The law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement: using information from non-cartel investigations to prosecute cartels
I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in sever...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
München
CESifo
2011
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper
3506 : Category 11, Industrial Organisation |
| Online-Zugang: | http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/b-publ/b3publwp/_wp_abstract?p_file_id=16106285&category= kostenfrei http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49470 |
| Zusammenfassung: | I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in several jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A investigation typically cannot be directly used for a cartel case due to the underlying statutes and the legal and administrative procedures that govern information use. Reviewing the management and corporate strategy literature, I note that M&As form a vital part of firms' core business strategy, with the longer-run strategic aspects being more important. These longer-run strategies could be jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the likelihood of detection and prosecution would increase under the proposed rule change, which would punish bad (collusive) behavior. I argue that irrespective of exactly how many cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the likelihood of creating a meaningful deterrence effect. I also discuss the potential downsides related to Type 1 errors and administrative costs. Overall, I argue that the proposed rule change could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cartel enforcement, and open an additional front in the fight against hardcore cartels that operate within jurisdictions as well as internationally. -- cartels ; enforcement ; law and economics |
| Beschreibung: | graph. Darst. |
| Format: | . - Acrobat Reader |
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| 520 | 1 | |a I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in several jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A investigation typically cannot be directly used for a cartel case due to the underlying statutes and the legal and administrative procedures that govern information use. Reviewing the management and corporate strategy literature, I note that M&As form a vital part of firms' core business strategy, with the longer-run strategic aspects being more important. These longer-run strategies could be jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the likelihood of detection and prosecution would increase under the proposed rule change, which would punish bad (collusive) behavior. I argue that irrespective of exactly how many cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the likelihood of creating a meaningful deterrence effect. I also discuss the potential downsides related to Type 1 errors and administrative costs. Overall, I argue that the proposed rule change could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cartel enforcement, and open an additional front in the fight against hardcore cartels that operate within jurisdictions as well as internationally. -- cartels ; enforcement ; law and economics | |
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| spelling | Ghosal, Vivek 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)170665135 aut The law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement using information from non-cartel investigations to prosecute cartels Vivek Ghosal München CESifo 2011 graph. Darst. txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier CESifo working paper 3506 : Category 11, Industrial Organisation I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in several jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A investigation typically cannot be directly used for a cartel case due to the underlying statutes and the legal and administrative procedures that govern information use. Reviewing the management and corporate strategy literature, I note that M&As form a vital part of firms' core business strategy, with the longer-run strategic aspects being more important. These longer-run strategies could be jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the likelihood of detection and prosecution would increase under the proposed rule change, which would punish bad (collusive) behavior. I argue that irrespective of exactly how many cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the likelihood of creating a meaningful deterrence effect. I also discuss the potential downsides related to Type 1 errors and administrative costs. Overall, I argue that the proposed rule change could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cartel enforcement, and open an additional front in the fight against hardcore cartels that operate within jurisdictions as well as internationally. -- cartels ; enforcement ; law and economics Online-Ausgabe Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 39 S., 858 KB) . - Acrobat Reader Reproduktion von Ghosal, Vivek, 1960- The law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement 2011 http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/b-publ/b3publwp/_wp_abstract?p_file_id=16106285&category= http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1206580.PDF kostenfrei Volltext http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49470 Download aus dem Internet, Stand: 19.07.2011 |
| spellingShingle | Ghosal, Vivek 1960- The law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement using information from non-cartel investigations to prosecute cartels |
| title | The law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement using information from non-cartel investigations to prosecute cartels |
| title_auth | The law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement using information from non-cartel investigations to prosecute cartels |
| title_exact_search | The law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement using information from non-cartel investigations to prosecute cartels |
| title_full | The law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement using information from non-cartel investigations to prosecute cartels Vivek Ghosal |
| title_fullStr | The law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement using information from non-cartel investigations to prosecute cartels Vivek Ghosal |
| title_full_unstemmed | The law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement using information from non-cartel investigations to prosecute cartels Vivek Ghosal |
| title_short | The law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement |
| title_sort | the law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement using information from non cartel investigations to prosecute cartels |
| title_sub | using information from non-cartel investigations to prosecute cartels |
| url | http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/b-publ/b3publwp/_wp_abstract?p_file_id=16106285&category= http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1206580.PDF http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49470 |
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