Financial accounting theory:
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Toronto
Pearson Prentice Hall
2011
|
Ausgabe: | 6. ed. |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Includes bibliographical references and index |
Beschreibung: | XVIII, 571 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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245 | 1 | 0 | |a Financial accounting theory |c William R. Scott |
250 | |a 6. ed. | ||
264 | 1 | |a Toronto |b Pearson Prentice Hall |c 2011 | |
300 | |a XVIII, 571 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1804148509125902336 |
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adam_text | Contents
Preface
xiii
Acknowkdgrnents
xvii
1
Introduction
1
1.1
The Objective of This Book
1
1.2
Some Historical Perspective
1
1.3
The
2007-2008
Market
Meltdowns
9
1.4
Conservative Accounting
15
1.5
A Note on Ethical Behaviour
17
1.6
Rules-Based Versus Principles-
Based Accounting Standards
18
1.7
The Complexity of Information
in Financial Accounting and
Reporting
19
1.8
The Role of Accounting
Research
20
1.9
The Importance of Information
Asymmetry
21
1.10
The Fundamental Problem
of Financial Accounting
Theory
22
1.11
Regulation as a Reaction to the
Fundamental Problem
23
1.12
The Organization of This
Book
24
1.12.1
Ideal Conditions
24
1.12.2
Adverse Selection
25
1.12.3
Moral Hazard
26
1.12.4
Standard Setting
26
1.12.5
The Process of Standard
Setting
26
1.13
Relevance of Financial
Accounting Theory to
Accounting Practice
30
2
Accounting Under Ideal
Conditions
34
2.1
Overview
34
2.2
The Present Value Model Under
Certainty
35
2.2.1
Summary
38
2.3
The Present Value Model Under
Uncertainty
38
2.3.1
Summary
44
2.4
Reserve Recognition
Accounting (RRA)
45
2.4· 1
An Example of
RRA
45
2.4-2
Summary
48
2.4.3
Critique of RRA
48
2.4-4
Summary
52
2.5
Historical Cost Accounting
Revisited
52
2.5.1
Comparison of Different
Measurement Bases
52
2.5.2
Conclusion
54
2.6
The Non-Existence of True Net
Income
54
2.7
Conclusion to Accounting Under
Ideal Conditions
55
3
The Decision Usefulness
Approach to Financial
Reporting
66
3.1
Overview
66
3.2
The Decision Usefulness
Approach
67
3.2.1
Summary
68
3.3
Single-Person Decision
Theory
68
3.3.1
Decision Theory Applied
69
3.3.2
The Information
System
72
3.3.3
Information Defined
76
3.3.4
Summary
77
3.4
The Rational, Risk-Averse
Investor
77
3.5
The Principle of Portfolio
Diversification
80
3.5.1
Summary
85
3.6
The Optimal Investment
Decision
85
3.6.1
Summary
87
3.7
Portfolio Risk
87
3.7.1
Calculating and Interpreting
Beta
87
3.7.2
Portfolio Expected Value
and Variance
90
3.7.3
Portfolio Risk as the Number
of Securities Increases
91
3.7.4
Summary
92
3.8
The Reaction of Professional
Accounting Bodies to the Decision
Usefulness Approach
92
3.8.1
Summary
95
3.9
Conclusions on Decision
Usefulness
96
4
Efficient Securities
Markets
108
4.1
Overview
108
4.2
Efficient Securities Markets
109
4.2.1
The Meaning of
Efficiency
109
4.2.2
How Do Market Prices Fully
Reflect All Available
Information? Ill
4.2.3
Summary
114
4.3
Implications of Efficient
Securities Markets for Financial
Reporting
114
4.3.1
Implications
114
4.3.2
Summary
116
4.4
The Informativeness of
Price
116
4.4-1
A Logical Inconsistency
116
4.4-2
Summary
119
4.5
A Capital Asset Pricing
Model
120
4.6
Information Asymmetry
124
4-6.1
A Closer Look at Information
Asymmetry
124
4.6.2
Summary
127
4.7
The Social Significance of
Securities Markets that Work
Well
128
4.8
An Example of Full
Disclosure
130
4.8.1
Introduction
130
4.8.2
Management Discussion and
Analysis
130
4.9
Conclusions on Efficient
Securities Markets
143
5
The Information Approach to
Decision Usefulness
152
5.1
Overview
152
5.2
Outline of the Research
Problem
154
5.2.1
Reasons for Market
Response
154
5.2.2
Finding the Market
Response
155
5.2.3
Separating Market-Wide
and Firm-Specific
Factors
156
5.2.4
Comparing Returns and
Income
157
5.3
The Ball and Brown Study
158
5.3.1
Methodology and
Findings
158
5.3.2
Causation Versus
Association
160
5.3.3
Outcomes of the BB
Study
162
5.4
Earnings Response
Coefficients
163
5.4-1
Reasons for Differential Market
Response
163
5.4-2
Implications of ERC
Research
168
5-4-3
Measuring Investors Earnings
Expectations
169
5.4-4
Summary
171
5.5
A Caveat about the Best
Accounting Policy
171
5.6
The Information Content of
Other Financial Statement
Information
173
5.7
Conclusions on the Information
Approach
174
6
The Measurement Approach
to Decision Usefulness
184
6.1
Overview
184
6.2
Are Securities Markets Fully
Efficient?
186
6.2.1
Introduction
186
6.2.2
Prospect Theory
188
6.2.3
Is Beta Dead?
191
6.2.4
Excess Stock Market
Volatility
193
6.2.5
Stock Market Bubbles
194
6.2.6
Efficient Securities Market
Anomalies
195
6.2.7
Implications of Securities
Market Inefficiency for
Financial Reporting
199
6.2.8
Discussion of Market
Efficiency Versus Behavioural
Finance
200
6.2.9
Limits to Arbitrage
201
6.2.10
A Defence of Average Investor
Rationality
203
6.2.11
Conclusions About Securities
Market Efficiency
205
6.3
Other Reasons Supporting a
Measurement Approach
207
6.4
The Value Relevance of Financial
Statement Information
207
6.5
Ohlson s Clean Surplus
Theory
209
6.5.1
Three Formulae for Firm
Value
209
6.5.2
Earnings Persistence
213
6.5.3
Estimating Firm Value
215
6.5.4
Empirical Studies of the Clean
Surplus Model
220
6.5.5
Summary
221
6.6
Auditors Legal Liability
222
6.7
Asymmetry of Investor
Losses
224
6.8
Conclusions on the Measurement
Approach to Decision
Usefulness
229
7
Measurement
Applications
239
7.1
Overview
239
7.2
Current Value Accounting
240
7.3
Longstanding Measurement
Examples
242
7.3.1
Accounts Receivable and
Payable
242
7.3.2
Cash Flows Fixed by
Contract
242
7.3.3
The Lower-of-Cost-or-Market
Rule
243
7.3.4
Revaluation Option for
Property, Plant, and
Equipment
243
7.3.5
Ceiling Test for Property,
Plant, and Equipment
243
7.3.6
Pensions and Other Post-
Employment Benefits
244
7.3.7
Summary
244
7.4
Financial Instruments
245
7.4.1
Introduction
245
7.4-2
Valuation of Debt and Equity
Securities
245
7.4.З
Fair Value Versus Historical
Cost
249
7.5
The
2007-2008
Market
Meltdown Again
251
7.5.1
Standard Setters Back Down
Somewhat on Fair Value
Accounting
251
7.5.2
Derecognition and
Consolidation
253
7.6
Derivative Instruments
257
7.6.1
Characteristics of
Derivatives
257
7.6.2
Hedge Accounting
260
7.7
Conclusions On Accounting for
Financial Instruments
264
7.8
Accounting for Intangibles
264
7.8.1
Introduction
264
7.8.2
Accounting for Purchased
Goodwill
265
7.8.3
Self-Developed Goodwill
268
7.8.4
The Clean Surplus Model
Revisited
270
7.8.5
Summary
271
7.9
Reporting on Risk
271
7.9.1
Beta Risk
271
7.9.2
Why Do Firms Manage
Firm-Specific Risk?
273
7.9.3
Stock Market Reaction to
Other Risks
273
7.9.4
A Measurement Approach to
Risk Reporting
275
7.9.5
Summary
278
7.10
Conclusions on Measurement
Applications
279
8
Economic Consequences
and Positive Accounting
Theory
293
8.1
Overview
293
8.2
The Rise of Economic
Consequences
295
8.2.1
Summary
296
8.3
Employee Stock Options
296
8.4
The Relationship between
Efficient Securities Market
Theory and Economic
Consequences
303
8.5
The Positive Theory of
Accounting
304
8.5.1
Outline of Positive Accounting
Theory
304
8.5.2
The Three Hypotheses
of Positive Accounting
Theory
307
8.5.3
Efficient Contracting and
Conservative Accounting
310
8.5.4
Empirical PAT Research
311
8.5.5
Distinguishing the Opportunistic
and Efficient Contracting
Versions of PAT
315
8.6
Conclusions on Economic
Consequences and Positive
Accounting Theory
318
9
An Analysis of Conflict
327
9.1
Overview
327
9.2
Understanding Game
Theory
328
9.3
A Non-Cooperative Game
Model of Manager-Investor
Conflict
329
9.3.1
A Single-Period Game
329
9.3.2
A Trust-Based Multi-Period
Game
334
9.3.3
Summary
339
9.4
Some Models of Cooperative
Game Theory
339
9.4.1
Introduction
339
9.4.2
Agency Theory: An
Employment Contract
Between Firm Owner and
Manager
340
9.5
Manager s Information
Advantage
351
9.5.1
Earnings Management
351
9.5.2
Controlling Earnings
Management
355
9.6
Discussion and Summary
357
9.7
Agency Theory: A Bondholder-
Manager Lending Contract
359
9.7.1
Summary
361
9.8
Implications of Agency Theory
for Accounting
361
9.8.1
Is Two Better Than
One?
361
9.8.2
Rigidity of Contracts
365
9.9
Reconciliation of Efficient
Securities Market Theory with
Economic Consequences
367
9.10
Conclusions on the Analysis of
Conflict
368
10
Executive Compensation
383
10.1
Overview
383
10.2
Are Incentive Contracts
Necessary?
384
10.3
A Managerial Compensation
Plan
387
10.4
The Theory of Executive
Compensation
389
10.4-1
The Relative Proportions of
Net Income and Share Price in
Evaluating Manager
Performance
389
10.4.2
Short-Run Effort and
Long-Run Effort
392
10.4-3
The Role of Risk in Executive
Compensation
395
10.5
Empirical Compensation
Research
400
10.6
The Politics of Executive
Compensation
402
10.7
The Power Theory of Executive
Compensation
407
10.8
The Social Significance of
Managerial Labour Markets that
Work Well
410
10.9
Conclusions on Executive
Compensation
410
11
Earnings Management
422
11.1
Overview
422
11.2
Patterns of Earnings
Management
425
11.3
Evidence of Earnings
Management for Bonus
Purposes
426
11.4
Other Motivations for Earnings
Management
432
11.4.1
Other Contracting
Motivations
432
11.4-2
To Meet Investors Earnings
Expectations and Maintain
Reputation
434
11.4.3
Initial Public
Offerings
435
11.5
The Good Side of Earnings
Management
436
11.5.1
Blocked Communication
436
11.5.2
Empirical
Evidence
of Good
Earnings Management
438
11.6
The Bad Side of Earnings
Management
442
11.6.1
Opportunistic Earnings
Management
442
11.6.2
Do Managers Accept Securities
Market Efficiency?
445
11.6.3
Implications for
Accountants
447
11.7
Conclusions on Earnings
Management
447
12
Standard Setting:
Economic Issues
460
12.1
Overview
460
12.2
Regulation of Economic
Activity
461
12.3
Ways to Characterize Information
Production
462
12.4
First-Best Information
Production
464
12.5
Market Failures in the Production
of Information
464
12.5.1
Externalities and
Free-Riding
464
12.5.2
The Adverse Selection
Problem
465
12.5.3
The Moral Hazard
Problem
466
12.5.4
Unanimity
466
12.6
Contractual Incentives for
Information Production
467
12.6.1
Examples of Contractual
Incentives
467
12.6.2
The
Coase
Theorem
468
12.7
Market-Based Incentives
for Information
Production
470
12.8
A Closer Look at
Market-Based Incentives
470
12.8.1
The Disclosure Principle
470
12.8.2
Signalling
475
12.8.3
Private Information
Search
477
12.9
Are Firms Rewarded for Superior
Disclosure?
478
12.9.1
Theory
478
12.9.2
Empirical Tests of Disclosure
Models
479
12.9.3
Is Estimation Risk
Diversifiable?
480
12.9.4
Conclusions
481
12.10
Decentralized Regulation
481
12.11
How Much Information Is
Enough?
483
12.12
Conclusions on Standard
Setting Related to Economic
Issues
486
13
Standard Setting: Political
Issues
497
13.1
Overview
497
13.2
Two Theories of Regulation
499
13.2.1
The Public Interest
Theory
499
13.2.2
The Interest Group
Theory
499
13.2.3
Which Theory of Regulation
Applies to Standard
Setting?
501
13.3
Conflict and Compromise:
An Example of Constituency
Conflict
501
13.4
Distribution of the Benefits of
Information, Regulation
FD
504
13.5
Criteria for Standard Setting
506
13.5.1
Decision Usefulness
507
13.5.2
Reduction of
Information
Asymmetry
507
13.5.3
Economic Consequences of
New Standards
508
13.5.4
The Political Aspects of
Standard Setting
509
13.5.5
Summary
509
13.6
The Regulator s Information
Asymmetry
509
13.7
International Integration of
Capital Markets
514
13.7.1
Convergence of Accounting
Standards
514
13.7.2
Effects of Customs and
Institutions on Financial
Reporting
515
13.7.3
Enforcement of Accounting
Standards
517
13.7.4
Benefits of Adopting
High-Quality Accounting
Standards
518
13.7.5
Should Standard Setters
Compete?
519
13.7.6
Summary of Accounting for
International Capital Markets
Integration
520
13.8
Conclusions and
Summing Up
521
Biblography
533
Index
553
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Scott, William R. 1931- |
author_GND | (DE-588)124685943 |
author_facet | Scott, William R. 1931- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Scott, William R. 1931- |
author_variant | w r s wr wrs |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV039650290 |
classification_rvk | QP 810 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)747882223 (DE-599)BVBBV039650290 |
dewey-full | 657.044 |
dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
dewey-ones | 657 - Accounting |
dewey-raw | 657.044 |
dewey-search | 657.044 |
dewey-sort | 3657.044 |
dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
edition | 6. ed. |
format | Book |
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language | English |
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publisher | Pearson Prentice Hall |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Scott, William R. 1931- Verfasser (DE-588)124685943 aut Financial accounting theory William R. Scott 6. ed. Toronto Pearson Prentice Hall 2011 XVIII, 571 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Includes bibliographical references and index Accounting / Textbooks Rechnungswesen (DE-588)4048732-5 gnd rswk-swf Rechnungswesen (DE-588)4048732-5 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Passau application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024499976&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Scott, William R. 1931- Financial accounting theory Accounting / Textbooks Rechnungswesen (DE-588)4048732-5 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4048732-5 |
title | Financial accounting theory |
title_auth | Financial accounting theory |
title_exact_search | Financial accounting theory |
title_full | Financial accounting theory William R. Scott |
title_fullStr | Financial accounting theory William R. Scott |
title_full_unstemmed | Financial accounting theory William R. Scott |
title_short | Financial accounting theory |
title_sort | financial accounting theory |
topic | Accounting / Textbooks Rechnungswesen (DE-588)4048732-5 gnd |
topic_facet | Accounting / Textbooks Rechnungswesen |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024499976&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT scottwilliamr financialaccountingtheory |