Public microeconomics: efficiency and equity in public policy
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cheltenham [u.a.]
Elgar
2012
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | XI, 197 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780857932075 |
Staff View
MARC
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Record in the Search Index
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|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Preface
and acknowledgments
χ
Foreword to students
xii
1
Introduction
1
1.1
Positive vs. normative analysis
1
1.2
Social interaction and equilibrium
1
1.3
Government and markets
3
1.4
Efficiency
5
1.4.1
The Pareto criterion
5
1.4.2
Pareto efficiency
6
1.4.3
The Pareto criterion and the utility possibilities set
6
1.5
Distributive justice
7
1.5.1
Social welfare functions
7
1.5.2
Expensive and cheap tastes
10
1.5.3
Equality of opportunity
11
1.6
Traditional economic postulates and economic efficiency
12
1.7
A simple model
13
1.7.1
Production and costs
14
1.7.2
Preferences and utility
15
1.7.3
Allocations and efficiency
15
1.8
Quasilinearity and surplus analysis
16
1.8.1
Valuation functions
16
1.8.2
Social surplus
19
1.8.3
Efficiency and the maximization of social surplus
19
1.8.4
The maximization of a social welfare function
20
Appendix 1A A Yes-No good with a continuum of people
21
1A.1 A continuum economy
21
1A.2 Valuations, surplus and efficiency
22
Appendix IB Game theory
25
Appendix
1С
Proof of the equivalence between efficiency
and the maximization of surplus
29
Appendix ID The potential compensation criterion
30
2
Private goods without externalities
31
2.1
Efficiency conditions for private-goods economies without
externalities
31
VI PUBLIC MICROECONOMICS
2.2
The utility
possibilities frontier
32
2.3
The First
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics
and market failures
33
2.3.1
The invisible hand and the theorem
33
2.3.2
Market failures
36
2.3.3
Equity, efficiency and public policy
36
2.4
Surplus analysis of competitive markets
37
2.4.1
The First Fundamental Theorem in
quasilinear
economies
37
2.4.2
Obtaining valuation from demand
38
2.4.3
Aggregate demand and social valuation
40
2.4.4
Social surplus as the area between the aggregate
demand and marginal social cost curves
40
2.4.5
The distribution of social surplus into consumer
surplus and profits
45
Appendix 2A The First Fundamental Theorem of
Welfare Economics in the continuum
economy
49
Appendix 2B Potential compensation in
quasilinear
economies
53
3
Externalities
54
3.1
Introduction
54
3.1.1
Concepts
54
3.1.2
Examples of externalities
55
3.1.3
The externality market failure
57
3.2
Unidirectional negative externalities
57
3.2.1
A two-person model
57
3.2.2
Surplus maximization
58
3.2.3
Free-market equilibrium
60
3.2.4
Policy instruments for negative externalities
62
3.2.5
Pigouvian tax
63
3.2.6
Cap and trade
63
3.2.7
Distributional flexibility
64
3.2.8
More than one generator
68
3.2.9
Comparison of policies
70
3.3
Omnidirectional externalities: North and South
70
3.3.1
The model
70
3.3.2
Free-market allocation
71
3.3.3
The nationalistic solution
71
3.3.4
Social (world) surplus
73
3.3.5
Surplus maximization and international fairness
75
3.4
Positive externalities
75
CONTENTS VU
3.5
3.6
Emission
abatement
76
3.5.1
The upstream-downstream model with
abatement
76
3.5.2
Abatement costs
78
3.5.3
The surplus-maximizing solution
78
3.5.4
The free-market allocation and policy
approaches
80
Bargaining
83
3.6.1
Disagreement points
83
3.6.2
The disagreement point when the recipient has
no right to clean water
84
3.6.3
The disagreement point when the recipient has
the right to clean water
84
3.6.4
Complete bargaining
84
3.6.5
Pigouvian taxes plus complete bargaining
86
Appendix
ЗА
Omnidirectional externalities in the
continuum economy
88
ЗАЛ
The model
88
3A.2 Negative externality: congestion
and the tragedy of the commons
88
3A.3 Positive externality: the network
94
Appendix 3B The so-called
Coase
theorem
98
3B.
1
Statements
98
3B.2 The second best when bargaining is
impossible
99
3B.3 Liability for damages
99
Public goods
100
4.1
Concepts
100
4.1.1
Nonrivalness
100
4.1.2
Excludability
101
4.1.3
Free disposal
101
4.1.4
Summary
103
4.2
The efficient provision of public goods
103
4.2.1
Feasible states and efficiency
103
4.2.2
Efficiency condition for a Yes-No public good
104
4.2.3
Differentiability and the
Samuelson
condition
105
4.2.4 Quasilinear
preferences and surplus maximization
105
4.2.5
Comparison of the marginal conditions for
efficiency in public and private goods
108
4.3
The provision of a public good through the political
process
112
4.3.1
Lindahl
equilibrium
112
Vill PUBLIC MICROECONOMICS
4.3.1.1
The simultaneous determination of
provision
and financing
112
4.3.1.2
Unanimity and the
Lindahl
equilibrium
113
4.3.1.3
The
Lindahl
model
114
4.3.1.4
The efficiency of the
Lindahl
equilibrium
116
4.3.1.5
Social welfare at the
Lindahl
equilibrium
117
4.3.2
The provision of a public good under an
exogenous financing rule
117
4.3.2.1
Financing rules
117
4.3.2.2
Single-peaked net benefit functions
118
4.3.2.3
Median peaks and the Condorcet theorem
118
4.3.2.4
Multiple peaks and the Condorcet paradox
121
4.3.2.5
One-dimensional political competition and
the Hotelling-Downs median voter
theorem
123
4.3.2.6
Majority voting and economic efficiency
125
4.4
The provision of a public good by voluntary
contributions
127
4.4.1
The voluntary contribution game
127
4.4.2
Equilibrium contributions
128
4.4.3
The inefficiency of the voluntary contributions
equilibrium
132
4.4.4
Many identical players
133
4.5
The provision of an excludable public good by charging
user fees
133
4.5.1
Efficient pricing
133
4.5.2
Lindahl
prices for a continuous public good
134
4.5.3
Access fees for a Yes-No public good
135
Appendix 4A Public goods in the continuum economy
140
Public utilities
142
5.1
Capacity costs and operating costs
142
5.2
Capacity as a continuous variable and peak-load pricing
143
5.2.1
Costs
143
5.2.2
Peak-load pricing under zero operating costs
144
5.2.3
Peak-load pricing under positive operating costs
145
5.3
Capacity as a Yes-No variable and natural monopoly
147
5.3.1
Increasing returns in the production of a private
good
147
CONTENTS
IX
5.3.2 Uniform and linear
prices: the conflict between
efficiency and breaking even
150
5.3.3
Two-part tariffs
152
Appendix 5A Access fees in the continuum economy
158
Appendix 5B Personalized linear prices and the
Ramsey-Boiteux equation
159
6
Uncertainty and asymmetrical information
162
6.1
Decisions under uncertainty
162
6.2
Prices vs. quantities in externality policy
164
6.3
Asymmetrical information and adverse selection
169
6.4
Riskaversion
176
6.5
Efficient risk sharing
180
6.6
Risk-sharing entails ex post redistribution
188
6.7
Actuarial fairness and ex ante redistribution
¡89
6.8
Asymmetrical information in insurance
190
6.9
Minimal guaranteed insurance
191
6.10
Compulsory insurance
191
Index
193
|
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| author | Silvestre, Joaquim 1945- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)170466221 |
| author_facet | Silvestre, Joaquim 1945- |
| author_role | aut |
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| bvnumber | BV039962500 |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| id | DE-604.BV039962500 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:15:05Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780857932075 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-024820213 |
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| owner_facet | DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-1047 DE-20 DE-M382 DE-N2 |
| physical | XI, 197 S. graph. Darst. |
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| publisher | Elgar |
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| spelling | Silvestre, Joaquim 1945- Verfasser (DE-588)170466221 aut Public microeconomics efficiency and equity in public policy Joaquim Silvestre Cheltenham [u.a.] Elgar 2012 XI, 197 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd rswk-swf Versorgungswirtschaft (DE-588)4063229-5 gnd rswk-swf Pareto-Optimum (DE-588)4173334-4 gnd rswk-swf Öffentliches Gut (DE-588)4043179-4 gnd rswk-swf Externer Effekt (DE-588)4153414-1 gnd rswk-swf Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd rswk-swf Risiko (DE-588)4050129-2 gnd rswk-swf Effizienz (DE-588)4013585-8 gnd rswk-swf Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd rswk-swf Öffentliches Gut (DE-588)4043179-4 s Effizienz (DE-588)4013585-8 s Pareto-Optimum (DE-588)4173334-4 s Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 s Externer Effekt (DE-588)4153414-1 s Versorgungswirtschaft (DE-588)4063229-5 s Risiko (DE-588)4050129-2 s Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 s Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 s b DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024820213&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Silvestre, Joaquim 1945- Public microeconomics efficiency and equity in public policy Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd Versorgungswirtschaft (DE-588)4063229-5 gnd Pareto-Optimum (DE-588)4173334-4 gnd Öffentliches Gut (DE-588)4043179-4 gnd Externer Effekt (DE-588)4153414-1 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd Risiko (DE-588)4050129-2 gnd Effizienz (DE-588)4013585-8 gnd Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4120934-5 (DE-588)4063229-5 (DE-588)4173334-4 (DE-588)4043179-4 (DE-588)4153414-1 (DE-588)4039225-9 (DE-588)4050129-2 (DE-588)4013585-8 (DE-588)4066735-2 |
| title | Public microeconomics efficiency and equity in public policy |
| title_auth | Public microeconomics efficiency and equity in public policy |
| title_exact_search | Public microeconomics efficiency and equity in public policy |
| title_full | Public microeconomics efficiency and equity in public policy Joaquim Silvestre |
| title_fullStr | Public microeconomics efficiency and equity in public policy Joaquim Silvestre |
| title_full_unstemmed | Public microeconomics efficiency and equity in public policy Joaquim Silvestre |
| title_short | Public microeconomics |
| title_sort | public microeconomics efficiency and equity in public policy |
| title_sub | efficiency and equity in public policy |
| topic | Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd Versorgungswirtschaft (DE-588)4063229-5 gnd Pareto-Optimum (DE-588)4173334-4 gnd Öffentliches Gut (DE-588)4043179-4 gnd Externer Effekt (DE-588)4153414-1 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd Risiko (DE-588)4050129-2 gnd Effizienz (DE-588)4013585-8 gnd Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Asymmetrische Information Versorgungswirtschaft Pareto-Optimum Öffentliches Gut Externer Effekt Mikroökonomie Risiko Effizienz Wohlfahrtstheorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024820213&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT silvestrejoaquim publicmicroeconomicsefficiencyandequityinpublicpolicy |