Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth: Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future
This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficac...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Carlisle, PA
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
2011
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Advancing strategic thought series
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force |
| Beschreibung: | "September 2011." Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-26) Introduction -- Myth #1 : the British military is an effective learning institution -- Myth #2 : British civil-military COIN planning is strategically perceptive -- Myth #3 : the British military has flexibly adapted to the demands of COIN -- Myth #4 : the British military has an ingrained educational approach to COIN -- Myth #5 : Iraq represented the zenith of 60 years worth of modern COIN learning -- Myth #6 : the British can do COIN alone -- Myth #7 : the British "don't talk to terrorists" -- Myth #8 : "hearts and minds" and "minimum force" are sacrosanct elements of the British way of COIN -- Myth #9 : the Malayan emergency is the archetypal COIN campaign -- Myth #10 : the British military are the ultimate COIN practitioners -- The value of the British experience |
| Beschreibung: | VII, 26 S. Ill. |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV039826696 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20171120 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 120123s2011 a||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |z 1584875097 |9 1584875097 | ||
| 020 | |z 9781584875093 |c pbk. |9 978-1-58487-509-3 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)757348018 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV039826696 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-Bo133 | ||
| 084 | |a 8 |2 ssgn | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Mumford, Andrew |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1015966020 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth |b Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future |c Andrew Mumford |
| 264 | 1 | |a Carlisle, PA |b Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College |c 2011 | |
| 300 | |a VII, 26 S. |b Ill. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Advancing strategic thought series | |
| 500 | |a "September 2011." | ||
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-26) | ||
| 500 | |a Introduction -- Myth #1 : the British military is an effective learning institution -- Myth #2 : British civil-military COIN planning is strategically perceptive -- Myth #3 : the British military has flexibly adapted to the demands of COIN -- Myth #4 : the British military has an ingrained educational approach to COIN -- Myth #5 : Iraq represented the zenith of 60 years worth of modern COIN learning -- Myth #6 : the British can do COIN alone -- Myth #7 : the British "don't talk to terrorists" -- Myth #8 : "hearts and minds" and "minimum force" are sacrosanct elements of the British way of COIN -- Myth #9 : the Malayan emergency is the archetypal COIN campaign -- Myth #10 : the British military are the ultimate COIN practitioners -- The value of the British experience | ||
| 520 | |a This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force | ||
| 648 | 4 | |a Geschichte 1900-2000 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Counterinsurgency / Great Britain | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Guerrilla warfare / Great Britain | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 20th century | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 21st century | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Kriegführung |2 fes | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Militärpolitik |2 fes | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Sicherheitspolitik |2 fes | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Geschichte | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Aufstand |0 (DE-588)4003554-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Bekämpfung |0 (DE-588)4112701-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 4 | |a Great Britain / Military policy | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Großbritannien |2 fes | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Großbritannien | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Großbritannien |0 (DE-588)4022153-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Großbritannien |0 (DE-588)4022153-2 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Aufstand |0 (DE-588)4003554-2 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Bekämpfung |0 (DE-588)4112701-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 710 | 2 | |a Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.) |e Sonstige |0 (DE-588)1046371-9 |4 oth | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-024686702 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804148763636269056 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Mumford, Andrew |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1015966020 |
| author_facet | Mumford, Andrew |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Mumford, Andrew |
| author_variant | a m am |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV039826696 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)757348018 (DE-599)BVBBV039826696 |
| era | Geschichte 1900-2000 |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1900-2000 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03572nam a2200577 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV039826696</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20171120 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">120123s2011 a||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">1584875097</subfield><subfield code="9">1584875097</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">9781584875093</subfield><subfield code="c">pbk.</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-58487-509-3</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)757348018</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV039826696</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Bo133</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">8</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mumford, Andrew</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1015966020</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth</subfield><subfield code="b">Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future</subfield><subfield code="c">Andrew Mumford</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Carlisle, PA</subfield><subfield code="b">Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College</subfield><subfield code="c">2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">VII, 26 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">Ill.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Advancing strategic thought series</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"September 2011."</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-26)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Introduction -- Myth #1 : the British military is an effective learning institution -- Myth #2 : British civil-military COIN planning is strategically perceptive -- Myth #3 : the British military has flexibly adapted to the demands of COIN -- Myth #4 : the British military has an ingrained educational approach to COIN -- Myth #5 : Iraq represented the zenith of 60 years worth of modern COIN learning -- Myth #6 : the British can do COIN alone -- Myth #7 : the British "don't talk to terrorists" -- Myth #8 : "hearts and minds" and "minimum force" are sacrosanct elements of the British way of COIN -- Myth #9 : the Malayan emergency is the archetypal COIN campaign -- Myth #10 : the British military are the ultimate COIN practitioners -- The value of the British experience</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1900-2000</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Counterinsurgency / Great Britain</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Guerrilla warfare / Great Britain</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 20th century</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 21st century</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Kriegführung</subfield><subfield code="2">fes</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Militärpolitik</subfield><subfield code="2">fes</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Sicherheitspolitik</subfield><subfield code="2">fes</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Geschichte</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Aufstand</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4003554-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Bekämpfung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4112701-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Great Britain / Military policy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Großbritannien</subfield><subfield code="2">fes</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Großbritannien</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Großbritannien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4022153-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Großbritannien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4022153-2</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Aufstand</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4003554-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Bekämpfung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4112701-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="710" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.)</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1046371-9</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-024686702</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | Great Britain / Military policy Großbritannien fes Großbritannien Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Great Britain / Military policy Großbritannien |
| id | DE-604.BV039826696 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:12:18Z |
| institution | BVB |
| institution_GND | (DE-588)1046371-9 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-024686702 |
| oclc_num | 757348018 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-Bo133 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-Bo133 |
| physical | VII, 26 S. Ill. |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publishDateSearch | 2011 |
| publishDateSort | 2011 |
| publisher | Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Advancing strategic thought series |
| spelling | Mumford, Andrew Verfasser (DE-588)1015966020 aut Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future Andrew Mumford Carlisle, PA Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2011 VII, 26 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Advancing strategic thought series "September 2011." Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-26) Introduction -- Myth #1 : the British military is an effective learning institution -- Myth #2 : British civil-military COIN planning is strategically perceptive -- Myth #3 : the British military has flexibly adapted to the demands of COIN -- Myth #4 : the British military has an ingrained educational approach to COIN -- Myth #5 : Iraq represented the zenith of 60 years worth of modern COIN learning -- Myth #6 : the British can do COIN alone -- Myth #7 : the British "don't talk to terrorists" -- Myth #8 : "hearts and minds" and "minimum force" are sacrosanct elements of the British way of COIN -- Myth #9 : the Malayan emergency is the archetypal COIN campaign -- Myth #10 : the British military are the ultimate COIN practitioners -- The value of the British experience This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force Geschichte 1900-2000 Counterinsurgency / Great Britain Guerrilla warfare / Great Britain Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 20th century Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 21st century Kriegführung fes Militärpolitik fes Sicherheitspolitik fes Geschichte Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 gnd rswk-swf Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd rswk-swf Great Britain / Military policy Großbritannien fes Großbritannien Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 gnd rswk-swf Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 g Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 s Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 s DE-604 Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.) Sonstige (DE-588)1046371-9 oth |
| spellingShingle | Mumford, Andrew Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future Counterinsurgency / Great Britain Guerrilla warfare / Great Britain Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 20th century Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 21st century Kriegführung fes Militärpolitik fes Sicherheitspolitik fes Geschichte Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 gnd Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4003554-2 (DE-588)4112701-8 (DE-588)4022153-2 |
| title | Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future |
| title_auth | Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future |
| title_exact_search | Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future |
| title_full | Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future Andrew Mumford |
| title_fullStr | Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future Andrew Mumford |
| title_full_unstemmed | Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future Andrew Mumford |
| title_short | Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth |
| title_sort | puncturing the counterinsurgency myth britain and irregular warfare in the past present and future |
| title_sub | Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future |
| topic | Counterinsurgency / Great Britain Guerrilla warfare / Great Britain Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 20th century Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 21st century Kriegführung fes Militärpolitik fes Sicherheitspolitik fes Geschichte Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 gnd Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Counterinsurgency / Great Britain Guerrilla warfare / Great Britain Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 20th century Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 21st century Kriegführung Militärpolitik Sicherheitspolitik Geschichte Aufstand Bekämpfung Great Britain / Military policy Großbritannien |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mumfordandrew puncturingthecounterinsurgencymythbritainandirregularwarfareinthepastpresentandfuture AT strategicstudiesinstitutecarlislebarrackspa puncturingthecounterinsurgencymythbritainandirregularwarfareinthepastpresentandfuture |