c) Vertical Agreements Concluded by Associations of Retailers
9.77
(d) Vertical Agreements Containing IP Rights Provisions
9.81
(e) The Interface Between the
BER
and Other Block Exemption
Regulations
9.87
(7)
Hardcore Restrictions under Article
4
of the
BER
9.88
(a) Vertical Price Fixing Under Article 4(a)
9.94
(b) Territorial and Customer Sales Restrictions under Article 4(b)
9-112
(c) Selective Distribution Systems and Sales Restrictions under Article
4 9.126
(d) Internet Selling and Sales Restrictions Under Article
4 9.133
(e) The Combination of Selective and Exclusive Distribution
9.139
(0
Aftermarkets
9.145
(g)
Individual Assessment of Hardcore Resale Restrictions
9.146
(8)
Excluded Restrictions under Article
5
of the
BER
9.153
(a) Non-Compete
Obligations Exceeding Five Years
9.155
(b) Post-Term
Non-Compete
Obligations
9.160
(c) Boycott Under Selective Distribution
9.162
(9)
Transitional Period and Expiry Date of the
BER
9.163
(10)
Withdrawal of the benefit of the
BER
9.164
(11)
Disapplication
of the
BER
9.169
( 12)
Market Share Thresholds and Market Share Calculation
9.173
(13)
The Framework of Analysis for Individual Assessment
9.188
(a) Anti-Competitive Effects
9.191
(b) Efficiencies
9.201
C. Analysis of Different Categories of Vertical Restraints
9.214
(1)
Single Branding
9.214
(a) Market Position of the Supplier
9.220
(b) Incidence and Duration of the Single-Branding Obligation
9.221
(c) Market Position of Competitors
9.225
(d) Barriers to Entry
9.227
(e) Countervailing Power
9.228
(0
Uvei
of Trade
9.229
(g) Possible Efficiencies
9.234
(2)
Exclusive Distribution
9.235
(a) Supplier's Market Position
9.238
(b) Competitors' Market Position
9.239
(c) Buying Power
9.240
(d) Level of Trade
9.241
(e) Maturity of the Market
9.242
(0
Combination with Exclusive Sourcing
9.243
(g) Possible Efficiencies
9.244
lv
Contents
(3)
Exclusive Customer Allocation
9.245
(4)
Selective Distribution
9.248
(a) Qualitative vs Quantitative Selective Distribution
9.249
(b) Quantitative Selective Distribution
9.251
(c) Supplier's Market Position
9.257
(d) Competitors' Market Position
9.258
(e) Barriers to Entry
9.260
(0
Buying Power
9.261
(g) Maturity of the Market
9.262
(h) Possible Efficiencies
9.263
(5)
Franchising
9.264
(6)
Exclusive Supply
9.265
(a) Buyer's Market Share
9.266
(b) Duration of the Agreement
9.269
(c) Competitors' Market Position
9.270
(d) Countervailing Power
9.271
(e) Level of Trade and Nature of the Product
9.272
(0
Possible Efficiencies
9.273
(7)
Upfront Access Payments
9.274
(8)
Category Management Agreements
9.279
(9)
Tying
9.283
(10)
Recommended and Maximum Resale Prices
9.291
10.
Intellectual Property
Kevin
Coates,
Lars Kjolbye, and Luc Peeperkom
A. Introduction
10.01
(1)
Overview
10.01
(2)
Purpose of IP Rights
10.04
(3)
The Relationship between IP Protection and
EU
Law
10.09
(a) IP Protection and the Free Movement Provisions
10.10
(b) IP Protection and the Competition Rules
10.11
(i) General Approach
10.12
(ii) Block Exemptions
10.14
B. IP Rights and
EU
Law
10.16
(1)
Introduction
10.16
(2)
Existence vs Exercise and the Specific Subject Matter of an IP Right
10.19
(a) Existence and Exercise
10.19
(b) Specific Subject Matter
10.21
(3)
The Specific Subject Matter of IP Rights
10.22
(a) Patents
10.23
(b) Know-How
10.24
(c) Copyright
10.29
(d) Trademarks
10.32
(e) Plant Breeders'Rights
10.34
(4)
Exhaustion of IP Rights
10.36
(a) Exhaustion Requires Consent
(i)
Centrafarm
v
Sterling Drug
10.37
(ii) Consent Does Not Have To Be Explicit
10.39
(b) For a Sale to Exhaust IP Rights It Is Not Necessary for that Sale to be
Made in a Jurisdiction Where It Enjoys IP Right Protection
10.40
lvi
Contents
(і)
Merck
v
Stephar 10.41
(c)
Exhaustion Requires the Consent of the Right Holder Even if the
Goods were Lawfully Put on the Market in Another Member State
Without That Consent
10.42
(i) EMI/Patricia
10.43
(ii) Keurkoop/Nancy Kean Gifts
10.44
(d) Exhaustion Requires an Actual Sale
10.45
(e) Exhaustion Depends on the Specific Subject Matter of the Right in
Question
10.46
(i) Warner
v
Christiansen
10.48
(f) Exhaustion for the Purposes of
EU
Law Requires Use in the EEA
10.51
(g) Exhaustion and Licensing Under the Competition Rules
10.56
(5)
Exhaustion Concept in
EU
IP Legislation
10.58
C. Technology Transfer Agreements
10.59
(1)
Introduction
10.59
(2)
The Basic Framework and Underlying Philosophy of theTTBERand the
Technology Transfer Guidelines
10.62
(3)
The Scope of theTTBERand the Technology Transfer Guidelines
10.68
(a) Agreements for the Production of Contract Products
10.69
(b) Technology Transfer Agreements
10.72
(c) The Interface between the TTBER and Other Block Exemptions
10.78
(4)
Competitors vs Non-Competitors
10.82
(5)
The Hardcore Restrictions
10.92
(a) Price Fixing
10.97
(b) Output Limitations
10.99
(c) Territorial and Customer Sales Restrictions
10.100
(i) Territorial and Customer Sales Restrictions between
Competitors
10.101
(ii) Territorial and Customer Sales Restrictions between
Non-Competitors
10.108
(d) Restrictions on the Use of Own Technology or to
Carry Out R&D
10.112
(6)
Excluded Restrictions
10.114
(7)
The Safe Harbours
10.119
(8)
Withdrawal and
Disapplication
10.124
(9)
Application Outside the Scope of the Block Exemption
10.128
(a) Introduction
10,128
(b) Royalty Obligations
10.133
(c) Exclusive Licences and Sales Restrictions
10.136
(d) Output Restrictions
10.141
(e) Field of Use Restrictions
10.144
(f) Captive Use Restrictions
10.149
(g) Tying and Bundling
10.151
(h) Exclusive Dealing
10.155
(i) Settlements
10.158
(j) Licensing of Future Developments
10.160
(10)
Technology Pools
10.161
(a) The Nature of the Pooled Technologies
10.163
(b) Competition Concerns Relating to the Creation of the Pool
10.166
(c) Assessment of Individual Restraints
10.169
lvii
Contents
D.
Trademark
Licences
10.172
(1)
Licences and Assignments
10.173
(a) Terri
corial Protection
(b) Prohibition on Compering Producrs
10.179
(c) No-Challenge Clauses (Ownership)
10.181
(d) No-Challenge Clauses (Validity)
10.182
(e) Prohibition on Sub-Licensing or Assignment
10.184
(0
Quality Control Measures
10.185
(2)
Trademark Delimitation Agreements
10.186
(a) Market Partitioning
10.187
(b) Confusion of Marks
10.189
E. Copyright
10.190
(1)
EU Directives
Relating to Copyright
10.190
(2)
Territorial
Protection through Exclusive Licences
10.198
(a) Exclusive Territory Does Not Necessarily Infringe
Article
101(1) 10.198
(b) Collective Refusals to License
10.202
(c) Specific Subject Matter of Copyright and Article
101(1) 10.205
(3)
Collecting Societies
10.207
(a) Artists'Licences to a Collecting Society
10.207
(b) Licensing Agreements Between Collecting Societies
10.209
(c) Licences from Collecting Societies
co
Manufacturers
10.212
F. Article
102 10.214
(1)
Introduction
10.214
(2)
IP and Market Definition
10.216
(3)
IP and Dominance
10.225
(4)
Abuse
10.228
(a) Refusals to License IP Rights
10.230
(i) The IBM Undertaking
10.230
(ii) Volvo/Veng
\Ъ.2ЪЪ
(iii) Magill
10.236
(iv)
IMS Health
10.246
(v) Microsoft
10.249
(b) Licensing of IP Rights and Article
102 10.256
(c) Misuse of Regulatory Process
10.260
(d) Conclusions on Abuses
10.261
III SPECIAL SECTORS
11.
Financial Services
Nicholas Banasevic, Stephen Ryan, and Rita
Wezenbeek
A. Introduction
11.01
(1)
General Remarks on Financial Services
11.02
(2)
Developments in the Commission's Approach
11.04
(3)
The Post-2007 Financial Crisis and Consequences for Competition in the
Financial Sector
11.05
(4)
Competition and Regulation in the Financial Sector
11.11
(5)
Social Security
11.15
lviii
Contents
В.
Banking
11.16
(1)
Preliminary Remarks
11.16
(2)
Payment Systems
11.20
(a) Introduction to Payment Systems
11.20
(b) Regulation, Self-Regulation, and Competition Law Enforcement
11.24
(c) Pricing issues (Interchange Fees)
11.31
(d) Issues Relating to Access
11.53
(i) SWIFT/La
Poste
11.54
(ii)
Visa International and Visa Europe
11.57
(iii)
Groupement des
Cartes
Bancaires
11.58
(iv)
European Payments Council
11.60
(3)
Non-Payment Banking Antitrust Cases
11.61
(4)
Banking Mergers
11.69
(a) Introduction
11.69
(b) Turnover Calculation for Credit Institutions and Other Financial
Institutions
11.71
(c) The Approach to Market Definition
11.74
(d) Significant Cases
11.80
(e) Nationalization and Recapitalization
11.85
(f) Looking Forward
11.97
C. Capital Markets
11.103
(1)
Preliminary Remarks
11.103
(a) Importance of Clearing
11.107
(b) MiFIDII
11.110
(2)
Antitrust Cases
11.113
(a) Clearstream
11.113
(b) Recent Enforcement
11.132
(c) Standard &C Poor's
11.133
(d) Reuters Instruments Codes (RICs)
11.140
(e) Credit Default Swaps
11.144
(3) Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext
Merger Case
11.146
(a) Introduction
(b) The Parties and the Deal
11.150
(c) Market Definition
11.155
(d) Competitive Assessment
11.164
(e) Claimed Efficiencies
11.170
(f) Remedies
11.175
(g) Conclusion
11.177
D. Insurance
11.178
(1)
Introductory/Preliminary Remarks
11.178
(a) Some Characteristics of Insurance
11.178
(b) Market Definition Issues in the Insurance Sector
11.182
(2)
The Commissions Antitrust Policy in the Insurance Sector
11.186
(a) Commission Antitrust Case Law on Insurance
11.186
(b) Commission Block Exemption Regulation for the Insurance Sector
11.189
(c) Sector Inquiry in Business Insurance
11.191
(3)
Specific Types of Practices in the Insurance Sector
11.193
(a) Agreements on Prices
11.193
(b) Jointly Produced Compilations, Tables, and Studies
11.196
(c) Standard Policy Clauses
11.200
lix
Contents
(d)
Co-Imurancc and Co-Rcinsurance Pools 11.204
(і)
Pools in
the
Block
Exemption
11.205
(ii)
Commission Decisions and Other Cases on
Pools 11.209
(с)
Security
í
Vviccs
11.214
(ł)
Agreements on Settlement or Claims and on Registers of
Aggravated Risks
11.216
(g) Insurance Distribution
11.218
E. Conclusions
11.220
12.
Energy
(.Viinr (iaurr ami¡ttn Kjolhyc
A. Introduction
(
І)
liberalization
.пні
the
Regulatory
Framework
(2)
Regulation
ліні
(
louipciition Enforcement
(í)
Findings
ol
the
С
^munissions
Energy Sector Inquiry
(α)
Market
C 'oni
entrauon
(b)
Vertical Foreclosure
(c)
Market
Integration
(d)
Downstream Markets
B.
Market Definition
( 1 )
Product Market
(a) C ¿as Markets
(b) Electricity Markets
(2)
Geographic Market
(a) Exploration,
Production, and Sales of Crude Oil and Gas
(b) Supply Markets
(c) Transport Markets
(d) Flexibility of Markets in Gas
(3)
Conclusion
C. Obstacles to Market Integration and Discrimination
{
I
)
Horizontal Market Partitioning
(2)
Curtailment of Networks
(3)
Territorial Restrictions and Destination Clauses in Vertical Agreements
(4)
Conclusion
D. Vertical Contractual Restraints
(1)
Use Restrictions
(2)
Customer Foreclosure
(3)
Exclusive Distribution and Volume Reduction Clauses
(4)
Conclusion
E. Horizontal Contractual Restraints
(1)
Non-Compete Clauses
(2)
Joint Investment and Joint Operation of Production Capacity
(3)
Network Effects and Minority Shareholdings
(4)
Joint Purchasing
(5)
Joint Selling
(a) Pure Joint Selling
(b) Joint Selling as Part of Supply Chain
lx
1
2.01
1
2.04
1
2.10
1
2.12
1
2.13
1
2.14
1
2.15
I
2.17
1
2.18
1
2.19
1
2.19
1
2.26
1
2.36
1
2.36
1
2.37
1
2.43
1
2.46
1
2.47
1
2.48
1
2.49
1
2.53
1
2.57
1
2.66
1
2.67
1
2.68
1
2.74
1
2.82
1
2.87
1
2.88
1
2.89
1
2.95
12
.110
12
.112
12
.116
12
.117
12.123
Contents
(6) Exchange
of
Information 12.129
(7)
Conclusion
12.137
F. Network
Foreclosure
12.138
(1)
Refusal to Supply by Vertically Integrated Undertakings
12.140
(a) Access to Transport Networks is Indispensable
12.141
(b) Refusals to Access Networks in Various Forms
12.143
(c) Elimination of Effective Competition and Objective Justification
12.155
(2)
Input Foreclosure
12.157
(a)
Long-Term
Capacity Reservations: The
GDFzná E.
ON Gas Cases
12.160
(b) Pre-Emptive
Capacity Reservation: The
ČEZCzse
12.167
(3)
Remedies
12.168
(a) The
RWE
and
ENI
Cases
12.170
(b)
The GDFand E. ONGas Foreclosure Cases
12.173
(c) The
ČEZ
Case
12.175
(4)
Conclusion
12.179
G. Exploitative Abuses
12.182
(1)
Energy Markets are Prone to Exploitative Conduct
12.183
(2)
The Commission's Practice
12.188
(a) E.ON Electricity: The German Electricity Wholesale
Market Case
12.189
(b) E.ON Electricity: The German Electricity Balancing Case
12.198
(3)
Conclusion
12.203
H. State Measures and Article
106
TFEU
12.205
I. Final Remarks
12.216
(1)
The Energy Sector: Five Years After the Energy Sector Inquiry
12.218
(2)
Competition Policy: The Contribution of Energy Cases
12.225
(a) New Types of Infringements
12.226
(b) First Structural Remedies
12.229
(c) Deterrence vs Swift Impact on the Market
12.234
(3)
Conclusion
12.238
13.
Communications (Telecoms and Internet)
David Gabathuler and
Eduardo
Martinez
Rivero
A. Introduction
13.01
B. EU
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications
13.04
(1)
Introduction
13.04
(2)
Opening the Market to Competition
(1990s) 13.07
(a) Progressive Liberalization (Reliance on Article
106
Directives)
13.08
(b) Harmonization Measures
13.13
(3)
The Regulatory Framework
13.16
(a) The Regulatory Package
13.20
(b) Functioning of the Regulatory Framework
13.24
(c) Article
7
consultation mechanism
13-31
(d) Article
7
Oversight Extended to Regulatory Remedies
13.35
(e) Functional Separation
13.37
(f) Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications
(BEREC)
13.40
lxi
Contents
(4)
Specific
Regulatory Measures
13.44
(a) International Mobile Roaming
13.44
(b) Radio Spectrum Policy
13.48
(5)
Completing the Telecoms Single Market: Commissions 'Connected
Continent' Proposal
13.55
С
Move from Copper Networks to Next Generation Access Networks
13.60
(1)
The Emergence of Next Generation Access Networks
13.60
(2)
The NGA Recommendation
13.65
(3)
The Recommendation on Non-Discrimination and Costing
Methodologies
ІЗ.7І
D. Interaction Between Ex Post Competition Enforcement
and Ex Ante Regulation
13.77
(
I
)
The Applicability of the Competition Rules to the Electronic
Communications Sector
13.77
(2)
A Complementary Approach
13.92
(3)
Resolving Conflicts Between Sector Regulation and Competition
Enforcement
13.107
(4)
The Influence of Competition Law Principles on the
Regulatory Framework
13.111
(5)
Economic Incentives to Invest
13.117
(6)
No Exemption for Emerging Markets
13.119
(7)
Ex Ante Regulation as a Mitigating Circumstance
13.127
E. Commission's Antitrust Enforcement in the Electronic
Communications Sector
13-133
( 1 )
Margin Squeeze: An Autonomous Type of Abuse
13.134
(a) Deutsche Telekom
(2003) 13.137
(b) Telefonica
(2007) 13.141
(c) TeliaSonera
(2011) 13.148
(2)
Predatory Pricing: Leveraging of Incumbent Power into an Emerging
Market
13.153
(3)
Refusal to Supply: Competition Enforcement in Addition to Regulatory
Intervention
13.162
(4)
Market Sharing: Article
101
Violation Extending to More Than One
Member State
13.167
E
Mergers in the Electronic Communications Sector
13.171
(1)
Introduction
13.171
(2)
Mobile Telecommunications
13.174
(a) Horizontal Overlap
13.176
(b) Vertical Relationships
13.192
(3)
Fixed-Line Telecommunications
13.195
(4)
Alternative Infrastructure: Cable and Satellite
13.202
(a) Cable
13.203
(b) Satellite
13.206
(5)
Some Notable Merger Decisions in Other Markets
13.207
G. Internet
13.209
(1)
Overview
13-209
(2)
Net Neutrality Regulation
13.210
(3)
Proposed Net Neutrality Measures at
EU
Level
13.211
(4)
Situation at the National Level
13.214
lxii
Contents
(5)
Net Neutrality and Competition Law Enforcement
13.219
(6)
Google: Online Search and Advertising
13.222
H. Other Developments
13.226
(1)
Network Sharing in Mobile Telephony
13.226
(2)
State Aid to Broadband
13.233
(3)
Standard Essential IPR Relating to Mobile Telephony Standards
13.238
14.
Media
Krzysztof
Kuik and Anthony Dawes
A. Introduction
14.01
(1)
Main Features of the Media Sector
14.02
(i) Music Industry
14.05
(ii) Audiovisual Industry
14.08
(iii)
Book Production, Publishing, and Distribution
14.11
(iv)
Advertising Markets
14.13
(2)
Regulatory Framework
14.14
(3)
Issues Arising Across the Media Sector
14.18
(i) Enforcement at Both
EU
and National Level
14.19
(ii) Cultural Diversity
14.21
(iii)
Copyright
14.22
(iv)
Exclusivity
14.23
(v) Two-Sided Markets
14.25
(4)
Structure
14.27
B. Competition Issues under Article
101 14.29
(1)
Horizontal Agreements
14.31
(a) Price-Fixing
14.32
(i) Contractual Systems of Fixed Book Prices
14.33
(ii) Arrangements Akin to Price Fixing
14.36
(i) Agreements or Concerted Practices Seeking to Influence the
Retail Prices of Physical Recordings
14.37
(ii) Agreements or Concerted Practices Restricting the Freedom to
GrantRebates
14.38
(Hi) Concerted Practices Leading to an Increase in Retail Prices
14.41
(b) Customer and Territorial Allocation
14.47
(i) Restrictions on the Collective Licensing of Content
14.49
(ii) Restrictions on the Ability of Right Holders to Entrust the
Licensing of Content to the Person of Their Choice
14.53
(iii)
Agreements or Concerted Practices Resulting in Territorial
Allocation
14.58
(c) Joint Selling of Television Rights
14.63
(i) Does Joint Selling of Rights Fall Within Article
101(1)? 14.64
(ii) Horizontal Aspects of Joint Selling of Rights
14.66
(iii)
Specificity of Sport
14.68
(iv)
Absence of Downstream Exclusivity
14.69
(d) Joint Purchasing of Television Rights
14.70
(i) Appreciable Restriction of Competition
14.72
(ii) Main Competition Concerns
14.76
(iii)
Joint Purchasing of Sports Rights by Public Broadcasters
14.77
(2)
Vertical Agreements
14.82
(a) Exclusivity Clauses Over Premium Content
14.84
lxiii
Contents
(і)
Commissions
Policy Objective
14.85
(ii)
The Approach in
ARD 14.86
(iii)
A More
Generai
Framework of Assessment
14.91
(iv)
Possible Limits on the Duration and Scope of Such
Agreements
14.93
(v) The Impact of the FA Premier League and Murphy Cases on the
Level of Remuneration a Right Holder Can Obtain in Return
for Exclusivity
14.96
(b) Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses
14.97
(i) Most-Favoured-Supplier Clauses
14.98
(ii) Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses
14.104
(iii)
Cross-Platform Parity Clauses
14.107
(iv)
Conclusion
14.110
(c) Territorial Restrictions
14.111
(i) Territorial Restrictions in Bilateral Reciprocal Agreements
Between Collecting Societies
14.112
(ii) Absolute Territorial Protection Before FA Premier League and
Murphy
14.114
(iii)
Absolute Territorial Protection After FA Premier League and
Murphy
14.117
(iv)
Territorial Restrictions in the Online World
14.120
C. Competition Issues under Article
102 14.121
(1)
Market Definition
14.122
(2)
Dominance
14.123
(i) Assessing the Economic Strength of a Content Provider
14.124
(ii) Assessing the Economic Strength of a Broadcaster
14.125
(3)
Abuse
14.126
(a) Unfair Trading Conditions
14.127
(b) Excessive Pricing
14.133
(c) Discriminatory Pricing
14.135
(d) Exclusionary Abuses
14.139
D. The Competition Directive: Market Entry, Special or Exclusive Rights,
and Spectrum Assignments
14.143
(1)
Member States Prohibited From Granting Exclusive or Special Rights
14.146
(2)
Member States Required to Assign Spectrum on the Basis of Appropriate
Criteria
14.149
E. Mergers in the Media Sector
14.156
(1)
General Remarks
14.158
(i) Consolidation
14.159
(ii) Digital Markets
14.160
(iii)
Content
14.161
(iv)
Vertical Issues
14.162
(2)
The Scope of the Competition Assessment under the Merger Regulation
14.163
(3)
Concentrations in Selected Media Industries
14.167
(a) Concentrations in the Music Industry
14
Л
67
(і)
Music Publishing
14.169
(i) Relevant Product Markets
14.170
(ii) Relevant Geographic Markets
14.171
(Hi) The Assessment of Non-Coordinated Effects
14-172
(iv)
The Assessment of Coordinated Effects
14.17~~
lxiv
Contents
(ii)
Recorded Music
14.178
(і)
Relevant Product Markets IA
.179
(ii) Relevant Geographic Markets
14.180
(iii)
The Assessment of Non-Coordinated Effects
14.181
(iv)
The Assessment of Coordinated Effects
14.186
(b) Concentrations in the Audiovisual Industry
14.189
(i) Relevant Product Markets
14.192
(ii) Relevant Geographic Markets
14.200
(iii)
The Assessment of Pay-TV Mergers
14.203
(i) Prohibitions Following the Lack of Satisfactory Remedies
14.204
(ii) Focus on Vertical Issues (Input Foreclosure)
14.2 07
(Hi) Vertical Issues Remain in Mergers with Limited Horizontal
Overlaps
14.211
(c) Concentrations in the Book Publishing Industry (Including E-Books)
14.215
(i) Relevant Product Markets
14.217
(ii) Relevant Geographic Markets
14.219
(iii)
The Assessment of Non-Coordinated Effects
14.221
(jv) The Assessment of Coordinated Effects
14.223
(d) Concentrations in the Written Press
14.225
(i) Relevant Product Markets
14.226
(ii) Relevant Geographic Markets
14.228
(iii)
The Assessment of Non-Coordinated Effects
14.229
(iv)
The Assessment of Coordinated Effects
14.230
(v) The Assessment of Conglomerate Effects
14.231
(e) Concentrations in Advertising Markets
14.234
(i) Product Markets
14.235
(ii) Relevant Geographic Markets
14.237
(iii)
The Assessment of Coordinated/Non-Coordinated Effects
14.238
(iv)
Vertical Effects
14.242
(4)
Conclusion
14.244
15.
Transport
Hubert
de Broca,
Marta
Mielecka Riga, andAnatoly
Subočs
A. The Economic Importance of Transport
15.01
B. Competition Law Framework
15.05
(1)
Historical Evolution
15.07
(2)
Modernization of Competition Rules in the Transport Sector
15.13
C. Air Transport
15.19
(1)
Introduction
15.19
(2)
Legal Framework
15.21
(a) Liberalization of the
EU
Aviation Market
15.21
(b) International Aspects
15.26
(i) Air Service Agreements with Third Countries
15.26
(ii) Open Skies Agreement and Other Comprehensive Air
Transport Agreements
15.33
(c) Application of
EU
Competition Rules in Air Transport
15-41
(3)
Market Definition in Airline Cases
15.42
(a) Introduction
15.42
(b) Air Transport of Passengers
15 A4
(i) Supply of Air Transport Services to End Customers
15.44
lxv
Contents
(і)
Starting
Point:
Origin-anďDestination (O&D)
Approach
15 A4
(ti)
Type of Passenger
15.49
(iii)
Airport Substitutability
15.54
(iv)
Non-Stop vs One-Stop Flights
15.58
(v) Charter Services
15.60
(vi)
Inter-Modal Competition
15.63
(ii) Supply of Airline Seats to Tour Operators
15.65
(c) Air Transport of Cargo
15.66
(4)
Competitive Assessment of Airline Alliances and Mergers
15.69
(a) Introduction
15.69
(b) Determination of Affected Markets
15.76
(c)
Counterfactuaí
15.80
(d) Assessment of Restrictions of Competition
Î
5.85
(í)
Restriction of Competition by Object
15.85
(ii) Restriction of Competition by Effect
15.87
(ε)
Efficiencies
15.94
(i) Introduction
15.94
(ii)
Generai
Assessment Framework Under Article
101(3) 15.95
(Hi) Efficiency Gains
15.99
(iv)
Pass-on to Consumers
15.101
(v) Indispensabilicy
15.103
(vi)
No Elimination of Competition
15.106
(f) Commitments
15.108
(i) Introduction
15.108
(îi)
Síot
Releases 15.H3
(iii)
Special Prorate Agreements
15Л20
(iv)
Fare Combinability Agreements
15.123
(v) Frequent Flyer Programmes
15.124
(vi) Intermodal
Agreements
15.125
(vii)
Other Commitments
15.126
(5)
Prohibited Airline Mergers: Ryanair/Aer Lingus and Olympic/Aegean
15.130
(6)
Hardcore Restrictions
15.136
(a) Price Fixing
15.136
(b) Market Sharing
15.139
(7)
Abuses of a Dominant Position
15.141
D. Maritime Transport
15.144
(1)
Introduction
15.144
(2)
The Repeal of the Conference Block Exemption
15.146
(3)
The Exemption of Maritime
Consortia
15.150
(a) Backgro
und 15.152
(b)
Objectives of the Latest Review
2 5.
Î
5 5
(c) Trie Scope of the Exemption
15-159
(<1) The Content of the Exemption
15.1
<S2
(e) The Conditions for the Exemption
15.166
(i) Market Share Threshold
15.167
(ii) Notice Period
15.172
(4)
The Maritime Guidelines
15.174
(5)
Individuai
Exemption
15.180
(6)
Market Definition
15-182
(7)
Agreements and Abuses of Dominant Position
15-189
ixvi
Contents
E.
Inland Transport
15.193
( 1 )
Road Transport
15.194
(a) Transport of Goods
15.195
(b) Transport of Passengers
15.199
(2)
Inland Waterways
15.205
(3)
Rait
Transporc
15.208
(a) Transport of Goods by Rail
15.208
(b) Transport of Passengers by Rail
15.211
(c)
EU
Liberalization in the Railway Sector: The Railway Packages
15.214
(i) First Railway Package
15.215
(ii) Second Railway Package
15.216
(iii)
Third Railway Package
15.218
(iv)
Rail Recast Directive
15.220
(v) Fourth Railway Package
15.225
(vi)
Railway Interoperability
35.230
(4)
Controlled Competition for Public Transport: Regulation
1370/2007
15.232
(5)
Antitrust Rules Applicable to Inland Transport
15.242
(a) Article
2
of Regulation
169/2009:
Technical Agreements
15.247
(b) Article
3
of Regulation
169/2009:
Exemption for Groups of Small
and Medium-Sized Companies
15.253
(6)
Market Definition
15.259
(a) Freight
15.260
(b) Passenger Transport
15.281
(7)
Prohibited Agreements
15.300
(8)
Abuses of a Dominant Position
15.314
F. Transport Infrastructure (and Related Services)
15.349
(1)
Applicability of Competition Rules toTransport Infrastructure (and
Reiated Services)
15.351
(a) Economic Activity
15.351
(b) Services of Genera] Economic Interest
15.361
(2)
Airport Infrastructure
15.364
(a) Market Definition
15.364
(i) Product Market
15.364
(ii) Geographic Market
15.366
(b) Discriminatory Landing Fees
15.370
(c) Access to Airport Services (Ground-Handling)
15.375
(3)
Maritime Infrastructure
15.378
(a) Market Definition
13378
(i) Product Market
15.378
(ii) Geographic Market
15.382
(b) Competition Concerns
15.383
16.
Pharrrta
Harald Mische,
Elena Kamilarova, and
Dominik
SchnicheL·
A. Introduction
16.01
B. Overview of the Pharma Sector
16.02
(1)
Pharmaceuticals
16.02
(2)
Market Players
16.05
(i) Manufacturers
16.05
lxvii
Contents
(ii) Generic
Companies
16.06
(iii)
Distribution
16.08
(iv)
Demand
16.09
(3)
Regulatory Framework
16.10
(i) Patents
16.11
(ii)
SPC
16.14
(iii)
Markering
Authorization
16.16
(iv)
'Data Exclusivity' and 'Marketing Exclusivity'
16.18
(v) National Pricing and Reimbursement Rules
16.19
(4)
Antitrust Enforcement Priorities before the Sector Inquiry
16.24
(5)
Sector Inquiry and Follow-Up
16.25
(i) Sector Inquiry
16.25
(ii) Follow-Up
16.28
C. Market Definition
16.30
(1)
Pharmaceutical Markets in Case Law
16-30
(2)
АТС
Classification
16-32
(3)
Medicine Characteristics
16.35
(4)
Galenic Formulation
16.36
(5)
Product Life Cycle
16.37
(6)
Future Markets
16.38
(7)
Distribution Channels
16.39
(8)
Upstream Markets
16.40
(9)
Supply Side
16.43
(10)
Geographic Markets
16.44
(11)
Recent Antitrust Decisions
16.45
D. Dominance in Abusive Conduct Cases
16.47
(1)
Commission Practice
16.47
(2)
National Cases
16.48
(i) UK Cases {Reckitt Benckiser and
Napp)
16.48
(ii) The French
Sanofi-AventL·
Case
16.49
E. Restrictive Practices Between Originators and Generic Companies
16.50
(1)
Main Competition Concerns and the Economic and Legal Context of
Generic Competition
16.51
(a) Main Competition Concerns
16.51
(b) Dynamics of Competition Between Originaror and Generic
Companies
16.55
(c) The Competitive Process Leading to Generic Entry
16.62
(2)
Pay-for-Delay Settlement Agreements
16.67
(i) Terminology
16.67
(ii) Forms of Value Transfer
16.69
(iii)
Overview of US and
EU
Debate
16.70
(a) Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the US
16.72
(i) Hatch-Waxman Act
16.73
(ii) Potential Scope of the Patent Test
16.76
(iii)
Presumption of Restraint of Trade
16.78
(iv)
US Supreme Court's 'Rule of Reason' Test
16.80
(b) Pay-for-Delay Patent Settlement Agreements under Article
101 16.85
(i) Review of Patent Settlements Under the
2008/2009
Sector Inquiry
16.85
lxviii
Contents
(ii)
Pay-for-Restriction
in
Settlement
Agreements 16.87
(iii)
Commission Decision in Lundbeck
16.88
(iv)
Commission Decision in Fentanyl
16.99
(v)
EU
and UK Investigations in
Servier
and Paroxetine Under
Article
101 16.100
(vi)
Relevant Jurisprudence
16.103
(3)
Acquisition of Patent Rights and Exclusive Licensing
16.110
(a) Acquisition of API Technology
16.111
(b) Merger Regulation vs Articles
101
and
102 16.112
(c) Relevant Jurisprudence
16.113
(d) Exclusive Licensing
16.114
(4)
Exclusive Supply Agreement
16.117
F. Competition Between Manufacturers of Generic Medicines
16.118
(1)
National Pricing Systems and Their Impact on Generic Competition
16.119
(2)
The German Sickness Funds and the Dutch Preference Policy
16.123
G. Case Law under Article
102
and National Law: Abuses by
Originators
16.127
( 1 )
Misleading Representations in Government Procedures and Misuse of
Procedures
16.128
(a) Misleading Representations in Government Procedures
16.129
(b) Misuse of Procedures
16.138
(2)
Acquisition of Competing API Technology
{Servier
Investigation)
16.142
(3)
Pay-for-Delay Settlement Agreements
{Servier
and Paroxetine
Investigations)
16.143
(4)
Exclusionary Pricing Discounts in the Hospital Segment
(the OFT's
Napp
Case)
16.144
(5)
Withdrawal and
Delisting
of a Product (the OFT's Reckitt
Benckiser Case)
16.146
(6)
Denigration (the
L'Autorité de
la concurrence's Schering-Pbugh and
Sanofi-Aventis Cases)
16.147
(7)
Abusive Practices Against Competing Originator Companies
{Boehringer Case)
16.150
H. Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals
16.152
(1)
Rationale
16.153
(a) The Specificity of the
EU
Internal Market
16.155
(b) The Internal Market Objective
16.157
(2)
Restrictions of Parallel Trade and Article
101
τ
Supply Quotas and
Dual Pricing
16.160
(a) Supply Quotas and Article
101 16.163
(i)
EU
Case Law
16.163
(ii) National Case Law
16.166
(b) Dual Pricing
16.168
(i) EU
Case Law: Restriction by Object
16.168
(ii) Special Characteristics of the Pharmaceutical Sector
16.172
(iii)
National Case Law
16.178
(3)
Restrictions of Parallel Trade and Article
102:
Supply Quotas
16.180
(a) EU
Case Law: Absence of a Per
Se
Abuse Under Article
102 16.181
(b) National Case Law
16.191
(i) The Case Law of the French Competition Authority
16.192
lxix
Contents
(ii)
The Case Law of the Spanish Competition Authority
16.196
(iii)
The Case Law of the Belgian Competition Authority
16.203
(iv)
Conclusion
16.205
IV STATE AID
17.
State Aid
Tim Maxian
Rusche,
Claire Micheau, Henri Piffaut, and
Koen
Van
de Casteele
A. Why State Aid Control?
17.01
(1)
The Origins
17.01
(2)
Constant Conflict of Objectives
17.09
(3)
The
2012-2014
State Aid Modernization
17.13
B. Notion of State Aid
17.18
( 1 )
Aid Granted by the State or Through State Resources
17.20
(a) Or'is to be Read as'and'
17.20
(b) State Resources.May Be Private (As Long As They Are
Under Control)
17.23
(c) Imputability
17.29
(2)
Advantage
17-35
(a) Beneficiary of the Advantage
17-36
(i) Notion of Undertaking
17.36
(ii) Indirect Beneficiary
17.44
(b) Notion of Advantage
17.49
(i) Economic Advantage
17.51
(ii) The Market Economy Investor Principle/Private
Creditor Principle
17-60
(i) The Private Investor Principle
17.60
(ii) Private Creditor Principle
17.76
(Hi) Sale of State Property \7
.79
(iv)
Extensions
17-85
(v) Infrastructure Projects
17-88
(iii)
Tax Advantage
17-90
(3)
Selectivity
* 17-95
(a) Notion of Selectivity
17.95
(b) Tax Selectivity
17-100
(i) Material Selectivity
17.104
(i)
De fure
and
De
Facto Selectivity
17-1 04
(ii) The Test of Tax Selectivity
17-107
(Hi) Discretionary Power
17.113
(iv)
Justification by the logic of the Tax System IV
Λ
15
(ii) Regional Selectivity
17-121
(4)
Distortion of Competition and Effect on Trade
17.1 30
(a) Affectation of Competition and Trade
17
Л
30
(b)
De Minimis
Regulation 17.146
(і)
Scope
17.152
(ii) Recipient
17-155
(iii)
Calculation
17-156
(iv)
Transparent
Aid
17-161
(v) Application in Time
17.162
(vi)
Further Conditions
17.166
lxx
Contents
(vii)
Monitoring 17.169
(viii)
Cumulation
17.170
(ix)
Controversy on the Nature of the
De Minimis
Rule
17-172
(с)
New SGEl
De Minimis
Regulation
17.179
С.
Compatibility of State Aid with the Internal Market
17.183
( 1 )
Refined Economic Approach
17.186
(a) Well-Defined Objective of Common Interest
17.189
(b) Well-Designed Instrument
17.193
(c) Balancing of the Positive and Negative Effects/Overall
Positive Balance
17.196
(d) The Way Forward
17.197
(2)
General Principles of Necessity (Incentive Effect) and Proportionality
17.199
(3)
Compatibility on the Basis of Article
107(2) 17.201
(a) Aid Having a Social Character Granted to Individual Consumers
17.204
(b) Aid to Make Good Damage Caused by Natural Disasters or
Exceptional Occurrences
17.207
(c) Aid to Compensate for the Economic Disadvantages Caused by the
Division of Germany
17-212
(4)
Compatibility Declared by the Commission on the Basis of
Article
107(3) 17.215
(a) Aid to Promote the Economic Development of Areas where the
Standard of Living is Abnormally Low or Where There is Serious
Underemployment (Art 107(3)(a))
17.221
(b) Aid to Promote the Execution of an Important Project of Common
European Interest (Art 107(3)(b) first alternative)
17.235
(c) Aid to Remedy a Serious Disturbance in the Economy of a Member
State (Art
107(3)
(b) second alternative)
17.239
(d) Aid to Promote Culture and Heritage Conservation (Art 107(3)(d))
17.245
(e) Aid to Facilitate the Development of Certain Economic Activities or
of Certain Economic Areas (Art 107(3)(c))
17.246
(i) State Aid for Environmental Protection
17-250
(i) Investment Aid
17.255
(it) Operating Aid
17'.262
(ii) AidforR&D
17.263
(i) Stage of
Rà-D
17.264
(ii)
Incentive Effect ofR&DAid
17-267
(in) Eligible Costs
17.270
(iv)
Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty
17'.271
(iii)
Other Soft Law of a Horizontal Nature
17.323
(iv)
Soft Law Concerning Only Certain Sectors
17.326
(f) Other Categories to be Specified by Decision of the Council
(Art
107(3)
(c))
17.327
(g) Aid for the Coordination of Transport
17-328
(5)
Compatibility Declared by the Council: Article
108(2) 17.329
(6)
Services of General Economic Interest
17-338
(a) Introduction: Definition and Legal Basis
17.338
(b) Before
Altmark:
Compensation and State Aid Approach
17.348
(c) The
Altmark
Ruling
17-351
(d) Analysis of
Altmark:
Positive Effects and Open Questions
17-359
(e) The SGEI Package
17.364
(i) The Monti-Kroes Package
17-364
lxxi
Contents
(ii)
The New Package
17.368
(i) Existence of an SGEl
17.370
(ii) Entrustment Act
\7.Ъ7\
(iii)
Parameters of Compensation \7372
(iv)
Avoidance of Overcompensation
17.373
(v) Selection of the Provider
17.374
(vi)
De Minimis
Regulation
17377
(vii)
Block Exemption
17.379
(viii)
Framework
17.380
(7)
1Ће
General Block Exemption Regulation
17.387
D. State Aid Procedure
17.394
(1)
Legal Basis and Applicable Texts of Hard and Soft Law
17.395
(2)
Notification and Assessment of New Aid (Chapter II Procedural
Regulation)
17.402
(a) Objective of the Notification and Assessment Procedure
17.404
(b) Legal Basis and the Principle of Notification Requirement
17.406
(c) Steps in the Notification and Assessment Procedure
17.410
(i) Preparation and Filing of Notification
17-411
(ii) Pre-Notification
17.420
(iii)
Preliminary Investigation
17.423
(iv)
Formal Investigation Proceedings
17.427
(d) Internal Commission Decision-Making Procedure
17-430
(e) Delays and Mistakes in the Notification Procedure and How to
Avoid Them
17-435
(f
)
Monitoring of Approved and Notification-Exempted State Aid
17-443
(3)
Unlawful Aid (Chapter III of the Procedural Regulation)
17.445
(a) The Case Law on Unlawful Aid
17.446
(b) The Codification of the Case Law in the Procedural Regulation
17.448
(c) Innovation in the Procedural Regulation: The Recovery Injunction
17-449
(d) Recovery of Unlawful and Incompatible Aid
17.450
(i) Legal Basis and General Principles of Recovery
17.455
(i) Legal Basis of Recovery
17Л55
(it) Immediate and Effective Recovery According to
National Laws
17.460
(Hi) Imposition of Compound Interest
17.467
(ii) Defences Against Recovery
17.471
(i) Defences That Can Be Invoked by the Member State
17.473
(ii) Defences That Can Be Invoked by the Beneficiary
17.474
(iii)
Specific Problems and Situations of Recovery
17-479
(i) Domestic Motivation for Recovery
17.479
(ii) Recovery and Insolvency Proceedings
17-481
(Hi) The Correct Addressee for the Recovery Claim
17-487
(iv)
Recovery Practice of the Commission
17.493
(4)
Existing Aid (Chapter IV Procedural Regulation)
17-497
(a) The Distinction Between New and Existing Aid
17-501
(b) Procedure for Existing Aid
17-511
(c) The Treatment of Borderline Cases
17-516
(5)
The Rights of Third Parties, in Particular: The State Aid Complaint
lxxii
Contents
(Chapter V Procedural Regulation)
17.519
(a) Rights of Third Parties in General
17.519
(b) State Aid Complaints
17.524
(c) ChallengeableActs
17.541
(i) Existing Aid
17.543
(ii) Opening Decisions
17.544
(iii)
Injunctions
17.546
(iv)
Administrative Letters in Response to Complaints
17.548
(6)
Action Seeking the Suspension and Provisional Recovery^of State Aid in
Front of National Courts
17.553
(7)
The Scope of Judicial Review
17.556
(a) Judicial Review: Failure to Act
17.559
(b) Judicial Review: Interim Relief
17.561
(c) Judicial Review: Action for annulment
17.565
Index
2033
lxxiii |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author2 | Faull, Jonathan 1954- Nikpay, Ali Taylor, Deirdre |
| author2_role | edt edt edt |
| author2_variant | j f jf a n an d t dt |
| author_GND | (DE-588)171143892 (DE-588)171197690 (DE-588)1060992809 |
| author_facet | Faull, Jonathan 1954- Nikpay, Ali Taylor, Deirdre |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV040535009 |
| callnumber-first | K - Law |
| callnumber-label | KJE6456 |
| callnumber-raw | KJE6456 |
| callnumber-search | KJE6456 |
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| classification_rvk | PS 3360 |
| classification_tum | JUR 395f |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)876241015 (DE-599)BVBBV040535009 |
| dewey-full | 343.24/0721 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 343 - Military, tax, trade & industrial law |
| dewey-raw | 343.24/0721 |
| dewey-search | 343.24/0721 |
| dewey-sort | 3343.24 3721 |
| dewey-tens | 340 - Law |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| edition | Third edition |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV040535009 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-01-02T11:40:55Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780199665099 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025381016 |
| oclc_num | 876241015 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-M382 DE-703 DE-188 DE-20 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-523 DE-384 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-703 DE-188 DE-20 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-523 DE-384 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM |
| physical | cccxxxiii, 2134 Seiten Diagramme |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publishDateSearch | 2014 |
| publishDateSort | 2014 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | The EU law of competition edited by Jonathan Faull ; Ali Nikpay. Assistant editor: Deirdre Taylor Faull & Nikpay The EU law of competition Third edition Oxford Oxford University Press 2014 cccxxxiii, 2134 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd rswk-swf Concurrence - Droit - Pays de l'Union européenne Antitrust law European Union countries Competition, Unfair European Union countries Restraint of trade European Union countries Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 gnd rswk-swf Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 b Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 s DE-604 Faull, Jonathan 1954- (DE-588)171143892 edt Nikpay, Ali (DE-588)171197690 edt Taylor, Deirdre (DE-588)1060992809 edt Bis 2. Auflage unter dem Titel Faull, Jonathan: The EC law of competition (DE-604)BV021234037 Digitalisierung UB Bamberg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025381016&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | The EU law of competition Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Concurrence - Droit - Pays de l'Union européenne Antitrust law European Union countries Competition, Unfair European Union countries Restraint of trade European Union countries Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)5098525-5 (DE-588)4121924-7 |
| title | The EU law of competition |
| title_alt | Faull & Nikpay The EU law of competition |
| title_auth | The EU law of competition |
| title_exact_search | The EU law of competition |
| title_full | The EU law of competition edited by Jonathan Faull ; Ali Nikpay. Assistant editor: Deirdre Taylor |
| title_fullStr | The EU law of competition edited by Jonathan Faull ; Ali Nikpay. Assistant editor: Deirdre Taylor |
| title_full_unstemmed | The EU law of competition edited by Jonathan Faull ; Ali Nikpay. Assistant editor: Deirdre Taylor |
| title_old | Faull, Jonathan: The EC law of competition |
| title_short | The EU law of competition |
| title_sort | the eu law of competition |
| topic | Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Concurrence - Droit - Pays de l'Union européenne Antitrust law European Union countries Competition, Unfair European Union countries Restraint of trade European Union countries Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Europäische Union Concurrence - Droit - Pays de l'Union européenne Antitrust law European Union countries Competition, Unfair European Union countries Restraint of trade European Union countries Wettbewerbsrecht |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025381016&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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