Principled agents?: the political economy of good government
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford Univ. Press
2009
|
Ausgabe: | reprinted |
Schriftenreihe: | The Lindahl lectures
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 234-247 |
Beschreibung: | XIV, 266 S. graph. Darst. |
ISBN: | 019927150X 9780199271504 9780199283910 |
Internformat
MARC
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | Contents
Preface to Paperback Edition
X
Preface
xi
Acknowledgements
xiv
1
Competing views of government
1
1.1
The issues
1
1.2
This book
2
1.3
Background
4
1.3.1
The size of government
4
1.3.2
Corruption
10
1.3.3
Property rights
14
1.3.4
Trust and turnout
17
1.4
Economic policy making
20
1.4.1
Foundations
21
1.4.2
Good policies
23
1.4.3
The public choice critique of welfare
economics
25
1.5
Political economy
27
1.6
Incentives and selection in politics
36
1.7
Concluding comments
43
2
The
anatomy of government failure
45
2.1
Introduction
45
2.2
Three notions of government failure
48
2.2.1
Pareto inefficiency
48
2.2.2
Distributional failures
49
2.2.3
Wicksellian failures
52
2.2.4
Comparisons
53
2.3
An example: financing a public project
55
2.3.1
Private provision
56
2.3.2
Government provision
57
VII
Contents
2.4
Sources of government failure
59
2.4.1
Ignorance
59
2.4.2
Influence
61
2.4.3
The quality of leadership
68
2.5
Sources of political failure
70
2.5.1
Voting
71
2.5.2
Log-rolling and legislative behavior
74
2.6
Dynamics
77
2.6.1
Investment linkages
78
2.6.2
Political and policy linkages
82
2.6.3
Investment and politics
89
2.7
Implications
93
2.8
Concluding comments
97
3
Political agency and accountability
98
3.1
Introduction
98
3.2
Elements of political agency models
102
3.2.1
The nature of the uncertainty
103
3.2.2
The motives for holding office
104
3.2.3
The nature of accountability
105
3.2.4
Retrospective voting
105
3.2.5
Model types
106
3.3
The baseline model
108
3.3.1
The environment
108
3.3.2
Equilibrium
110
3.3.3
Implications
111
3.4
Extensions
123
3.4.1
Polarization and competition
124
3.4.2
Information and accountability
128
3.4.3
The nature of the distortion
136
3.4.4
Within-term cycles
141
3.4.5
Multiple issues
144
3.4.6
Multiple two-period terms
148
3.4.7
Indefinite terms
154
3.4.8
Multiple agents
157
3.5
Discussion
165
3.5.1
Civic virtue and the quality of
government
165
3.5.2
Decentralization versus centralization
166
3.5.3
Autocracy versus democracy
169
VIII
Contents
3.5.4
Accountability to whom?
169
3.5.5
Wage policies for politicians
170
3.5.6
Behavioral versus rational choice models
172
3.6
Concluding comments
172
4
Political agency and public finance
(with Michael Smart)
174
4.1
Introduction
174
4.2
The model
177
4.3
Three scenarios
180
4.3.1
Pure adverse selection
180
4.3.2
Pure moral hazard
182
4.3.3
Combining moral hazard and adverse
selection
185
4.4
Implications
188
4.4.1
Equilibrium voter welfare
189
4.4.2
Are good politicians necessarily good for
voters?
191
4.4.3
Turnover of politicians
193
4.4.4
The spending cycle
194
4.5
Restraining government
195
4.5.1
A direct restraint on the size of
government
199
4.5.2
Indirect restraints
200
4.5.3
Summary
209
4.6
Debt and deficits
210
4.7
Governments versus
NGOs 214
4.7.1
Framework
216
4.7.2
Aid to the government
219
4.7.3
Comparisons
220
4.7.4
Further issues
222
4.8
Competence
223
4.9
Conclusions
225
Appendix
226
5
Final Comments
228
References
234
Index
249
ix
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Besley, Timothy 1960- |
author_GND | (DE-588)128383178 |
author_facet | Besley, Timothy 1960- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Besley, Timothy 1960- |
author_variant | t b tb |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV039688166 |
classification_rvk | QD 050 QL 000 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)767765728 (DE-599)BVBBV039688166 |
dewey-full | 352.3 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 352 - General considerations of public administration |
dewey-raw | 352.3 |
dewey-search | 352.3 |
dewey-sort | 3352.3 |
dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
edition | reprinted |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV039688166 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:09:00Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 019927150X 9780199271504 9780199283910 |
language | English |
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open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-945 |
owner_facet | DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-945 |
physical | XIV, 266 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 2009 |
publishDateSearch | 2009 |
publishDateSort | 2009 |
publisher | Oxford Univ. Press |
record_format | marc |
series2 | The Lindahl lectures |
spelling | Besley, Timothy 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)128383178 aut Principled agents? the political economy of good government Timothy Besley reprinted Oxford Oxford Univ. Press 2009 XIV, 266 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier The Lindahl lectures Literaturverz. S. 234-247 Staatstätigkeit (DE-588)4182679-6 gnd rswk-swf Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 gnd rswk-swf Staatstätigkeit (DE-588)4182679-6 s Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s DE-604 Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 s b DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Bamberg application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024537020&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Besley, Timothy 1960- Principled agents? the political economy of good government Staatstätigkeit (DE-588)4182679-6 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4182679-6 (DE-588)4126353-4 (DE-588)4043214-2 |
title | Principled agents? the political economy of good government |
title_auth | Principled agents? the political economy of good government |
title_exact_search | Principled agents? the political economy of good government |
title_full | Principled agents? the political economy of good government Timothy Besley |
title_fullStr | Principled agents? the political economy of good government Timothy Besley |
title_full_unstemmed | Principled agents? the political economy of good government Timothy Besley |
title_short | Principled agents? |
title_sort | principled agents the political economy of good government |
title_sub | the political economy of good government |
topic | Staatstätigkeit (DE-588)4182679-6 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 gnd |
topic_facet | Staatstätigkeit Agency-Theorie Ökonomische Theorie der Politik |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024537020&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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